Gurais 1948 Operation Snipe and RTI questions

Discussion in 'Defence & Strategic Issues' started by invincible, Aug 15, 2011.

  1. invincible

    invincible Regular Member

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    I am looking for information on the Operation Snipe in the 1948 time frame. I have two cases in the Suprem court of India and before the RTI.
    We believe several generals and policitians decided to take the credit for this operation and The Greandiers and Gurkha were given ther true credit.
    The evidence is very clear. But since we are now making a movie on the subjuec I would like to have more details on the names of some men.
    Vijji Gully.
    Zojilla and Burzill Pass and lots more ...please share your information if you have any.
     
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  3. anoop_mig25

    anoop_mig25 Senior Member Senior Member

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    sorry to ask u but what was is operation all about? can u post some info related to it
     
  4. ALBY

    ALBY Elite Member Elite Member

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    It was a military miossion for recapturing Skardu and Gurais IN 1948.Gurais was captured but could'nt capture Skardu.

    "In response, General Thimayya submitted a plan on 20 June for the
    recapture of Gurais and the relief of Skardu. No details of this plan,
    named `Operation Snipe' are available. It seems the plan
    envisaged an
    early capture of Gurais followed by an advance across the Burzil Pass
    and the Deosai plateau to Skardu. This ambitious plan would have not
    only removed the threat to Bandipur and raised the siege of Skardu,
    but would also have cut off the enemy's line of communication to
    Kargil, Dras and the Leh area.

    The first part of the plan was accomplished by the recapture of Gurais
    on 29 June, as described earlier. But the plan for advance to the
    Burzil Pass and over the Deosai plains was never attempted, or even
    approved by HQ Western Command. The administrative difficulties of
    moving and maintaining a large force across that barren and icy region
    would have been well-nigh insurmountable, and after crossing the
    Burzil Pass the operation might not have even had the advantage of
    surprise. Moreover, enemy pressure was very heavy in the Southern
    sector in July, and the entire 9th (Frontier) Division of the Pakistan
    Army was reported to be in action in the Chakothi-Tithwal area. Sri
    Div, therefor, had no troops to spare for the advance to Burzil or
    Dras, and no help could be sent to 1 Patiala to enable them to
    maintain their valuable positions at Machhoi. On 25 July, Thimayya
    reported that the hostiles were attacking Kanzalwan, infiltrating
    towards Chowkibal, Kupwara and the vital Nastachhun Pass from Tithwasl
    area, concentrating near Haji Pir Pass and threatening Punch, Uri and
    Gulmarg. Thimayya had all his troops already committed : 161 Infantry
    Brigade and 163 Infantry Brigade had only two coys each in reserve,
    and the 77 Para Brigade had no reserve at all. Of his outlying
    garrisons, both Leh and Skardu appeared on their last legs. The 5
    Mahratta, 3 Jat and 1 Royal Gorkha Rifles arrived about the end of
    July 1948 to reinforce Sri Div and enable it to attack Dras-Kargil and
    link up with Skardu, but all these three battalions had to be rushed
    to hold the enemy attacks on the Tithwal-Chakothi front. The Gwalior
    Mountain Battery was expected to reach Srinagar early in August, but
    no other major reinforcements were available, and Lieut-General K. M.
    Cariappa, the COC-in-C, Western Command, was compelled to authorise
    Thimayya to fall back on Uri if forced to withdraw.

    On 5 August 1948, Thimayya submitted a statement of his requirements
    and the troops available in his command. To stabilise the position and
    to hold each sector firmly, he estimated the requirements as:


    For Uri-Chakothi sector 10 battalions

    For Tithwal area 5 battalions


    For line of communication from Tithwal to Handwara 2 battalions


    For Gurais-Kanzalwan sector 2 battalions


    For the Zoji La 1 battalions


    For the Pir Panjal-Gulmarg area 1 battalions


    Total 21 battalions



    But he had only 17 battalions of the Indian Army and one SF battalion,
    i.e. 7 K. I. Available with him. Three more Indian Army battalions at
    least were, therefore, required before Sri Div could be safe.

    Thimayya had in fact staved off disaster only by exploiting to the
    full his advantage in operating on interior lines. He had rushed his
    forces quickly from one sector to another, to meet acute danger, and
    somehow held the enemy at bay. But he could not spare additional
    troops for operation `Snipe' or for operation `Duck'
    (for the
    recapture of Dras and Kargil), unless and until the hostile pressure
    on Chakothi and Tithwal eased considerably and thus permitted him to
    take out some troops from those sectors.

