Hindustan Trainer HTT-40
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p2prada
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The Tejas Debate Continues | TKS' Tales
This says the same.
Apprehensions about the FBW were high. The air force preferred a more conservative approach of a hybrid system with French collaboration wile the DRDO opted for a more daring quad digital path with American help. The French entities walked out of the collaborative arrangements. They had been enthusiastic supporter of the LCA till then.
We could have got the LCA flying very early had it been for the French.
Anyway, other snippets from the article that hurt LCA-
- The story was the same for the MMR. It was clear that the time lines for the two projects were not matching. Yet, no corrective activity was visible.
- The DRDO was still confident of doing the job in a decade. The Air Force was a little more pragmatic. They would have been happy to introduce the aircraft by 2000.
- To assert its full control over the project, the DRDO created a new design authority entity as the ADA and cut off the HAL design bureau from the loop. A little later, a National Flight Test Centre was created and the ASTE/Flight Test group of the HAL were excluded. These actions generated some interpersonal irritations.
This says the same.
Apprehensions about the FBW were high. The air force preferred a more conservative approach of a hybrid system with French collaboration wile the DRDO opted for a more daring quad digital path with American help. The French entities walked out of the collaborative arrangements. They had been enthusiastic supporter of the LCA till then.
We could have got the LCA flying very early had it been for the French.
Anyway, other snippets from the article that hurt LCA-
- The story was the same for the MMR. It was clear that the time lines for the two projects were not matching. Yet, no corrective activity was visible.
- The DRDO was still confident of doing the job in a decade. The Air Force was a little more pragmatic. They would have been happy to introduce the aircraft by 2000.
- To assert its full control over the project, the DRDO created a new design authority entity as the ADA and cut off the HAL design bureau from the loop. A little later, a National Flight Test Centre was created and the ASTE/Flight Test group of the HAL were excluded. These actions generated some interpersonal irritations.
p2prada
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That is what GTRE means by JV. Indian funded, foreign made Indian product.
The foreign core will be mated to some Indian made items. Only that's extra.
Saturn, P&W, GE, Salyut, EADS, Snecma and a few others are competing in a GTRE tender for the JV.
Saturn has already done what you posted, except that we cannot use the AL-31 tech outside MKI.
By the time we get GE to upgrade the 4/5th gen hybrid EPE for our needs and then we make equivalent engines of our own, the Russians and Americans will have started developing 6th gen engines.
The Russians have already moved away from SCB (4th gen, AL-31/AL-41/117/117S) to Composites (5th gen, PAKFA Item 30 engine) and then to ceramics (6th gen).
http://defenceforumindia.com/forum/...rcraft-technology-evolution-3.html#post769479
Where did you read this any link for the same ? Thanks
WMD
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Admissions & obfuscations in IAF clarification on BS reports
Two news reports in Business Standard, on Monday and Tuesday, have elicited a "clarification" from the Indian Air Force (IAF).
The two articles (July 29, Indian Air Force at war with Hindustan Aeronautics; wants to import, not build, a trainer; and July 30, IAF diluted at least 12 benchmarks for trainer aircraft) reported on a letter from Indian Air Force (IAF) head, Air Chief Marshal N A K Browne, to Defence Minister A K Antony, requesting that a contract for 106 trainer aircraft be awarded to Swiss company, Pilatus. Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL),currently developing the trainer, should be stripped of the contract, says Browne.
The news reports are based on documents available with Business Standard. They report Browne's unprecedented assault on HAL, which he has accused of misrepresenting the cost of their trainer – called the Hindustan Turbo Trainer-40 (HTT-40) – and of being incapable of delivering it on time to the IAF. Browne has written to Antony that the HTT-40 would cost Rs 43.59 crore apiece at 2011 prices and, after factoring in forex escalation and inflation, would cost Rs 59.31 crore in 2018 and Rs 64.77 crore in 2020. The IAF chief contrasts this with the cost of the Pilatus PC-7 Mark II, which he claims costs just Rs 30 crore apiece.
That figure of Rs 30 crore is incorrect. The cost of the PC-7 Mark II is derived from the IAF's contract for 75 PC-7 Mark II trainers, signed on May 24, 2012, for Swiss Franc 557 million (Rs 3,606 crore). The contract specifies that each trainer would cost SwFr 6.09 million. Since payment is linked to delivery, the cost of each PC-7 Mark II is touching Rs 40 crore today.
The news reports also reveal that at least 12 changes were made to performance benchmarks for the basic trainer the month after it was decided to buy 75 out of the IAF's overall requirement of 181 trainers from the global market, while HAL developed the remaining 106. Surprisingly, the performance benchmarks imposed on HAL (in a March 2009 document called the Preliminary Staff Qualitative Requirements or PSQR) were exceptionally stringent. These were subsequently diluted, the month after it was decided to buy abroad, and issued in October 2009 in a document called the Air Staff Qualitative Requirements (ASQR).
In a happy coincidence, the diluted ASQR allowed the PC-7 Mark II to qualify (it did not meet the PSQR requirement which had been imposed on HAL). Without that dilution, Pilatus would have had to field the PC-21, a costlier trainer and unlikely to have been the lowest bidder. Making the PC-7 Mark II technically compliant by lowering the specifications brought a low-cost trainer into contention. Meanwhile the other trainers that qualified – the Korean Aerospace KT-1 and the American Hawker-Beechcraft T-6C Texan-II – were qualitatively better (meeting the PSQR requirements) but also more expensive. The PC-7 Mark II won the contract as the cheapest trainer that met the (lowered) specifications.
