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ajtr

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PAKISTAN: The Blasphemy Law in Pakistan and its Impact


Naeem Shakir

(Ed note: Naeem Shakir have been involved as a defence lawyer in high profile cases about blasphemy. Human Rights SOLIDARITY will carry his analysis of the blasphemy law in two issues. The first part of the article deals with the origin and consequence of the law from the legal point of view.)

Religious Fundamentalism Grown Beyond Proportions

The minorities in Pakistan are caught up in a grave situation, with gory incidents occurring. A wild wave of sectarianism has engulfed the society, which has resulted in unethical sentiments of religious prejudices. The armed religious extremists are playing havoc in the society. A situation of religious intolerance has spread suffocation in our lives. The doors of dialogue are being closed. Religious fundamentalism has grown beyond proportions. Muslim clerics are demanding complete imposition of Islamic Shariah in Pakistan, making it applicable also to the non-Muslim citizens.

The minorities in Pakistan have already suffered seriously on account of sectarian legislation which has thrown non-Muslim citizens out of the mainstream of national life. They are no more part of the mainstream activities of the state and are being discriminated against in all fields of life. The claim of the minorities as equal and respectable citizens is at stake. The life and property of people in minority community is no longer safe. A sense of insecurity is growing fast among the minorities.

The Christians are being roped in false cases under the blasphemy law. They are being murdered by zealots to win heavens for themselves. They take the law in their hands and do not even wait for the judicial verdict. The judgements of the superior courts have proved that this law on blasphemy is being ruthlessly abused for settling personal scores and, of course, for religious persecution. This law is proving to be a sword hanging on the heads of non-Muslims and the secular-minded people.

Bishop John Joseph, Roman Catholic Bishop of Faizalabad, who was an ardent spokesman for peace and inter-religious dialogue, had waged a struggle on war footing against fundamentalism, religious intolerance, and discriminatory laws, particularly against the amended provisions of the law about blasphemy. And in order to give an impetus to the struggle and focus world attention on this crucial issue, he sacrificed his life for the just cause on May 5, 1998. He shot himself right in front of the iron gate of the Sessions Court of Sahiwal, which convicted Ayub Masih a charge of blasphemy and sentenced him to death vide its judgement passed on April 27, 1998. This death sentence has once again raised fear and panic amongst the minority communities in Pakistan as the law of blasphemy casts the net wide open to rope in anyone - Christians and Ahmedias more easily, maybe due to personal malice or religious prejudice.

The death of Bishop John Joseph excited a wave of anger among the Christians. They spontaneously came on the roads to publicly mourn the death of their leader and demonstrate their will to continue the struggle against oppression and discriminatory laws, including the law on blasphemy. The peaceful processions were brutally suppressed by the police and the state apparatus.

In order to underplay the impact of the self-sacrifice of Bishop John Samuel, the Muslim clerics treacherously launched a move to field a counter version that the Bishop was murdered by a Catholic Father due to some rivalry. The print media was fully used by the clerics in a malicious way so as to diffuse the zealous spirit among the Christians. However, they have miserably failed in their nefarious designs.

Collaboration of Dictatorship and Fundamentalism

In order to get a clear picture about the law on blasphemy it would be better to discuss the issue in a broader perspective which will enable us to have a better understanding about the whole situation.

Pakistan came into being in 1947. It was earlier part of united India. The united struggle of people of India for independence was meant to overthrow the yoke of British colonial rule which prolonged for more than a century. On August 14, 1947 when people won independence, simultaneously the partition of India took place and thus a new state of Pakistan emerged. Though Islam was used as a catchword during the movement for Pakistan, the great leader and founder of this new nation, Mr. Mohammed Ali Jinnah, had categorically made it clear that the country will not be a theocratic state. In his presidential address to the first Constituent Assembly of Pakistan at Karachi, on September 11, 1947, he said, "We are starting with this fundamental principle that we all are citizens and equal citizens of one state. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed that has nothing to do with the business of the state." It is however, most unfortunate that since the death of the Father of the Nation in September 1948, politics based on religious sectarianism has been in vogue in Pakistan. Politicians tried to take mileage on the basis of religion. This approach in politics has not only negated the fundamental principle (referred to above) but has also generated the baneful sentiment of religious prejudice among the people at large. Therefore, soon after his demise this infant nation was thrown out of the cradle of democracy. The country went into the hands of opportunists, fundamentalists and colonial agents.

Here, I would like to mention a crucial point: later on, a complete departure from the earlier spelt-out state structure was made. The net result was that the religion (Islam) was introduced in the socio-political corpus through an Objectives Resolution, which has served as a preamble to all the three Constitutions of 1956, 1962 and 1973. This resolution, while speaking for Islam, however, in a sixth paragraph, provided that "an adequate provision shall be made for the minorities freely to profess and practise their religion and develop their culture". During the military rule of 1977-1987 the Objectives Resolution which was serving as a preamble to the 1973 Constitution was through a Presidential Order made substantive part of the Constitution by incorporation of Article 2-A:

While doing so the word "freely" was deliberately deleted from the text. Now it reads as "an adequate provision shall be made for the minorities to profess and practise their religion and develop their culture." It was a deliberate and dishonest act on the part of the military ruler to delete the word "freely". Earlier in the preamble of the Constitution of Pakistan, the word freely was present whereas in the new Article 2-A the word freely was missing. I think this is a singular example of reading history through prejudice. This deliberate deletion later had serious repercussions in our socio-political set-up. It introduced an element of religious extremism in our society. And from that point of time the treatment meted out to the non-Muslims citizens has been very harsh.

In order to remain in the seat of power General Ziaul-Herq, the military dictator collaborated with the religious fundamentalists. Those who were never voted for the Assemblies were brought to the corridors of power through administrative measures. The army general took upon himself the task of Islamising the society. In that process of Islamisation, sectarian legislation was promulgated.

First of all, he amended the Penal Code and introduced Islamic punishments in the form of Hudood laws. You may call it an Islamic version of criminal law. The Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979 related to theft cases. "Hadd" means "punishment ordained by the Holy Quran or Sunnah". The punishment for theft liable to Hadd for the person committing the offence first time is amputation of his right hand from the joint of the wrist. And if such a person commits the offence a second time, he shall be punished with amputation of his left foot up to the ankle. The proof of theft liable to Hadd shall be the evidence of "at least two Muslim adult male witnesses who are supposed to be truthful persons who abstain from major sins". Section 25 of this ordinance says that the Presiding Officer of the court by which a case is tried, or an appeal is heard, under this ordinance shall be a Muslim.

The second ordinance was called the "Offence of Zina" (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance of 1979. Zina was defined thus: "a man and a woman are said to commit Zina if they wilfully have sexual intercourse without being validly married to each other". The punishment provided includes stoning to death at a public place; or one hundred lashes with the whip at a public place.

The proof of Zina shall require the evidence of at least four Muslim adult male witnesses about whom the court is satisfied that they are truthful and abstain from major sins. The Presiding Officer of the court is required to be a Muslim.

Both these Ordinances are applicable to non-Muslims as well. The next law was Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order 1979. It prohibited the use of liquor and other intoxicants. The Christians may use liquor for religious ceremonies provided they are issued liquor permits by the government. The punishment provided for offences under this Order includes life imprisonment or imprisonment of not less than two years along with thirty lashes with the whip. For purposes of enforcing Hadd punishment the evidence of at least two Muslim adult male witnesses is required. As in other Hudood laws the Presiding Officer is to be a Muslim. The other Hudood laws relating to Qazaf (perjury) and "Execution of the Punishment of Whipping" were promulgated in 1979.

The Evidence Act was also Islamised thereby the credibility of a non-Muslim witness was brought down to a secondary position. The witness is supposed to be truthful who abstains from major sins as defined in holy Quran and Sunnah.

Thereafter the Islamic Shariah was made the supreme law of the land through Enforcement of Shariah Act 1991. The Shariah under this act has been defined as the "injunctions of Islam as laid in the Holy Quran and Sunnah". Section 4 of this Act says, "While interpreting the statute-law, if more than one interpretation is possible, the one consistent with the Islamic principles and jurisprudence shall be adopted by the court". According to this Act, the education system, the judicial system, the economic system and the media shall be Islamized. The Act, however, lays down in a provision to section 1(4)". "Nothing contained in this Act shall effect the personal laws, religious freedom, traditions, custom and way of life of the non-Muslims".

When every field of life is Islamised, how on earth can the non-Muslims lead their own way of life? There has been a serious invasion against the personal laws of non-Muslims. And the institution of marriage has been rendered as a fragile thing because the laws are interpreted according to the injunctions of Islam. I may inform you that ours is a feudal society. Abduction of non-Muslim women (who belong to the marginalised section of the society) is a common feature. The Muslim abductor forcibly takes away a married Christian woman. In order to avoid the rigours of penal law, he converts the abductee to Islam and undergoes the procedure of Islamic marriage with her. The whole exercise is undertaken in such a mechanical manner that the law is made a sheer mockery. It is practically a preparation of the required papers in this whole exercise. Since Islamic Shariah has become the supreme law, and the statute law is to be interpreted according to the injunctions of Islam, her earlier marriage under the Christian Marriage Act stands dissolved ipso facto. Why, because she has now embraced Islam and thus her personal law shall prevail. Islam does not allow a Muslim woman to get married with a non-Muslim man. Her fist husband being Christian shall cease to hold that marital status with her. This situation has many times created serious problems regarding custody and guardianship of minor children born out Christian wedlock.

Judicial System Shaken

The judicial system was completely disturbed. The Constitution was amended and Federal Shariat Court was constituted to adjudicate appeal of cases under Shariah law. Under Article 230- D of the Constitution, the Federal Shariat Court has been empowered to strike down any statute law which may be deemed repugnant to the injunctions of Islam. The establishment of Shariat Court has introduced a parallel judicial system and has dealt a serious blow to the supremacy of Parliament. It would not be out of place to mention here that although Shariah laws are applicable to non-Muslims but a non-Muslim lawyer is not entitled to appear as a legal practitioner before this Federal Shariat Court.

Non-Muslim Rights Abused

A stunning blow causing serious damage to the socio-political status of non-Muslim citizen was administered through amendments to the electoral law in 1979. This amendment introduced an apartheid mode of separate electorates in the country vide President's Order 14 of 1985. The electoral laws were changed and framed in a manner which divided citizens on the basis of religion. The electoral lists have been separated as Muslim voters and non-Muslim voters. Both cannot vote for each other. At the time of general elections it appears as if two nations are living in this country. The delimitation of constituencies of non-Muslims is rather ridiculous. It's the whole country for National Assembly seats reserved for non-Muslims and likewise the whole of province for the reserved seats in Provincial Assemblies. The non-Muslim citizens stand marginalised under this apartheid mode of separate electorates as they have been thrown out of the mainstream of national life. They are no more part of the business of the state as their right of franchise has been subjected to religious classification. This renders them as second class citizens of the state.

The legislative measures introduced to Islamise the society leave no room for non-Muslims to freely profess and practise their religion. The sectarian legislation based on supremacy of one particular religion, i.e. Islam has promoted a culture of religious intolerance. Religion has played a vital role in human development but wherever and whenever it was used for purposes opposed to its inherent spirit of peace, brotherhood and social justice, it not only lost its relevance in the process of social development but its image was also tarnished in the minds of those who were subjected to oppressive measures adopted in the name of religion.

The law on blasphemy also belongs to this era when the country was under military rule. The subject law is part of the Penal Code of Pakistan. Its Chapter XV deals with offences relating to religion, which contains Sections 295 to 298. The British during their colonial rule framed the Indian Penal Code in 1860. The authors of the Penal Code deemed it proper to provide a preface to Chapter XV dealing with offences relating to religion. And the same is reproduced as under, " The principle on which this chapter has been framed is a principle on which it would be desirable that all Governments should act, but from which the British Government in India cannot depart without risking the dissolution of society : it is this, that every man should be suffered to profess his own religion, and that no man should be suffered to insult the religion of another."

The British authors were conscious of the religious feelings of the people of the multi- ethnic and multi-religious Indian culture. And it was perhaps for this reason that the authors provided the afore-mentioned preface.

Section 295 provided: "Whoever destroys, damages or defiles any place of worship, or any object held sacred by any class of persons with the intention of thereby insulting the religion of any class of persons is likely to consider such destruction, damage or defilement as an insult to their religion, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years or with fine or with both."

It may be mentioned here that these provisions still exist on the statute book as framed in 1860. During the independence movement in early twentieth century in India, religious decrees were also used to accelerate the pace of struggle. In those days different religious groups fanned religious sentiments of the people. However, the process of polemics continued in the society in an atmosphere of religious tolerance.

The British, however, were obliged to add a new section as 295-A because a Hindu writer (Raj Pal) published a book on Prophet Mohammed about which the Indian Muslims took serious exception as some objectionable material amounting to insult to the Prophet was observed. Agitation by the Muslims continued for some time. The writer was later murdered by a Muslim zealot (Illam Din). Resultantly the following section was introduced in 1927: " Whoever with deliberate and malicious intention of outraging the religious feelings of any class of His Majesty's subjects, by words, either spoken or written, or by visible representation, insults or attempts to insult the religion or the religious beliefs of that class, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine or with both."

As adapted in the Pakistan Penal Code the words "His Majesty's subjects", were deleted and "the citizens of Pakistan" were incorporated. At the same time a punishment of "ten years" was substituted in place of "two years" in the original. The change was effected through the Criminal Law (Third Amendment) Ordinance XXI of 1991.

A new Section 295-B was introduced vide Ordinance 1 of 1982 to deal with defiling of the Holy Quran. This section reads as follows: "Whoever wilfully defiles, damages or desecrates a copy of the Holy Quran or of an extract therefrom or uses it in any derogatory manner or for any unlawful purpose shall be punishable with imprisonment for life".

As days passed, religious extremism grew. Religion was used in politics to steal a march over rivals. Gen. Zia formed a Parliament on the Islamic pattern, called Majlis-e-Shoora. Through this Assembly of chosen 'representatives' Section 295-C was added. It is reproduced as below: "295-C: Whoever by word, either spoken or written, or by visible representation, or by any imputation, innuendo or insinuation, directly or indirectly, defiles the sacred name of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) shall be punished with death or imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine".

Gen. Zia, through a constitutional amendment, constituted the Federal Shariat Court which under the new Article 203-D had the following powers and jurisdiction.

"203-D (1). The Court may (either of its own motion or on the petition of a citizen of Pakistan or the Federal Government or a Provincial Government) examine and decide the question whether or not any law or provisions of law is repugnant to the injunctions of Islam, as laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunnah of the Holy Prophet hereinafter referred to as the injunctions of Islam".

The story does not end here. A petition was moved before the Federal Shariat Court for declaring the punishment provided in Section 295-C, null and void, as the same was repugnant to Quran and Sunnah. The plea was made that the injunctions of Islam provide punishment in the form of Hadd only, and not otherwise, and that too in mandatory form - meaning thereby that the punishment of life imprisonment was void and thus be deleted and mandatory punishment of death be retained. The Shariat Court accepted the petition. The relevant part of the judgement of October 30, 1990, is reproduced below:

"In view of the above discussion we are of the view that the alternate punishment of life imprisonment as provided in Section 295-C PPC is repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam as given in Holy Quran and Sunnah and therefore, the said words be deleted therefrom".

"A copy of this Order shall be sent to the President of Pakistan under Article 203-D (3) of the Constitution to take steps to amend the law so as to bring the same in conformity with the injunctions of Islam. In case, this is not done by April 30 1991 the words" or imprisonment for life" in Section 295-C, PPC shall cease to have effect on that date. Therefore, now there is only one punishment provided in section 295-C and that is the death penalty.