    Then, with the fall of Skardu on 14 August, the main purpose of
    operation `Snipe' ceased to exist. All efforts were
    concentrated on
    the recapture of Dras and Kargil and the link up with Leh-
    `Operation
    Duck'."

    Yahoo! Groups
     
  5. invincible

    invincible Regular Member

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    Please search Brigadier Rajendra Singh defense team in the RTI for some better briefing. In essence as the post below shows is General Srinagesh, Thimmaya, Carriappa were defeated in the 1947 bashing .....infact the NARA files show that Cariappa told Thimmaya that his loosing SKARDU meant the end of his career ...he was saved by a renegade airforce pilot. The largest and complete defeat in the Zojilla, Burzil PAss Kanjenwalla Pass and Gurais was the work of Brigadier Rajendra Singh and the SOUTH BLOCK has agreed to this ...but the RTI would not give the awards for this as they said this is not the right forum.
    By the way Cariappa, Thimmaya and Srinagesh have combined written one small inconsequential book on war and Rajendra Singh has written 54 such books given introductions by Liddle Hart, Auckenleck and Mounbatten....
    We have an ORDER from RTI to inspect all regiments WAR ORDERS to validate this operation and I have WAR DIARIES of several regiments that completely discount other claims
     
  6. ALBY

    ALBY Elite Member Elite Member

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    @ invincible publish those valuable diaries in the forum..
     
  7. invincible

    invincible Regular Member

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    CENTRAL INFORMATION COMMISSION
    …..
    F. No.CIC/AT/A/2006/00295
    Dated, the 31st January, 2007
    Appellant : Shri Jugvir Inder Singh, Legal Concept Defence Team, C/o Rajendra
    Singh Estate, C/o Madam Laure Cadier, Sector B-1, Flat 1050A, Vasant
    Kunj, New Delhi-110 070.
    Respondents : Brig S.C. Nair, DDG(PI) & CPIO, Addl. Dte. General of Public Info., B-
    30, South Block, Directorate General of Military Intelligence, Army
    Headquarters, DHQ, PO New Delhi-110 011.
    The Director General (DC&W) and Appellate Authority, B-30, South
    Block, Directorate General of Military Intelligence, Army Headquarters,
    DHQ, PO New Delhi-110 011.
    This is an appeal filed by Shri Jugvir Inder Singh against the order dated 6.7.2006 of the
    CPIO, Col S. Thapar, Director (Media), Directorate General of Military Intelligence, Army
    Headquarters, Ministry of Defence.
    2. It is seen from the submissions made by the appellant that he had sought a range of
    information pertaining mostly to the military operations during the 1947-48 conflict in Kashmir and
    the role played by the appellant’s father late Brig. Rajendra Singh. The appellant has asked for
    ‘all records’ of Field Marshal Cariappa and of General Thimayya; ‘all’ maps of the required subject
    area; ‘all’ documents of General Srinagesh at that time; ‘all’ documents “alleged in the Rajendra
    Singh’s letter……” and those connected with ‘Operation Snipe’; “all” the requests for enquiry and
    requests for Gurais Medals of Honour by Brig Rajendra Singh “during any time in the Armed
    Forces”; the reasons from “any person…… that denies the medals of Honour”, the history of Vij
    Galli Hut, among others. The appellant has gone on to claim relief by way of award of Padma
    Bhushan to late Lt.Col. Rajendra Singh as well as a Maha Param Vir Chakra and, an addendum
    to be attached to the history of ‘Jammu & Kashmir Operation book’ produced by the Ministry of
    Defence, to acknowledge the contribution of Lt. Col. Rajendra Singh, besides a formal apology
    from the President of India to the family of Lt.Col. Rajendra Singh and so on.
    3. The AA, in his comments to the Commission, has stated that the queries of the appellant are
    basically questions about the veracity of the historical records pertaining to the 1947-48 Conflict,
    specially the role played by late Brig. Rajendra Singh.
    The appellant has demanded that historical records be amended and honours / awards be
    bestowed upon late Brig. Rajendra Singh. The AA has concluded that the RTI Act is not the forum
    for amending history or awarding honours or medals.
     

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