Most of you must have already seen this. In fact, I myself have read & re-read it numerous times since this was posted on "BharatRakshak" last year by "Rudradev", because I find it exhilarating to the say the least. The author has really thought over it & articulates his point very well. For everyone's benefit, I am posting it here:
"Becoming the Kabila": An Alternate Strategy For Afghanistan
I want to put forward an idea for discussion here, about an alternative strategy by which the US could pursue its security interests in Afghanistan that may be more successful than the strategy they've followed from 2001 to the present.
It is dependent on a hypothetical US-India security partnership of an unprecedented degree, which in itself could be problematic. However, let's leave that aside for now. It could be argued that both US and India have lasting interests in Afghanistan that are largely convergent... that, if they work together in this, both countries may be able to secure their respective interests at less cost than otherwise.
I'm not saying it's a good idea or a bad idea. It is definitely predicated on many assumptions, which may not all be valid; and its implementation will have very extensive strategic and geopolitical repercussions, not all of which I have analysed. However, I'd like to put it down here for the consideration and analysis of fellow BRF-ites as a thought-experiment.
Essentially the idea is that Afghanistan has always resisted long-term occupiers because it is prime Kabila territory. A mobile, maneuverable military force can prevail over a less mobile force that is more invested in governance, development etc. simply by denying strategic control to the invested force.
The Taliban, being a Kabila, has a much easier criterion for strategic success than the US/NATO/ANG (Afghan National Govt.) does.
If the US/NATO /ANG want to engage in nation building, the Taliban can win simply by denying the US/NATO/ANG any opportunity to achieve this sustainably. If the US/NATO/ANG want to be credible providers of security to Afghan cities and villages, they must succeed 100% of the time in foiling each and every Taliban attack... meanwhile, even 1 successful Taliban attack represents a palpable loss to the US/NATO/ANG. In the long run, US/NATO/ANG is perpetually at a strategic disadvantage in trying to fight a war like this.
Meanwhile, it has been shown by invaders from Alexander to the Persians to the Sikhs to the British that an attacking force which is also mobile, and restricts its operations to the short-term achievement of specific goals of strategic importance, can influence Afghanistan successfully in the long-term.
Think of Afghanistan as a very hot lump of clay. You cannot shape this clay by slowly squeezing and moulding it this way and that way until it takes the form you want. The longer your hands remain in contact with the clay the more certain they are to get burned, before the goal of shaping the clay is achieved. The way to shape Afghanistan is through a series of strategically applied slaps... whack it here, whack it there until gradually it assumes the approximate form you want. Fine tuning may not be possible by this method... but at least some degree of strategic re-shaping is achieved, and meanwhile you can out-wait the fire that is heating up the clay. That fire also requires some exhaustible source of fuel to keep burning. Ultimately when the fire goes out, the clay will no longer be too hot to touch, and more detailed shaping will become possible.
The primary problems with the current US strategy in Afghanistan are:
1) Over-dependence on Pakistan. We all know what the double game is and I won't go into further detail here. Pakistan cannot be the political lynchpin, the logistical supply-line or the military "ally" for the US mission in Afghanistan because all its strategic goals are opposed to the interests of the US.
2) The US is the "invested" force, which gives the Taliban the strategic advantage of being the "Kabila" force.
What I propose here is a strategy whereby both these pitfalls could theoretically be circumvented. This of course introduces other potential pitfalls, including a very close degree of partnership between the United States, India and Russia. These might not be possible to work around for a thousand reasons... but just for argument's sake, let's assume that they are.
According to a recent article by Praveen Swami in the Hindu,
http://www.thehindu.com/news/internatio ... 321586.ece Putin has declared open support for the NATO mission in Afghanistan, and other CARs are with him in this; meanwhile, there are definite convergences of some Indian and US interests in preventing the emergence of Pak-pasand jihadi groups as state authorities in Afghanistan.
I am very well aware of the usual arguments for why this could not work, as they have been discussed on BRF in thousands of lakhs of posts. Yet those arguments have not brought us any closer to finding a solution... in fact, they have only driven us further into the "despairing Indian" mode, which certainly doesn't help us develop any capacity for strategic thinking. So let's see if we can at least find some new objections to the following, rather than simply rehashing the old ones!
The basic assumptions on which the strategy is predicated are:
1) Pakistan's cooperation is completely unavailable and must be completely excluded as a possibility. Its cooperation with the US/NATO/ANG has ceased 400%. ISI/TSPA are not allowing NATO overflights, drones or anything else... they are in fact doing everything possible to help Haqqani, Maulvi Nazir, Hekmatyar and their other proxies.
2) US/NATO and allies... including India and (to some extent) Russia... cannot win by being the "invested" government in Kabul. That role is to be played only by the ANG. What the US/NATO/allies must do is to become a Kabila themselves.
3) At the start of the scenario, 2014, most US troops have pulled out of Afghanistan. About 10-15,000 US military and CIA personnel remain as "advisors" to the ANP/ANA.
4) ANP/ANA are about 250,000 strong all told. 90% of the brush-fire missions, putting down small uprisings, taking out troublesome warlords, maintaining law and order are left exclusively to this force.
5) The US maintains SSGNs and a CBG off the coast of Karachi as a reserve of airpower. Some squadrons for CAS may still remain at Bagram and a few other bases. These will be called in by the ANA if required.
