India Launched Surgical Strikes Across LoC: DGMO 29/09/2016

[Superdefender]

National Security And Foreign Policy: Why Modi And His Men Do What They Do
By: Nitin A. Gokhale - Sep 11, 2017, 7:58 AM

Sometime early this year, I was on my annual visit to one of the military training establishments to deliver a talk. Over tea, after the usual lively interactive session, a young, smartly dressed officer popped a question that stumped me for a moment. He asked, “Why does media always doubt our military’s ability? Why can’t it believe the forces when they say Indian soldiers went across the LoC to carry out surgical strikes?”

My counter argument to him was, “Don't generalise. There are many (including me in my earlier avatar as a media practitioner) who report factually, but in the absence of official accounts of what actually happened in the raids that took place in 2015 and 2016, it is difficult for the media too, to give the audience the full picture,” I pointed out to him.

While the officer wasn’t entirely convinced, the exchange with him set me thinking. On the return flight to Delhi, I tried to recall what I exactly knew about many of the recent actions taken by the military and other security forces; or for that matter how decision-making evolves at say, the Prime Minister’s level or in the top echelons of the government.

As I scribbled some points, realisation dawned: I may have known enough to write a quick news story or a longer analysis, but clearly, the details about crucial events have always been elusive in the realm of national security.

I asked myself, how easy or hard it would be then to attempt a book on the insider accounts of some the recent decisions taken by the Indian government. As I began looking for unknown details—and more importantly authentic accounts—one realised that it was going to be an uphill task getting genuine information for all the events that I had in mind.

By mid-February however, the idea to write a book had been firmly embedded in my mind. Starting bottom up, some of the preliminary information was gathered; old notes were reviewed; some documentaries were revisited, but I was still not able to put the finger on the period that I wanted to concentrate on.

So choosing a time-period was the first step. As the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government was about to complete three years in May 2017, lots of books hit the stores focusing on Prime Minister Narendra Modi and the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) which appeared unstoppable in winning elections.
None of them, however, looked in-depth at one domain I am familiar with: Security and strategic affairs. That is the time the central idea of this book—unveiling the three years of Modi government’s security policies—finally crystallised in my mind.

I was aware of some of the path breaking policy initiatives the defence ministry and the bold decisions taken by the Prime Minister but the details were missing.

We didn’t know for instance what led to the decision to authorise surgical strikes both in Myanmar and in PoK? Or what drives India’s new found resolve in tackling China? I was curious to know how the Prime Minister arrives at a particularly tough decision? What drives his national security policies? Why does he stress on personal equations with world leaders?

All these questions needed clear answers.

The first task, therefore, was to make a list of possible events to concentrate on and then go looking for information about them. The content and the time period were set. Now came the hard part. Extracting information in the domain that I work in is as it is not easy; to get people to talk about what normally remains secret was doubly difficult. That’s when old associations and friendships came in handy. Information started trickling in bits and pieces; authenticating and fleshing out bare minimum facts was the next step. Slowly, the chapters started taking shape. In most other sectors, people would have gladly spoken about their role and contribution, but those in uniform and the secretive world of intelligence have an inbuilt resistance to sharing even innocuous information.

Nevertheless, I have tried to put together a book based on several insider accounts and hitherto unknown facts about some of the unprecedented steps taken by the Modi government in the past 40 months.

This book by no means is an analytical document. In fact, it is mostly factual and narrated from the point of view of those involved—and more importantly, those whom I could get access. I also had to keep in mind the identity of the persons who have shared the information with me. In that respect, I have followed what my guru M V Kamath told me ages ago: ‘It is more important what you don’t write than what you write.’ But as readers, you would understand why this is so.

Some would view this book as an incomplete account. It’s a start nevertheless. Till then, read the book for what it is: a journalistic record of some of the bold and unconventional decisions taken by the Modi government since 2014.

There is no denying the fact that this book has gained immensely by the trust reposed in me by people in very sensitive appointments. Many who spoke to me cannot be named because they continue to serve in the military and our intelligence agencies. Many details have come from people at the apex of decision-making structure in this country. Some details have been revealed for the first time. I am therefore hoping; many readers would be interested in reading this book.

The book is set to be launched on 29 September in Delhi. The day is significant as it marks the first anniversary of the surgical strikes by Indian Special Forces in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK).

