Discussion in 'Politics & Society' started by ajtr, Mar 26, 2010.
Headley names Pak Army officers behind 26/11
Headley confession shows close Al Qaeda, LeT ties: NYT
Pakistani Army is shameless. They will hide behind technicalities and denials and will continue to perpetrate state sponsored terrorist activities until India pulls up it socks and show these terrorists their place.
Firstly, India should start by declaring Pakistan as a terror sponsoring nation and should cut-off all ties and punish them on all fronts - economic, military, diplomatic and even water.
Exactly, as long as India deals with them as if terrorism is just another mundane issue, PA will keep doing this. Why should India recognise Pakistan as a responsible state? Why are we submitting dossiers to Pakistan about its own army's involvement as if it is a responsible state? This sham must end and the guilty party is not Pakistan(it will continue to do what it was created for), it is Indian leadership.
I completely agree with you DD, lets say tommorow GOI declares that it has come to the conclusion that all terrorism in India emanation from Pakistan is directly sponsored by PA, not just their present leadership but over generations, and therefore India declares Pakistan as a rogue nation and terrorist nation and thus cuts off all ties with them. Their citizens would not be allowed to travel to India. Any company/country doing business with Pakistan will be given lesser priority then the country/company which is not doing business with them. What will happen if GOI takes this stand? Will heavens fall on our head? Why is GOI so docile?
Nothings going to happen even after all these revelations.
India should adopt the following approach, Issue a fixed timeline or deadline to pakistan for bringing all those terrorists to book. Make it a big issue at every forum internationally. Make it clear in no uncertain terms that india will take actions it sees fit after the deadline passes.
That will highten tensions as most people will construe it as an ultimatum for war. But no we don't want an open war unless its imposed on us. What we can do is assassinate all those responsible. Saeed, Azhar, Salauddin, Dawood. I am sure our good friends in Mossad will help us with various techniques. Openly claim responsibility for such assassinations. That will make all take notice that india will no longer sit quite. Also attack terror camps esp Muridke which is a thriving center of excellence in terror education. If pakistan wants to escalate, they can be our guests.
Access to Mumbai terrorist creates rift between India, U.S.
Funny, Pakistan Has nothing to say on this or Headly's involvement in 26/11. Are they all dead.
Yusuf, immediately after 26/11, India raised the pitch and demanded action from Pakistan and threatened that 'all options are open', the issue was raised on all important fora around the world. So, the first step that you said was done at that time. Once, Pakistan did not do anything, the next step of retribution, covert or overt as India saw fit should have followed. It didnt. Why? B@ll-less leadership...
The same will happen with your proposal as well, the first step of giving ultimatum, raising issue on all forum will happen, but the second step is were India falters.
Obama tells Pak to catch 26/11 brain
Doesn't come as a surprise. Reminds me of Kargil, how during and after the blunderous operation all the officers responsible for the planning and execution went silent. It was even denied that any state actors were involved for the initial stages. They will always cook up terror plans, launch them, watch them blow up in their faces and then accept guilt only after having been caught. PA has been engaging in this dark side of unconventional warfare for a long time now with zero accountability. They have mowed down any criticism or opposition from within and gone on a killing spree outside from India to United Kingdom Pakistani military establishment has left fingerprints all over with acts of terrorism.
David Headley's Plea Agreement
I think this confession coming out is a ploy by US to keep Pakistani begging bowl in check nothing else
Rather i think usa is playing both india and pakistan against each other to get concessions from both.
The Asset Managers
DAVID HEADLEY 26/11 INTELLIGENCE
Headley’s confessions prove a Pak role. But did the US know of 26/11 beforehand?
Now that clear pictures of this US agent are being released, does Bhattson's excuse of going blind seeing the white skin hold water? Dawood miyan looks a typical pakistani elite, nothing more.
Headley deal hints at near miss for Delhi military spots
The focus of Laskhar-e-Tayyeba (LeT) terrorist David Coleman Headley's case has been his role in conducting the reconnaissance for the Mumbai attack on November 26, 2008.
But now, Indian investigators have been struck by the tasks he was assigned for the planned follow-up attack that could have taken place had he not been arrested in Chicago in October.
Primary among his targets was the National Defence College (NDC), located on 6 Tees January Marg in Lutyens New Delhi, opposite Gandhi Smriti - the house were Mahatma Gandhi was assassinated.
According to his interrogators and as mentioned in his plea agreement, Headley said he was pushed by the LeT handlers to target the so-called ideological spots - the Jewish Chabad Houses, hotels where foreigners and Indians mingled and the Chhatrapati Shivaji train terminal. But the Pakistan Army's Inter- Services Intelligence personnel were reportedly keen that he scout targets related to the military.
