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India and its Hybrid War | idrw.org
++
India and its Hybrid War
.
SOURCE:- THE PRIONIER
.
.
Going by the definition of Hybrid Warfare, what
we witnessed in 1971 was the preparation,
provocation and successful execution of a first
rate Hybrid War.The 40th anniversary of the
Bangladesh Liberation War passed by in the
middle of December. As ever it was an occasion
to reminisce independent India's greatest military
success. Most of the writing and recollecting,
therefore, remained confined to the positive
aspects of the campaign.
What we heard was the purely conventional
story as has been repeatedly told — from Mrs
Indira Gandhi's directive to General Sam
Maneckshaw and his legendary refusal to initiate
hostilities prematurely, to how the Pakistani Army
persisted with digging itself into a hole that it
found surrounded by the Indian Army on
December 16, 1971. Various individual acts of
brilliance and bravery were also recounted. Since
times are changing, the sailing of the US Navy's
Seventh Fleet into the Bay of Bengal found lesser
space than in previous years. But that is par for
the course.
Some of the more discerning comments were
about how India managed a superb manoeuvre
campaign. Instead of attacking conventionally,
which it did initially, the Army bypassed dug-in
Pakistani troops to get to the centre of gravity,
Dhaka. Army-Air Force synergy came into play at
this stage, and some suitably praised it, for it was
exemplary. The mobility of the Indian military
mind stood out in stark contrast to the Pakistani
Army's reactive and confused state of thinking.
But that was only to be expected since the
perpetrator of atrocities and the harbinger of
freedom carry with them contrasting manuals of
perceptions. The preconceived assessment of
India's actions had already been made by the
sheer scale of the Pakistani Army's brutality. It
was a cake walk in the battle of global opinion
polls. In the euphoria of analysis it is not
surprising that two aspects of the Bangladesh
Liberation War get short shrift.
It was, for starters, a just war in the global
perception stakes. Not since World War II was it
possible to define good and bad in terms as
clearly as it was in the weeks and months
running up to December 1971. The villain and the
vanquisher had been determined long before the
first shot was fired. This was as much on
account of Pakistan's villainy as it was on India
playing the perception management game.
Which then leads on to the second aspect of the
war that has gotten short shrift thus far. It still
remains an unanswered query, but which begs
asking. Did India do everything in its abilities to
ensure hostilities happened? Was Indian policy
designed to trigger a war, or was it really a
sleeping neighbour roused to goodness by the
scale of cruelty heaped on East Pakistan? Did
Pakistan simply walk into a mate prepared by the
brilliance of India's manoeuvres on the global
chess board?
Asking questions in this direction does not take
away from Pakistan's perfidy toward its own
people, and it doesn't take away the goodness
from India's actions. India as the initiator of
conflict does not become the villain. What it does
is to lead us to the crux of the second aspect of
the war that has gotten short shrift. Did India in
1971 predate the 21st century global fixation with
Hybrid Warfare? Going simply by the prevailing
definitions of Hybrid Warfare, it is possible to
credit India with the preparation, provocation and
successful execution of a first rate Hybrid War.
Military analysts around the democratic world
have been poring over writing, training, conflicts,
skirmishes, and evolving ideologies to arrive at a
greater understanding of the nature of Hybrid
Warfare. It is regarded as the greatest threat to
the global order of things. The genesis of this
fascination lies in a Beijing pamphlet credited to
two officers of the People's Liberation Army and
mischievously titled 'Unrestricted Warfare'. It
created a storm when published in the late-1990s.
The concept of Hybrid Warfare was thus born,
and in the last decade it has moved from concept
papers in high brow military journals, to seminar
rooms, to possible field training manuals. India
recently conducted its first brain storming session
on Hybrid Warfare in a closed-door seminar at
the prestigious Army War College in Mhow. The
attendees included serving and retired officers,
military and civilian. Organised and hosted by the
Army War College, the seminar represents India's
first attempt at understanding this phenomenon.
Little wonder that the initiative was taken by the
Army War College, doyen of military thought and
teaching in India.