Source Link: https://nitinagokhale.blogspot.in/2017/09/the-story-behind-making-of-new-book.html?m=1

 

[IndiaRising]

Major Rohit Suri (KC), to speak to shiv aroor today regarding the surgical strikes. it will be amazing to hear this patriot's voice.

 

[IndiaRising]

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[cruise_1982]

An interview with Lt.Gen. Hooda, by Vishnu Som of NDTV.........

http://www.ndtv.com/india-news/was-...nned-ex-commander-on-surgical-strikes-1752934


NEW DELHI:

When Lieutenant General DS Hooda, then Northern Army Commander, saw the live video feed of India's surgical strike across the Line of Control, he knew he wasn't necessarily getting the full picture.

"I won't say what footage it was but we were watching the operation," said the Lt General who approved the plans for Special Forces to retaliate less than two weeks after the Uri terror attack in September last year, when 19 Indian soldiers were killed by Pakistani terrorists.

"Whatever footage you may get, it doesn't give you a very detailed picture of what is happening on the ground. You see black figures running, and whether it is our soldier or whether it is terrorists - it's difficult to make out but the way things were going - broadly we could make out from the footage we were viewing that things were going as had been planned," said the General, confirming hand-to-hand fighting between army commandos and Pakistani terrorists and army.


"The Special Forces had gotten into places where they were confident they could cause maximum number of casualties so they had to get fairly close to where the camps were and there were some Pakistani posts in close vicinity so that also had to be catered for so, yes, they did get into close combat," he said.

The surgical strike in the intervening night between September 28 and 29 is perhaps the most audacious Indian military operation since the Kargil war, and saw commandos of the Army's elite 4 and 9 Para Special Forces engaging multiple targets on either side of the Pir Panjal range.

19 Indian soldiers were killed by Pakistani terrorists in Uri attack in September last year.


While the government had considered air strikes, Lt General Hooda said: "After the June 15 strikes across Myanmar, a lot of statements had come out from Pakistan. Their interior minister and also their official spokesperson had said 'Pakistan is not Myanmar and we will give a befitting reply if India resorts to any adventurism.' Once the surgical strikes were carried out, they just went totally quiet and I think that was more of a moral victory."

It is clear that the army leadership had war-gamed casualties, given the scale of the operations.

It was the incredible training of the commandos that ensured that all the men got back safely to Indian territory. According to Lt General Hooda, "It wasn't so much about we shouldn't lose a single man or we shouldn't have a casualty because it would be foolish if we planned for such a large operation [to] say we will come back without any casualty - so our planning process had to take into account that there could be casualties. I think the key factor was not a single man must be left behind and that took a lot of thought, a lot of planning - if something happens and we have casualties, how would those people come back so the key element was not so much casualties as not leaving a single man behind."

If things went south, the Army was ready for whatever it took to get its commandos back. Helicopter units were on standby for extremely risky casualty evacuation missions. "Multiple plans were made... in case there was a fighting extrication, how would it actually be carried out - what assets would be required for such a contingency - whether in terms of aerial assets or whether in terms of even sending some more people across to bring our people back so that kind of planning had been put in process and we were conscious that there could be a fighting extrication."

While the operations went off perfectly with dozens of terrorists and Pakistan Army personnel being eliminated, a jawan was severely injured while crossing back. As he got word of every man having returned, Lt General Hooda also "got information that one jawan has got injured. It was actually a minefield on our side of the border and a number of minefields are not marked or mines drift so unfortunately, we had one casualty but that was not due to Pakistan action - that was an accident on our own side. A part of the leg was blown off."

While the surgical strike teams celebrated with the top military leadership in Kashmir after the successful conclusion of the surgical strikes, there was serious concern that Pakistan could retaliate, a fear that seemed to lessen after Islamabad insisted the attacks never happened. "We were [worried about retaliation] and why not? It would be unprofessional to say there would be no retaliation and that we shouldn't plan for it. We had planned for it but as I said, the Pakistanis were quite shell-shocked and the minute they said surgical strikes hadn't happened, we knew a response from their side would at best be very very limited." That response never came.

 

[Indian Sniper.001]

An excerpt from Nitin Gokhale's book - 'Securing India - The Modi Way".

