India and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)

nitesh

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China can not do anything except some blabbering, like they did at the time of nuclear deal too. US will kick them, and they will fall in line. Nothing much to read in to this
 

pmaitra

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I wonder how far PRC will afford to differ with the other honchos in NSG.

Us, however, have lots of trade and economic links with PRC, so I won't expect the US to go too far to annoy PRC.
 

satish007

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Aap Kaisey Ho? nice to meet you guys in this nice forum, I am Chinese, work in a Global company , I have a lot of Indian colleagues and friends.
 

Yan Luo Wang

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China can not do anything except some blabbering, like they did at the time of nuclear deal too. US will kick them, and they will fall in line. Nothing much to read in to this
You mean like when America told China to immediately raise the value of the Yuan? ;) Or when Hiliary Clinton begged China to keep purchasing US debt?

And I think it's strange to assume that the USA will have such an interest in getting India into the NSG.

America is still the largest source of external funding for the Pakistani Army. So I doubt they care much about India's interests.

In addition, India is not even a signatory to the NPT. Which means that India is not yet even considered to be a "Nuclear weapons state" under the treaty.
 
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nrj

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Ofcourse they can not 'commit' in public. We are no allies. There will be arm twisting.

There will be extensive meeting & consultations. And about what Obama talked on India's inclusion in those 3-4 clubs, its US going to gain, trying to gang up like they always do. India has nothing to loose nor are we desperate.
 

Iamanidiot

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You mean like when America told China to immediately raise the value of the Yuan? ;) Or when Hiliary Clinton begged China to keep purchasing US debt?

And I think it's strange to assume that the USA will have such an interest in getting India into the NSG.

America is still the largest source of external funding for the Pakistani Army. So I doubt they care much about India's interests.

In addition, India is not even a signatory to the NPT. Which means that India is not yet even considered to be a "Nuclear weapons state" under the treaty.
Suppose Beijing goes up in an mushroom cloud because of an Indin nuke would you still believe India is not a nuclear weapons state.
 

nitesh

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You mean like when America told China to immediately raise the value of the Yuan? ;) Or when Hiliary Clinton begged China to keep purchasing US debt?
How does it explains the volta face done by Chinese at the times of nuclear deal, when last minute call from President Bush ensured that the deal went through, in spite of Chinese trying to scuttle it.

And I think it's strange to assume that the USA will have such an interest in getting India into the NSG.

America is still the largest source of external funding for the Pakistani Army. So I doubt they care much about India's interests.
Well what interest they have to bring India the nuclear deal then?
Well pakistan is a wh0re, who is ready to sell itself to any one who gives them the money, pakistan is a bomb waiting to implode. Doesn't care much about it.

In addition, India is not even a signatory to the NPT. Which means that India is not yet even considered to be a "Nuclear weapons state" under the treaty.
So what?
 
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Conditions on Indian NSG Membership - Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

The question of Indian membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) is reportedly on the agenda for the Group's annual plenary next week in the Netherlands.1 As the NSG participating governments consider adding new members, the question of conditions for membership becomes paramount. This is particularly true for states that are not parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), namely India, Pakistan and Israel. These three non-NPT states in particular should be demonstrably "like-minded" in supporting the broader aims of the nonproliferation regime, of which the NSG is a critical component. To demonstrate this likemindedness, they should be expected to meet objective nonproliferation criteria for membership that ensure their behaviour is consistent with the objectives of the Group.

Positive feedback from some experts in India, Pakistan, and Israel suggests broad agreement with this approach, if not specific agreement with all of the fourteen conditions suggested in an earlier essay (listed below).2 It is noteworthy that in the case of India, the state first in the queue for membership, many of these conditions are consistent with current Indian policy. One Indian colleague has argued, however, that three of the conditions are "unrealistic" to expect of India.3 In fact these conditions—safeguards on all new nuclear facilities; CTBT ratification; and nuclear test moratorium—are entirely realistic if the expectation is that future NSG members share basic assumptions and approaches about the nonproliferation regime, in addition to agreeing to uphold NSG Guidelines. In this vein, it would seem that an Indian view that "the NPT did serve its purpose during the cold-war period, but has outlived its practical usefulness now" is fairly inconsistent with the current policies of NSG members.4 Each of the three "unrealistic" criteria are assessed below.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards on Non-Military Facilities
The first contested criteria (number 2 on the original list) would require any non-NPT state to place all new nuclear facilities located outside existing military nuclear sites on the list of facilities eligible to be safeguarded by the IAEA. The practical effect of this condition would be to limit nuclear weapons activities to current military nuclear sites. New facilities could be developed on existing sites, but any new nuclear-related site would have to be made eligible for safeguards.

