This is what Prasun Sengupta has to say about recent LCA negativity
"HAL can provide the same type of consultancy (provided by Dassault), but to date no one has answered why HAL’s contribution in such areas was not sought since the late 1980s! The only one who can answer this is Dr V S Arunachalam, the then DRDO Chief in the late 1980s who successfully convinced the then PM Rajiv Gandhi to adopt the totally flawed methodology of developing the LCA Mk.1. It was evident to any qualified person (I.e. a licensed aeronautical engineer) by 2006 itself that the LCA Mk.1’s design & developmental roadmap was totally flawed & unacceptable to the prospective end-users (more about it explained below). But all this emerged in full-view only since 2015 when the stark truth could no longer stay hidden through denials!
Only those with blinkers on will view the issue as being negative or positive, as opposed to making an objective, emotion-less assessment of ground realities. One must NEVER be passionate about such matters, since injection of emotions clouds one’s final judgement. Now, let’s get the foundational fundamentals right:
1) Anyone seeking to develop a 4th-gen MRCA must receive substantial technical & industrial support from an established aircraft manufacturer from the detailed design stage itself. Was this the case with the LCA project? Definitely not, since the DRDO’s ADA was left in total charge of the LCA’s developmental effort.
2) The person heading ADA ought to be a licensed aeronautical engineer who understands the mandatory need for an optimally engineered end-product. Have any of ADA’s Directors to date been licensed aeronautical engineers? NO.
3) As per universal practice, ONLY a licensed aeronautical engineer will understand that whenever any combat aircraft is being developed, it is MANDATORY to start flight-testing the initial prototytpe aircraft with its on-board cannon & internal self-protection suite ALREADY INSTALLED. Why? Elementary: internal cannopn-firing involves generation of exhaust gases & kinetic recoil that have consequences for engine air-intake design/positioning configuration & the latter affects the structural integrity of the airframe. Until these 2 factors can be quantified through flight-tests, the airframe service-life can NEVER be established. Similarly, internal self-protection suites using EW jammers radiate energy that affects the performance of other avionics LRUs, i.e. electromagnetic interference (EMI). Hence, unless the compatibility of the EW jammer with other on-board mission avionics is established, the optimal performance of the entire mission avionics suite can never be ascertained. Has all this been done so far? NO. Cannon-fire tests/qualification & internal jammer-avionics compatibility tests should have been undertaken as far back as 2006. Since this wasn’t done & still hasn’t been done (contrary to global practices), virtually the entire LCA developmental effort tantamounts to putting the cart before the horse. Again, only licensed aeronautical engineers—not internet fanboys or techies engaged in CAD—are able to comprehend suich mandatory real-life realities. Hence, all that is outstanding for the IAF to do is say & convincingly prove (through easily available empirical data) that the airframe design/robustness Tejas Mk.1 & Tejas Mk.1A is UNSOUND from a flight-safety standpoint & that will be the final nail in the coffin of these two aircraft variants!!!
4) As for LCA versus MiG-21, don’t compare apples with oranges, i.e. 4th-gen MRCA with 2nd-gen MRCA. If you want to compare quantum of testers reqd/used, then do so between the LCA & Rafale or LCA & Gripen or F-16 Block 70. MiG-21 obviously requires far less testers since it does not possess the quantum of on-board avionics the LCA Mk.1 does. Human resource is always the most expensive component of any institution & that’s why the manpower-levels of the IA & IAF have stayed frozen & have not had any increases since the 1990s-hence don’t delude yourself with wrong assumptions."