The rest of the amendment in this chapter particularly relates to Ahmadies in the form of 298-A, 298-B and 298-C. I will not discuss them now due to time constraints.

It would not be out of place to mention here that till the pronouncement of this judgement, by the Federal Shariat Court, which provide mandatory death penalty, no case of blasphemy was reported to have been registered under Section 295-B or 295-C PPC. The amended sections are so wide in their connotation, including 'innuendo' or 'insinuation', that to allege blasphemy against any one has been made so easy. The import of these provisions is quite vague in nature. These provisions are discriminatory as supposedly these are meant to Islamise the criminal law whereas these are applicable to non-Muslims as well. A non-Muslim is supposed to adhere to his own belief. And if a non-Muslim professes his belief publicly that would amount to blasphemy according to the amended provisions. Thus, these amendments in the Pakistan Penal Code relating religion have cast the net wide open to rope in anyone on mere allegation of blasphemy. And once someone is charged with this offence, he is doomed as the offence is non-bailable, the death penalty is mandatory in law, justice is being subjected to sectarian affiliation and because religious frenzy is being promoted in the society by the vested interests and the religious fundamentalists.

The Blasphemy Law in Pakistan and its Impact

(Ed. note: In July's issue of Human Rights SOLIDARITY Naeem Shakir has given an in-depth analysis of the origin and the impact of the law. The second part of the article consists of vivid accounts of how Christians are being victimised under such tyrannical law.)

Since I have been involved as a defence lawyer in high profile cases about blasphemy, I have painfully experienced the tyrannical nature of this law. Apart from the accused, the lawyers, and even judges are not safe in this highly vulnerable situation. Before winding up I would like to give a few examples of blasphemy cases against Christians.

" Conversion from Islam to Christianity is in itself a cognisable offence"

Tahir Iqbal was a Christian convert from Islam. He had suffered from paralysis. The lower part of his body had been paralysed rendering him invalid. He could not walk. He could not stand even. He used a wheel chair. He was an engine mechanic in the Pakistan Air Force. His conversion to Christianity had annoyed Muslims. He lived in the southern part of Lahore close to a mosque. The Muslim cleric in charge of that mosque finally decided to teach him a lesson. He got a case of blasphemy registered against him on December 7, 1990, alleging that "when he recites 'Azaan' (call for prayer) early in the morning in the mosque, Tahir Iqbal feels infuriated and starts abusing Prophet Mohammed at the top of his voice, imparts anti-Islamic education to children who come to him for tuition, has defiled Holy Quran by underlining with green marker, and thus has seriously injured our religious feelings."

He was arrested by the police on blasphemy charges and that's all. He was doomed. Despite his physical inability, he was not bailed out. As earlier stated, justice has been subjected to sectarian affiliations. A very crude example may be cited of Tahir Iqbal. The Sessions Judge who dismissed his bail application on July 7, 1991, passed the following order:

"Learned counsel for the petitioner has conceded before me that the petitioner has converted as Christian. With this admission on the part of petitioner's counsel there is no need to probe further into the allegations as contained in the FIR because learned DDA has disclosed that charge has already been framed and the accused is facing trial. Since conversion from Islam to Christianity is in itself a cognisable offence involving serious implication, I do not consider the petitioner entitled to the concession of bail at this stage".

Though it is needless to comment, it may be mentioned that no law in Pakistan has yet been framed which makes conversion from Islam to Christianity a cognisable offence. The case was fixed for recording of prosecution evidence on July 21, 1992, before the Sessions Court. When I as the defense lawyer, appeared in the court I was informed by the State Counsel that the accused had died in the jail the previous night. Tahir Iqbal was poisoned to death in jail under a conspiracy about which he had informed all authorities concerned beforehand. He was killed because he had embraced Christianity.

Innocent People Seek Asylum

Chand Barkat, 28, a bangle stall holder in Mangle Bazar, Karachi was charged with blasphemy by a co-bangle vendor because of professional jealousy. Arif Hussain used to sit beside him for selling bangles in the bazaar. He did not tolerate women going to Chand Barkat, a Christian, for buying bangles. One day Arif warned him to quit that place as otherwise he would teach him a lesson. Chand Barkat did not leave the place. Arif involved Chand Barkat in a case of blasphemy on October 8, 1991, alleging that he used derogatory language against Prophet Muhammad and his mother. He was charged under Section 295-C. Chand Barkat was acquitted by the Sessions Court for want of evidence.

Gull Masih of Faisalabad was charged under section 295-C for using sacrilegious language about the Prophet and his wives on December 10, 1991. The complainant Sajjad Hussain, had a quarrel with him over repair of a street water tap. Out of this quarrel had emanated the blasphemy case. Gull Masih was tried under the blasphemy law and sentenced to death by the Sessions Court, Sargodha, on November 2, 1992. This death sentence created a commotion. Human rights organisations and the Church agitated against the death sentence. We filed a criminal appeal in the High Court against the judgement of the Sessions Judge. Gull Masih was bailed out neither by the Sessions Court nor by the High Court. I moved an application for early hearing in the High Court but it took two years for the final hearing. The appeal was heard by the Division Bench of the Lahore High Court, which held that it was a case of no evidence and thus set aside the death sentence and acquitted Gull Masih. It became difficult for Gull Masih to come out of jail as religious fundamentalists had warned of dire consequences. He had to be kept under tight security. Later, in order to save his life, arrangements were made for his exit quietly. He is now in Germany on asylum.

Winning Heaven by Killing Blasphemer

Naimat Ahmar 43, a Christian teacher and a poet and writer of Faisalabad, was butchered by Farooq Ahmad, a young member of a militant religious group (ASSP) on the premises of office of the District Education Officer, Faisalabad, at 10 a.m. while on duty. The religious zealot killed him because the deceased had reportedly used highly insulting remarks against Islam and Prophet Mohammed. No case of blasphemy was registered against the deceased. He was not tried by any court. The young religious extremist, as briefed by his organisation, took the law in his own hands and killed the poet, writer and teacher, leaving behind a widow and four children. The killer was charged with murder. He made a confession. He was garlanded in jail by religious clerics. The statement of the killer was published in the press that by killing a blasphemer he had won heaven.

The trial court sentenced him to fourteen years� imprisonment. His appeal to set aside the sentence is pending in the High Court, and I am representing the complainant who is the younger brother of the deceased.

A minor, Salamat Masih, 12 years old, along with Manzoor Masih, 37, and Rehamat Masih, 42, of Gujranwala, were charged with writing derogatory remarks against Prophet Mohammed on the wall of the mosque of the village where they lived. All the three were in fact illiterate and did not know to write. The case of the minor became a high-profile case in the world media.

We got the case transferred to Lahore through the High Court because each time we went to the Sessions Court in Gujranwala, religious extremists would gather in front of the courtroom with banners urging immediate execution of the alleged blasphemers. They used to pose threats to the lawyers coming from Lahore and none of the local lawyers dared to defend the accused. The case was later heard by the Sessions Judge of Lahore. The court, on our request, provided police guards to escort the accused and their lawyer from his office to court and back to his office. On June 5, 1994 the three accused were brought back by the police guards to my office, and after staying for about half an hour they left for their place of hibernation. They had hardly crossed about 500 yards away from my office when they were attacked by armed religious militants with guns. Manzoor Masih died on the spot while the other two accused and their escort, John Joseph, sustained grievous injures. The murder of Manzoor Masih increased the sense of insecurity among Christians. There was countrywide agitation by the Christians demanding repeal of the blasphemy law and security to their lives in the country.

The Sessions Court of Lahore, convicted the remaining two accused and passed death sentence against them. The death sentence against the minor attracted the attention of human rights activists the world over. The High Court, however, while adjudicating their appeal against conviction, acquitted them declaring that it was a case of no evidence. They had to flee the country to save their lives. They are also living in Germany on asylum. One of the senior judges of the Division Bench, which acquitted the two Christians, was murdered by a religious extremist on that very account.

Bantu Masih, 80, and Mukhtar Masih, 50, were arrested on the allegation of committing blasphemy. Both died under police custody. Bantu Masih was stabbed by a fundamentalist in the presence of policemen. He later succumbed to his injuries whereas Mukhtar Masih was tortured to death at the police station. There are many other cases of like nature against Christians, Muslims and Ahmadis. The plight of Ahmadis is much worse. The record shows that such cases were framed maliciously for settling personal scores or for religious persecution. The Christians are demanding repeal of the amended provisions of the law on blasphemy, but the Muslim fundamentalists are threatening that in case the law is repealed or changed they would overthrow the government. They are also using threatening language for the non-Muslim citizens among whom sense of insecurity is growing fast.

I hope that the examples of these cases would help better understanding of the situation we are faced with. We are in difficult times. We need support from around the world from all those who respect human rights, as their strong voice does have an impact on the forces who are responsible for this situation. We, however, know that basically it is through the political struggle launched by secular and progressive forces that we can make our society tolerant and civilised.
 

ajtr

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MASSACRES OF SHIAS IN IRAQ & PAKISTAN---THE BACKGROUND

by B.Raman

(This is to be read in continuation of my earlier articles titled " Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, bin Laden & RamziYousef " (http://www.saag.org/papers5/paper484.html ), "Al Qaeda & Taliban Target Hazaras" (http://www.saag.org/papers8/paper731.html ) and " Iraq: From Bad To Worse" ( http://www.saag.org/papers10/paper923.html )
------------------------

In my despatch of February 16, 2004, from Israel, I had stated as follows: "The Falluja raid has come at a time when there are reports of the infiltration of about 60 Yemeni, Yemeni-Balochi and Pakistani terrorists, belonging to the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (al-Almi meaning international) and the sunni extremist Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) into Iraq from Saudi Arabia. They had gone to Saudi Arabia under the guise of Haj pilgrims. After the Haj was over, they crossed over into Iraq instead of returning to their country. Similar instances had taken place last year too. With their entry, the total number of foreign jihadi terrorists in Iraq is estimated at about 360 to 380.

2. To understand the anti-Shia massacres at Karbala and Baghdad in Iraq ( about 180 fatal casualties) and at Quetta in Pakistan's Balochistan (41 killed ) during the Muhurrum procession on March 2, 2004, one has to go back to the creation of Pakistan in 1947.

3. When Pakistan was formed in 1947, the Shias were amongst the major land-owners of Pakistan's Punjab, its granary, and many of the Sunnis, who migrated to Pakistan from India's Punjab, were largely poor landless farm workers, who had to earn their livelihood in their country of adoption by working in the farms of the Shias. The perceived exploitation of the Sunnis by the Shia landlords started the process of the polarisation of the two sects of Islam in Pakistan.

4. This sectarian polarisation largely due to economic reasons was given a religious twist by Zia-ul-Haq, Pakistan's military dictator of the 1980s, after the overthrow of the Shah of Iran and the triumph of the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979. To counter the growing political assertiveness of the Shias and their political party, the Tehrik-e-Jaffria (TEJ) Pakistan, which generally supported Mrs. Benazir Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party (PPP), he encouraged and assisted Sunni extremist organisations such as the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP).

5. With his blessings, the SSP challenged the right of a woman to come to political power and projected the Shias and Mrs. Nusrat Bhutto, the mother of Benazir, as the surrogates of Iran. The SSP also started calling for the declaration of the Shias as non-Muslims and for the proclamation of Pakistan as a Sunni State.

6. Even before Zia seized power in 1977, Pakistan used to see sectarian tension and clashes between the Sunnis and the Shias, but this violence took a virulent form in the 1980s. There were many targeted attacks on Shias in the Sindh and Punjab provinces of Pakistan and in the Northern Areas of Jammu & Kashmir (Gilgit and Baltistan, where the Shias are in a majority), which has been under Pakistani occupation since 1947-48.

7. The last years of the Zia regime saw the Shias of Gilgit come out with a demand for a separate Shia State consisting of Gilgit and the Shia majority areas of Punjab and the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP). They wanted the Shia state to be called the Karakoram Province and remain part of a confederation of Pakistan.

8. The Zia regime crushed the Shia movement ruthlessly. In August 1988, the Pakistan Army inducted a large Sunni tribal force from the NWFP and the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), led by Osama bin Laden, into Gilgit and it massacred hundreds of Shias and crushed their revolt. The hatred of the Shias for Osama bin Laden and his Al Qaeda dates from this period.

9. Shortly after this massacre, Zia died in a mysterious plane crash. Though the report of the enquiry commission has not been allowed to be released by the Army, it is generally believed by many in Pakistan that the crash of the aircraft was caused by a Shia airman on board the flight. In October,1991, Lt.Gen. (retd) Fazle Haq, a close associate of Zia, was assassinated in Peshawar, the capital of the NWFP, by Shia gunmen.

10. The virulent anti-Shia ideology of the SSP was also exploited by the intelligence agencies of the USA and Iraq in their attempts to destabilise Iran and have the Shia clergy ruling Teheran overthrown. As a result of the support from the Saddam Hussain regime, the SSP, which was an anti-Pakistani Shia and not an anti-Iran movement, started targeting the Iranians living in and visiting Pakistan too in the 1990s. There were many attacks on Iranian civilians, diplomats and military officers coming to Pakistan for training. The SSP was also used by the intelligence agencies of the USA and Iraq to instigate the Sunni Balochis of Iran to revolt against Teheran.

11. Many notorious Pakistani and Arab terrorists such as Ramzi Yousef, now in jail in the US for his involvement in the New York World Trade Centre explosion of February,1993 Maulana Masood Azhar of the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM), Fazlur Rahman Khalil of the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM) and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian, started their career as terrorists as members of the SSP and participated in many of its anti-Shia massacres in Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan. When al-Zarqawi, along with some other Jordanians, many of them of Chechen ancestry, came to Pakistan in the 1980s to join the Arab mercenary force trained and armed by the CIA and the ISI and used against the Soviet troops in Afghanistan, his passport gave his name as Fadel al-Khalayleh, which is believed to be his real name.

12. On June 20, 1994 Ramzi Yousef and al-Zarqawi, at the instigation of the Iraqi intelligence, caused an explosion at Mashad in the Iranian territory adjoining Pakistan which killed a large number of Shias. Zarqawi, along with the late Riaz Basra, the leader of the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LEJ), the militant wing of the SSP, helped the Taliban in the capture of Kabul in September, 1996.

13. The LEJ subsequently helped the Taliban and Al Qaeda in the massacre of the Hazaras (Shias ) of Afghanistan. Osama bin Laden never liked Saddam, whom he looked upon as an apostate because of his secular and socialist policies, and the proximity of the LEJ and al-Zarqawi to Saddam's intelligence agency created differences between them and bin Laden.

14. Despite this, the LEJ joined bin Laden's International Islamic Front (IIF) for Jihad Against the Crusaders and the Jewish People after it was formed in 1998 and has remained loyal to bin Laden. Till 2002, the anti-Shia activities of the LEJ were confined to Punjab and Sindh. Balochistan remained largely free of anti-Shia incidents. The situation changed after the arrest of Khalid Sheikh Mohammad (KSM) by the Pakistani authorities at Rawalpindi in March, 2003 and his handing over to the USA's Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). It was reported that KSM had fled from Karachi to Quetta in September 2002, after the arrest of Ramzi Binalshibh and from there shifted to Rawalpindi fearing betrayal by the Hazaras (Shias) of Balochistan, who were suspected of helping the US agencies in their hunt for bin Laden because of their anger over the massacre of the Hazaras of Afghanistan before 9/11.

15. It is this suspicion, which was behind two anti-Shia incidents in Quetta last year. In the first, Hazara policemen under training and in the second in the first week of July, 53 Shia worshippers were killed. This suspicion against the Shias has increased in recent weeks in the wake of reports, contradicted by the Pakistani authorities, that President Pervez Musharraf has agreed to permit the US troops to comb for bin Laden in the FATA and the Pashtun majority areas of Balochistan. The massacre of the Shias in Quetta on March 2 was in reprisal partly for their suspected collaboration with the Americans in their hunt for bin Laden and partly for the murder of Maulana Azam Tariq, the leader of the SSP, last year, allegedly by Shia extremists.