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The following is an excerpt from Nitin A. Gokhale’s new book, Securing India the Modi Way: Pathankot, Surgical Strikes and More. It is published here with permission from Bloomsbury Publishing India.

For Col H and Col K (names withheld), the moment of reckoning arrived on the afternoon of 18 September 2016. Throughout that morning, the Commanding Officers (COs) of two separate Para (Special Forces) battalions were like most of their colleagues posted in Kashmir Valley, following the increasingly grim news coming out of Uri, the garrison town not very far from Srinagar. Well-trained and well-informed terrorists of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) had infiltrated across the Line of Control (LoC) and attacked an administrative camp in the 12 Brigade HQ located in Uri with deadly effect. At least 19 soldiers of 6 Bihar battalion, camping in tents — days before they were to take their assigned positions along the LoC — were killed in the early morning attack. Majority of the soldiers died in their sleep, resting as they were in highly inflammable tents. Although all the four terrorists were neutralised eventually, they had set off a chain of events that would culminate on the morning of 29 September.

In Udhampur, Northern Army Commander Lt Gen DS Hooda was distressed. He had been the GOC-in-C for over two years and witnessed his share of successes and setbacks as the head of India’s most active Army command. Nevertheless, this was possibly the worst moment of his long and distinguished career, spent fighting insurgencies and terrorism in the north-east as well as Jammu & Kashmir. “It was terrible. Very difficult to justify what happened. There were definitely lapses on our part,” Hooda says in retrospect.

But an Army Commander doesn’t have the luxury of wallowing in his own state of mind. He has to set an example by leading from the front. As he accompanied Army Chief Gen Dalbir Singh to Uri, Hooda knew the time had come to implement a plan, the seeds of which had vaguely taken shape in his mind some fifteen months ago. Even Gen Dalbir, aware of how the Prime Minister’s mind worked, was thinking of something different.

Gen Dalbir was drawing on his experience during the cross-border raid in Myanmar more than a year previously when the PM had quietly authorised the strike against north-east militants holed up in the jungles of Manipur-Myanmar border after killing 18 Indian soldiers. Gen Dalbir had a hunch then that the Prime Minister may demand a Myanmar-like action if push came to shove in J&K. Cut to mid-June in 2015. In June 2015, it was under his watch as Army Chief that the soldiers of a Para SF unit of the Indian Army, based in the north-east, had carried out a precise attack on an NSCN (K) camp located inside Myanmar and eliminated at least 60 insurgents in the process. While the cross-border raid inside Myanmar was making waves and dividing opinion (see separate chapter), discussions in TV studios in India centred around the possibility of similar raids against Pakistan. Minister of State of Information & Broadcasting, Rajyavardhan Rathore told TV anchors that the option of cross-border raids against Pakistan are a possibility. He also told Indian Express in June 2015: “This is a message for all countries, including Pakistan, and groups harbouring terror intent towards India. A terrorist is a terrorist and has no other identity. We will strike when we want to.”

The success of Myanmar operations had planted the seed of thought about a surgical strike in Pakistan in everyone’s mind. Once during his visit to the Northern Command, then Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar too had exhorted top commanders to be prepared for every eventuality. “Although I didn’t spell it out explicitly, I knew some day a grave provocation by Pakistan may require a Myanmar-like operation. So I told the Army Chief and his senior commanders to look at every possible response,” Parrikar recalls. On his part, Lt Gen Hooda called the two COs (Col H and Col K) and told them that they needed to start looking at targets across the LoC, although frankly at that point in time (June 2015) neither Gen Dalbir, nor Lt Gen Hooda or the political leadership would have thought of such an eventuality arising. Till then, the thinking at the highest levels of India’s political and military leadership was any major trans-LoC strike would be deemed escalatory. Remember, in Kargil, the Vajpayee government had imposed the strict restriction of NOT crossing the LoC in spite of a grave provocation.