It is not correct, however, to pretend that this is akin to arguing that "India shouldn't be allowed to develop nuclear weapons for its security," as our Indian colleague suggests.5 In fact, India would be able to continue the development of its nuclear weapons program at its current sites unfettered.

This returns the debate to the "like-minded" question posed at the outset. Does India hold similar views on nuclear weapons as the other NSG members, including the five nuclear weapons states? Should the NSG really welcome as one of its members a state which, in addition to expanding existing military nuclear facilities on existing sites, would also insist on increasing the number of such military sites? Would that be compatible with India's "declared intention to unilaterally follow articles I, III and VI of the NPT?"6 Such actions by India would be out of step with the global consensus on the need to continue to reduce the numbers and salience of nuclear weapons, as evidenced by the 2010 NPT Review Conference Final Document.
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)

A second criteria (number 8 on the list) that our Indian colleague dismisses as "meaningless" would require non-NPT states to "have signed and ratified the CTBT"¦with the understanding that its ratification will be automatically completed upon ratification of the CTBT by the U.S. and China. If another state in the region proceeds with a nuclear test, this could constitute an event as defined in Article IX.2 of the CTBT, thereby justifying withdrawal."

This condition is also required of the five nuclear-weapon states under Step 1 of the "13 Steps" contained in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference and reaffirmed in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference. It does not require India and Pakistan to ratify the CTBT before the United States and China have both done so. It has also long been assumed that both India and Pakistan would ratify the CTBT simultaneously and under the same conditions.

Returning to the issue of like-mindedness, will members of the NSG welcome a state for which "the CTBT is a dead issue"¦[in need of] a quiet burial?"7

Nuclear Test Moratorium
The third "unrealistic" criteria (number 9 of the 14) would require non-NPT states to "commit, pending the entry into force of the CTBT, to adhere to a unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosion tests, as required under Step 2 of the 2000 NPT Review Conference Final Document's "13 Steps." It is unclear why this criterion is "meaningless,"8 particularly in the eyes of the international community, given that as recently as February 2010 Indian Special Envoy Shyam Saran reiterated that "India is committed to its voluntary unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosive testing."9 Yet, our colleague persists, "any signature without ratification basically means nothing," calling into question the value of voluntary unilateral declarations.

In any case, NSG members will have to consider if India's position on CTBT and a test moratorium is really consistent with the spirit of article VI of the NPT and with the recent UNSC Resolution 1887 (24 September 2009), which

"7. Calls upon all States to refrain from conducting a nuclear test explosion and to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), thereby bringing the treaty into force at an early date; [and]

8. Calls upon the Conference on Disarmament to negotiate a Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices as soon as possible, welcomes the Conference on Disarmament's adoption by consensus of its Program of Work in 2009, and requests all Member States to cooperate in guiding the Conference to an early commencement of substantive work."

If this resolution is considered irrelevant by the NSG in the case of India, one should not expect that it will have much value for Pakistan or any other state.

It is clear from the tortured debates in India surrounding the Indo-U.S. civil nuclear deal that these issues are quite sensitive matters for Indian sovereignty. It is also apparent that it would be foolish to expect that India would happily make concessions that it believes are "designed simply to constrain" its nuclear weapons program just to become a member of the NSG.10

In his critique of these conditions, Rajiv Nayan concludes that "the reality is that India won't modify its strategy of ambiguous nuclear weapon status for NSG membership."11 Of course, there is no requirement that India become an NSG member, particularly if it does not share the views and assumptions of the other participating governments. Thus, the real issue is whether it would be smart for the NSG to accept without condition India as a new member with the right to block consensus on any future decision by the Group. If India does not share some of the key perspectives and positions of existing NSG members, then admitting it into this consensus-based body would mean that India could determine its future direction in ways that current members have not fully contemplated. Judging from reservations expressed by some Indian experts, India would likely seek to weaken rather than strengthen the NSG. Existing NSG governments will want to ponder this before inviting India to join.