6) In every ANG-controlled district of Afghanistan, with the cooperation of the ANG and the US, India has teams of civilians working in advisory capacity on development projects, medical and educational missions etc. Embedded with these civilians are a rotating force of 5-7,000 IA personnel (about 1-2,000 officers, many from intelligence, and 4-5,000 other ranks including JCOs and NCOs.)
7) This group of IA personnel, along with perhaps a squadron each of IAF combat and reconnaissance aircraft, represent India's entire *permanent* deployment in Afghanistan. They, and the permanent US deployment of 10-15,000 will be supplied exclusively by the Northern Corridor via Russia and CARs. If India can leverage Iran as a supply route for its own troops that is well and good, but it should not be necessary.
8 ) Meanwhile, the IA will raise an Afghan Combat Operations Task Force (ACOTF) under Western Command, based out of Ambala, Udhampur and other sizeable facilities mainly in Punjab/J&K. This will be an airborne force of a size whose personnel and equipment, plus supplies for a two-week campaign, can be transported entirely by air (using C17s and C130s) to a location in Afghanistan within a 36-hour period. I am not at all sure what the size of such a force would be but given PLA claims of moving 30-plus divisions into Tibet within a week, I would guess two full-strength mountain infantry divisions plus two IABs and air support elements. I am not a mil-tech sort of guy so I'll leave the actual composition of the ACOTF to Rohitvats, Singha, RahulM and other orbat experts.
9) The "permanent" deployment of IA in Afghanistan will be drawn in rotation from the combat personnel of the ACOTF. The idea is that ACOTF personnel, particularly those in leadership roles at all levels, should continuously familiarize themselves with their potential theatre of operations without providing a large "sitting duck" target for Kabila attacks. In India, the ACOTF will be maintained in a state of combat readiness at all times.
10) Following major US withdrawal, it can be expected that ISI proxy Taliban will mount an offensive to seize territory in Southern Afghanistan. The ANA will resist to the extent possible, but will tactically withdraw in the face of overwhelming assaults. The idea is that the Taliban should be able to become invested, to some extent, in occupying and governing territory. This will reduce their maneuverability as a Kabila force, and transform them into more of an invested force.
11) The ANA will be able to exert itself more effectively by focusing on fewer strategic loci, mainly in North and Central Afghanistan. ANP will be better able to concentrate its efforts on providing security in a few well-defined regions, where sustainable development can be pursued under a stronger watch. Mainly the ANA will fight a defensive war, making it as costly as possible for the Taliban to make any territorial gains, and disrupting any attempts by the Taliban to consolidate political power or undertake governance in the territory they have captured. 90% of the low-intensity warfare in Afghanistan will be conducted exclusively by the ANA, with support from US air assets based in Bagram.
12) The ACOTF will be the sword-arm of India's Kabila in Afghanistan. Its purpose is to serve as a land-force spearhead for major offensives by the ANA, or intervene when the ANA finds itself facing a sustained and overwhelming Taliban offensive aimed at a key strategic location. ACOTF will go in, do its job aided by the personnel of "permanent" IA deployment in theatre, and leave within less than two weeks... along the lines of the Cold Start model. It will not be an occupying force to hold territory (that job will have to be done by ANA/ANP) but an executive force to accomplish limited, well defined objectives of strategic importance.
13) When action is required, the US naval and air assets off the coast of Sindh will enforce a no-fly zone for the PAF, and neutralize Pakistani air-defense assets, along a well-defined corridor of Pakistani airspace to facilitate the deployment of the ACOTF by air. This will probably be a corridor overflying parts of Pakjab and K-P. Ideally the IAF will not be involved in attacking Pakistani territory at all. This will deprive Pakistanis of the opportunity to usurp the escalation ladder against India and initiate an India-Pakistan conventional conflict. Of course, if they do attack Indian territory in retaliation that's something we have to be ready for; but I doubt they would find it in their interest to do so, and their actions following the Abbotabad operation do not make it seem likely that they would try to outfight the USAF and USN.
14) Within 12 hours of the no-fly-zone being established, ACOTF will begin deployment. Within 48 hours deployment to the theatre of action will be completely achieved. Within two weeks, the objective will be achieved to the extent that ANA can take over entirely in theatre, and the ACOTF will return to base.
15) Essentially, the ACOTF in Punjab/J&K and the USN/USAF assets off the coast of Sindh will constitute a maneuverable force that is applied for limited periods of time to achieve specific strategic objectives, and tip the scale of the forthcoming Afghan civil war in favour of the ANA at critical times. These US and Indian forces will not be deployed on Afghan soil permanently, or become invested in any "nation building" process. They will be applied as and when common Indian, US and ANG interests are to be upheld, i.e. when the Taliban is to be defeated in its attempt to secure a major strategic objective. This will give the ANG (with Indian civilian assistance) space to create sustainable development in Afghanistan, and maximize the attritive erosion of the ongoing civil war against the Pakistanis and their Talib proxies.
16) Ultimately, the Afghan war will be fought between the ANA and the ISI's proxies until one side or the other is exhausted; ACOTF will be a decisive ingredient in advancing eventual ANA victory (and Pakistani exhaustion) without the burden of becoming an invested, occupying army. The end result hoped for is that Indian influence and strategic interests in Afghanistan will be secured in the long-term, while the IA remains in the more effective "Kabila mode" as opposed to the more risky "invested mode" of a large permanent deployment.