“I thought to myself, if tomorrow someone asks us to go, how can I, as Northern Army Commander say we are not prepared?” Hooda remembers thinking. Gen Dalbir says: “From my experience in planning and executing the Myanmar raids, I wanted my commanders to make sure that any cross-border raid should be carried out with minimum casualties. My instructions were, not one single soldier should be left behind in enemy territory even if we suffered any setback.” Hence, in the immediate aftermath of the Myanmar operation, the two COs were told to seriously plan to hit targets inside PoK. Other senior officers in Northern Command’s planning staff also held discussions a couple of times with the MO (Military Operations Directorate at the Army HQ). They identified targets, looking for more intelligence inputs on them, and consolidating a thought process in the presence of the Army Chief and the Northern Army Commander.

But were not cross-border raids carried out earlier too, I asked Gen Dalbir. “Yes, they were,” he agreed “but most actions taken in our younger days were, what we call, BAT (Border Action Team) raids on specific post(s) as retribution for something that the Pakistan Army troops would have carried out on our position(s),” he said. “What we were now planning for was much larger with greater ramifications,” he explained.

For two months in the winter of 2015, the two battalions trained as whole units after years of operating in small, agile teams against terrorists in J&K. This training was to prove crucial in sharpening the set of skills needed for raids across the LoC.

In a way, it was like revisiting their basic tenets for the Special Forces men. And they loved it. Although no one could have anticipated that they would be called in to strike across the LoC, the very thought of crossing a line that was seen as taboo motivated the troops further. Indeed for over two decades no one at the highest political level had ever expressed willingness to sanction, or had demanded such an action inside PoK for the fear of escalation. “The two to two-and-a-half months that these boys spent together helped them hone their skills in surveying targets, mount surveillance, practising infiltration and exfiltration, which in the final analysis helped them achieve what was asked of them,” a senior officer in MO Directorate, privy to the development now agrees, looking back at that decision. As a result of the reorientation, by the time the summer of 2016 arrived, the two battalions had added an extra edge to their repertory of formidable skills. However, no one—not even the most imaginative scriptwriter in Bollywood — could have anticipated the events as they unfolded in September 2016.

Across the board, the langar gup (mess gossip) was full of frustration and rage. I remember speaking to some middle level officers posted in J&K in the immediate aftermath of the Uri incident. The anger was palpable. “If this is not the last straw, what is,” many of them wondered aloud when the possibility of the Indian army’s retaliation was discussed. NSA Doval too remembers Prime Minister Modi telling him: “This attack should not go without a response.” Gen Dalbir adds: “During one of the meetings in the immediate aftermath of Uri, the Prime Minister said the retaliation should be immediate to send an unambiguous message.” Parrikar, Doval and Gen Dalbir however knew they had to plan for several contingencies before attempting a Myanmar-style cross-border raid. For one, unlike on the Myanmar border, the Pakistani forces strung all along the LoC were on highest alert in the wake of the Uri attack. The terrorists would have also been told to lie low and shifted to camps located farther away from the LoC so that hitting those targets would have become harder. Moreover, no matter how remote the possibility, India had to wargame the likely escalation by Pakistan if retribution was ordered.

The Pressure Builds Up

The week of the Uri attack was also a testing time for the Prime Minister’s leadership. Modi, adept at judging the public mood, was aware that people expected him to “walk the talk” in acting tough against India’s implacable enemy. Public opinion in the country was inflamed. People were calling for an all-out war against Pakistan. Even saner voices were advocating at least some demonstrable retribution. Modi was aware of the public sentiment and the anger that was building up in popular perception. He vowed immediate retribution. “I assure the nation that those behind this despicable attack will not go unpunished,” he tweeted on the day of the Uri attack. Not many people took the statement at face value. After all, politicians and prime ministers in the past had pledged stern action against terrorists and their handlers many times, but had ultimately refrained from giving that final go ahead required to retaliate, urging restraint instead.