Fourteen Criteria for NSG Membership12
To become a full member of the NSG, a non-NPT state must:

1. Undertake to comply (as have the five NPT nuclear-weapon states) with the requirements of Articles I, III.2 and VI of the NPT;

2. Have in force a Voluntary Offer Agreement (VOA) with the IAEA whereby the non-NPT State undertakes to place all new nuclear facilities located outside existing military nuclear sites on the list of facilities eligible to be safeguarded by the IAEA under INFCIRC/66-type safeguards agreements (with duration and coverage provisions in conformity with IAEA document GOV/1621 of August 1973);13

3. Have ratified an Additional Protocol to its safeguards agreement (as already done by the five NPT nuclear-weapon states);

4. Not be in material breach of an IAEA safeguards agreement;

5. Commit not to export or transfer items specified in INFCIRC/254/ Parts 1 and 2 to a NNWS unless such State has a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA)14 and an Additional Protocol (AP)15 in force with the IAEA, and is in compliance with its international obligations in the field of non-proliferation. This export condition has been accepted by a very large majority of NSG members and should be agreed upon by any new member;

6. Have in place legal measures to ensure the effective and uninterrupted implementation of the NSG Guidelines (both Part 1 and Part 2), including export licensing regulations, enforcement measures, and penalties for violations;

7. Commit to share information on "catch all" denials with the IAEA and the members of the NSG;

8. Have signed and ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT),16 as specifically requested of India and Pakistan under UNSC Resolution 1172, with the understanding that its ratification will be automatically completed upon ratification of the CTBT by the U.S. and China. If another state in the region proceeds with a nuclear test, this could constitute an event as defined in Article IX.2 of the CTBT, thereby justifying withdrawal.

9. Commit, pending the entry into force of the CTBT, to adhere to a unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosion tests, as required under Step 2 of the 2000 NPT Review Conference Final Document's "13 Steps;"

10. Fully implement all UN Security Council resolutions adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter that relate to nuclear proliferation or terrorism (in particular, Resolution 1540);

11. Adhere to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and have in place the corresponding export control legislation;

12. Have ratified the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), as amended in 2005;

13. Be party to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, as adopted by the UN General Assembly in resolution A/RES/59/290 (April 2005);

14. Pending completion of a formal treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, commit to implement in good faith Step 3 of the "13 Steps" and "agree on a program of work which includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on such a treaty with a view to their conclusion within five years."
 

sukhish

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Conditions on Indian NSG Membership - Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

The question of Indian membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) is reportedly on the agenda for the Group's annual plenary next week in the Netherlands.1 As the NSG participating governments consider adding new members, the question of conditions for membership becomes paramount. This is particularly true for states that are not parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), namely India, Pakistan and Israel. These three non-NPT states in particular should be demonstrably "like-minded" in supporting the broader aims of the nonproliferation regime, of which the NSG is a critical component. To demonstrate this likemindedness, they should be expected to meet objective nonproliferation criteria for membership that ensure their behaviour is consistent with the objectives of the Group.

Positive feedback from some experts in India, Pakistan, and Israel suggests broad agreement with this approach, if not specific agreement with all of the fourteen conditions suggested in an earlier essay (listed below).2 It is noteworthy that in the case of India, the state first in the queue for membership, many of these conditions are consistent with current Indian policy. One Indian colleague has argued, however, that three of the conditions are "unrealistic" to expect of India.3 In fact these conditions—safeguards on all new nuclear facilities; CTBT ratification; and nuclear test moratorium—are entirely realistic if the expectation is that future NSG members share basic assumptions and approaches about the nonproliferation regime, in addition to agreeing to uphold NSG Guidelines. In this vein, it would seem that an Indian view that "the NPT did serve its purpose during the cold-war period, but has outlived its practical usefulness now" is fairly inconsistent with the current policies of NSG members.4 Each of the three "unrealistic" criteria are assessed below.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards on Non-Military Facilities
The first contested criteria (number 2 on the original list) would require any non-NPT state to place all new nuclear facilities located outside existing military nuclear sites on the list of facilities eligible to be safeguarded by the IAEA. The practical effect of this condition would be to limit nuclear weapons activities to current military nuclear sites. New facilities could be developed on existing sites, but any new nuclear-related site would have to be made eligible for safeguards.