The widely accepted definition of Hybrid Warfare
is credited to its most avid analyst, retired United
States Marine Corps officer Frank Hoffman.
Writing inConflict in the 21st century: The Rise of
Hybrid Wars, published by the Potomac Institute
of Policy Studies, Hoffman states, "Hybrid threats
incorporate a full range of different modes of
warfare, including conventional capabilities,
irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts,
including indiscriminate violence and coercion,
and criminal disorder.
Hybrid Wars can be conducted by both state and
a variety of non-state actors. These multi-modal
activities can be conducted by separate units, or
even by the same unit, but are generally
operationally and tactically directed and
coordinated within the main battlespace to
achieve synergistic effects in the physical and
psychological dimensions of conflict. The effects
can be gained at all levels of war."
The global benchmark of a hybrid campaign is
currently regarded to be that of the Lebanese
Hizbullah in 2006 when it succeeded in halting
and overturning Israel's incursion into south
Lebanon. Panelists and participants at the Army
War College seminar did allude to a Hizbullah
scenario in the future, but there was mention too
of India in 1971. In fact one of the participants
brought out points from Kautilya that could easily
be taken as preparations for a Hybrid War.
Going by the myriad of actions and activities that
constitute Hybrid Warfare, there is no doubt
aspects of it did exist in the mind and thinking of
Kautilya. Just as there is no doubt that what India
conducted in 1971 was not merely a war in the
conventional sense of the word, but a hybrid
campaign that covered almost all aspects as
highlighted by Hoffman. India prepared for the
campaign physically as well.
But lessons from the conduct of the Pakistani
Army are equally important. They serve to
highlight the mind as the centre of gravity, in
every aspect of warfare. As the Commandant of
Army War College, Lt Gen Anil Chait, said, "The
Army that rejects seminal thinkers, deprives itself
of innovative ideas and intellectual self renewal. It
will ultimately become a defeated Army,
vanquished in the wake of foes who adapt more
wisely and quickly, to the ever-evolving art and
science of war."
++
India and its Hybrid War
.
SOURCE:- THE PRIONIER
.
.
Going by the definition of Hybrid Warfare, what
we witnessed in 1971 was the preparation,
provocation and successful execution of a first
rate Hybrid War.The 40th anniversary of the
Bangladesh Liberation War passed by in the
middle of December. As ever it was an occasion
to reminisce independent India's greatest military
success. Most of the writing and recollecting,
therefore, remained confined to the positive
aspects of the campaign.
What we heard was the purely conventional
story as has been repeatedly told — from Mrs
Indira Gandhi's directive to General Sam
Maneckshaw and his legendary refusal to initiate
hostilities prematurely, to how the Pakistani Army
persisted with digging itself into a hole that it
found surrounded by the Indian Army on
December 16, 1971. Various individual acts of
brilliance and bravery were also recounted. Since
times are changing, the sailing of the US Navy's
Seventh Fleet into the Bay of Bengal found lesser
space than in previous years. But that is par for
the course.
Some of the more discerning comments were
about how India managed a superb manoeuvre
campaign. Instead of attacking conventionally,
which it did initially, the Army bypassed dug-in
Pakistani troops to get to the centre of gravity,
Dhaka. Army-Air Force synergy came into play at
this stage, and some suitably praised it, for it was
exemplary. The mobility of the Indian military
mind stood out in stark contrast to the Pakistani
Army's reactive and confused state of thinking.
But that was only to be expected since the
perpetrator of atrocities and the harbinger of
freedom carry with them contrasting manuals of
perceptions. The preconceived assessment of
India's actions had already been made by the
sheer scale of the Pakistani Army's brutality. It
was a cake walk in the battle of global opinion
polls. In the euphoria of analysis it is not
surprising that two aspects of the Bangladesh
Liberation War get short shrift.
It was, for starters, a just war in the global
perception stakes. Not since World War II was it
possible to define good and bad in terms as
clearly as it was in the weeks and months
running up to December 1971. The villain and the
vanquisher had been determined long before the
first shot was fired. This was as much on
account of Pakistan's villainy as it was on India
playing the perception management game.