Comments were sought from the IAF before each news report but it chose to remain silent. Today, the IAF has responded with a lengthy "clarification". Its first response is that the stringent benchmarks in the PSQR imposed on HAL in March 2009 were only "Desirable" parameters for the trainer, not "Essential" parameters. In lengthy citations of the Defence Procurement Policy, the IAF tries to suggest there was no dilution of QRs, only a legitimate paring of the "Desirable" parameters.
This is not a valid argument. The PSQR, of which Business Standard has a copy, does not differentiate between "Essential" and "Desirable" parameters. All parameters are listed together, with no differentiation. HAL officials, speaking anonymously, confirm that until the parameters were diluted in the ASQR issued in October 2009, the HTT-40 was being built to meet all the parameters in the PSQR.
The IAF also suggests no rules were broken, since the PSQR was revised downwards along with the ASQR, after the benchmarks were lowered in October 2009. "The amended 'PSQR' after ratification by (the MoD) on Dec 1, 2009, were issued to HAL"¦Therefore, as on date, PSQR and ASQR are similar."
This neatly sidesteps the essential point of the news report, that performance benchmarks were irregularly lowered when it came to a global buy. The PSQR was lowered, as was the ASQR. It matters little that they are similar today. In that respect, the IAF confirms a key point made by Business Standard.
The IAF seeks to validate the selection of the PC-7 Mark II by stating, "It needs to be noted that the (tender) for BTA received maximum responses, generating the largest competition in aircraft procurement in recent history, wherein M/s Pilatus was one of the three vendors who met all ASQR and"¦ emerged as the L1 (lowest bid) vendor on the basis of their commercial offer."
This evades the point that lowered benchmarks appear to have allowed the PC-7 Mark II to meet the specifications, introducing a low-cost aircraft into the contest. The deal was held up for almost a year after the Korean defence minister wrote personally to Antony, requesting him to intercede. An internal MoD investigation eventually gave a go-ahead.
The IAF also suggests the compromise made in crucial safety specifications, by removing the need for a 'zero-zero' ejection seat (which allows the pilot to bail out even while the aircraft is stationary on the ground) was done because "retaining the ASQR of 0-0 ejection seat would have narrowed the competition to only two vendors". Lowering the specifications "ensured that more than seven vendors remained in the competition."
On the one hand, this argument accepts that specifications in even "Essential" parameters were lowered. However, the Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) nowhere states that important safety compromises can be made to generate competition. And, the fact is that the PC-7 Mark II does not have a 'zero-zero' ejection seat.
The IAF also tries to justify its dilution of multiple criteria reported by Business Standard by responding that "both the ASQR and current PSQR" do not stipulate requirements for parameters like cockpit pressurisation, external vision criteria, in-flight simulation (for simulating failures), takeoff within 1,000 metres and maximum speed of 450 kmph.
That the ASQR and current PSQR have identical benchmarks do not exonerate the improper dilution of benchmarks in the "current PSQR" after taking a decision to buy the basic trainer from the global market.
In other respects, as evident from the Pilatus PC-7 Mark II webpage on the internet, the IAF "clarification" contains outright falsehoods. It claims "the maximum speed of the PC-7 Mk Il is 555 kmph and not 448 kmph as falsely stated in the news article". In fact, as is well known, the maximum speed of an aircraft is calculated in level flight at sea level and the Pilatus website (Welcome to Pilatus Aircraft Ltd) states this is 448 kmph.
The IAF "clarification" admits the IAF chief gave out false figures in his letter to the RM, since the current exchange rate was not factored in. The IAF now says the PC-7 Mark II would cost Rs 38.3 crore. And, it now says the HTT-40 would be 25 per cent more expensive than the PC-7 Mark II.
Browne's letter to Antony had stated, "As per the contract, the unit price of PC-7 Mk II is Rs 30 crore for the mean delivery year of 2014. The aircraft would be supplied at the same cost up to 2017 under the 'Option Clause'. Hence, the HTT-40 will be more expensive to the IAF when compared with the PC-7 Mk II by over 89 per cent from 2018 onwards."
"It is unprecedented for a service chief to present incorrect figures to the Raksha Mantri," says a senior MoD official anonymously. "And, what makes this doubly damning is that the air chief is using incorrect figures to make a case for a foreign vendor."
Admissions & obfuscations in IAF clarification on BS reports | Business Standard
:fp: :fp:
Is the the current IAF chief another incarnation of former chief Tyagi??
Two news reports in Business Standard, on Monday and Tuesday, have elicited a "clarification" from the Indian Air Force (IAF).
The two articles (July 29, Indian Air Force at war with Hindustan Aeronautics; wants to import, not build, a trainer; and July 30, IAF diluted at least 12 benchmarks for trainer aircraft) reported on a letter from Indian Air Force (IAF) head, Air Chief Marshal N A K Browne, to Defence Minister A K Antony, requesting that a contract for 106 trainer aircraft be awarded to Swiss company, Pilatus. Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL),currently developing the trainer, should be stripped of the contract, says Browne.