16. In a message disseminated by Al Jazeera TV before the invasion of Iraq by the coalition troops led by the US last year, bin Laden had called for a united struggle against the Americans by the Sunnis and Shias of Iraq forgetting their sectarian differences. While continuing to describe Saddam as apostate, he appealed to the Shias and Sunnis not to let their differences come in the way of a joint resistance against the Americans.

17. Even before the invasion, terrorist elements of the IIF started moving to Iraq via Saudi Arabia and Iran for starting a jihad against the Americans. The first group to go was from the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM). They went to Saudi Arabia as Haj pilgrims and from there crossed over to Iraq. Subsequently, Arab-speaking volunteers of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) and the LEJ also started going to Iraq in small numbers. Many of the Arabs of Chechen ancestry, originally belonging to Jordan and Saudi Arabia, who were in the South Waziristan area of the FATA, also joined them.

18. Neither the HUM nor the LET had in the past come to notice for indulging in anti-Shia massacres in Pakistan though some leaders of the HUM had originally been members of the SSP. Of those who have gone to Iraq from Pakistan, only the members of the LEJ had indulged in anti-Shia massacres in Pakistan and Afghanistan in the past and could be expected to indulge in similar massacres in Iraq without any hesitation. The Iraqi resistance fighters are unlikely to indulge in the kind of massacres carried out at Karbala and Baghdad on March 2. The needle of suspicion, therefore, strongly points to the LEJ.

19. Their action in targeting the Shias of Iraq arises partly from their deeply-ingrained anti-Shia reflexes and partly is a reprisal for the perceived collaboration of the Shia leaders of Iraq with the American troops. If al-Zarqawi wanted to promote a civil war in Iraq by instigating Shia-Sunni clashes, as alleged by US officials, the LEJ, with which he has had a history of association in the past and which would not hesitate to massacre Shias anywhere in the world, would be the ideal tool in his eyes.
 

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Gilgit-Baltistan: The A.Q. Khan Proliferation Highway---Part III


By B. Raman

The first signs of political ferment against Islamabad appeared in 1971 when an organisation called the Tanzeem-e-Millat (TM) started operating in Gilgit despite the ban on political activities. In 1974, Johar Ali Khan, the founder of the party, called for a strike to demand the repeal of the Frontier Crime Regulations (FCRs) and the recognition of the basic rights of the locals. When the agitation took a violent turn, A. R. Siddiqui, the then Deputy Commissioner, ordered the Gilgit Scouts, a para-military unit raised by the British and with a history of over a hundred years, to fire on the agitators and disperse them. They refused to open fire on fellow-Shias. He then grabbed a rifle from a soldier of the Gilgit Scouts and opened fire on the crowd himself. One agitator was killed and the crowd dispersed. Johar Ali Khan and 15 others were arrested and taken to the jail. A large number of Shias raided the jail and got them freed. They were subsequently re-arrested.

2. Following these violent incidents---the first in the history of the NA since the Pakistan Army occupied it--- Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto, then in power in Islamabad, issued a notification disbanding the Gilgit Scouts as a punishment for its refusing to fire on the Shia agitators. The disbanding of the unit hurt the feelings of the Shias. It also threw a large number, who served in the Scouts, out of job. This marked the beginning of the alienation of the Shias of the NA against Islamabad. Tracing the history of the alienation of the Shias of the NA, the "Friday Times", a weekly of Lahore, wrote in its issue of October 15-21,1992, as follows: " The Gilgit Scouts was the only credible law-enforcing agency from pre-Partition times. Northerners generally resent the undoing of this centuries-old institution."

3. The widespread anger caused by the disbanding of the Gilgit Scouts led to the emergence of a number of anti-Government religious organisations of the Shias. To counter this, the local Army authorities allegedly encouraged the formation of pro-Government organisations by the Sunnis. This injected the poison of religious sectarianism in the NA, which like the rest of Jammu & Kashmir, had historically remained a tolerant society.

4. The injection of this poison led to an anti-Shia carnage in Gilgit in May 1988. This was followed by more anti-Shia incidents in 1990, 1992 and 1993. In its issue of April 1990, the "Herald", the monthly journal of the "Dawn" group of publications of Karachi, wrote as follows: "In May 1988, low-intensity political rivalry and sectarian tension ignited into full-scale carnage as thousands of armed tribesmen from outside Gilgit district invaded Gilgit along the Karakoram Highway. Nobody stopped them. They destroyed crops and houses, lynched and burnt people to death in the villages around Gilgit Town. The number of dead and injured was put in the hundreds, but numbers alone tell nothing of the savagery of the invading hordes and the chilling impact it has left on these peaceful valleys. Today, less than two years later, Gilgit is an arsenal and every man is ready to fight. In March 1990, when the Administration raided homes in Gilgit Town to seize weapons, one was reminded of Karachi and Beirut, not Shangri-la. In February and March this year, sectarian violence in Gilgit claimed several lives in the worst flare-up since May, 1988."

5. The "Herald" did not identify "the invading hordes" or their leader. These hordes consisted of Mehsuds and Wazirs from the Waziristan area of the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan. Their leader was a man called Osama bin Laden. He was then the blue-eyed Mujahideen of the USA's Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). 1988 was the year which saw the end of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Before the Soviets announced their intention to withdraw, the attacks by the Afghan and Arab Mujahideens were intensified. An increased number of private flights organised by the CIA brought in more and more weapons for use by the Mujahideen against the Soviet troops. Some of these weapons were diverted by the ISI to the Mehsuds and the Wazirs, who carried out during 1988 the greatest massacre of Shias in the history of the sub-continent since India and Pakistan became independent in 1947. More Shias of Gilgit were killed by bin Laden's Mehsuds and Wazirs in 1988 than the Shias (Hazaras) killed by the Taliban during the five years of its rule in Afghanistan.

6. Since the support of these tribals and of OBL and his Arab Mujahideen was needed in the culminating battles against the Soviet troops, the Western world maintained a silence on the carnage of the Shias. Till "Herald" broke the story of the carnage two years later, the outside world hardly had an idea of the ferocity of the suppression of the Shias of Gilgit by the Pakistan Army with the help of the invading tribal hordes from the FATA.

7. Writing on the same subject, the "Friday Times" (October 15-21, 1992) said as follows:" In 1988, 150 people were killed when armed lashkars from Chilas and Kohistan--- a predominantly Sunni and an exceptionally militant region-- raided the Shia-dominated region of Gilgit. After eight days of uninterrupted carnage, the military was finally called in and curfew imposed. Zia-ul-Haq's regime exploited the Shia-Sunni chasm. The invasion from outside has ignited an inferno of instability that has continued to blaze with the passage of time. It has militarised an otherwise peaceful environment into a ghetto of blind hatreds and animosities."

8. Twenty-eight Shias were killed in Gilgit Town in May, 1992. Latif Hasan, a well-known Shia leader of the Town, was murdered in broad daylight by masked assassins, leading to retaliatory attacks by Shias on the Sunnis, killing six of them. On August 18, 1993, 20 Shias were killed in the same town and the authorities had to impose a curfew.

9. Strongly condemning the anti-Shia incidents in the NA, Allama Syed Sajid Ali Naqvi, the chief of the Tehrik-e-Jafria Pakistan, the Shia political organisation of Pakistan, demanded the dismissal of the Inspector-General of Police of the NA. The "Frontier Post" of August 28, 1993, quoted him as saying as follows: "Due to wrong policies and inappropriate tactics of the IGP of the Northern Areas, the situation has deteriorated to such an extent that the Pakistan Army had to leave the peaks of Siachen for the streets of Gilgit. The bureaucracy and the authorities of the Northern Areas, who do not have the fear of accountability, have started interfering in the beliefs, customs, traditions and religious affairs of the poor people."

10. The year 1988 saw not only the "invading hordes" of Sunni tribals trained and motivated by OBL coming down the Karakoram Highway constructed with Chinese assistance in territory, which belongs to India. It also saw the movement of the first heavily-protected convoy of Chinese vehicles carrying Chinese weaponry, including short-range missiles, and nuclear-related equipment down the same Highway. The Karakoram Highway had become AQ Khan's Proliferation Highway. Many more convoys carrying such material have since come down this Highway---most of them carrying weaponry meant for the Pakistani Armed Forces and some carrying weapons meant for Iran.

11. Iran, which was dependent on this Highway for the movement of some of its military imports from China, chose to maintain a silence on the plight of the Shias of Gilgit. To be continued
 

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Talibanization of Gilgit-Baltistan and Sectarian Killings



Senge H. Sering

October 19, 2009
The authorities in Gilgit-Baltistan were not quite done celebrating the proclamation of the Empowerment and Self-governance Ordinance of 20091, when a bomb rocked Gilgit town on September 27 sparking off the latest bout of Shia-Sunni riots.2 Gun battles in the aftermath of the blast have led to the death of more than twelve people, including Raja Ali Ahmed Jan, a prominent leader of the Pakistan Muslim League.3 The incidents, culminating in a short-lived peace in this Pakistani occupied Shia region of Jammu & Kashmir, have led to the detention of several civilians as well two policemen. Some of the arrested are allegedly linked to those who assassinated Deputy Speaker Asad Zaidi and his companions in Gilgit in April 2009.4 Zaidi was the third-most high profile Shia politician, after the revered clerics Agha Ziauddin5 and Allama Hassan Turabi, to become the target of sectarian violence – a menace that has troubled Gilgit-Baltistan socially and economically, since the 1970s. Agha Ziauddin's death in January 2005 caused widespread clashes leading to a six-month long curfew and emergency, and loss of more than two hundred lives. Allama Turabi, shot dead in Karachi on July 14, 2006, hailed from Baltistan and was the President of Tehrik Jafaria of Pakistan (TJP). His death has been termed as detrimental to Shia rights' movement in Pakistan.6

In the sequence of events, as one looks back, eighteen people including the Director of the Agriculture Department of Gilgit7 died in 2008 as a result of Shia-Sunni clashes. However, by far, 2009 has seen more sectarian killings than the previous two years put together. It started in the middle of February when two Shias were killed in an attack on a van in Gilgit.8 Then, on June 17, ISI personnel arrested a Shia political activist, Sadiq Ali, and tortured him to death.9 Two months later, when the leader of the banned anti-Shia political party Sipah-e-Sahaba of Pakistan (SSP), Allama Ali Sher Hyderi was killed in Sindh, riots broke out in Gilgit leading to the closure of markets and heavy gun battle between Shias and Sunnis.10 In September, two Sunni Pashtuns and three native Shias were killed in Gilgit while a bus with Shia passengers coming from Baltistan was torched, causing several casualties.11

For centuries, people of Gilgit-Baltistan, professing various religions, co-existed in amicable conditions. It was only after Pakistan's annexation of these regions in the seventies that anarchy began. First, authorities abrogated the State Subject Rule, the law that until then protected the local demographic composition, and encouraged Pakistani Sunnis to settle in Gilgit town. This illegal government-sponsored settlement scheme damaged the social fabric and provoked religious feuds that continue to simmer. Pakistan created a political vacuum and a law and order crisis, once princely states and time-tested administrative structures of Gilgit-Baltistan were abolished. While Islamabad refused to delegate powers to local Shias by establishing viable a modern political structure, the despotic military rulers maintained ad-hoc policies to govern the region with an iron fist. It was during the same time that Pakistan embarked on its well-rehearsed divide and rule policy to paralyze local society. It exploited ethnic and religious fault-lines to weaken the natives in their demands for genuine political and socio-economic rights. Government-led Shia-Sunni and Shia-Nurbaxshi riots caused acute socio-political polarization in Skardo during the early 1980s. Events like these forced members of the local intelligentsia like Wazir Mehdi, the only Law graduate of Gilgit-Baltistan from Aligarh University, to admit that unification with Ladakh and Kashmir brought culture and civilization to the region while opting for Pakistan has resulted in the arrival of drugs, Kalashnikovs and sectarianism. On occasion, agencies employ religious leaders to fan hatred. In one such incident, intelligence agencies released a Punjabi cleric, Ghulam Reza Naqvi, from prison "to be sent to Gilgit to keep the pot of sectarian violence boiling." His release was granted after negotiations with SSP, which also got their leader Maulana Mohammad Ludhianivi freed from jail.12 A watershed in the history of Gilgit-Baltistan causing permanent trust deficit was reached in May 1988 when tribal Lashkars, after receiving a nod of approval from General Zia, massacred thousands of Shias in Gilgit and abducted local women. The intention was to undertake demographic change by force in this strategically located region sandwiched between China, the former Soviet Union and India.

The recent killings of Shias in Gilgit-Baltistan may also hinder the election process for the Gilgit-Baltistan Legislative Assembly (GBLA) that will take place in November of 2009. With the newly proclaimed self-governance ordinance, GBLA is expected to legislate on 66 articles pertaining to socio-economic and administrative issues. While local political institutions are evolving towards achieving genuine autonomy, the Sunni minority fears that the Shias would gain a majority in the assembly, which the former sees as a direct attack on its long term political and socio-economic interests in the region. The authorities intend to exploit similar insecurities to consolidate control over Gilgit city, which is not only the largest settlement in the region but also the capital of Gilgit-Baltistan. As the regional ballot is nearing, authorities may resort to electoral engineering to create a hung assembly, thereby stripping GBLA of the mandate to pass laws. The past experience of reorganization of constituencies along Shia-Sunni lines has also enabled Sunni candidates to gain a majority in various constituencies.

Gilgit city is divided into two constituencies – Gilgit-1 and Gilgit-2. Until a decade ago, voters from both constituencies sent Shia members to the local Council. The demographic change has turned the tide in favor of the Sunnis; in 2004, voters of Gilgit city returned Sunni candidates as winners. Shias in Gilgit-1 were further marginalized when the major Shia settlement of Nomal was transferred to Gilgit-4, thereby tilting the population balance. Since then, contests between Shia and Sunni candidates have remained neck to neck.13 The tipping point is the vote bank in the Amphari neighborhood with a mixed Shia-Sunni population where sectarian polarization will help the Sunni candidate gain a lead. Likewise, in Gilgit-2, the settlement of Pathans and Punjabis has changed the demography and this one-time Peoples Party (PPP) stronghold supported Hafiz Rehman of PML in the 2004 elections, which he won by a small margin of 500 votes.14 The voters' list released recently shows more than a 80 per cent increase in voters' numbers in Gilgit-1 (from 28,146 to 47,835) and Gilgit-2 (from 34,517 to 62,048) in just five years.15 Of these, a majority are Pakistani settlers who will impact election results in favor of Sunni candidates. The government is planning to increase the number of GBLA seats after the November elections and the above-mentioned additional voters in Gilgit city will lead to an out of proportion representation for Sunnis in GBLA. Such interference from Pakistan will only lead to further sectarian clashes and deaths.

Although sniper shooting has remained the primary method of sectarian killings, owing to Taliban influences bomb blasts are also becoming common. In May 2009, a bomb blast occurred in Baltistan, which led to the arrest of two Sunnis and recovery of explosive-making material and hand grenades.16 Later in July, a bomb was hurled at Bagrot Hostel, Gilgit, killing two and injuring several other Shia students.17 In April 2009, an Al Qaeda member, Abdullah Rehman, threatened to bomb a four-star hotel in Baltistan.18 Many Taliban who escaped from Swat and adjoining areas found shelter among Sunni extremists in Gilgit.19 Analysts fear that locals may benefit from the Taliban expertise in the field of bomb and suicide jacket making. Local youth is also susceptible to converting to the extremist Islamic ideology and joining the suicide bomber club as a result of Taliban influences. The fact that more than 300 suspected terrorists were expelled from Gilgit in October 2008 highlights fears that the Taliban presence in Gilgit-Baltistan is widespread.20 Successful Talibanization of Gilgit-Baltistan means more Shia deaths and continued arrival of Taliban in large hordes, which will hasten demographic change and hurt local cultural identity and ethnic solidarity. The ongoing military operation in Waziristan against Taliban and Al Qaeda may also create greater problems for Gilgit-Baltistan as Shia soldiers of the Northern Light Infantry Regiment will be in direct confrontation with those who perpetuated the Shia genocide in Gilgit in 1988.
 