Which then leads on to the second aspect of the
war that has gotten short shrift thus far. It still
remains an unanswered query, but which begs
asking. Did India do everything in its abilities to
ensure hostilities happened? Was Indian policy
designed to trigger a war, or was it really a
sleeping neighbour roused to goodness by the
scale of cruelty heaped on East Pakistan? Did
Pakistan simply walk into a mate prepared by the
brilliance of India's manoeuvres on the global
chess board?
Asking questions in this direction does not take
away from Pakistan's perfidy toward its own
people, and it doesn't take away the goodness
from India's actions. India as the initiator of
conflict does not become the villain. What it does
is to lead us to the crux of the second aspect of
the war that has gotten short shrift. Did India in
1971 predate the 21st century global fixation with
Hybrid Warfare? Going simply by the prevailing
definitions of Hybrid Warfare, it is possible to
credit India with the preparation, provocation and
successful execution of a first rate Hybrid War.
Military analysts around the democratic world
have been poring over writing, training, conflicts,
skirmishes, and evolving ideologies to arrive at a
greater understanding of the nature of Hybrid
Warfare. It is regarded as the greatest threat to
the global order of things. The genesis of this
fascination lies in a Beijing pamphlet credited to
two officers of the People's Liberation Army and
mischievously titled 'Unrestricted Warfare'. It
created a storm when published in the late-1990s.
The concept of Hybrid Warfare was thus born,
and in the last decade it has moved from concept
papers in high brow military journals, to seminar
rooms, to possible field training manuals. India
recently conducted its first brain storming session
on Hybrid Warfare in a closed-door seminar at
the prestigious Army War College in Mhow. The
attendees included serving and retired officers,
military and civilian. Organised and hosted by the
Army War College, the seminar represents India's
first attempt at understanding this phenomenon.
Little wonder that the initiative was taken by the
Army War College, doyen of military thought and
teaching in India.
The widely accepted definition of Hybrid Warfare
is credited to its most avid analyst, retired United
States Marine Corps officer Frank Hoffman.
Writing inConflict in the 21st century: The Rise of
Hybrid Wars, published by the Potomac Institute
of Policy Studies, Hoffman states, "Hybrid threats
incorporate a full range of different modes of
warfare, including conventional capabilities,
irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts,
including indiscriminate violence and coercion,
and criminal disorder.
Hybrid Wars can be conducted by both state and
a variety of non-state actors. These multi-modal
activities can be conducted by separate units, or
even by the same unit, but are generally
operationally and tactically directed and
coordinated within the main battlespace to
achieve synergistic effects in the physical and
psychological dimensions of conflict. The effects
can be gained at all levels of war."
The global benchmark of a hybrid campaign is
currently regarded to be that of the Lebanese
Hizbullah in 2006 when it succeeded in halting
and overturning Israel's incursion into south
Lebanon. Panelists and participants at the Army
War College seminar did allude to a Hizbullah
scenario in the future, but there was mention too
of India in 1971. In fact one of the participants
brought out points from Kautilya that could easily
be taken as preparations for a Hybrid War.
Going by the myriad of actions and activities that
constitute Hybrid Warfare, there is no doubt
aspects of it did exist in the mind and thinking of
Kautilya. Just as there is no doubt that what India
conducted in 1971 was not merely a war in the
conventional sense of the word, but a hybrid
campaign that covered almost all aspects as
highlighted by Hoffman. India prepared for the
campaign physically as well.
But lessons from the conduct of the Pakistani
Army are equally important. They serve to
highlight the mind as the centre of gravity, in
every aspect of warfare. As the Commandant of
Army War College, Lt Gen Anil Chait, said, "The
Army that rejects seminal thinkers, deprives itself
of innovative ideas and intellectual self renewal. It
will ultimately become a defeated Army,
vanquished in the wake of foes who adapt more
wisely and quickly, to the ever-evolving art and
science of war."