The news reports are based on documents available with Business Standard. They report Browne's unprecedented assault on HAL, which he has accused of misrepresenting the cost of their trainer – called the Hindustan Turbo Trainer-40 (HTT-40) – and of being incapable of delivering it on time to the IAF. Browne has written to Antony that the HTT-40 would cost Rs 43.59 crore apiece at 2011 prices and, after factoring in forex escalation and inflation, would cost Rs 59.31 crore in 2018 and Rs 64.77 crore in 2020. The IAF chief contrasts this with the cost of the Pilatus PC-7 Mark II, which he claims costs just Rs 30 crore apiece.
That figure of Rs 30 crore is incorrect. The cost of the PC-7 Mark II is derived from the IAF's contract for 75 PC-7 Mark II trainers, signed on May 24, 2012, for Swiss Franc 557 million (Rs 3,606 crore). The contract specifies that each trainer would cost SwFr 6.09 million. Since payment is linked to delivery, the cost of each PC-7 Mark II is touching Rs 40 crore today.
The news reports also reveal that at least 12 changes were made to performance benchmarks for the basic trainer the month after it was decided to buy 75 out of the IAF's overall requirement of 181 trainers from the global market, while HAL developed the remaining 106. Surprisingly, the performance benchmarks imposed on HAL (in a March 2009 document called the Preliminary Staff Qualitative Requirements or PSQR) were exceptionally stringent. These were subsequently diluted, the month after it was decided to buy abroad, and issued in October 2009 in a document called the Air Staff Qualitative Requirements (ASQR).
In a happy coincidence, the diluted ASQR allowed the PC-7 Mark II to qualify (it did not meet the PSQR requirement which had been imposed on HAL). Without that dilution, Pilatus would have had to field the PC-21, a costlier trainer and unlikely to have been the lowest bidder. Making the PC-7 Mark II technically compliant by lowering the specifications brought a low-cost trainer into contention. Meanwhile the other trainers that qualified – the Korean Aerospace KT-1 and the American Hawker-Beechcraft T-6C Texan-II – were qualitatively better (meeting the PSQR requirements) but also more expensive. The PC-7 Mark II won the contract as the cheapest trainer that met the (lowered) specifications.
Comments were sought from the IAF before each news report but it chose to remain silent. Today, the IAF has responded with a lengthy "clarification". Its first response is that the stringent benchmarks in the PSQR imposed on HAL in March 2009 were only "Desirable" parameters for the trainer, not "Essential" parameters. In lengthy citations of the Defence Procurement Policy, the IAF tries to suggest there was no dilution of QRs, only a legitimate paring of the "Desirable" parameters.
This is not a valid argument. The PSQR, of which Business Standard has a copy, does not differentiate between "Essential" and "Desirable" parameters. All parameters are listed together, with no differentiation. HAL officials, speaking anonymously, confirm that until the parameters were diluted in the ASQR issued in October 2009, the HTT-40 was being built to meet all the parameters in the PSQR.
The IAF also suggests no rules were broken, since the PSQR was revised downwards along with the ASQR, after the benchmarks were lowered in October 2009. "The amended 'PSQR' after ratification by (the MoD) on Dec 1, 2009, were issued to HAL"¦Therefore, as on date, PSQR and ASQR are similar."
This neatly sidesteps the essential point of the news report, that performance benchmarks were irregularly lowered when it came to a global buy. The PSQR was lowered, as was the ASQR. It matters little that they are similar today. In that respect, the IAF confirms a key point made by Business Standard.
The IAF seeks to validate the selection of the PC-7 Mark II by stating, "It needs to be noted that the (tender) for BTA received maximum responses, generating the largest competition in aircraft procurement in recent history, wherein M/s Pilatus was one of the three vendors who met all ASQR and"¦ emerged as the L1 (lowest bid) vendor on the basis of their commercial offer."
This evades the point that lowered benchmarks appear to have allowed the PC-7 Mark II to meet the specifications, introducing a low-cost aircraft into the contest. The deal was held up for almost a year after the Korean defence minister wrote personally to Antony, requesting him to intercede. An internal MoD investigation eventually gave a go-ahead.
The IAF also suggests the compromise made in crucial safety specifications, by removing the need for a 'zero-zero' ejection seat (which allows the pilot to bail out even while the aircraft is stationary on the ground) was done because "retaining the ASQR of 0-0 ejection seat would have narrowed the competition to only two vendors". Lowering the specifications "ensured that more than seven vendors remained in the competition."
On the one hand, this argument accepts that specifications in even "Essential" parameters were lowered. However, the Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) nowhere states that important safety compromises can be made to generate competition. And, the fact is that the PC-7 Mark II does not have a 'zero-zero' ejection seat.
The IAF also tries to justify its dilution of multiple criteria reported by Business Standard by responding that "both the ASQR and current PSQR" do not stipulate requirements for parameters like cockpit pressurisation, external vision criteria, in-flight simulation (for simulating failures), takeoff within 1,000 metres and maximum speed of 450 kmph.
That the ASQR and current PSQR have identical benchmarks do not exonerate the improper dilution of benchmarks in the "current PSQR" after taking a decision to buy the basic trainer from the global market.
In other respects, as evident from the Pilatus PC-7 Mark II webpage on the internet, the IAF "clarification" contains outright falsehoods. It claims "the maximum speed of the PC-7 Mk Il is 555 kmph and not 448 kmph as falsely stated in the news article". In fact, as is well known, the maximum speed of an aircraft is calculated in level flight at sea level and the Pilatus website (Welcome to Pilatus Aircraft Ltd) states this is 448 kmph.