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Gilgit-Baltistan: The AQ Khan Proliferation Highway---Part I


By B. Raman
On September 7, 2009, President Asif Ali Zardari of Pakistan signed what was called the Gilgit-Baltistan Empowerment and Self-Governance Order 2009, purporting to introduce administrative, political, financial and judicial reforms in the Northern Areas of Jammu & Kashmir, which has been under Pakistani occupation since 1947-48. The order re-names the Northern Areas as Gilgit-Baltistan, thereby seeking to obliterate the linkage of the area with Jammu & Kashmir.

2..Addressing a press conference the same day, the President of the Gilgit-Baltistan branch of the Pakistan People's Party ( PPP) Syed Mehdi Shah said that Zardari had instructed the authorities concerned to prepare a comprehensive plan to accelerate economic development in Gilgit-Baltistan. He claimed that the Zardari Government had given internal freedom and all financial, democratic, administrative, judicial, political and developmental powers to the Legislative Assembly of Gilgit-Baltistan. He said that a Gilgit-Baltistan Council, to be headed by the Prime Minister, would be set up and that Zardari had ordered the early initiation of a Gilgit-Skardu road project, the establishment of regional branches of the National Bank of Pakistan, the National Database and Registration Authority and the House Building Finance Corporation in the area.

3.Explaining the changes sought to be introduced by the Government in the status of the area to the media, Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani stated as follows on August 29,2009:

"All the stakeholders were taken on board prior to getting the approval from the Cabinet to give internal and political autonomy to the Northern Areas, which shall be now called Gilgit-Baltistan."

The Foreign Office was consulted on it and they have cleared it. "Every aspect was taken care of."

The Cabinet decision will empower the Gilgit-Baltistan Council and the Assembly to make laws. "The subjects about which the Assembly shall now have power to make law have been increased from 49 to 61 while the Council shall have 55 subjects."

There will be a Governor for Gilgit-Baltistan, who will be appointed by the President of Pakistan. Till the election of the Legislative Assembly, the Minister for Kashmir and Northern Areas will be acting as the Governor. "There will be a Chief Minister, who shall be elected by the Gilgit-Baltistan Legislative Assembly and will be assisted by six Ministers with the provision of two advisers."

The Legislative Assembly will have 24 members, who will be elected directly and in addition, there will be six women and three technocrat seats. In order to empower the Council and the Assembly on financial matters there would be a consolidated fund.The budget of the area would be presented and approved by the Gilgit-Baltistan Legislative Assembly.

The Chief Judge of the Appellate Court will be appointed by the Chairman of the Gilgit-Baltistan Council on the advice of the Governor, and other judges will be appointed by the Chairman on the advice of the Governor after seeking the views of the Chief Judge. The number of judges will be increased from three to five.

A Gilgit-Baltistan Public Service Commission, a separate Auditor-General and an Election Commissioner will be appointed.

Answering a question, Gilani said under the Constitution, the Northern Areas could be given the status of a province, "but we have given them internal autonomy as per the Constitution."

Answering another question, he said Gilgit-Baltistan could not be given representation in Parliament. Responding to a query, the Minister for Information, Kashmir Affairs and Northern Areas Qamar Zaman Kaira said the measures would be enforced through a presidential order replacing the Legal Framework Order of l994.

4. In an article on the subject titled "The Gilgit-Baltistan Bungle" published by the "News", on September 10,Asif Ezdi, a retired officer of the Pakistan Foreign Service, stated, inter alia, as follows:

"The Gilgit-Baltistan (Empowerment and Self-Governance) Order, 2009, approved by the Cabinet on Aug 29 seeks to grant self-rule to the people of the area on the pattern of the autonomy enjoyed by Azad Kashmir. As the Government itself admits, the promulgation of this Order, which has now been signed by Zardari, implies a rejection of the demand that Gilgit-Baltistan be made a province of Pakistan and that its people be given the same constitutional rights, including representation in the National Assembly and the Senate. The reason given by the Government is that acceptance of these demands would go against Pakistan's obligations under UN Security Council resolutions on Kashmir, which give Islamabad administrative powers over the territory but debar any change in its status.

"Given this self-imposed constraint, the Government had only limited room for action. It could only make those changes in the constitutional structure of Gilgit-Baltistan which would devolve more powers to the people of the territory, but not affect its international status. The last two constitutional measures adopted by the Government for the Northern Areas – in 2000 and 2007 – had also sought to give more powers to the elected Assembly within this constraint. The scope for further devolution was thus quite small. It is therefore no wonder that the changes introduced by the latest constitutional package are by no means of a radical nature.

"The most significant change is that a Council has been set up on the same pattern as exists in Azad Kashmir. It will have the power to legislate on more or less the same subjects as the Azad Kashmir Council. The federal Government will have a built-in majority in the Gilgit-Baltistan Council, as in the Azad Kashmir Council. The practical consequence is that legislation on these matters will continue to be controlled by Islamabad.

"Some of the changes made in the new law are cosmetic, such as renaming the Chairman as Governor, the chief executive as Chief Minister and advisers as Ministers. On the one hand, the new designations seek to highlight similarities with a province; and on the other hand, they underscore difference from Azad Kashmir.

"Since the purpose is to equate Gilgit-Baltistan with Azad Kashmir, the Government needs also to do two more things. One, it should rename the new legal framework for Gilgit-Baltistan as the Interim Constitution, just as the fundamental law of Azad Kashmir is called. Two, the new constitutional package should be passed by the elected Assembly of Gilgit-Baltistan, just as the Azad Kashmir Interim Constitution was passed by the elected Assembly of Azad Kashmir, instead of being promulgated through executive fiat.

"The concerns of Kashmiris are two-fold. First, their position has been that Gilgit-Baltistan is part of Jammu and Kashmir and cannot accede to Pakistan separately from the rest of the state. Second, Kashmiri leaders have expressed the fear that the accession of Gilgit-Baltistan would be taken as Pakistan's acquiescence in the permanent partition of Kashmir and would harm the freedom struggle. Such misgivings have been voiced by Yasin Malik ( of the J&K Liberation Front) and by some political circles in Azad Kashmir.

"Typically, the new law was not presented before its adoption for public or parliamentary debate. Instead, the Government only held some closed-door briefings for the parliamentary committee concerned and a few selected leaders from the Northern Areas. Representatives of Azad Kashmir and the APHC were not consulted. The Government clearly still treats the matter as a bureaucratic issue to be tackled bureaucratically."

5. MY COMMENTS: The Northern Areas of J&K, now re-named as Gilgit-Baltistan in violation of the UN resolutions by the Zardari Government has a total area of 28,000 sq.miles as against the only 4494 sq.miles of Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK), which Pakistan calls Azad Kashmir. It had a population of a little over 1.5 million in the 1990s. It was part of the State of J&K before 1947 and was called "the Northern Areas of J&K" to distinguish it from the Valley, Jammu and Ladakh.

6.In 1935, Maharaja Hari Singh, the then ruler of J&K, transferred the territory on a 60-year lease to the British authorities from whom it reverted back to the ruler under the Indian Independence Act of 1947. Upon its reversion, the ruler appointed Brig. Ghansara Singh as the "Governor of the Northern Areas of J&K" with headquarters at Gilgit. During 1947-48, the Pakistan Army illegally occupied the entire Northern Areas and parts of the Districts of Poonch, Mirpur and Muzaffarabad.

7. The Government of Pakistan constituted the occupied areas of Poonch, Mirpur and Muzaffarabad into the so-called autonomous State of Azad Kashmir. The Northern Areas were separated from the POK by a proclamation of April 28,1949, and placed directly under the administration of the Federal Government under the changed name of the "Northern Areas of Pakistan". Before doing so, it transferred some territory of the Northern Areas in the present Chitral region to the jurisdiction of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP). The suffx "of J&K" was deleted because Pakistan no longer considered the Northern Areas as part of J&K though it continued to say that its future, like that of POK and India's J&K, would be decided by a plebiscite under the auspices of the UN. In 1963, the Government of military dictator Ayub Khan ceded to China under a 99-year-lease 6000 sq.miles of Kashmiri territory from the NA--- that is, nearly, one-fourth of the NA territory. This has been incorporated by China into the Xinjiang Autonomous Region.

8.In 1982, Gen.Zia-ul-Haq proclaimed that the people of the NA were Pakistanis and not Kashmiris and that its future had nothing to do with that of J&K. However, his successors as rulers retained the fiction that the future of the NA would be decided under a plebiscite along with that of J&K and the POK.

9. The NA is divided into six districts called Hunza-Nager, Gilgit, Koh-e-Ghizer, Ghanche, Diamir and Skardu. These districts are grouped into three agencies or Divisions called Diamir with headquarters at Chilas, Gilgit with headquarters in Gilgit Town and Baltistan with headquarters in Skardu Town. Of the total population of the NA, 50 per cent used to be Shias, 25 per cent Ismailis, who are close to the Shias, and the remaining 25 per cent Sunnis. While the Sunnis were in a preponderant majority in the POK, they were in a minority in the NA. The Sunnis were in a majority in the Diamir District and in a minority in the remaining five districts.

10. Under Zia, a programme was initiated to change the demographic composition of the NA and reduce the Shia-Ismaili preponderant majority by re-settling a large number of Sunni ex-servicemen ----Punjabis as well as Pashtuns--- in the NA. This policy has been continued by subsequent Governments. No authentic census has been held in the NA and the POK and the results released to the public. As a result, one does not know the demographic composition of the present population of the NA and the POK. But the systematic Punjabi-Pashtun colonisation of the NA and the POK----which is similar to the Han colonisation of Xinjiang--- has reduced the percentage of ethnic Kashmiris in both POK and the NA and the number of Shias and Ismailis in the NA.

11. It is this attempt to change the demographic composition of the NA population and reduce the Shias-Ismailis to a minority in their traditional homeland that led to the start of a movement for a separate and autonomous ----not independent--- Shia province to be called the Karakoram province when Zia was in power. The ruthless suppression of this Shia-Ismaili movement by Zia and the resentment over his actions played a role in the crash of the plane in which he was travelling from Bahawalpur to Islamabad in August,1988, resulting in his mysterious death. Even though no proper enquiry was held into the plane crash, very reliable reports received by the Indian intelligence at that time had indicated that the plane crash was caused by a resentful Shia airman from Gilgit who released a can of some harmful gas in the cockpit thereby disorienting the crew.

12. The NA is one of the least developed areas of Pakistan. Successive Pakistani Governments took no interest in its development because of its Shia-Ismaili majority. Whatever development took place in the area was because of the interest of the Aga Khans, who started a number of rural development projects for the welfare of the Ismailis. The Sunnis, with the Sunni extremist Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) and the Jamaat-e-Islami (JEI) in the forefront, started a campaign against the Aga Khans by projecting them as Western agents and anti-Islam.

13. The local Shias drew their subsistence from tourism and the Armed Forces, which they used to join in large numbers. There was a time when many of the airmen in the Pakistani Air Force were Shias from Gilgit. After the crash of the plane carrying Zia, the Pakistani Armed Forces drastically reduced the recruitment of Shias from the NA into the Armed Forces thereby adding to unemployment.

14. Next to tourism and military service, Government service attracted a number of Shias. Punjabis and Pashtuns serving in the Government service in the NA received a 25 per cent extra allowance to which the locals were not entitled. This added to the resentment. Whereas the Mirpuris from the POK have been able to migrate in large numbers to the West from where they support their families, this avenue is not open to the natives of the NA because they require an exit permit for going abroad which is rarely issued.---To be continued
 

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GILGIT-BALTISTAN: THE AQ KHAN PROLIFERATION HIGHWAY---PART II

B.RAMAN


Between 1949 and 1974, the Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK) was governed directly from Islamabad through Punjabi and Pashtun officers deputed from the federal Government services. In 1974, Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto gave it a facade of an autonomous governing set-up through an Interim Constitution. He called it an Interim Constitution because he contended that the Kashmiris would be given a final constitution after a plebiscite had been held under the UN auspices. Even now, it is ruled under this so-called Interim Constitution.


2. This Interim Constitution provided for a President of the POK as the head of State, a Prime Minister as the head of the Government and a Legislative Assembly consisting of 40 directly elected and eight indirectly elected members. It also allowed the POK to have its own national flag and to issue its own passports to its residents. The POK flag and passports were different from those of Pakistan. However, the POK passports were not recognised by foreign countries. The inhabitants of the territory, therefore, travelled with Pakistani passports.The Interim Constitution also provided for a POK National Anthem, an Election Commission, an Auditor-General, a Supreme Court, a High Court and subordinate courts.


3.The exercise of powers by this ostensibly autonomous set-up is strictly limited by the following provisions:



Only candidates, who sign a declaration that Kashmir is a part of Pakistan, can contest the elections to the Legislative Assembly.

Under Article 32 of the Interim Constitution, the Legislative Assembly cannot make any laws relating to the defence and security of the territory, currency, external affairs and trade.

All important decisions of the POK Government, including appointments of Judges and senior officials, are subject to approval by a body called the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Council, whose Secretariat is based in Islamabad and functions under a Minister of the central Government designated as the Federal Minister of State for Kashmir and Northern Areas ( of Pakistan) Affairs. The Council is presided over by the Prime Minister of Pakistan and consists of five Federal Ministers nominated by the Prime Minister, the Federal Minister of State for Kashmir and Northern Areas ( of Pakistan) Affairs, who is an ex-officio member, the President of the POK and the
Prime Minister of the POK, or in his absence, one of his Ministers. This Council was not given any jurisdiction over the NA.


4. Even this facade of a separate set-up was denied to the NA, which was incorporated into Pakistan as a centrally administered tribal area like the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) near the Afghan border. Like the FATA, the NA was also governed under what was called the Frontier Crime Regulations (FCR) framed by the British during the colonial days for dealing with what they looked upon as the criminal tribes of the areas bordering Afghanistan. The people of the NA were not given passports and were not allowed to travel or migrate abroad. Every resident had to report to his local Police Station once a month and all movements from one village to another had to be reported to the police station. Collective fines were imposed on entire villages for crimes or violations of law and order committed by individual inhabitants of the villages.


5. Till Octobrer 1994, the people of the NA had no right of adult franchise. The territory had no elected Assembly or even municipal councils and no representation in the National Assembly. Political parties were banned. In 1994, the Benazir Bhutto Government allowed political parties of Pakistan, but not of the POK, to extend their activities to the NA and set up branches there. The PPP, the Pakistan Muslim League (PML), the Muttahida Qaumi Party of Altaf Hussain, the Jamaat-e-Islami and the Tehrik-e-Jaffria Pakistan (TJP), a Shia party, opened branches in the NA. The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) encouraged the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), a Sunni extremist party which has been campaigning for the declaration of the Shias as anti-Muslim, to expand its activities in the NA to counter the activities of the TJP.