Headley told the Federal Bureau of Investigation ( FBI) that he had surveyed the NDC and its sister facility, Raksha Bhavan where the students flats are, several times during his visit to New Delhi in 2009. He had once walked 2.5 km from Raksha Bhavan, which is located on Man Singh Road near the Andhra Bhavan roundabout, to the NDC. Whether he also videographed this roundabout is not known. But he did tell the FBI that he had observed the timings of the buses as they ferried the student officers from Raksha Bhavan to the NDC and back.
The college, which is the highest- level training institution for senior officers of the armed forces, houses a hundred students, staff and support personnel at any given time. Many of them are foreigners from countries such as the US, Australia, the UK, Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka.
Headley provided the details of the LeTISI link- up in what is being called the 'Karachi Project' of conducting terrorist strikes in India using local recruits, and Lashkar cadre where possible.
However, intelligence officials said Abdul Khwaja, aka Amjad, who was handed over to India from Bangladesh did not use the word "Karachi Project". But he claimed to have met several Indians, including the Bhatkal brothers and Abdul Aziz aka Gidda at a safe house in the high- security cantonment in Karachi.
Who paid David Coleman Headley's credit card bill?
NEW DELHI: Who paid Pakistani-American terrorist David Coleman Headley's international credit card bills is at the heart of a widening probe which has revealed that at least Rs 20-25 crore was spent by terror suspects in the recent past across the country through such credit cards. Bills for such cards were paid in US, Canada and Nepal, and establishing a link could unearth the identity of their masters.
Intelligence agencies, tracking economic footprints and wide network of jihadis and their sleeper cells in different cities, have found that of late, terror suspects have been using international credit cards issued in US, Canada, UK, Dubai, Nepal and Bangladesh and bills are picked up by their handlers based in these countries. Agencies are identifying all such payment gateways and their beneficiaries.
It's no more hawala channel or traders operating across the LoC that are sources of funding for the scores of terror outfits active within the country. Terrorists are now individually given international credit cards which they use to withdraw money for their operations in India and pay for their bills during their stay here.
Top sources said at least Rs 20-25 crore expenditure made by terror suspects in the recent past through such credit cards was traced by security and intelligence agencies. Investigation revealed that money was withdrawn in all parts of the country, including Delhi, Mumbai, Bangalore, Hyderabad and Kashmir — indicating the wide spread of terror networks and the ease with which they manage to hoodwink the surveillance system.
In what could lead to the exposing of a wider base of terror masterminds operating from as far away as US, Canada and some other destinations in Europe, the government is in touch with these countries to verify who picked up the credit card bills on behalf of these terror suspects.
The attempt of terror outfits to use destinations like the US and Europe to fund their operatives here through credit cards is also a new modus operandi, according to a senior intelligence official. This is to hoodwink the financial system that was keeping a close watch on all possible channels of funding for terror outfits coming from countries like Pakistan, Bangladesh and UAE, he added.
The government had imposed strict know-your-customer guidelines for banks and financial institutions in the country to choke terror funding using the legal system. This was in addition to a major crackdown on hawala channels after a series of terror attacks in the past were linked to such financing methods.
Road ahead on Headley
David Headley has pleaded guilty on 12 counts, including the 26/11 Mumbai attacks and the Danish plot. However, not much is known of his role in the wave of attacks in India between September 2006 and July 2008. This should be an area of focus for India if and when it gets to interrogate him
The Chicago conspiracy case has taken a curious turn with the plea agreement between the US Attorney’s Office and David Coleman Headley. The 35-page plea bargain document filed with the US Court, Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, makes for interesting reading. While the earlier chargesheets had covered several details on the transcripts of conversations and e-mails exchanged between David Headley and his Pakistan-based controllers from both the Lashkar-e-Tayyeba and Brigade 313, the plea bargain reveals some new facts.
While it was known previously that Headley had attended training in Lashkar camps in Pakistan in 2002-2003, the plea bargain details specifically what training was received and when. In February 2002 Headley is said to have attended a three-week course on indoctrination on the merits of jihad. Following this he further attended another three-week course in August 2002 on handling weapons and grenades. In April 2003 we are told he attended a three-month course on close combat tactics and survival skills. In August 2003 we are told of another three-week course on surveillance.