The IAF "clarification" admits the IAF chief gave out false figures in his letter to the RM, since the current exchange rate was not factored in. The IAF now says the PC-7 Mark II would cost Rs 38.3 crore. And, it now says the HTT-40 would be 25 per cent more expensive than the PC-7 Mark II.
Browne's letter to Antony had stated, "As per the contract, the unit price of PC-7 Mk II is Rs 30 crore for the mean delivery year of 2014. The aircraft would be supplied at the same cost up to 2017 under the 'Option Clause'. Hence, the HTT-40 will be more expensive to the IAF when compared with the PC-7 Mk II by over 89 per cent from 2018 onwards."
"It is unprecedented for a service chief to present incorrect figures to the Raksha Mantri," says a senior MoD official anonymously. "And, what makes this doubly damning is that the air chief is using incorrect figures to make a case for a foreign vendor."
Admissions & obfuscations in IAF clarification on BS reports | Business Standard
:fp: :fp:Is the the current IAF chief another incarnation of former chief Tyagi??
Decklander
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There is complete team which has been put in place by the Italian waitress starting from Naik to Tyagi to browne to another two.
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You are side stepping the issue and giving a false info. ADA was created to implement Fly by wire and composite tech requirement raised for LCA by the scientific elite who thought with imminent supplies of F-16 to pak the version of the fighter that IAF asked for as a monkey level improvement will be obsolete and will have no use in Indo-Pak air combat.
ADA was created after the LCA techs were finalized. So accusing ADA of upping the ante has no basis.What is more important is after the Mig-29 , IAF did not buy any non-RSS single engined fighter.Their next buy was Mirage with FCS and fly by wire which can hold it's own against F-16. And then they moved for Mig-29 which had shorter range, lower payload for a twin engined fighter but had a very high TWR to face the F-16.
SO IAF was wrong and Scientific establishment that set out the tech to be implemented for LCA by ADA was right. If at all a cheap fighter like an improved Mig-21 was developed by 1990s, IAF would have flatly refused to induct it citing it's inferiority over Mig-29 and MIrage.
Also all the fancy consultancy by the foreign consultants came to a halt by the late 1980s when we tested PRITHVI. SO all the tech for LCA was developed in house including the Fly By Wire FCS and radar (later with israeli processor for air to ground mode). And engine dragged on and it became irrelevant once IAF once again upped the ante by asking for higher weight wing when they asked for higr weight higer range, more launch stress inducing Air to Air WVR missiles for LCA.Which led to FSED-phase-II in 2004 further delaying the program.
Thanks to the wrangling by IAF which delayed the funding to 1993 (leading to progress in the crucial years of 1989(when project definiton was over) and 1993 funds release for the TDs), Thsi delay was the one that derailed the FCS co-operation between US and India. Because in the late 90s sanctions kicked in after India tested nuclear device which stalled the FCS JV and it introduced another 3 years delay for the indigenous FCS fly by wire development.
Grippen team could not develop an indigenous fly by wire them selves and rushed to US Jv after the crash of few prototypes which killed a few test pilots is and ADA developed it all by itself is a testimony to the capability of the IIT an Kota Harinarayana's developmental team.
It was only because of IAF chief Krishnaswamy's letter to Defence minister and the continued lack of confidence expressed by IAF in the late 80s which led to the funding delay of 4 years and more importantly if it is not for Abdul Kalam's intervention the program could have been summarily cancelled.
It was none other than the former president Who intervened on ADA's behalf which led to the decisions of Two Tds first to demo the tech and only after five years of testing the tech funds for PVs and LSPs will be granted.While this intervention saved the program, it delayed the program because since PVS are not rolling out sid by side from the production line in months , the testing program was also delayed.
Once again a group of MPs were despatched to ADA to review the progress of ADA and a decision was about to be made to shut down the program. Then It was Ratan Tata who intervened and stopped the program being closed down,You can see the article in TAMAK -007 blog.
It was this continued uncertainity over the program which stopped HAL from allocating enough resources and mebers of the developmental team quitting in disgust.If at all IAF whole heartedly backed the program ot would have been over long by now.
This is what meant by Philip Rajkumar when he openly says in his bookThat IAF dropped the ball till 2006.Only in 2006 after seeing the success of the Tejas and it's imminent entry into service IAF got involved in the program and started to raise close to 200 request fro actions . Other than 12 (which are reserved for Mk-2) almost all of them was cleared.
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bennedose
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The air force explanation sounds like a lame excuse..
Admissions & obfuscations in IAF clarification on BS reports | idrw.org
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If service chief's won't toe the UPA line on procurement they will meet the fate of,"former army chief V.K. Singh".Admissions & obfuscations in IAF clarification on BS reports
Two news reports in Business Standard, on Monday and Tuesday, have elicited a "clarification" from the Indian Air Force (IAF).
The two articles (July 29, Indian Air Force at war with Hindustan Aeronautics; wants to import, not build, a trainer; and July 30, IAF diluted at least 12 benchmarks for trainer aircraft) reported on a letter from Indian Air Force (IAF) head, Air Chief Marshal N A K Browne, to Defence Minister A K Antony, requesting that a contract for 106 trainer aircraft be awarded to Swiss company, Pilatus. Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL),currently developing the trainer, should be stripped of the contract, says Browne.