6. In October,1994, party-based elections to a 26-member council called the NA Executive Council were held. It was announced on March 31,1995, that its members would have the same status, emoluments and privileges as the members of the NWFP Legislative Assembly,thereby giving it a facade of a provincial Legislative Assembly, but, in reality, the Executive Council was given only recommendatory
powers and not legislative powers. Five of its members were designated as Advisers to the Federal Minister for Kashmir and Northern Areas (of Pakistan) Affairs, Mohammad Afzal Khan. He told the National Assembly on March 26,1996, that the Advisers would have the same status and powers as the Ministers of the POK Government. Even the POK Ministers have very limited powers, but even those limited
powers were not given to the NA Advisers. The Minister's statement was just an eye-wash.


7. The NA continued to be ruled directly from Islamabad by the Minister of State For Kashmir and Northern Areas (of Pakistan) Affairs. with the help of six officers----all non-natives----deputed from outside. These officers were the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), the Commissioner,the Deputy Commissioner, the Inspector-General of Police (IGP), the Judicial Commissioner and the Chief Engineer, Public Works. While the posts of the CEO and Chief Engineer were generally filled by serving or retired army officers, the other posts were filled by officers taken on deputation from Punjab or the NWFP. There was no right of appeal against the judgements of the Judicial Commissioner. The Pakistan Supreme Court had no jurisdiction over him.


8. These so-called political and administrative reforms introduced by the Benazir Bhutto Government failed to satisfy the locals and to reverse the process of alienation of the people, which had started in 1971. ( 13-9-09) To be continued.
 

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GILGIT-BALTISTAN: THE AQ KHAN PROLIFERATION HIGHWAY---PART IV

B.RAMAN


The anti-Shia incidents of 1988-93 led to two developments. A number of new political groups of the Shias came into being, despite the ban on political activities. They started demanding that the NA should be converted into a separate province to be called the Karakoram Province with an elected Legislative Assembly and the same status as the Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK). This demand was strongly
opposed by the political parties of the POK, a predominantly Sunni area, and by the Sunni political groups of the NA, which demanded that the NA should be merged with the POK.


2. The "Friday Times" of October 15-21,1992, quoted Muhammad Yahya Shah, the Chief Convenor of the Hunza-Nager Movement, one of these new Shia organisations, as saying as follows: "We were ruled by the whites during the British days, but we are now being ruled by the browns from the plains...... The rapid settling-in of mostly Punjabis and Pakhtoons from outside, particularly the trading classes, has created
a sense of acute insecurity among the local Shias and resulted in antagonistic perceptions between the locals and outsiders.... The genie is out of the bottle. Political reform has been abandoned in favour of extremism, which the Government is abetting in order to prolong its unconstitutional militarisation. The economic and environmental plundering continues unabated. During Qasim Shah's tenure as Minister of NA, the forests were denuded rapidly. In the 1988 conflict, 400000 acres of jungle were depleted and the wood smuggled out. Marco Polo sheep, an endangered species, was hunted in the hundreds by the previous Corps Commander, Lt.Gen.Ali Akbar, who used helicopter gunships for his sport."


3. The same issue of the "Friday Times" quoted Muzzafar Ali, another Shia leader and General Secretary of the NA Bar Association, as saying: " The Government is instigating violence to suppress our genuine demands. In Pakistan, three Supreme Court Judges have to confirm a Sessions Judge's verdict. Here things happen in total negation of legal procedures as enshrined in the Constitution. A single senior judge from down-country confirms a verdict functioning as an autonomous Judicial Commissioner. He is at times even junior to the local Sessions Judge. The State-subject rules remained enforced in Indian Kashmir after 1947, while we blundered by getting integrated,without adequate guarantees, into Pakistan for the sake of Muslim brotherhood. We have ended up without a Constitution, representation,
even without civil or judicial rights as are available to our Pakistani brothers."


4. Opposing the demand of the Shias for a separate Karakoram Province, a group of Sunni leaders of the POK filed a petition before the POK High Court on October 16,1990, demanding that the NA, being Kashmiri territory, should be merged with the POK. Delivering the judgement on March 8,1993, Justice Abdul Majeed Mallick, Chief Justice of the POK High Court, ruled as follows:



"The NA are and have been part of the State of J&K as it existed before and on August 15,1947."

" The NA are part of Azad J&K and are to be construed and acknowledged as such."

"The detachment of the NA from the rest of Azad J&K is tantamount to a violation of the Resolutions of the Security Council of March 30, 1951, and January 24,1957."

"The State-subjects residing in the NA have been deprived of the benefits of fundamental rights enshrined in the Interim Constitution during the past without lawful authority. These rights are admissible and exercisable by them."


5. Refusing to accept the judgement, the Government of Pakistan said in a statement issued on March 11,1993: "The Azad J&K Government has no jurisdiction over the NA, which are under the administrative control of Pakistan and historically had been administered by the Central Government. There is no question of passing on the administrative jurisdiction of the NA to the AJK Government." (16-9-09)---To be
continued
 

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GILGIT-BALTISTAN: THE AQ KHAN PROLIFERATION HIGHWAY---PART V

B.RAMAN


The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan carried out a special study of the situation in the NA in 1993. The results of this study were published in its monthly newsletter for January,1994. The study said inter alia:



"The Government of Pakistan governs the NA through the Kashmir and Northern Areas Division (KANA). Authority behind KANA has remained vague. The executive head is the Chief Commissioner appointed by KANA and only answerable to it. The place is totally under bureaucratic rule. There is no industry in NA."

" The Judicial Commissioner does not have any writ jurisdiction, and, as the people of the NA do not have any fundamental rights, the Judicial Commissioner does not have any jurisdiction to enforce them."

"The Judicial Commissioner has no say in the appointments and transfers of subordinate court judges, which are done by the KANA Division."

" The people of the NA have no say in what laws should govern them. The KANA Division exercises the powers of the provincial Government for the NA and by notification extends laws of Pakistan and such amendments as it thinks fit to the NA. Entrusting such absolute legislative powers to a Government functionary is not without its share of hardships."

"By a notification, Order 39 of the Civil Procedure Code was amended taking away the powers of the civil courts to grant temporary injunctions against the Government, thus making most of the cases against the Government meaningless. By another notification, the Speedy Trials Courts Act,1992, was made applicable to the NA, with the amendment that in appeal from the trial court, any differences of opinion between the two Judges of the Appellate Court will be settled by the Chairman of the court. Such arbitrary application of law is particularly unfair because not only do the people have no forum to protest against or amed these laws, but also because the courts have no writ jurisdiction nor the people any fundamental rights. Thus, such laws cannot be tested for their legality and reasonableness for violation of fundamental rights."

"The Northern Areas Council is headed by the Minister of KANA and meets whenever called by the Minister. The members cannot convene a meeting. The orders require that a meeting of the Council should be called every two and a half months, but, in practice, the Minister at times does not convene one for months. The Council, in any case, has no power. It cannot form a government, cannot legislate and has no say in the administration. It cannot suggest development schemes. The main function of the Councillors, as a cynic said, is receiving dignitaries from Pakistan."

" The police in the NA has no prosecution or crime branch nor a forensic laboratory. No newspaper is published within the NA. There are a few local language weeklies and monthlies, but they are printed elsewhere."

" The Sunni and Shia communities in Gilgit had lived harmoniously for centuries. It is not easy to say when the trouble started, but it reached its climax in the killings of 1988. Some people suspect that the administration started it up after the political upheaval in Pakistan of 1970 and 1971 to take the minds of the people off political issues. It has even given rise to the occasional rumour that the Government itself pays the ulema to start the clashes. With very low literacy, extreme poverty and no organised political activity, it is not surprising that the ulema had acquired such a strong hold over the people. No judicial enquiry has been held into the clashes of 1992 and no compensation paid to the heirs of the persons killed or for properties damaged."


2. In its summing-up, the study stated as follows:



The people of the NA have no say in who governs them.

The democratic rights of the people have been tied to a cause.

A Pakistani civil servant legislates for the NA and influences all the executive and judicial acts.

Sometimes arbitrary laws are applied, while important ones are not extended, according to convenience.

The NA Council, the highest elective body in the NA, has no legislative powers at all.

The Judicial Commissioner and the subordinate courts are not free.

The people have no fundamental rights whatsoever.

Executive acts, however arbitrary, cannot be judicially reviewed.

The Election Commissioner is not independent and is vulnerable to pressures.

The administration has failed to control sectarian clashes due to mismanagement and acquiescence to pressures. (17-9-09)


To be continued
 

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GILGIT-BALTISTAN: THE AQ KHAN PROLIFERATION HIGHWAY---PART VI

B.RAMAN


The Aga Khan Foundation has over the years undertaken many rural development projects in the NA. Whatever little development has been there is mainly due to the Aga Khan Foundation. Even though the Islamic fundamentalist parties from time to time mounted a campaign against successive Aga Khans and their workers in the NA by projecting them as Western agents and anti-Islam, the Government of Pakistan saw to it that there was no interference with the Foundation's work because of its excellent international image.

2. The only major development project taken up by the Government was the construction of the Karakoram Highway with Chinese assistance to facilitate the overland movement to China of the exports from Punjab. The benefit of these exports largely went to the peopleof Punjab. It was completed in 1978.


3. The Karakoram Highway was also used for the movement to Pakistan of Chinese nuclear and military equipment such as the M-9 and M-11 missiles, equipment for the Chashma nuclear power station constructed by the Chinese etc. The two countries avoided transporting such sensitive equipment by sea to avoid detection by the US. Some of the missiles supplied by North Korea to Pakistan after Benazir Bhutto's secret visit to Pyongyang in 1993 also came by the overland route via China and then the Karakoram Highway. Some of the missiles for Iran from China and North Korea were also transported by the same route.


4. On March 9,1995, Pakistan, China, Kazakhstan and Kyrghystan signed at Islamabad a Transit Trade Agreement to facilitate trade between Pakistan and the Central Asian republics (CARs) via China. Under a separate agreement between Pakistan and China, it was decided to upgrade the Karakoram Highway to facilitate this trade with the CARs, with Pakistan meeting the expenditure on its side and China on its side. While work on the Pakistan side involving an investment of US $ 85 million started after the signing of the agreement, China dragged its feet on upgrading the Highway in its territory because of its concerns over the increasing use of the Highway by the
Uighur extremist elements for getting arms, ammunition and explosives from Pakistan and by Pakistani narcotics smugglers for smuggling heroin to China.


5.Writing in the "Herald" (December,1995), the monthly journal of the "Dawn" group of publications, Ahmed Rashid, the well-known Pakistani expert on Afghanistan and the CARs, said: " Beijing's reluctance stems from the fact that the proposed road would run across Xinjiang and the Chinese fear that the route would increase the traffic in fundamentalism. After an abortive Islamist uprising in the town of Baren in 1992 in which 22 people were killed, China closed its road links with Pakistan for several months. In the second week of November,1995, Ibrahim Rouzi, Director of Xinjiang's Religious Affairs Bureau, ordered a Government probe into the mushrooming of unauthorised mosques and Quranic schools in the region, which, he said, were often opened from funds from abroad. "We must firmly oppose religious activities which run counter to the Socialist system, divide the motherland and incite fanaticism by disseminating speeches in mosques about a religious war," he added."


6.Ahmed Rashid further reported in the same article that six Islamic militants (Uighurs) from Xinjiang, who were undergoing training at the Islamabad Islamic University, attended a convention of the Jamaat-e-Islami at Lahore.


7. The "International Herald Tribune" reported on May 28,1996, that following a resurgence of pro-independence terrorist activity in Xinjiang, the local authorities had tightened border security and issued the following instructions: " We must greatly increase control on frontier crossings, put more soldiers on duty, strengthen inspection of goods crossing the border and seriously stop weapons, splittists and reactionary phamplhlets entering China."


8.The "Far Eastern Economic Review" of Hong Kong reported as follows in its issue of June 13,1996: " Beijing has ordered the re-deployment of several army units in the troubled Muslim region of Xinjiang as a result of increased separatist activities in the border areas. A Chinese scholar told a seminar in Hong Kong that he had been delayed for six hours while travelling in the region in May because of a massive shift of troops in the Aksu District. The official media have confirmed the assassination by separatists of one Muslim cleric and several polcemen in the regional capital Urumqi in late February. The movement of troops from military sub-districts in the region is believed to be the largest since a separatist insurrection took place in the Western border county of Akto in April,1990"


9.Another reason for China's concerns over the threats to its internal security from the Karakoram Highway was the increasing use of the Highway by narcotics smugglers for smuggling heroin from Afghanistan into China via Pakistan. As in the FATA, in the NA too, large sections of the local people, because of the extreme poverty, started taking to narcotics smuggling as a means of livelihood.


10. Quoting a Chinese diplomat in Islamabad, the Urdu language daily "Nawai Waqt" of Pakistan reported as follows on June 4,1996: " China has deported hundreds of Pakistanis, who had illegally entered Xinjiang for hunting eagles. These Pakistanis did not possess any valid documents to enter the Chinese territory. He also disclosed that dozens of people, allegedly involved in the smuggling of drugs, were
arrested by Chinese guards and one of them has been sentenced to death in Beijing. Several Pakistani drug smugglers are still languishing in Chinese jails."


11. It added: " The diplomat termed as incorrect a report about denial of visas to Pakistani tourists wishing to visit China. He said that following the arrest of about 450 Pakistanis in October,1995, in Xinjiang for illegal activities, Beijing has decided not to issue visas to any individual tourist. However, tourist groups are not being denied visas if they are sponsored by Pakistani or Chinese tourism institutions.Moreover, no trader or industrialist of Pakistan will be refused a visa. Asked whether the arrested Pakistanis were indulging in unhealthy political activities in Xinjiang, he declined to comment."


12. After seizing power in October 1999, Pervez Musharraf took up with the Chinese authorities the importance of the early implementation of the project for the upgradation of the Karakoram Highway. The Chinese took up the work on their side according to a mutually agreed revised schedule and have reportedly completed it ahead of schedule. The upgradation work on the Pakistan side has been much behind
schedule.


13. In the winter of 1998-99, Musharraf used the NA as the launching pad for the infiltration of the Pakistani Army into the Kargil area of India's J&K. Pakistani troops, assisted by Mehsuds and Wazirs from Waziristan trained by Al Qaeda, occupied the Kargil heights during the height of winter with the objective of disrupting traffic between Srinagar and Kargil and starving the Indian troops deployed in the Siachen sector of J&K. After the explosions outside the US Embassies in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam by Al Qaeda in August 1998, the Nawaz Sharif Government came under considerable pressure from the US either to act against Al Qaeda sanctuaries in Afghan territory or to let the US do it. Musharraf sold to Nawaz the idea that some of the inmates of Al Qaeda camps in the Afghan territory could be shifted to the NA for helping the Pakistan Army in its operations in J&K.


14. Nawaz agreed to it under the impression that the operations planned by Musharraf on the Kargil heights would only involve the tribals trained by Al Qaeda and not the Pakistan Army. In May,1999, a military conflict broke out between the Indian and Pakistani armies when the Indian Army took action to eject the Pakistani Army invaders from the Indian territory on the Kargil heights. The Indian Army killed or
captured regular soldiers of the Pakistan Army, many of them belonging to its Light Infantry Regiments raised in the NA. Through a back channel mechamism, the Government of India confronted Nawaz with conclusive evidence of the involvement of the Pakistani Army in the illegal occupation of the Indian territory, which triggered off the conflict.


15. Nawaz was taken by surprise because the clearance given by him to Musharraf was for shifting some of the inmates of Al Qaeda camps in Afghan territory to the NA for use against India and not for using the Pakistan Army for occupying Indian territory. The anger of Nawaz with Musharraf for using the Pakistan Army for occupying Indian territory set in motion the train of events which ultimately led to his overthrow and arrest by Musharraf in October,1999.