It is not correct, however, to pretend that this is akin to arguing that "India shouldn't be allowed to develop nuclear weapons for its security," as our Indian colleague suggests.5 In fact, India would be able to continue the development of its nuclear weapons program at its current sites unfettered.

This returns the debate to the "like-minded" question posed at the outset. Does India hold similar views on nuclear weapons as the other NSG members, including the five nuclear weapons states? Should the NSG really welcome as one of its members a state which, in addition to expanding existing military nuclear facilities on existing sites, would also insist on increasing the number of such military sites? Would that be compatible with India's "declared intention to unilaterally follow articles I, III and VI of the NPT?"6 Such actions by India would be out of step with the global consensus on the need to continue to reduce the numbers and salience of nuclear weapons, as evidenced by the 2010 NPT Review Conference Final Document.
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)

A second criteria (number 8 on the list) that our Indian colleague dismisses as "meaningless" would require non-NPT states to "have signed and ratified the CTBT"¦with the understanding that its ratification will be automatically completed upon ratification of the CTBT by the U.S. and China. If another state in the region proceeds with a nuclear test, this could constitute an event as defined in Article IX.2 of the CTBT, thereby justifying withdrawal."

This condition is also required of the five nuclear-weapon states under Step 1 of the "13 Steps" contained in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference and reaffirmed in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference. It does not require India and Pakistan to ratify the CTBT before the United States and China have both done so. It has also long been assumed that both India and Pakistan would ratify the CTBT simultaneously and under the same conditions.

Returning to the issue of like-mindedness, will members of the NSG welcome a state for which "the CTBT is a dead issue"¦[in need of] a quiet burial?"7

Nuclear Test Moratorium
The third "unrealistic" criteria (number 9 of the 14) would require non-NPT states to "commit, pending the entry into force of the CTBT, to adhere to a unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosion tests, as required under Step 2 of the 2000 NPT Review Conference Final Document's "13 Steps." It is unclear why this criterion is "meaningless,"8 particularly in the eyes of the international community, given that as recently as February 2010 Indian Special Envoy Shyam Saran reiterated that "India is committed to its voluntary unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosive testing."9 Yet, our colleague persists, "any signature without ratification basically means nothing," calling into question the value of voluntary unilateral declarations.

In any case, NSG members will have to consider if India's position on CTBT and a test moratorium is really consistent with the spirit of article VI of the NPT and with the recent UNSC Resolution 1887 (24 September 2009), which

"7. Calls upon all States to refrain from conducting a nuclear test explosion and to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), thereby bringing the treaty into force at an early date; [and]

8. Calls upon the Conference on Disarmament to negotiate a Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices as soon as possible, welcomes the Conference on Disarmament's adoption by consensus of its Program of Work in 2009, and requests all Member States to cooperate in guiding the Conference to an early commencement of substantive work."

If this resolution is considered irrelevant by the NSG in the case of India, one should not expect that it will have much value for Pakistan or any other state.

It is clear from the tortured debates in India surrounding the Indo-U.S. civil nuclear deal that these issues are quite sensitive matters for Indian sovereignty. It is also apparent that it would be foolish to expect that India would happily make concessions that it believes are "designed simply to constrain" its nuclear weapons program just to become a member of the NSG.10

In his critique of these conditions, Rajiv Nayan concludes that "the reality is that India won't modify its strategy of ambiguous nuclear weapon status for NSG membership."11 Of course, there is no requirement that India become an NSG member, particularly if it does not share the views and assumptions of the other participating governments. Thus, the real issue is whether it would be smart for the NSG to accept without condition India as a new member with the right to block consensus on any future decision by the Group. If India does not share some of the key perspectives and positions of existing NSG members, then admitting it into this consensus-based body would mean that India could determine its future direction in ways that current members have not fully contemplated. Judging from reservations expressed by some Indian experts, India would likely seek to weaken rather than strengthen the NSG. Existing NSG governments will want to ponder this before inviting India to join.