The news reports are based on documents available with Business Standard. They report Browne's unprecedented assault on HAL, which he has accused of misrepresenting the cost of their trainer – called the Hindustan Turbo Trainer-40 (HTT-40) – and of being incapable of delivering it on time to the IAF. Browne has written to Antony that the HTT-40 would cost Rs 43.59 crore apiece at 2011 prices and, after factoring in forex escalation and inflation, would cost Rs 59.31 crore in 2018 and Rs 64.77 crore in 2020. The IAF chief contrasts this with the cost of the Pilatus PC-7 Mark II, which he claims costs just Rs 30 crore apiece.
That figure of Rs 30 crore is incorrect. The cost of the PC-7 Mark II is derived from the IAF's contract for 75 PC-7 Mark II trainers, signed on May 24, 2012, for Swiss Franc 557 million (Rs 3,606 crore). The contract specifies that each trainer would cost SwFr 6.09 million. Since payment is linked to delivery, the cost of each PC-7 Mark II is touching Rs 40 crore today.
The news reports also reveal that at least 12 changes were made to performance benchmarks for the basic trainer the month after it was decided to buy 75 out of the IAF's overall requirement of 181 trainers from the global market, while HAL developed the remaining 106. Surprisingly, the performance benchmarks imposed on HAL (in a March 2009 document called the Preliminary Staff Qualitative Requirements or PSQR) were exceptionally stringent. These were subsequently diluted, the month after it was decided to buy abroad, and issued in October 2009 in a document called the Air Staff Qualitative Requirements (ASQR).
In a happy coincidence, the diluted ASQR allowed the PC-7 Mark II to qualify (it did not meet the PSQR requirement which had been imposed on HAL). Without that dilution, Pilatus would have had to field the PC-21, a costlier trainer and unlikely to have been the lowest bidder. Making the PC-7 Mark II technically compliant by lowering the specifications brought a low-cost trainer into contention. Meanwhile the other trainers that qualified – the Korean Aerospace KT-1 and the American Hawker-Beechcraft T-6C Texan-II – were qualitatively better (meeting the PSQR requirements) but also more expensive. The PC-7 Mark II won the contract as the cheapest trainer that met the (lowered) specifications.
Comments were sought from the IAF before each news report but it chose to remain silent. Today, the IAF has responded with a lengthy "clarification". Its first response is that the stringent benchmarks in the PSQR imposed on HAL in March 2009 were only "Desirable" parameters for the trainer, not "Essential" parameters. In lengthy citations of the Defence Procurement Policy, the IAF tries to suggest there was no dilution of QRs, only a legitimate paring of the "Desirable" parameters.
This is not a valid argument. The PSQR, of which Business Standard has a copy, does not differentiate between "Essential" and "Desirable" parameters. All parameters are listed together, with no differentiation. HAL officials, speaking anonymously, confirm that until the parameters were diluted in the ASQR issued in October 2009, the HTT-40 was being built to meet all the parameters in the PSQR.
The IAF also suggests no rules were broken, since the PSQR was revised downwards along with the ASQR, after the benchmarks were lowered in October 2009. "The amended 'PSQR' after ratification by (the MoD) on Dec 1, 2009, were issued to HAL"¦Therefore, as on date, PSQR and ASQR are similar."
This neatly sidesteps the essential point of the news report, that performance benchmarks were irregularly lowered when it came to a global buy. The PSQR was lowered, as was the ASQR. It matters little that they are similar today. In that respect, the IAF confirms a key point made by Business Standard.
The IAF seeks to validate the selection of the PC-7 Mark II by stating, "It needs to be noted that the (tender) for BTA received maximum responses, generating the largest competition in aircraft procurement in recent history, wherein M/s Pilatus was one of the three vendors who met all ASQR and"¦ emerged as the L1 (lowest bid) vendor on the basis of their commercial offer."
This evades the point that lowered benchmarks appear to have allowed the PC-7 Mark II to meet the specifications, introducing a low-cost aircraft into the contest. The deal was held up for almost a year after the Korean defence minister wrote personally to Antony, requesting him to intercede. An internal MoD investigation eventually gave a go-ahead.
The IAF also suggests the compromise made in crucial safety specifications, by removing the need for a 'zero-zero' ejection seat (which allows the pilot to bail out even while the aircraft is stationary on the ground) was done because "retaining the ASQR of 0-0 ejection seat would have narrowed the competition to only two vendors". Lowering the specifications "ensured that more than seven vendors remained in the competition."
On the one hand, this argument accepts that specifications in even "Essential" parameters were lowered. However, the Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) nowhere states that important safety compromises can be made to generate competition. And, the fact is that the PC-7 Mark II does not have a 'zero-zero' ejection seat.
The IAF also tries to justify its dilution of multiple criteria reported by Business Standard by responding that "both the ASQR and current PSQR" do not stipulate requirements for parameters like cockpit pressurisation, external vision criteria, in-flight simulation (for simulating failures), takeoff within 1,000 metres and maximum speed of 450 kmph.
That the ASQR and current PSQR have identical benchmarks do not exonerate the improper dilution of benchmarks in the "current PSQR" after taking a decision to buy the basic trainer from the global market.
In other respects, as evident from the Pilatus PC-7 Mark II webpage on the internet, the IAF "clarification" contains outright falsehoods. It claims "the maximum speed of the PC-7 Mk Il is 555 kmph and not 448 kmph as falsely stated in the news article". In fact, as is well known, the maximum speed of an aircraft is calculated in level flight at sea level and the Pilatus website (Welcome to Pilatus Aircraft Ltd) states this is 448 kmph.