Amidst all the criticism, the Prime Minister continued to be unruffled. Recall his aides: “The PM went through with his daily routine and pre-scheduled appointments and programmes without any change, but made sure he had all possible options presented to him before giving the final go ahead (for a punitive strike against Pakistan).” All options, economic, political, and diplomatic were considered. They ranged from downgrading diplomatic ties, revisiting the provisions of the Indus Water Treaty, mobilising international opinion by furnishing proof of Pakistan’s complicity in terrorist attacks, and of course punish Pakistan militarily. But he was not about to be rushed into any hasty decision. The Prime Minister however made up his mind by 23 September, five days after the Uri attack. Later that evening, he and Doval, escorted by a Major General from the MO Directorate, walked the length of the South Block Corridor from the PMO to the Army HQ Ops room around 2100 hours, much long after the corridors had been emptied and offices had closed. Already present in the room were Defence Minister Parrikar, Army Chief Gen Dalbir Singh, DGMO, Lt Gen Ranbir Singh, and a couple of MO Directorate senior functionaries. The PM sat through the briefing silently, listening with rapt attention. He was presented various options, shown targets that were planned to be hit inside PoK, and briefed on the possible retaliation/ reaction by Pakistan. Once the initial briefing was over, Modi had a couple of questions on other possible options like a precise air strike on terrorist camps, remembers a participant. Eventually, the Prime Minister agreed that a Special Forces raid across the frontier was the best possible course of action at that point, the participant added.

As one week passed after the Uri attack, the debates tapered off; people seemed resigned to live with the bitter fact that the situation in J&K and on the LoC would continue to be volatile with the Indian army unable to take any deterrent steps. Little did anyone know that India was about to unleash unprecedented and audacious cross-border strikes.

Once the political call was taken, the wheels began to move faster. In Udhampur, the Ops room was buzzing with activity. Now was the time to bring the two Corps Commanders of 15 and 16 Corps in the loop.

Accordingly, Lt Gens Satish Dua and RR Nimborhkar, heading the Srinagar-based Chinar and Nagrota-based White Knight Corps respectively, were also brought on board.

Col H and Col K meanwhile were back to their respective bases. They had much to do. Both had finalised the targets, but the men had to be selected for different tasks, although in their mind they had already earmarked some key personnel the previous winter when the entire units were training together.

As Col H remembers, “Most of our reorientation took place in the mind; we were crossing a threshold that had been embedded in the mind: thus far and no further. Now we were being asked to do a job that had not been undertaken in decades.” Adds Col K: “Our boys always had the skills, but they had applied the skills to a different set of circumstances, not the task we were about to undertake. However, due to our practice and reorientation, they were at the peak of their skills.” They were, like many Indian Army Officers before them posted along the LoC, aware of one-off, shallow raids launched by different infantry units into PoK. But all of them were individual punitive actions and not large-scale planned operations like the one that was being contemplated now.

The tasks were diverse. Teams had to be formed accordingly. Over the past quarter century, the Indian Army had created a strong network of intelligence operatives in the valley and within various tanzeems based in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (PoK). Post the Uri attack and around the time when the surgical strike was being finalised, Northern Command tapped a couple of sources in Hizbul Mujahideen, located in the general area of Anantnag, to obtain more information about the layout of Pakistani camps, and the possible routes that could be taken both to enter and exit PoK. These inputs were crucial to plan strategy and form teams for different tasks like mounting secret surveillance, raid the camps, and for guiding the troops back safely. They also had to do last minute rechecking of targets to make sure that the terrorists were still holed up there and launch pads were not emptied out after the Uri attack.

So what were the thoughts that were going through their minds as they prepared to launch the strikes, I asked the two Commanding Officers.

Looking back, with a quiet sense of pride in their eyes, both the officers recalled their state of mind: “We knew we had to hit the adversary so hard that he would be humiliated. There was no time for half-measures, no place for token gestures,” recounted Col K. His colleague added: “This is what we train for: That one chance to deliver a blow so lethal that the enemy will constantly think about it when planning any misadventure.”

Accordingly, the COs were told that the intent of the cross-border strikes was two-fold: inducing fear and extracting revenge. Simultaneously, total destruction of terrorist infrastructure directly opposite Uri was planned so that those who had launched the attack on 18 September would get the right message. “The idea was to let them know that we know where you are based and where you launch your attacks from and more importantly, we know where to hit you.

The message had to go up to Muzzafarabad (the capital of PoK),” Col H said, reflecting upon the week in the run up to the actual operation.

The wait was now getting shorter. It was finally over on 28 September.

That afternoon, Lt Gen Hooda signalled the launch of Operation X when he called both Col H and Col K. Separately, he wished them a simple “good luck” and told them to go ahead and complete the assigned task.

Teams surged forward by late evening, poised on the edge of the LoC, ready to cross over later that night.

Back in Delhi, Gen Dalbir briefed NSA Doval about the mission plan and worked out a mechanism to update him as and when he received inputs from the ground.