Fourteen Criteria for NSG Membership12
To become a full member of the NSG, a non-NPT state must:

1. Undertake to comply (as have the five NPT nuclear-weapon states) with the requirements of Articles I, III.2 and VI of the NPT;

2. Have in force a Voluntary Offer Agreement (VOA) with the IAEA whereby the non-NPT State undertakes to place all new nuclear facilities located outside existing military nuclear sites on the list of facilities eligible to be safeguarded by the IAEA under INFCIRC/66-type safeguards agreements (with duration and coverage provisions in conformity with IAEA document GOV/1621 of August 1973);13

3. Have ratified an Additional Protocol to its safeguards agreement (as already done by the five NPT nuclear-weapon states);

4. Not be in material breach of an IAEA safeguards agreement;

5. Commit not to export or transfer items specified in INFCIRC/254/ Parts 1 and 2 to a NNWS unless such State has a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA)14 and an Additional Protocol (AP)15 in force with the IAEA, and is in compliance with its international obligations in the field of non-proliferation. This export condition has been accepted by a very large majority of NSG members and should be agreed upon by any new member;

6. Have in place legal measures to ensure the effective and uninterrupted implementation of the NSG Guidelines (both Part 1 and Part 2), including export licensing regulations, enforcement measures, and penalties for violations;

7. Commit to share information on "catch all" denials with the IAEA and the members of the NSG;

8. Have signed and ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT),16 as specifically requested of India and Pakistan under UNSC Resolution 1172, with the understanding that its ratification will be automatically completed upon ratification of the CTBT by the U.S. and China. If another state in the region proceeds with a nuclear test, this could constitute an event as defined in Article IX.2 of the CTBT, thereby justifying withdrawal.

9. Commit, pending the entry into force of the CTBT, to adhere to a unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosion tests, as required under Step 2 of the 2000 NPT Review Conference Final Document's "13 Steps;"

10. Fully implement all UN Security Council resolutions adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter that relate to nuclear proliferation or terrorism (in particular, Resolution 1540);

11. Adhere to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and have in place the corresponding export control legislation;

12. Have ratified the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), as amended in 2005;

13. Be party to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, as adopted by the UN General Assembly in resolution A/RES/59/290 (April 2005);

14. Pending completion of a formal treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, commit to implement in good faith Step 3 of the "13 Steps" and "agree on a program of work which includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on such a treaty with a view to their conclusion within five years."
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace won't be the one deciding the India's bid for NSG membership.
these folks cried loud when India was given clean unconditional waiver by NSG back in 2008. these are all left wing nut cases, they can only shout loud.
 

LurkerBaba

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A load of crap ! They're bogging us down with the CTBT again. NSG exemption is fine, we'll live without full membership tyvm

these are all left wing nut cases, they can only shout loud.
I certainly hope so
 
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sukhish

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A load of crap ! They're bogging us down with the CTBT again. NSG exemption is fine, we'll live without full membership tyvm
Don't worry India won't accept any of these conditions. they tried all these gimmicks in 2008 as well but were not successful. let's see for how long they can wait India out. India can also create it's own NSG for that matter ?, but I don't think it will come to that.
 
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NSG all set to up-end India's clean waiver

The Hindu : News / The India Cables : NSG all set to up-end India's clean waiver


Barring last minute objections, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) is set to approve new guidelines for the transfer of "sensitive" nuclear material that will do undo the hard fought "clean" waiver India obtained in 2008 from the cartel's restrictive export rules.

At stake is India's ability to buy enrichment and reprocessing technology and equipment (ENR) from NSG members. Under the terms of a landmark September 2008 agreement, the NSG waived its catch-all requirement of full-scope safeguards as a condition for supply in exchange for a concrete set of non-proliferation commitments by the Indian side. This agreement means NSG members are allowed to sell any nuclear equipment and material they want, including ENR, to India despite the fact that it does not allow international supervision over all its nuclear activities and is not a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Two months after that waiver — a product of the July 2005 Indo-U.S. agreement in which Washington committed itself to "work with friends and allies to adjust international regimes to enable full civil nuclear energy cooperation and trade with India" — the Bush administration threw its weight behind a bad-faith effort to remove ENR equipment and technology from the purview of the NSG-India bargain.