The IAF "clarification" admits the IAF chief gave out false figures in his letter to the RM, since the current exchange rate was not factored in. The IAF now says the PC-7 Mark II would cost Rs 38.3 crore. And, it now says the HTT-40 would be 25 per cent more expensive than the PC-7 Mark II.
Browne's letter to Antony had stated, "As per the contract, the unit price of PC-7 Mk II is Rs 30 crore for the mean delivery year of 2014. The aircraft would be supplied at the same cost up to 2017 under the 'Option Clause'. Hence, the HTT-40 will be more expensive to the IAF when compared with the PC-7 Mk II by over 89 per cent from 2018 onwards."
"It is unprecedented for a service chief to present incorrect figures to the Raksha Mantri," says a senior MoD official anonymously. "And, what makes this doubly damning is that the air chief is using incorrect figures to make a case for a foreign vendor."
Admissions & obfuscations in IAF clarification on BS reports | Business Standard
Is the the current IAF chief another incarnation of former chief Tyagi??
It was the message sent out by the UPA kichidi whose role is carpet bagging by sacking him for questioning the scam ridden TATRA truck deal.
So there is no use blaming service chiefs over this.
Sorry I don't agree with you the Chief have a choice to retire rich or Retire with Respect their future is taken care by Armed Forces Tyagi was known as a bad peach he scuttled many projects which could have resulted in import substitution for the Airforce. Armed forces personnel are well looked after with pension and Medical Facility .........
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You have to give proof of SATURN giving single crystal tech to India. you are making this claim that AL-41 is produced from raw material stage to full engine in India again and again. No one will transfer the tech to make SCB in India, But you are saying that these blades are made in India.
Also it is ceramic matrix that people go for towards new engine blade material not composites.
It was the failure of GOI in the seventies to negotiate such a deal that killed Marut in the seventies.
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As far as FBW and composite goes P Rajkumar had mentioned that it was not possible for us to develop those without the help the international players gave us so this should put to rest about we going alone and developing all on our own which is not the entire truth. What delayed it was the sanction in 1998 and ADA had to work alone but all those interaction with International Suppliers , Lockmart/Martin etc made its job easier although with lot of delays since the entire infrastructure to test FBW had to be made in India.
Looking back if a analog FBW or some other choice was a better option to speed up LCA induction by late 90's or mid 90's then IMO that would have been a better choice as by now we would have LCA flying for decades and dozens of squadron even if it means that being Mig-21++ or slightly better then JF-17 because in the end Aircraft Technology is just one part of the game.
Ajai Shukla has been known to do hit jobs in the past so I would take his reporting with a bunch of salt ... There are not exactly Black ( IAF ) and White ( HAL ) in the trainer deal there could be grey shades as well which we may not be aware off , you can always report a story that can paint people in black and white. Ofcourse I expect MOD to come out and clarify as both IAF and HAL reports to the MOD and being the boss of these two I expect them to put it in black and white for the greater good of these two organisation.
Looking back if a analog FBW or some other choice was a better option to speed up LCA induction by late 90's or mid 90's then IMO that would have been a better choice as by now we would have LCA flying for decades and dozens of squadron even if it means that being Mig-21++ or slightly better then JF-17 because in the end Aircraft Technology is just one part of the game.
Ajai Shukla has been known to do hit jobs in the past so I would take his reporting with a bunch of salt ... There are not exactly Black ( IAF ) and White ( HAL ) in the trainer deal there could be grey shades as well which we may not be aware off , you can always report a story that can paint people in black and white. Ofcourse I expect MOD to come out and clarify as both IAF and HAL reports to the MOD and being the boss of these two I expect them to put it in black and white for the greater good of these two organisation.
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You are side stepping the issue and giving a false info. ADA was created to implement Fly by wire and composite tech requirement raised for LCA by the scientific elite who thought with imminent supplies of F-16 to pak the version of the fighter that IAF asked for as a monkey level improvement will be obsolete and will have no use in Indo-Pak air combat.
ADA was created after the LCA techs were finalized. So accusing ADA of upping the ante has no basis.What is more important is after the Mig-29 , IAF did not buy any non-RSS single engined fighter.Their next buy was Mirage with FCS and fly by wire which can hold it's own against F-16. And then they moved for Mig-29 which had shorter range, lower payload for a twin engined fighter but had a very high TWR to face the F-16.
SO IAF was wrong and Scientific establishment that set out the tech to be implemented for LCA by ADA was right. If at all a cheap fighter like an improved Mig-21 was developed by 1990s, IAF would have flatly refused to induct it citing it's inferiority over Mig-29 and MIrage.
Also all the fancy consultancy by the foreign consultants came to a halt by the late 1980s when we tested PRITHVI. SO all the tech for LCA was developed in house including the Fly By Wire FCS and radar (later with israeli processor for air to ground mode). And engine dragged on and it became irrelevant once IAF once again upped the ante by asking for higher weight wing when they asked for higr weight higer range, more launch stress inducing Air to Air WVR missiles for LCA.Which led to FSED-phase-II in 2004 further delaying the program.