16. During the height of the Kargil fighting, the British High Commission in New Delhi used to organise daily briefings on the fighting for the benefit of some of the British journalists, who had assembled in New Delhi to cover the conflict. One of the British journalists who was covering the conflict from New Delhi was Julian West. In a despatch from New Delhi, which was carried by the "Electronic Telegraph" (May 30,1999) Julian West reported as follows:


(a). "A group of British Islamic fundamentalists are reported to be among the insurgents "¦According to Western intelligence sources, six Britons are reported to have recently received training in mountain techniques and high-altitude warfare."


(b)."The British Muslims are among a number of Islamic guerillas being trained in remote valleys near Skardu, in Pakistani Kashmir, just north of the LOC from Kargil"¦. Their instructor reportedly claimed that he was being paid Pound Sterling 30 a day---probably by Pakistan's military intelligence agency ISI."


( c ).The preparation of a mixed force of Afghan, Kashmiri, Pakistani and even British Muslim guerillas, trained to fight at high altitudes,reinforces India's contention that the current conflict was well planned. It also further confirms long-standing reports that Pakistan employs a loose network of international terrorists as well as Pakistani army regulars and Kashmiri militants-- not only for operations in Afghanistan,but also for intrusions into Indian Kashmir.


(d). "Western intelligence has long believed that various Muslim dissident groups in Britain are front organisations for Islamic extremism,funded by an international network of wealthy Muslims and often sponsored by Pakistani and Arab intelligence agencies."


(e)."Although the Indian army claims that these are Pakistani army regulars in disguise, Western intelligence believes that many are Afghan,Pakistani and even international Muslim militants backed by Pakistan's ISI.. Principal amongst these is Al Badr, a terrorist group linked to
Osama bin Laden"¦."


(f). An intelligence source, who believes about 3,000 to 5,000 militants are currently being trained in various camps run by Pakistani intelligence in Pakistan and possibly in Afghanistan, said: "This current operation (in Kargil) has all the hallmarks of the ISI."


(g). "The operation almost certainly has the backing of the ISI and could not have been launched without the knowledge of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif."


17.Apart from Al Badr of bin Laden mentioned by Western intelligence sources, other organisations which have claimed responsibility for the occupation of the ridges in the Kargil-Dras sector were:


(a). The Lashkar-e-Toiba. "The Times" of UK correspondent in Islamabad (May 31, 1999) quoted Abdullah Muntazir of the Lashkar as saying as follows: " We have Muslim volunteers from all over the world coming to join the jihad"¦.A large number of our fighters have come from the Afghan province of Nuristan. " The correspondent also reported that at least four other Pakistan-backed militant groups were recruiting people to fight in Kashmir.


(b). The United Jihad Council of Muzzafarabad , which claimed to be a united front of 14 unnamed organisations. It is headed by Syed Salahuddin belonging to one faction of the Hizbul Mujahideen. The Hizbul Mujahideen works in close concert with the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM), the Jammat-e-Islami of Pakistan and the Hizb-e-Islami of Gulbuddin Heckmatyar of Afghanistan.Since the US declared the HUM as an
international terrorist organisation in October, 1997, its volunteers operating in Kashmir use the cover of the Hizbul Mujahideen. (20-9-09)

To be continued
 

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GILGIT-BALTISTAN: THE AQ KHAN PROLIFERATION HIGHWAY---PART VII

B.RAMAN



Before the Agra summit of July 14-16,2001, between Atal Behari Vajpayee, the then Indian Prime Minister, and Pervez Musharraf, the latter had held a series of consultations with political and religious leaders of Pakistan, including Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK), on his negotiating strategy at Agra. Significantly, he did not invite any representative from the NA for these consultations.


2.Reliable source reports indicated that his decision not to invite anyone from the NA was due to the fact that Gilgit was in a serious state of unrest for a fortnight from the last week of June,2001, due to protests from Sunni organisations over the decision of the local administration to introduce different text-books in the schools for the Shias, who are in a majority in Gilgit, and the Sunnis. Embarrassed by the outbreak of the violence before the summit, the Pakistani authorities stopped all movements between Gilgit and the rest of Pakistan and imposed strict censorship on the publication of the details of the incidents in Gilgit.


3.The riots in Gilgit started on June 23,2001, when there were clashes between the workers of the extremist Sunni organisation Sipah Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) and law enforcing agencies following the arrests of some SSP leaders, who demanded that Shia students should study the same books as were prescribed for Sunni students by the Sunni Ulema and not separate books approved by the Shia clergy.


4.The Sunni traders started a shutter down strike in protest against the arrests of the central Khateeb and Ameer Tanzeem-e-Ahle-Sunnah-al-Jamat, Maulana Nisar Ahmed, and the President of the Gilgit branch of the SSP,Himayat-ullah, along with other religious scholars on the night of June 22.


5.To disperse rioting SSP members, the police first baton charged and when the SSP cadres retaliated by pelting stones, they fired tear-gas shells intermittently for nearly two hours, which resulted in a large number of casualties. A curfew was imposed and para-military forces were deployed to enforce it.


6.Thousands of protesting activists of the Ahle Sunnah blocked the roads in Gilgit City and Kohistan to prevent the movement of reinforcements, which were then rushed to the affected areas by helicopters. The Army then forcibly removed the demonstrators from the roads and used bulldozers to remove the barricades erected by them.


7.Subsequently, about 500 activists of the SSP surrounded the Gilgit City Police Station, demanded the release of the arrested Sunni leaders and defied an one-hour ultimatum to disperse issued by the Army.Brig.Zahid Mubashir, the Station Commander at Gilgit, then rushed to the Police Station and tried unsuccessfully to persuade the demonstrators to disperse. Later, he withdrew the Army to the barracks and let the local Police handle the inflamed situattion.


8.Meanwhile,another crowd of demonstrators led by Maulana Luqman Hakim, leader of the local unit of the Jamaat-ul-Ulema Islam (JUI), and two members of the Northern Areas Council Sumbal Shah and Saif ur Rehman Khan surrounded the local airfield and refused to allow any aircraft to land or take off. They demanded the transfer of Muhammad Ali Shahzad, a Shia, who was the Deputy Commissioner of Gilgit, for
allegedly permitting the Shias to have their own text-books.


9.The Army cut off all telephone communications inside the NA as well as between the NA and the rest of Pakistan. Despite this, the news of the demonstrations spread to the rest of the NA resulting in demonstrations in other areas too and also in the Kohistan District of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP). The demonstrating mobs blocked the Karakoram Highway at many points.


10.Musharraf thereupon rushed Abbas Sarfaraz Khan, his Minister in charge of the POK and NA Affairs, to Gilgit to take control of the situation. Normalcy could be restored only by the first week of July.


11.The unrest was mainly directed against the Shia officers of the local Administration.There were no attacks by the Sunnis on the Shia civilian population. Long before the unrest, the "Dawn" of Karachi had reported as follows:


"Though outwardly calm, the Northern Areas of Pakistan are simmering with a crisis that has all the ingredients of boiling over the rim: the over 2 million people of the Northern Areas spread over an area of 72,500 sq km are politically unrepresented in Pakistan and thus facing obvious neglect as all the governments have linked their fate to the resolution of the Kashmir dispute. This discontent and anger, if not
appeased, can erupt into a national crisis with far reaching consequences.


"The region classified as 'Northern Areas' comprises five districts: Gilgit, Diamir, Baltistan, Ghizer and Ghanche. It had voluntarily acceded to Pakistan on Nov 1, 1948, liberating itself from the Dogra Raj. Yet, Islamabad considers it to be a disputed territory and links its future to that of Kashmir. The people of this area have neither been granted any civil, human and constitutional rights, nor do they have due representation in the legislature.


"The area has always been governed directly from Islamabad through an appointed Chief Secretary, armed with the Frontier Crime Regulation (FCR) laws. Although there is an elected Northern Areas Council to regulate its local affairs, the locals believe it to be just a 'rubber stamp'. Besides the Chief Secretary and a Minister for Northern Areas and Kashmir Affairs and his six officers, who sit in Islamabad,
the area has no other legal representation. All these people are non-locals, including the Judicial Commissioner against whose judgements there is no right to appeal.


"Fifty-three years down the line and exposed to an era of digital communication, the people of the Northern Areas are getting restless. Though committed to the denominators of Pakistan's security and integrity, they have started questioning Islamabad's policy of keeping them unrepresented and backward till Kashmir's fate has been determined. Their demand makes sense as even the internationally
accepted disputed territory of Kashmir has an assembly and an independent legal status.


"The feeling of alienation among the inhabitants of these areas is growing as Islamabad continues to turn a blind eye to their misery; they feel the government is trying to solve the Kashmir issue at their expense. The frequent protest demonstrations and various efforts by the locals in an attempt to attract the attention of Islamabad are too obvious a distress signal to ignore. Rallies marking 'day of deprivation' are held in many pockets across Gilgit and Baltistan.


"In May 1999, the Supreme Court of Pakistan in a landmark judgment ruled: "The NA are a disputed territory and the Government of Pakistan has no claim over it." In the same breath, the apex court asked the Federal Government to grant the region its due status within the next "six months". Nothing has come of it so far. The rift is taking its toll on the region in the form of grave national and international
consequences.


"The unrepresented status of the NA has resulted in its alienation from the national mainstream, causing deprivation and socio-economic backwardness. Strategically located, this serene and beautiful region is among the most poverty-ridden parts of the country. Lacking a strong socio-economic infrastructure, the region is not developed. Despite strong nationalistic feelings among the people of the NA, they
would like to enter into a legal and constitutional arrangement with Pakistan. The Northern Areas are as important to us as Kashmir; and this fact should be recognized by the authorities.


"On the international front, the indecisive status of the NA is a source of embarrassment. It hinders the development work. The pending Basha Dam, the gold mining project of the Australians and other such projects are examples of how the donors shy away from the region owing to its lack of constitutional and legal status.


"Similarly, tourism has failed to get a boost for which even the essential infrastructure is missing. "It is ironic that the world is more worried about the falling trees; they are sad that our white leopard are vanishing day by day; the dead bodies of our Markhor frightens them; they are going all out to preserve our ecosystem. But nobody ever thinks of the people of this land," says Raja Hussain Khan Maqpoon, Editor of Gilgit-Baltistan's weekly newspaper K2.


"While it is true that this area has some of the finest wildlife in the world which is in urgent need of protection, the fact that the people living here are facing abject poverty cannot be ignored for long. Much as they would like to preserve their heritage, it is becoming very difficult for them to cooperate with the concerned agencies in the face of non-existent basic facilities such as electricity, drinking water and elementary health care. Remoteness has added to their misery.


"Gilgit and Baltistan, which lie to the north of India, were part of the state of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) before 1947. In order to distinguish them from the valley proper, Jammu and Ladakh regions, they used to be called the Northern Areas of Jammu and Kashmir. After the 1948 war over Kashmir, the Government of Pakistan issued a proclamation on April 28, 1949, separating the Northern Areas of J&K from Azad
Kashmir and placing them under the administration of the Federal Government under the name of Northern Areas of Pakistan.


"Since then time has stood still for the locals owing to total neglect by successive regimes in Islamabad. For almost five decades, the area has been under virtual Martial Law. Under the Frontier Crime Regulations, framed by the British during the colonial days, every resident of the area has to report to the local police station once a month and all movements from one village to another have to be reported to the
police station.


"Frustration arising out of unemployment is forcing the youth to come out on the streets. As they have no access to courts they never receive any redress. Lack of educational institutions has practically closed all avenues of government jobs, thus negating their chances for upliftment. Money earmarked for development projects often end up in wrong places, so the economy is mainly dependent on agriculture.
But like feudalism everywhere, most of the land is owned by a privileged few with no respite to the common man.


"Hunza is a comparative exception. A high level of missionary movement and the Aga Khan Rural Support Programme has brought about a unique mix of modern education in the most primitive of places. Then, the border town of Sost, just below the Khunjerab Pass, also does well by the trade of electronic goods with China.


"However, it is time Islamabad played its cards with prudence and foresight. Cruising along the international front with Kashmir is fine, but it should not be done at the cost of the Northern Areas. They should be granted their due status and rights, to which they were entitled at the time they acceded to Pakistan."


Shaheen Sardar Ali, a prominent lawyer of the Peshawar bar, has co-authored a book titled "Indigenous Peoples and Ethnic Minorities of Pakistan" (Curzon Press) on the mess created by the ideological principle that only religion was the basis of nationhood. She attributes the ethnic and linguistic troubles of Pakistan to the blindly monistic claim that if one is a Muslim one can't be a Sindhi, Balochi, or Kashmiri etc and draws attention to the following facts:


"It is Article 21 of the 1974 Interim Constitution Act passed by the 48-member Azad Jammu and Kashmir unicameral assembly in 1974 which tells us how 'azad' is Azad Kashmir although the leader of the majority in the House is called Prime Minister unlike his counterpart in Held Kashmir. The article explained the role played by the Government of Pakistan in the affairs of Azad Jammu and Kashmir. It is in fact the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Council based in Islamabad which runs Azad Kashmir. The Prime Minister of Pakistan is its Chairman and a Secretary of the Ministry for Kashmir Affairs actually runs the territory on a daily basis. The Council has Azad Kashmiri members, including the President and Prime Minister, but it is the Prime Minister (of Pakistan) who orders everyone around. His power derives from the fact that he gives Azad Kashmir its annual budget and can actually dismiss the government of the state if the fancy takes him.


"Azad Kashmir has a High Court, but all appeals against its decisions lie in the Supreme Court of Pakistan, which makes sure that nothing is adjudicated in the state contrary to the policy of the Federal Government. One example of this came in the shape of cases in 1993 and 1995 ( Malik Muhammad Miskeen and Others vs. Government of Pakistan, through Secretary Kashmir Affairs and Northern Affairs Division,
Islamabad and Others [PLD AJ&K] and Federation of Pakistan vs. Malik Muhammad Miskeen and Eight Others [PLD SC]). In 1949, Pakistan decided to take over the administration of the Gilgit-Baltistan territory which is legally a part of Azad Kashmir. It concluded an agreement with the Government in Muzaffarabad and simply delinked it from Azad Kashmir to call it the Northern Areas. Later on, when it (Islamabad) sorted out its frontier with China, some of this territory was ceded to China with the proviso that the settlement was subject to the final solution of the Kashmir dispute. The cases at the Azad Kashmir High Court challenged the authority of the Federal Government to take away the Northern Areas and wanted the territory returned to the administration of Muzaffarabad.


"It is understandable that the High Court found for the petitioner. The Azad Kashmir Government was hardly sovereign to sign an equal treaty with Pakistan. On the other hand, Pakistan admitted that the Northern Areas were a part of the state. The Court ordered that Gilgit-Baltistan be returned to Azad Kashmir, whereafter Islamabad went to the Supreme Court in Islamabad in appeal. Here the case was
decided on political grounds, the Federal Government strangely taking the position that the case was not based on legality but politics."


The book concludes:"The judgement became the cause of serious concern for the Governments of Pakistan and Azad Jammu & Kashmir and they appealed to the Supreme Court. The contention that the Northern Areas formed historically part of the state of Jammu and Kashmir was not - indeed could not - be denied by either Government. That the Northern Areas were being looked after by the Pakistan government administratively by virtue of the 1949 agreement between the two governments was not disputed either. The arguments at the Supreme Court were mainly confined to technicalities of the petition. The Government of Pakistan contended that the issues raised were basically political in nature and hence not amenable to discussion and judgement before a court of law. It was further argued that the High
Court of Azad Jammu & Kashmir lacked jurisdiction in this matter as it could not issue a writ to the Government of Pakistan. In short the Supreme Court overturned the judgement handed down by the High Court of the state without going into the substantive details of the case."