“The die was cast now. The onus was on the Army that I was leading to deliver. But I was confident of our success,” Gen Dalbir recalls. Parrikar, meanwhile, was separately briefed about the roll-out of the action plan by the Army Chief.

OPERATION X

28-29 September 2016, J&K

From here onward, teams led by Col K and Col H were on their own. All of it depended on their skills, daring, ingenuity, and above all, determination to succeed in whether they would accomplish the task assigned to them.

There was no looking back now.

The operation, called Operation X in conversation but not officially named as such, was being monitored at Army HQ in Delhi, at the Northern Command HQ in Udhampur, and at Nagrota and Srinagar, the HQs of 16 and 15 Corps respectively.

As Prime Time television debates across different news channels were just about winding down, Col K’s teams were making their way to the LoC. Col K, assigned to target camps south of the Pir Panjal range, led his teams across the LoC around midnight. In four hours, they were in close proximity of the objectives. Having bypassed some of the outposts close to the LoC on the Pakistani side, the teams were now truly behind enemy lines.

Barring one minor injury, Operation X had gone off with clockwork precision. Complete surprise was achieved, resulting in the higher fatalities in the camps-cum-launch pads of the Pakistanis. It also validated many conceptual plans made over the years for trans-LoC operations.

So what was the death count? I asked the two COs.

Both were candid, admitting they didn’t stop to count the dead. “That was neither our remit nor the objective of the strike. We had been given a job to destroy selected targets to send a message. In light of which we performed to the best of our abilities. We can’t give you exact figures. No one can, but what we saw with our eyes in those moments, tells us that we would have accounted for at least 70–75 fellows combined,” both Col K and H tell me. Later that day, radio chatter from across the LoC reportedly confirmed at least 80 fatalities in the camps that were hit by Indian Special Forces.


@abingdonboy @hammer head @F-14B @Mikesingh @Project Dharma @rock127 @Screambowl @Butter Chicken @Kshatriya87 @Akshay_Fenix @mayfair @hit&run @Kunal Biswas

 

[lcafanboy]

Surgical strike: 'Indian Army expected retaliation, but Pakistanis were quite shell-shocked'
Thursday, September 21, 2017 By: TimesNow Source Link: CLICK HERE





The sole purpose of the surgical strike conducted in September last year was to send across a strong message to Pakistan after it increased cross-border attacks, said Lt. General D.S. Hooda (retd), former Commanding-in-Chief of Army's Northern Command.

Speaking to a news channel, Hooda, who was responsible for overseeing the surgical strike across the Line of Control (LoC) in Pakistan, said they were also prepared for retaliation from the neighbours but the situation did not escalate.

When asked why the Indian armed forces chose to cross the border to destroy the terror launch pads, the former general officer said any form of attack, such as air strike or any other form of long-range attack, would not have served the purpose.

"I think a strong message has to be sent sometimes. You can say you could have done it from air, from long-range artillery... I think a message had to be sent out, a strong message had to be sent out," Hooda said.

"After the June 2015 strike (by the Indian Army across India-Myanmar border), a lot of statements had come from Pakistan -- from their Interior Minister as also their official spokesperson -- which said Pakistan is not Myanmar, and we will give a befitting reply if India resorts to any adventurism. Those were the kind of statements that were made. "Once the surgical strike was carried out, they just went totally quiet. I think that was more of a moral victory," he said.

"The kind of message we wanted to send across, I don't think could have been done by strikes from afar,” he added.

Asked whether they anticipated any retaliation, Hooda said: "We had, and why not? It would be unprofessional to say there will be no retaliation, and that we shouldn't plan for it."

"We were prepared, we were ready. But, as I said, I think the Pakistanis were quite shell-shocked. The minute they said surgical strike did not happen, we knew that a response from their side will at best be very very limited," the retired Lt General said.

A surgical strike was conducted by the Indian Army on September 28-29 night in 2016 on terror launch pads across the Line of Control in Pakistan-administered Kashmir.

The strike came following a terrorist attack at an Indian Army camp at Uri in Jammu and Kashmir, in which 19 soldiers were killed.