It did so at least partly in order to keep a promise Condoleezza Rice made to the influential Congressman Howard Berman during the passage of the Hyde Act — that if Congress were to approve the proposal for nuclear commerce with India, the administration would get the NSG to ban the sale of ENR equipment to countries that had not signed the NPT.

Thus, under the proposed new guidelines as framed by the NSG in November 2008, ENR transfers will be allowed only if the recipient state fulfils a number of objective and subjective criteria. Top of the list is the requirement of NPT membership and full-scope safeguards. Since India is the only country outside of the NPT that NSG members are allowed to sell nuclear material to in the first place, it is obvious that these two criteria are aimed exclusively at India.

The revised NSG guidelines, known as the "clean text," have not been adopted yet largely because a number of the 46-nation cartel's members have been objecting to some of the other proposed restrictions such as the requirement that recipient states adhere to an Additional Protocol. To push the process along, the U.S. got its G-8 partners to declare at L'Aquila in 2009 that they would abide by the "clean text" in the interim. The G-8 has sent the same message every year, most recently in Deauville. On a parallel track, U.S. diplomats have worked behind the scenes to bring each of the NSG dissenters on board. Language has been found to address the concerns of Canada, Argentina, Brazil, South Korea and the Netherlands. The only holdouts until a couple of months ago were Turkey and South Africa but even they are now believed to be ready to vote for the new ENR guidelines when the NSG holds its plenary in The Hague next week.

India has objected to this unilateral redrawing of the nuclear bargain with both the U.S. and the NSG, but mostly in private and mostly without any impact on the process.

On February 3, 2009, for example, Shivshankar Menon, who was Foreign Secretary at the time, wrote to Under Secretary William Burns in the U.S. State Department that the American initiative on an ENR ban at the NSG constituted a "derogation" of the bilateral India-U.S. agreement on civil nuclear cooperation, or "123 agreement." "Menon's February 3 letter "¦ made a legal claim that an ENR ban would be inconsistent with Article 5.2 of the 123 Agreement itself, which provides for the possibility of amendments to the Agreement to permit ENR transfers, claiming that a ban in the NSG would eliminate the possibility of making such changes," Ambassador David C. Mulford told Washington in a cable accessed by The Hindu through WikiLeaks dated February 12, 2009 (191725: confidential).

The U.S. envoy went on to describe the exchange he had had on the ENR subject with the Foreign Secretary on February 11 as "an un-enriching discussion of reprocessing." The cable says that Mr. Mulford "asked what more we could say to convince Menon that this issue did not warrant the aggressive posture adopted by India. Menon expressed surprise that his letter had generated concern. He replied, "All we need is a clear statement that your position has not changed. We would like to know that what we agreed in the 123 Agreement stands." Ambassador Mulford noted that Indian officials felt the "criteria-based approach to ENR transfers" that requires NPT membership "is discriminatory toward India and not consistent with the spirit of the Agreement." He cited, in particular, the views of Anil Kakodkar, who was head of the Department of Atomic Energy at the time, "who professed a sense of 'betrayal' over the issue."

Though he noted the Indian view that U.S. policy "is not consistent with their view of assurances provided during the 123 Agreement negotiations that, while the U.S. would not transfer ENR to India, we would not stand in the way of others doing so," Ambassador Mulford said. Mr. Menon was "vague" and "not clear how reaffirming the 123 Agreement commitments would satisfy India's concerns." He concluded that section of his cable by commenting: "Whatever the truth behind India's concerns, a good place to start would be with a clear affirmation that the Obama administration stands by the commitments made in the 123 Agreement."

An anodyne and ultimately pointless affirmation was made a month later by Deputy Secretary of State Jim Steinberg, but the U.S. continued to press ahead with its effort to ban ENR sales to India. The July 2009 L'Aquila statement on non-proliferation at L'Aquila took a complacent Indian establishment completely by surprise. In public, the government tried to brazen it out, denying there had been any setback. "We have a clean waiver from the NSG. We have an India-specific safeguards agreement with the IAEA. We are not concerned over what position the G8 takes [on implementing the 'clean text']," Pranab Mukherjee told the Rajya Sabha on 13 July 2009. In private, of course, Indian officials were indeed concerned, very concerned.