Thanks to the wrangling by IAF which delayed the funding to 1993 (leading to progress in the crucial years of 1989(when project definiton was over) and 1993 funds release for the TDs), Thsi delay was the one that derailed the FCS co-operation between US and India. Because in the late 90s sanctions kicked in after India tested nuclear device which stalled the FCS JV and it introduced another 3 years delay for the indigenous FCS fly by wire development.
Grippen team could not develop an indigenous fly by wire them selves and rushed to US Jv after the crash of few prototypes which killed a few test pilots is and ADA developed it all by itself is a testimony to the capability of the IIT an Kota Harinarayana's developmental team.
It was only because of IAF chief Krishnaswamy's letter to Defence minister and the continued lack of confidence expressed by IAF in the late 80s which led to the funding delay of 4 years and more importantly if it is not for Abdul Kalam's intervention the program could have been summarily cancelled.
It was none other than the former president Who intervened on ADA's behalf which led to the decisions of Two Tds first to demo the tech and only after five years of testing the tech funds for PVs and LSPs will be granted.While this intervention saved the program, it delayed the program because since PVS are not rolling out sid by side from the production line in months , the testing program was also delayed.
Once again a group of MPs were despatched to ADA to review the progress of ADA and a decision was about to be made to shut down the program. Then It was Ratan Tata who intervened and stopped the program being closed down,You can see the article in TAMAK -007 blog.
It was this continued uncertainity over the program which stopped HAL from allocating enough resources and mebers of the developmental team quitting in disgust.If at all IAF whole heartedly backed the program ot would have been over long by now.
This is what meant by Philip Rajkumar when he openly says in his bookThat IAF dropped the ball till 2006.Only in 2006 after seeing the success of the Tejas and it's imminent entry into service IAF got involved in the program and started to raise close to 200 request fro actions . Other than 12 (which are reserved for Mk-2) almost all of them was cleared.
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IAF-HAL tiff threatens to shatter indigenization quest - Times Of India
Well the paid news lobby is starting it's artillery shelling to finish the HTT-40 effort by HAl.
Just look at the article. 95 percent space reserved for IAF's views from ,"unnamed sources", which tells a white lie that Pliatus- mk-7 is cheaper than HTT-40 , by hiding the fact that total per unit, maintenance , overhaul cost of Pliatus mk-7 will be significantly higher than the HTT_40.
The "unnamed source " also cleverly conceals the fact that Pliatus mk-7 will not have Zero-Zero ejection seat. But HTT-40 will have one. This means the trainee pilot will be killed if engine fails in lower altitude because he cannot eject at lower altitude with Zero-sixty ejection seat.(only Zero- Zero ejection seat is capable of saving the pilot at all altitudes.)
The following quote by unnamed source,
hides the crucial fact that ,the cost of pliatus is in swiss francs and as per today's exchange rate it will cost more than 40 crores, and as each year passes with the continuing depreciation of rupee the pliatus spares, future new unit costs will increase dramatically over the years. Adding insult to the injury is Pliatus mk-7 is a much inferior trainer with lesser safety features for trainee pilots at low altitude and will kill the domestic trainer effort for another decade, just as the purchase of jaguar killed the marut and indian fighter effort for two decades .
And another cruel joke by the unnamed IAF source is
But the HLL which has set aside Rs 150 crore of it's own fund to finish the HTT-40 and show it is more economical than the Pliatus and technologically superior to Pliatus mk-7 in many counts with Zero-Zero ejection seat which allows the trainee pilot to bail out at all altitudes( a crucial factor missing in the pliatus mk-7) is playing truant with IAF by not closing the shutters on HTT-40, and the MOD which is twiddling it's thumps is unable to force the HLL to close the HTT-40 effort prematurely according tot the source,
And any economist who considers the total life cycle cost of Pliatus mk-7 whose all spares and maintenance cost is in swiss francs (with inferior tech features ofcourse) through out it's service life will call the following quote by IAF unnamed source as total lie,
Well the paid news lobby is starting it's artillery shelling to finish the HTT-40 effort by HAl.
Just look at the article. 95 percent space reserved for IAF's views from ,"unnamed sources", which tells a white lie that Pliatus- mk-7 is cheaper than HTT-40 , by hiding the fact that total per unit, maintenance , overhaul cost of Pliatus mk-7 will be significantly higher than the HTT_40.
The "unnamed source " also cleverly conceals the fact that Pliatus mk-7 will not have Zero-Zero ejection seat. But HTT-40 will have one. This means the trainee pilot will be killed if engine fails in lower altitude because he cannot eject at lower altitude with Zero-sixty ejection seat.(only Zero- Zero ejection seat is capable of saving the pilot at all altitudes.)
The following quote by unnamed source,
hides the crucial fact that ,the cost of pliatus is in swiss francs and as per today's exchange rate it will cost more than 40 crores, and as each year passes with the continuing depreciation of rupee the pliatus spares, future new unit costs will increase dramatically over the years. Adding insult to the injury is Pliatus mk-7 is a much inferior trainer with lesser safety features for trainee pilots at low altitude and will kill the domestic trainer effort for another decade, just as the purchase of jaguar killed the marut and indian fighter effort for two decades .