In June 2015, the Indian Army had carried out a surgical strike along the India-Myanmar border on camps of Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland (Khaplang) militants, days after an ambush in which terrorists killed 18 Army men in Manipur.
http://www.defencenews.in/article/S...ut-Pakistanis-were-quite-shell-shocked-343734

 

[Mikesingh]

An excerpt from Nitin Gokhale's book - 'Securing India - The Modi Way".

Barring one minor injury, Operation X had gone off with clockwork precision.

Unfortunately, the injury to one of our commandos during exfiltration wasn't 'minor'. He was pretty badly injured in the leg as he unknowingly stepped on an anti-personnel mine on our side of the LoC.

Mines sometimes 'drift' from their locations due to rain, snow and even minor mud slides. Thus it is quite dicey to negotiate even marked minefield lanes/gaps in our minefields laid along the LoC.

 

[AmoghaVarsha]

I will buy Nitin Gokhale's book anyday but this Shiv Aroor guy seems like an iffy character.

EDIT: I kinda slandered him so should clarify. He got in touch with the creators of PDF to promote his book on the Indian forum owned by them. Also, he randomly tweets political views that are somewhat leftist.

PDF owns a Indian forum?Which one?

 

[Project Dharma]

Only two Pakistani soldiers were killed? Or was that in the first launchpad.

 

[Mikesingh]

Only two Pakistani soldiers were killed? Or was that in the first launchpad.

It is impossible to accurately count the number of casualties in such hit and scoot ops and it's also difficult to distinguish between terrorists and Pak army personnel at night.

The number of casualties that the Pakis suffered are around 60-70 which include terrorists as well as Pak army, ISI and Rangers personnel. This figure is from the horses' mouth.

 

[Project Dharma]

It is impossible to accurately count the number of casualties in such hit and scoot ops and it's also difficult to distinguish between terrorists and Pak army personnel at night.

The number of casualties that the Pakis suffered are around 60-70 which include terrorists as well as Pak army, ISI and Rangers personnel. This figure is from the horses' mouth.

Sir ji, on India Today there were referring to the Major as "Mike Tango" and for a second I got excited thinking it was yourself.

 

[Mikesingh]

Sir ji, on India Today there were referring to the Major as "Mike Tango" and for a second I got excited thinking it was yourself.

Lol! But I wish I was there too, to screw the frikkin Porks. :biggrin2: Killing terrorists gives one a high! Better than the best scotch in the world! We killed 96 of these buggers in Kashmir during our tenure in the Valley and I've still got a hangover! Jeeeez! Yeh dil maangey more!!

 

[lcafanboy]

Lol! But I wish I was there too, to screw the frikkin Porks. :biggrin2: Killing terrorists gives one a high! Better than the best scotch in the world! We killed 96 of these buggers in Kashmir during our tenure in the Valley and I've still got a hangover! Jeeeez! Yeh dil maangey more!!

The same feeling when people hit coakroaches with slippers at home. You kill one and you like to have more. Porkies too are coakroaches so i can understand your feelings...

Yes indeed, yeh Dil mange more.

 

[COLDHEARTED AVIATOR]

Can someone post about this uploading and downloading technology by masked communication network used by SF operators to transfer messages and multimedia because this has been claimed in the recent book launched on Surgical strike.It says the team commanders had such technology.

 

[aditya g]

Plenty of dope on surgical strikes going around .... Yet we barely scratched the surface on air force role

 

[Adioz]

Plenty of dope on surgical strikes going around .... Yet we barely scratched the surface on air force role

The reason why the Army needs to have Attack Helicopters. These air force gunships were as a backup in case the op went awry?

 

[Kunal Biswas]

Those MI-35 have ability to transport 8 full equipped commandos ..

 

[IndiaRising]

Only two Pakistani soldiers were killed? Or was that in the first launchpad.

paaji, probably these two. these were the only two official casualties accepted by pakistan.

 

[Mikesingh]

The reason why the Army needs to have Attack Helicopters. These air force gunships were as a backup in case the op went awry?

Yep! Plan B in case of a problem during exfiltration which is the most difficult as the element of surprise is lost. This was not for extraction of troops but for providing close support / covering fire during a sticky situation if it arose on their way back to our FDLs.

But the need didn't arise as those Paki dumbos didn't know WTF hit them! Lol!

 

[cobra commando]

Arnab talks to Retired Lt Gen DS Hooda