Other points to emerge from the book and other comments in Pakistan were: "And how has the Government of Pakistan acquitted itself of the responsibility of administering the Northern Areas or the region of Gilgit-Baltistan? Here too the Northern Areas Council has no independence and is run by the same Ministry that runs Azad Kashmir. What a politically unsteady Islamabad has done to the Northern
Areas is clear, if you study the developments in the region since 1988 when the first big sectarian killings occurred there. The book modestly states that the ulema began to be given more importance than the people, which caused the Islamised administration of Islamabad to retreat before the rising Sunni storm against the two communities (Shias and Ismailis) that formed the majority in Gilgit-Baltistan. Gilgit joined the other centres of Shia concentration in Pakistan, like Jhang and Parachinar, when its population were brutalised by the Deobandi assault, carrying a clear stamp of anti-Shia Afghanistan. The Aga Khan Foundation projects in Gilgit were attacked and bombed while Shia-Sunni marriages were stopped by force by the warrior priests. "


12.While the Government of Pakistan has, since 1975, allowed at least a façade of democracy and autonomy to Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK), it has kept the NA under tight federal control, imposing an iron curtain in the area. The reasons are its strategic location adjoining China and the clandestine use of the Karakoram Highway for the movement of Chinese nuclear material and missiles.


13.The "Washington Times" carried two reports on August 6 and 7,2001, stating as follows:


* The China National Machinery & Equipment Import & Export Corporation sent a dozen shipments of missile components to Pakistan since November,2000, and a US spy satellite detected the latest shipment as it arrived by truck at the mountainous Chinese-Pakistani border May 1,2001. The company supplied components for Pakistan's Shaheen-1 and Shaheen-2 missile programmes. The consignments were sent by ship and truck.


* The missile components were being used for the production of the Shaheen-1, which has an estimated range of 465 miles, and the development of the Shaheen-2, which US intelligence agencies think would have a range of up to 1,240 miles.


14.In a statement issued at Beijing on August 8,2001,the China National Machinery and Equipment Import and Export Corporation (CMEC) claimed that it had never exported or provided missile components to Pakistan. It contended that the CMEC's business scope was mainly confined to the contracting of international engineering projects, and export of machinery and electrical products and complete plants.
Since its founding, the CMEC had always operated strictly within the bounds of law and the business scope approved by the state and had never exported or provided any military equipment, arms or related components to Pakistan or any other country, it claimed further. It added that the CMEC had never used trucks as a means of transportation for cross-border exports.


15.Refuting the "Washington Times" report on August 9,2001, a spokesperson of the Chinese Foreign Office claimed that China had all along been implementing its non-proliferation policy in a serious, earnest and responsible approach and accused some newspapers in the US of frequently spreading "irresponsible and totally unfounded rumours" and slanders of China engaging in proliferation, which was entirely
driven by "ulterior motives."


16.She added that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery vehicles had an impact on international peace and security, and all countries had the obligation to strictly observe the relevant international legal instruments. "If any country adopts a selective approach to these legal instruments, it will only undermine the international non-proliferation efforts. It is even more inadvisable to spread irresponsible remarks based on so-called `intelligence' that is fabricated out of thin air in an attempt to exert pressure on other countries."


17.In the past, Pakistan had been receiving its clandestine missile consignments from North Korea by sea. Since the appointment of Richard Armitage as Deputy Secretary of State in the Bush Administration, Pakistan and North Korea were worried because in a paper on US policy options towards North Korea submitted to the US House of Representatives on March 4,1999, Armitage had, inter alia,
recommended as follows: "Should diplomacy fail, the United States would have to consider two alternative courses, neither of which is attractive. One is to live with and deter a nuclear North Korea armed with delivery systems, with all its implications for the region. The other is preemption, with the attendant uncertainties. Strengthened deterrence and containment. This would involve a more ready and robust posture, including a willingness to interdict North Korean missile exports on the high seas. Our posture in the wake of a failure of diplomacy would position the United States and its allies to enforce 'red lines.' Preemption. We recognize the dangers and difficulties associated with this option. To be considered, any such initiative must be based on precise knowledge of facilities, assessment of probable success, and clear understanding with our allies of the risks."


18.During the visit of the then Chinese Prime Minister Zhu Rongji to Pakistan in May,2001, Islamabad had taken up with China the question of allowing future missile consignments from North Korea to come to Pakistan by road via China and the NA and, according to reliable sources in the NA, this started happening thereafter.


19. After his return from the Agra summit, Musharraf visited the NA in August,2001. His visit came in the wake of the reports carried by the "Washington Times" about the detection by the US intelligence of a convoy of trucks carrying Chinese missile components by the Karakoram Highway. The Pakistani military junta had taken considerable precautions to prevent detection of the truck movements by not
associating any of the officials of the NA Administration, particularly the Shias, with the arrangements for the movement. In view of this,both Islamabad and Beijing were surprised and embarrassed by the US media reports that US intelligence had detected the truck movements. Pakistani officials claimed that even if US satellites had detected the trucks, they could not have known that the
consignments contained missile components. They, therefore, reportedly felt that there must have been leakage to the CIA from one of the Pakistani officials associated with the movement. Moreover, following past US detection of the storage of the earlier missiles/components in Sargoda, the military junta had drawn up alternate plans for storage in Gilgit in the hope that there would be less possibility of detection there by the CIA. Before Musharraf's arrival in the NA, Lt.Gen. Jamshed Gulzar, then Corps Commander, 10 Corps based in Rawalpindi, had
visited the NA to enquire into the leakage jointly with the Force Commander, NA, Lt-Gen Muhammad Safdar. Measures for tightening up security in the NA was one of the subjects which figured during the discussions of Musharraf in Gilgit in which apart from senior military officers, Abbas Sarfaraz, Musharraf's Minister for Kashmir and NA Affairs, who was also the Chief Executive of the NA, also participated.



20.In the NA, Musharraf had discussions with the officials of the NA Administration on the law and order situation in the wake of the riots by the Sunnis in June, 2001. He also addressed the NA Council, which had only powers of a local body and was not a full-fledged Assembly with legislative powers. He promised to consider suggestions for upgrading it as a full-fledged Legislative Assembly. At the same time, he made it clear that in view of the strategic importance of the area, the NA could not have a President and a Prime Minister as in POK, but would continue to be directly administered from Islamabad by the Ministry of Kashmir and NA Affairs, with the Minister in charge acting as the Chief Executive of the NA.


21.Musharraf declined to receive representatives of local Shia organisations, who wanted to present a memorandum reiterating their demand for the conversion of the NA into a separate Karakoram province, with the new province having the same powers as the other provinces of Pakistan. The Shias' demand for a sepate province is strongly opposed by the Sunnis of the POK, the Sunni component of the NA population and by the Sunni organisations of Pakistan.


22.The NA does not have a separate budget of its own. Its budget is incorporated in the budget of the Federal Government. After the Kargil conflict of 1999, the Federal Government, on the advice of the Army, embarked upon a plan for the improvement of road communications in the NA. The Federal Government allocated Rs 600 million for the construction of roads in the area.


23.There is no truckable road between Gilgit and Chitral, which is mainly accessible from Afghanistan along the Kunar River. A jeepable track was developed after 1950 between Dir and Darosh passing over the 3118 meter high Lowari Pass. However, it is open for only six months during the summer. The Lowari Pass remains blocked by snow during the rest of the year. During this period, the only way of
reaching Chitral is either by the Pakistan International Airways (PIA)'s Fokkar flights or through Afghan territory via the Bajaur Agency.


24.In 1975, an attempt to connect Chitral with the rest of Pakistan was made when work on an 8 km long tunnel under the Lowari Pass was started by the Lowari Tunnel Organisation, an army engineers' organisation, but they could not succeed in constructing the tunnel and the work was abandoned in 1977.


25.The Musharraf Government drew up in 2001 plans for the construction of a 24 -feet wide truckable road between Gilgit and Chitral as follows:

* Chitral to Mastuj (100 km):Already metalled for about 80 kms up to Buni. The remaining portion was to be metalled.


* Mastuj-Shandur: (42 km ): There was a jeepable track over the 3734m high Shandur top, which is the boundary between the NWFP and the NA. The elevation varies from 2280m in Mastuj to 3734 m at Shandur, which would be the highest point on this proposed road.



* Shandur- Pingal( 62 km):There was a jeepable track along the Ghizar river in Ghizar District. The jeep track descends from a height of 3734m to 2185 m at Pingal.



* Pingal-Gahkuch (40 km): There was a jeepable track along the Ghizar river. Gahkuch is the headquarters of Ghizar District. It descends from a height of 2185 m to 1870 m at Gahkuch.



* Gahkuch-Gilgit (77 km): A road already existed, which was to be metalled. The elevation at Gilgit is 1454m.


26.The Astore Valley and the Deosai plains used to provide the oldest route connecting Gilgit with Srinagar via the Burzil Pass and Skardu through Chotta Deosai and Sadpara. In 2001 a project was undertaken to connect Thelichi with Skardu via Chilum and Deosai to provide a shorter route between Astore and Skardu. The project was to be implemented as follows:



* Thelechi-Chilum (94 kms): It was to be 24 ft wide with 12 ft metalled. The elevation of the road rises from about 1250 m at Thelechi to 3400m at Chilum.


* Chilum to Deosai Plains ( 53 km): This section spans the Deosai. An existing track was to be widened. Its elevation is around 4500 m and it remains under snow for about four to five months in a year.



* Deosai Plains to Sadpara(29 km):Will be 24 feet wide. The elevation descends from the Deosai Plains (4500m) to 2600 m at Sadpara.



* Sadpara to Skardu (10km): This section will be 24 ft wide with 12 ft metalled. The elevation is around 2500 m. The area is snow bound for about two to three months in a year.


26.During his visit to the NA ---- his third since he assumed power in October,1999--- Musharraf inaugurated work on these projects. There were unconfirmed reports that the Pakistani Army had sought the assistance of North Korean army engineers for the construction of the Lowari tunnel. (21-9-09)
 

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South Asia Analysis Group

Paper no. 810

07. 10. 2003












PAKISTAN: The Shia Anger

by B. Raman

When the Shias of Pakistan are angry, the Pakistani Army and its Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) tremble.

2. Because they have not forgotten what happened in 1988. Faced with a revolt by the Shias of the Northern Areas (Gilgit and Baltistan) of Jammu & Kashmir (J&K), under occupation by the Pakistan Army, for a separate Shia State called the Karakoram State, the Pakistan Army transported Osama bin Laden's tribal hordes into Gilgit and let them loose on the Shias. They went around massacring hundreds of Shias--innocent men, women and children.

3. The resulting Shia anger led to the death of Gen.Zia-ul-Haq in a plane crash in August 1988, the end of the military regime and the subsequent assassination of Lt.Gen.Fazle Haq, a retired Army officer, close to Zia and hated by the Shias because of his suspected role in the assassination of a respected Shia leader. The enquiry report on the crash of Zia's plane has not so far been released by the Pakistan Army, but many in Pakistan believe that the crash was caused by a Shia airman from Gilgit, who was a member of the crew.

4. The Army and the ISI imposed an effective iron curtain around the NA after the genocide of the Shias of the area by bin Laden's tribal hordes. As a result, the world was ignorant of the extent of the anti-Shia carnage until the "Herald", the monthly journal of the prestigious "Dawn" group of Karachi, pierced the curtain in its issue of May,1990. It was helped by leaks from a somewhat tamed ISI, then headed by the late Maj.Gen.Kallue, a retired officer of the Army close to the late Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto, who had been hand-picked from retirement by Benazir Bhutto after she came to power in an attempt (since proved futile) to reform the ISI.

5. The "Herald" wrote: " In May,1988, low-intensity political rivalry and sectarian tension ignited into full-scale carnage as thousands of armed tribesmen from outside Gilgit district invaded Gilgit along the Karakoram Highway. Nobody stopped them. They destroyed crops and houses, lynched and burnt people to death in the villages around Gilgit town. The number of dead and injured was put in the hundreds. But numbers alone tell nothing of the savagery of the invading hordes and the chilling impact it has left on these peaceful valleys."

6. The Shias of Pakistan are angry again and on the warpath. This is evident from the daring assassination of Maulana Azam Tariq, the head of the anti-Shia Sunni extremist Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) in Islamabad, Pakistan's capital, on October 6, 2003.

7. They have many grounds for anger against Azam Tariq--- for the role of the SSP in the massacre of hundreds of Hazara Shias of Afghanistan before 9/11 because they were sympathetic to the Northern Alliance of Afghanistan; for its proximity to bin Laden's Al Qaeda and the International Islamic Front (IIF); for its targetted killing of dozens of Shia doctors and other intellectuals in Karachi since Musharraf came to power in October,1999; and for its massacre of the Gilgitis of Karachi and the Hazara and other Shias of Balochistan since the beginning of this year.

8. The latest incident of massacre of Shias took place in Karachi on October 3 when unidentified gunmen , suspected to be from the SSP,attacked a bus carrying employees of the Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission (SUPARCO) , killing at least six people and wounding eight. All the injured and four of the dead were Shias, while two – the bus driver Raza Ali and a Pakistan Army soldier Mohammad Rafiq – are Sunnis. The Shias of Karachi have viewed this incident as a continuation of the earlier massacres in Karachi and Balochistan and feel that the SSP has embarked upon the anti-Shia carnage in different parts of the country due to a suspicion that the officers of the USA's Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), now based in Pakistan, have been using the Shias as human agents in their hunt for bin Laden and the dregs of the Al Qaeda and the IIF.

9.While the ISI and the Army have remained silent on who is responsible for the anti-Shia massacres since the beginning of this year, Police officers in Karachi say that the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LEJ), the militant wing of the SSP, the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen al-Alami (HUM-AA) and the Harkat-ul- Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI) have formed a new outfit called 313, which has been operating on behalf of the IIF. According to them, while its attacks are presently directed at the Shias, it is likely to target American and other Western lives and interests soon. All the three are members of the IIF.

10. It has not yet been established as to who was responsible for the assassination of Azam Tariq, but the needle of suspicion points to members of a new, as yet unidentified Shia terrorist organisation. It is seen as an act of reprisal for the earlier massacres of Shias in Balochistasn and Sindh.

11. The Shias have cause for anger against Musharraf too. He banned on August 14, 2001, the SSP and the Tehriq-e-Jaffria Pakistan (TEJ), a Shia organisation, after declaring them terrorist organisations. He further banned on January 15, 2002, the LEJ and the Sipah Mohammad, the militant wing of the TEJ. The Shias complain that while the ban against their organisations have been enforced strictly, the bans on the SSP and the LEJ have not been.

12. Surprisingly and much to the anger of the Shias, Musharraf facilitated the election of Azam Tariq to the National Assembly in October last year by ordering the withdrawal of the cases pending against him under the Anti-Terrorism Act. Azam Tariq denied any association with the SSP and announced the formation of a new organisation called the Millat-e-Islamia Pakistan (MEI), but the Shias believe that it is the SSP, which is now functioning under the new name to circumvent the ban and that Azam Tariq continued to direct the activities of the SSP and the LEJ from his safe sanctuary as a member of the National Assembly.

13. Are there any signs of the Shia anger turning against the Army, with unpredictable consequences for Musharraf and his military rule? None yet, but one has to watch carefully.

14. This may please be read in continuation of my earlier article (Paper 484 of www.saag.org)) of July 1, 2002, titled "SIPAH-E-SAHABA PAKISTAN, LASHKAR-E-JHANGVI, BIN LADEN & RAMZI YOUSEF" and the subsequent articles on the anti-Shia massacres in Karachi and Balochistan.
 