It is interesting to note that Headley’s focus on India begins around the same time as the wave of terror starting late-2005 with the Delhi blasts. It is also interesting to note that planning for Headley to be based in India started as early as February 2006 with several trips to Pakistan and Chicago in the months leading up to the 7/11 Mumbai blasts. While it is not until September 2006 that Headley arrived in India, it is interesting to note that surveillance of potential targets in Mumbai and other cities had started in 2006 itself.
While 12 counts on which Headley has pleaded guilty cover the 26/11 Mumbai attacks and the planned attack in Denmark, not much is known of his role in the wave of attacks in India between September 2006 and July 2008. This should be an area of focus for India if and when it gets to interrogate him. The identities of the four Lashkar operatives that Headley interacted with also remain unknown at this time. It is important to note that while Lashkar members A, B and D and more specifically A &D find mention meeting with Headley on several occasions, not much is revealed on the specific role played by Lashkar member C and the circumstances of Headley’s interactions with Lashkar member C.
It is interesting to note that according to the plea bargain the Danish attacks were initially proposed by Lashkar member A. Headley’s overt collaboration with Ilyas Kashmiri’s Brigade 313 on the Danish attack did not start until November 2008. It is also claimed that Headley was initially unaware of the fact that Abdur Rehman’s controller or sponsor for the planned Danish attacks was Ilyas Kashmiri, even though he previously knew that Abdur Rehman was working for Ilyas Kashmiri.
An insight into the dynamics between the Lashkar and the Brigade 313 become apparent from a reported conversation from February 2009 when Ilyas Kashmiri is said to have advised Headley that Lashkar’s support was not required to conduct the Danish attack. It is also interesting to note that Lashkar too advises Headley of putting the Danish plans on hold on account of increased heat on Lashkar following 26/11.
Kashmiri’s suggestion that Lashkar’s services were not required at around the same time that Lashkar itself had decided to put its plans on hold, could perhaps be suggestive of something more than a mere coincidence. While this narrative leads to believe that Brigade 313 and Lashkar had distinct priorities, it must also be asked if the Brigade 313 was working in tandem with Lashkar to take the heat off Lashkar.
The plea bargain filings don’t throw much light on the circumstances that first brought Headley in contact with the Brigade 313’s Abdur Rehman. A significant omission considering that specific dates on Headley’s indoctrination into Lashkar spread over two years had been revealed. This ought to be an area for the Indian team to probe further to uncover the true nature of the Lashkar’s relationship with the so called Brigade 313 lead by Ilyas Kashmiri.
It must be recalled that there was practically no reportage on Ilyas Kashmiri for nearly three years after he was arrested and let off by Pakistan in 2004. It was not until 2007 that Ilyas Kashmiri’s Brigade 313 made news for its operations in Waziristan with retired Pakistan military officers and former Lashkar members in its fold. It must also be recalled that the blame for assassination of Pakistani Major-General Amir Faisal Alvi a week before of 26/11 was initially ascribed to the Lashkar before it was claimed that the accused Major Haroon was an ex-Lashkar working for 313 Brigade at Ilyas Kashmiri’s behest.
Interestingly all through 2009, Ilyas Kashmiri’s graph has been on the rise with his alleged escape from the jaws of death and the claims of his becoming the chief of Al Qaeda’s Shadow Army of Lashkar al-Zil. The apparent Takfiri faultline between the Lashkar and the Brigade 313 notwithstanding, there has been cross pollination between the two outfits in the form of ex-members of Lashkar and retired Pakistan Army officers. This cross-pollination should be reason for Indian investigators to be far more circumspect on the true nature of the Lashkar-operated syndicate within and outside the Pakistan military jihadi establishment than we have been lead to believe.
-- The writer, an expert on security affairs, tracks terrorism in South Asia.
MEA blocks Law Minister’s US trip
The Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) has refused to clear a week-long visit to a US-based institute by Law Minister Veerappa Moily, Chief Justice of India K.G. Balakrishnan and Attorney General G. E. Vahanvati. All three have accordingly called off the trip.
They were invited by the Dean Rusk Center for International Legal Studies at the University of Georgia. But the MEA hinted that it was beneath their dignity to go.
“The programme set out at the Dean Rusk Center does not seem to merit the participation of the honourable CJI, honourable minister and Attorney General,” Vivek Katju, secretary (west) in the ministry, said in a letter Bhupinder Prasad, secretary, justice.
Though the letter said that if “the high-ranking personalities” felt it would be undesirable to turn down an invitation already accepted, they could go ahead. It added: “The MEA would like to reiterate that political clearance is not a mere formality and this should be kept in mind before accepting any engagements.”
Though the law ministry refused to comment officially on the matter, a senior official said: “It would have been better if a clear reason had been given for rejecting the visit.”
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