During the November 2009 strategic security dialogue with the U.S., Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao reminded Under Secretary for Arms Control Ellen Tauscher that India took a dim view of the proposed ban on ENR sales at the NSG. A U.S. Embassy cable sent soon after that dialogue reported: "Rao stressed that India supported the goal of preventing transfers of "¦ ENR in principle, but asked that the United States' position in favor of a global ban not be seen as a "roll-back" of the NSG decision that made India a partner, and that India can't be seen as "half in and half out (of the NSG)." She characterised the pending decision as an "issue of significance for Indian perceptions about the Civil Nuclear Agreement and our partnership," said a cable dated November 27, 2009 (236981: confidential).

The cable notes that Ms. Rao "raised the politically sensitive nature of the issue again over lunch, stressing that it was an issue 'close to the heart'" and that India was "counting on the United States to value the spirit of the Civil Nuclear Agreement in the NSG." She concluded that India's core concern was that "the September 2008 NSG decision not be seen to be rolled back."

The U.S. official's response to this expression of Indian concern was three-fold. "Tauscher reassured Rao that restricting ENR transfers via the NSG criteria-based approach is based upon long standing U.S. policy, that decisions are up to the consensus-based body (46 members), and that the U.S. was not targeting India."

The cable does not record what Ms. Rao might have said to contradict Ms. Tauscher but, in fact, each of her three arguments is false.

If anything, U.S. policy on ENR transfers has been quite flexible. It sold reprocessing technology to Japan in the 1990s after making a determination that the sale of liquid metal reactor reprocessing technology "did not constitute 'sensitive nuclear technology'" as defined by its domestic statute "since Japan already possesses extensive reprocessing technology" [Fred McGoldrick, Limiting Transfers of Enrichment and Reprocessing Technology, 2011]. At the NSG level, the U.S. had no firm policy on ENR transfers until 2004. That year, George W. Bush floated a tough new proposal — which, ironically, would today suit the Indian nuclear industry better — that there should be a global ban on ENR sales to countries that do not already possess these technologies. India has reprocessing and enrichment facilities and would not be covered by such a ban; indeed, in July 2005 and September 2008, it assured the U.S. and the NSG respectively that it would be guided by such a strict approach in its own export policies. The U.S. came to embrace the "criteria-based approach" to ENR exports in the NSG only in November 2008, after the India waiver was adopted, and its policy can hardly be called "long-standing."

Ms. Tauscher's second and third arguments — that the NSG operates by consensus and that the U.S. is not targeting India — begs the question of why Washington is actively pushing for the unilateral redrafting of the cartel's bargain with India. The waiver of September 2008 was not granted by the NSG as an act of charity. It extracted a number of non-proliferation commitments from India in return, insisting, at the eleventh hour, that the Government of India make a formal statement listing out what it was prepared to do. Several of its members also expect lucrative contracts, especially the US, which squeezed India for a Letter of Intent promising to buy 10,000 MW worth of American reactors. The Indian side has scrupulously adhered to its side of the broad bargain and has assumed the U.S. and the NSG would do the same. But if the latter are going to cherry-pick which of their own commitments they will adhere to and which they will not, India may well be tempted to examine its own options.
 

anoop_mig25

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well i am sure if we use our clout as well as money our friends specially (russia,france) as well as number of small countries within nsg would not let pass the said guidlines in nsg
 

sukhish

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well i am sure if we use our clout as well as money our friends specially (russia,france) as well as number of small countries within nsg would not let pass the said guidlines in nsg
I really doubt that NSG will pass ENR restrictions banning india. I think India has good leverage and france and other European countries, rest assured that are babus are on top of this.
 

LurkerBaba

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:doh:


NSG ends India's 'clean' waiver


New guidelines bar 'sensitive' nuclear exports to countries outside NPT

The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) on Friday adopted new guidelines on the transfer of sensitive nuclear technology that will effectively nullify the "clean" waiver India received from the cartel in 2008 as far as the import of enrichment and reprocessing equipment and technology (ENR) is concerned.
 
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sukhish

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why the heck they gave the waiver in he first place. I'm still not sure if it would impact India
 
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why the heck they gave the waiver in he first place. I'm still not sure if it would impact India
It will impact India if ENR cannot be done domestically the nuclear deal will become a much more costly deal.
 

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