And another cruel joke by the unnamed IAF source is
that the HAL which could not complete a simple HTT-40 trainer in time to IAF's satisfaction is expected to complete 50 percent of the FGFA work. Now he accuses HAL of surrendering 30 percent of this 50 percent R & D work to sukhoi to concentrate on the HTT-40, joke of the century perhaps.(this statement by the source is seen in the coimbatore edition of the TOI , but not in the net edition)
But the HLL which has set aside Rs 150 crore of it's own fund to finish the HTT-40 and show it is more economical than the Pliatus and technologically superior to Pliatus mk-7 in many counts with Zero-Zero ejection seat which allows the trainee pilot to bail out at all altitudes( a crucial factor missing in the pliatus mk-7) is playing truant with IAF by not closing the shutters on HTT-40, and the MOD which is twiddling it's thumps is unable to force the HLL to close the HTT-40 effort prematurely according tot the source,
And any economist who considers the total life cycle cost of Pliatus mk-7 whose all spares and maintenance cost is in swiss francs (with inferior tech features ofcourse) through out it's service life will call the following quote by IAF unnamed source as total lie,
The HAL's counter explanation that fills the whole page of business standard article by Ajai Shukla is not buried with a single sentence quote,
each and every article written by this reported always quote unnamed Services officer with bogus explanations, with zero space for counter view by the design organization accused of commiting such sins, whether it be Arjun or LCA, the logic of this particular reporter is the same.
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Where is IAF's concern for the life of trainee pilot who is prone to make some mistake during the most challenging landing, take off and low altitude phase of the flight?,
But when it comes to crshing MIG-21s with bad engine design feature , unnamed sources always accuse HAL of not maintaining the MIG-21 well enough to save the precious lives of IAF pilots. Why suddenly this concern has evaporated when it came to Pliatus mk-7?
But when it comes to crshing MIG-21s with bad engine design feature , unnamed sources always accuse HAL of not maintaining the MIG-21 well enough to save the precious lives of IAF pilots. Why suddenly this concern has evaporated when it came to Pliatus mk-7?
I have only one gal with HAL, if HAL was making the BTA as per original PSQR till 2009(i. e. a better plane, but when they started working on original PSQR??) and assuming that they did some progress, its has been 4 years since then. What they were doing in all those 4 years? They should have gone ahead with the original PSQR and shown/launch a better plane today. Wouldn't this have been foolish on their part to drop the original design in 2009 and create a new with lesser capability later, for which they may not even meet the deadline. I would take a guess and say that they were no where progressing with the original design, even when we are building the LCA now. Now after 4 years, they think that they can make a world war 2 era, downgraded plan equal to PC-7, that's why all this drama. Not really they are to blame though. If the organization is not managed better and no politicians wants it to be anyway to get extra money, then you can't really blame the people working in it.
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'Our trainer aircraft 40 times better than F-16s', News - City - Bangalore Mirror,Bangalore Mirror
Did you ever read this?
http://ajaishukla.blogspot.in/
AFAIK the PSQR for HTT-40 is given in MARCH 2009 only. SO according to you how much time it will take to develop and deliver the plane?
SO what did the IAF do till MARCH 2009?
Why couldn't they forsee the demand for a HTT-40 type trainer earlier?
Why did they give a stringent PSQR in MARCH 2009?
And how did they decide that by October 2009 itself that HLL will not be able to meet it?
And how within 10 months time they issued a diluted ASR for internal tender to buy Pliatus?
IAF gave a requirement PSQR only in 2009 march according to the article. So when did the IAf expect the plane to be delivered?
By October 2009?
http://millenniumpost.in/NewsContent.aspx?NID=4459
Only on June 2012 HLL issued a tender for engine, so it is not as if the HTT-40 is in the making for the decades,
As per the above article , the reason the IAF wants cancellation of HTT-40 is not due to the delay by HLL in developing HTT-40 according to it's specs.IAF never cared much about specs or pilot safety is known from the diluted OCT 2009 ASR for pliatus tender.
IAF doesnot want HLL to use it's HLL's own 150 crore internal funds to develop HTT-40, because they already got Pliatus .
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/indiahom...HAL-urges-Antony-buy-Swiss-Pilatus-PC-7s.html
he cost of HTT-40 will be comparable to pliatus even with more advanced features like zero-zero ejection seat.
http://idp.justthe80.com/air-force-projects/trainers/htt-40-basic-flying-trainer
http://trishul-trident.blogspot.in/2012/12/rip-htt-35-htt-40-hjt-36-luh.html
So it was not as if HLL was sleeping tight on the trainer front. It did roll out proposals and all of them sank under the silence of IAF-MOD combine.
Then suddenly IAF woke up on 2009 March and issued a very advanced PSQR for HLL.
And even more surprisingly decided by 2009 october that HLL would not build the fighter,
And issued a global tender with significantly lower specs, And now want the HLL to stop developning the HTT-40.
You sleep for a decade on HTT-35 BT for a decade. Wake up suddenly on one fine morning in march 2009. Issue a stringent PSQR.
Then within six months reject HLL effort. issue a watered down ASR for global tender.
What kind of decision making is this?
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^ Thanks for the post, as I missed the date in article. It gives an idea of why IAF asks for anything only when the planes start going down and their is an immediate need. Don't they have any future Roadmap. if they had asked for a trainer in 2004-05 then HAL would have had good enough time.
sob
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I just get a feeling that there is no mechanism for the joint working of the Forces and the Defence Sector PSUs.
These issues should be thrashed out in meetings and there should be a joint task force.
IN does not seem to have these issues, any takers for it?
These issues should be thrashed out in meetings and there should be a joint task force.
IN does not seem to have these issues, any takers for it?