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SIPAH-E-SAHABA PAKISTAN, LASHKAR-E-JHANGVI, BIN LADEN & RAMZI YOUSEF


by B. Raman


(This article is to be read in continuation of my earlier ones titled "The Terrorist Meteorites & the Pakistanisation of Al Qaeda" , at http://www.saag.org/papers5/paper480.html and "The Daniel Pearl Murder Case: Curiouser & Curiouser and Murkier & Murkier" http://www.saag.org/papers5/paper465.html )

The late Zia-ul-Haq's perceived partiality towards the Deobandi sect of the majority Sunni community of Pakistan led to the formation on April 12-13,1979, of the Tehrik Nifaz Fiquah Jaffria (TNFJ---since re-named as the Tehrik Fiquah Jaffria--TFJ) by the Shias of Pakistan under the joint initiative of Mufti Jafar Hussain and Allama Syed Mohammad Rizvi with the Mufti elected as the first chief of the organisation. After its formation, it organised a huge demonstration of the Shias against Zia's anti-Shia policies at Islamabad on July 6,1980, which is considered even today to have been the largest demonstration ever organised by the Shias against the military-intelligence establishment.

2. The rapid advance made by the organisation in rallying round the Shias of the country under its banner and reports of its contacts with the Iranian intelligence set off alarm bells in Pakistan, the USA, Saudi Arabia and Iraq. The Zia regime was also alarmed by the sympathy of the Shias towards the Bhutto family, which was attributed by the military-intelligence establishment to the fact that Mrs. Nusrat Bhutto, the widow of the late Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto, was a Shia of Iranian origin.

3. To counter the activities of the Shia organisation, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), with the blessings of the USA, Saudi Arabia and Iraq, encouraged a group of Deobandi Muslim migrants (Mohajirs) from the districts of what constitute the Indian Punjab and Haryana of today to counter the activities of the TNFJ. Thus came into being the Ajuman-e-Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (since re-named as the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan--SSP) on September 6,1984, under the leadership of Maulana Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, a semi-educated Khateeb who had his religious education in Darul Uloom, Kabirwala, and the Khairul madrasa of Multan in Pakistani Punjab.

4. The birth of Pakistan on August 14,1947, was preceded and accompanied by large-scale migration to what constitutes Pakistan of today of a large number of Muslims from the Indian provinces of Uttar Pradesh (UP), Bihar and the then united Punjab, which was subsequently bifurcated into the two existing States of Punjab and Haryana. Those, who migrated from UP and Bihar, consisted of Sunnis as well as Shias, with the more tolerant Barelvi sect of the Sunnis constituting the majority. They had a large proportion of educated Muslims, part of the elite of British India, who had served in the civilian bureaucracy of the Central and State Governments. Amongst the migrants were also a large number of workers from the cottage industries, manual workers etc. The proportion of military personnel and farm workers was small. A preponderant majority of the migrants went to Karachi, the first capital of independent Pakistan, and other urban centres of Sindh. They continue to call themselves till today as Mohajirs (migrants or refugees), speak Urdu, and do not identify themselves with the native inhabitants of Pakistan and their intolerant culture.

5. The migrants from the Indian Punjab and Haryana were largely Sunnis, with very few Shias. They belonged to the intolerant Deobandi sect, which has a close affinity with Wahabism of Saudi Arabia. Zia himself was a devout Deobandi and his family belonged to Jallandhur in Indian Punjab. The spread of education amongst the Sunni Muslims of Punjab and Haryana before 1947 was poor as compared to that amogst the migrants from UP and Bihar. These migrants, who spoke the same Punjabi and Seraiki languages as are spoken in Pakistani Punjab, had no difficulty in integrating themselves in Pakistan and did not consider or call themselves as Mohajirs. Before 1947, they were either serving in the Armed Forces or earning their livelihood by working as farm labourers.

6. Many of the landless labourers, who migrated to Pakistani Punjab, started working in the farms of Shia landlords in places such as Jhang, Multan etc. The exploitation of these Sunni migrants by the Shia landlords led to feelings of deep resentment against the latter. In his efforts to use these migrants to counter the TNFJ, Zia and his ISI transformed what was essentially an economic grievance against the Shias into sectarian hatred of the Shias. This marked the beginning of sectarian terrorism in Pakistan. Shia-Sunni sectarian differences leading often to violence existed even in the British days, but they assumed a virulent form under the military-intelligence administrations because of the exploitation of these differences by the army through the ISI for sustaining itself in power through a policy of divide and rule.

7. In pursuit of this policy of divide and rule, the ISI under Zia encouraged the Mohajirs of Sindh to form the Mohajir Quami Movement ( since re-named as the Muttahida Qaumi Movement--MQM) under Altaf Hussain in the 1980s in order to use it to counter the activities of the Sindudesh movement under the late G. M.Syed and the popularity of Benazir Bhutto and her Pakistan People's Party (PPP). When the MQM went out of the control of the ISI during the first term of Benazir as Prime Minister (1988-90), the late Gen. Asif Nawaz Janjua, as the then Corps Commander at Karachi, tried to weaken Altaf Hussain's popularity amongst the Mohajirs by trying to create a divide between the Sunni and Shia migrants from UP and Bihar. When he did not succeed, he created a split between the migrants from UP, who remained solidly behind Altaf, and some sections of those from Bihar. Allured by the ISI and Asif Nawaz, these sections formed a splinter group called the MQM (Haqiqi--Real). The MQM (H), trained, armed and instigated by the ISI, indulged in widespread acts of violence against the followers of Altaf as well as against the Sindhi nationalists.

8. In Pakistani Punjab, after having created the SSP, Zia had its cadres trained, armed and inducted into Afghanistan, with the knowledge and possibly even the blessings of the USA's Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to fight against the Soviet troops under the leadership of Osama bin Laden. Their interactions with bin Laden and his diehard Wahabism in the jehadi fields of Afghanistan added to their Deobandi extremism and irrationality. Amongst the jehadi organisations, which distinguished themselves against the Soviet troops in Afghanistan, the Harkat-ul-Jehad-al-Islami (HUJI) and the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM) were the offspring of the SSP. So was the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM), formed in 2000 through an ostensible split in the HUM. The Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) has not so far come to notice for any nexus with the SSP.

9. The well-motivated and trained cadres of the SSP offered themselves as mercenaries not only to the ISI for its operations against the Soviet troops in Afghanistan and against the Shias in Pakistan itself, but also to the intelligence agencies of Saudi Arabia and Iraq for their operations against the Islamic regime in Iran. They let themselves be used to create violence and instability in those areas of Iran adjoining the Balochistan province of Pakistan, which are inhabited by Sunni Balochis.

10. In 1988, the Iranian intelligence instigated the Shias of Gilgit in the Northern Areas, who constitute the largest sectarian group there, to rise in revolt and demand the creation of a separate province for the Shias to be called the Karakoram province. Pervez Musharraf, who was asked by Zia to put down this revolt, inducted bin Laden and his tribal hordes into Gilgit and they carried out a large-scale massacre of the Shias. Musharraf also encouraged the SSP of Punjab to open an office in Gilgit to rally round the Sunnis against the Shias. This marked the spread of sectarian terrorism, which till then was confined to Pakistani Punjab and the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), to the Northern Areas too.

11. In Sindh, by 1994, the MQM under Altaf had re-established its ascendency, despite his being driven to exile by the ISI. Faced with the consequent weakening of the position of MQM(H), Musharraf, as the then Director-General of Military Operations in GHQ, had the SSP cadres from Punjab inducted into Sindh to re-inforce the position of MQM (H). The two (MQM(H) and the SSP) joined hands together and indulged in an orgy of violence directed against the Shia migrants from UP and Bihar, who had remained loyal to Altaf. Thus encouraged by the military-intelligence establishment, sectarian terrorism spread to Sindh too.

12. However, in 1996, the SSP underwent an ostensible split with a group led by Riaz Basra forming a separate anti-Shia organisation called the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LJ). Though the two have since been operating separately, Pakistani analysts call the split an eye-wash and describe the LJ as nothing but the militant wing of the SSP, to enable the latter to concentrate more on overground political activities.

13. Despite the growing sectarian divide in Pakistan due to the encouragement of sectarian activities by the military-intelligence establishment itself, Musharraf, after seizing power on October 12,1999, could not resist the temptation to continue to use the SSP and the LJ against the mainstream political parties. Having failed in his efforts to weaken the PPP by taking advantage of the exile of Benazir and faced with growing unity of action between Altaf Hussain's MQM and sections of Sindhi nationalist elements, he reportedly constituted a secret task force in the ISI to break the PPP, the MQM and the Sindhi nationalists.

14. This task force encouraged not only religious political organisations such as the Jamaat-e-Islami (JEI) of Qazi Hussain Ahmed, the Jamiat-ul-Ulema Islam (JUI) of Maulana Fazlur Rahman etc, but also sectarian organisations such as the SSP and the LJ to strengthen their activities in Sindh. Over 200 Shias have been gunned down, including 30 doctors of Karachi, since Musharraf seized power. Under him, one saw in Pakistan for the first time sectarian violence inside the Sunni community itself between the Sunnis of the Deobandi faith belonging to the Sipah Sahaba and the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and the Sunnis of the more tolerant Barelvi faith belonging to the Sunni Tehrik formed in the early 1990s to counter the growing Wahabi influence on Islam in Pakistan and the Almi Tanzeem Ahle Sunnat formed in 1998 by Pir Afzal Qadri of Mararian Sharif in Gujrat, Punjab, to counter the activities of the Deobandi Army of Islam headed by Gen.Mohammed Aziz, then Corps Commander, Lahore, and now Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, and, in that capacity, made responsible by Musharraf for the operations against Al Qaeda in Pakistan---the surest way of making sure that the operations would fail. It was like making bin Laden responsible for the anti-Al Qaeda operations.

15. The Tanzeem has been criticising not only the Army of Islam for injecting what it considers the Wahabi poison into the Pakistan society, but also the army of the State headed by Musharraf for misleading the Sunni youth into joining the jehad against the Indian army in J & K and getting killed there in order to avoid the Pakistani army officers getting killed in the jehad for achieving its strategic objective. The ISI, which was afraid of a direct confrontation with the Barelvi organisations, started inciting the SSP and the LJ to counter their activities .

16. This led to frequent armed clashes between rival Sunni groups in Sindh, the most sensational of the incidents being the gunning down of Maulana Salim Qadri of the Sunni Tehrik and five of his followers in Karachi on May, 18, 2001, by the Sipah Sahaba, which led to a major break-down of law and order in certain areas of Karachi for some days.

SOURCE OF FUNDS AND ACTIVITIES

17. In a newsitem published on January 20,1995, the "Nation", a daily newspaper of Pakistan, quoted a confidential report of the Home Department of Punjab as stating as follows: "(Under Zia), the Saudi Government started backing the Deobandi school of thought and, in the wake of the Afghan war, supplied funds and arms to the Deobandis. Indirectly, the USA and a few other Western countries also supported the SSP to counter the growing Shia and Iranian influence in this region. "

18. Though the Home Department report did not refer to other Islamic countries supporting the SSP, it was in receipt of financial assistance from Iraq and Libya too. The Deobandi members of the Pakistani diaspora abroad are also important contributors of funds to the SSP. It is believed that in the non-Islamic world, the largest contributions have been from the Deobandi members of the Pakistani community in the UK, followed by those in the USA and Canada.

19. In the UK, the SSP has reportedly a branch in what is described as the the Mufti Mustafa madrasa, 11-13, St George Road, Forest Hill, London (Tel. No. 0181-471-2652). One Kadir Abbasi, who is stated to be the head of the UK branch, works in close cooperation with Maulvi Abdul Rehman Baba, leader of the Saudi backed ultra right wing Sunni organisation 'Alami Majlis Tahaffuze Khatme Nabuwwat', which has its office at 35, Stockwell Green, London (Tel No. 0171-737-8199). While the SSP is believed to be working in the USA and possibly Canada too through the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM), it is not known whether it has its own offices there.

20. Maulana Haq Nawaz Jhangvi was assassinated on February 23, 1990, reportedly by Shia terrorists. Thereafter, Maulana Zia-ur Rehman Farooqi took over the leadership of the outfit. He was also killed in a bomb explosion in the Lahore Sessions Court on January 19, 1997. Maulana Azam Tariq succeeded him and has been leading it since then. Allama Ali Sher Ghazni is the Patron-in-Chief of the outfit. Maulana Zia-ul-Qasmi serves as the Chairman, Supreme Council. Other important SSP leaders are Qazi Mohammed Ahmed Rashidi, Mohammed Yousuf Mujahid, Tariq Madni, Muhammad Tayyab Qasim and Maulana Muhammad Ahmad Ludhianvi. It is reported to have approximately 3,000 - 6,000 trained activists

21. The SSP and the LJ hold Iran as the sponsor of the TFJ. Hence, whenever any major Sunni leader is assassinated, Iranians in Pakistan are targeted for retribution. The Iranian Counsel-General in Lahore, Sadeq Ganji, was killed in December 1990 in retribution for the February 1990 killing of Maulana Haq Nawaz Jhangvi. In January 1997, the Iranian Cultural Centre in Lahore was attacked and set on fire, while in Multan seven persons were killed including an Iranian diplomat Muhammad Ali Rahimi, in retaliation for the death of Zia-ur-Rehman Farooqi. In September 1997,five officers of the Iranian armed forces who were in Pakistan for training were killed by the SSP/LJ.

22. It was reported in October 2000 that the LJ had split into two factions with one faction headed by Riaz Basra and the other by the chief of the outfit's Majlis-i-Shoora (Supreme Council), Qari Abdul Hai alias Qari Asadullah alias Talha. Qari Hai was Basra's lieutenant and ran the latter's training camp in Sarobi, Afghanistan, until the two fell out and formed their own respective factions. While the majority of Hai's supporters are Karachi-based, Basra's cadres have their roots in the Punjab. Earlier, on January 3,1999, Basra was allegedly involved in a terrorist incident in which a bridge on the Lahore-Raiwind road, close to Nawaz Sharif's house, was blown up shortly before the then Prime Minister was due to pass by. Before this incident,the LJ, in a press release, had offered a reward of Pakistani Rs.135 million for anyone who would undertake the killing of Nawaz Sharief, Shabaz Sharief, his younger brother and the then Chief Minister of Punjab, and Mushahid Hussein, the then Information Minister. Pakistani media reports indicate that the active cadre strength of the LJ is approximately 300. Two of the LJ's most important training centres were located at Muridke (Sheikhupura) and Kabirwal, in Khanewal district in Punjab. It also had a training camp in Afghanistan located near the Sarobi Dam, Kabul. The present status of the camp is not known. LJ cadres generally wear police uniform while carrying out their acts of terrorism.

SSP AND RAMZI YOUSEF

23. The Pakistani authorities arrested on February 7,1995,Ramzi Ahmed Yousef, one of the main suspects in the New York World Trade Centre explosion of February,1993, who had fled to Pakistan from the Philippines in January,1995, in an Islamabad guest house and handed him over to the FBI. A spokesman of the Pakistani Foreign Ministry denied that Ramzi was a Pakistani national and asserted that "his papers showed that he is an Iraqi national."

24. This gave rise to the question as to whether Ramzi and his associates might have organised the New York World Trade Centre explosion, which coincided with the second anniversary of the end of the 1991 Gulf War, at the instance of the Iraqi intelligence, with the help of some local accomplices in New York. While the official agencies of Pakistan and the US could not collect any credible evidence to prove or disprove this suspicion, Ms. Laurie Mylorie, then of the Foreign Policy Research Institute of Philadelphia, made a detailed investigation into the nationality of Ramzi and a paper based on the results of her research were carried by the US journal "The National Interest" in its issue for Winter 1995/96.

25. While the enquiries into his real nationality after his arrest clearly established that he was a Balochi (Yemeni-Balochi?) of Pakistan, she came to the following conclusions on his possible links with Iraq:

* On September 1,1992, Ramzi arrived in the US with an Iraqi passport under the name Ramzi Ahmed Yousef without a US visa. He was granted temporary asylum pending an enquiry.

* On November 9,1992, he reported to the Jersey City Police that his name was Abdul Basit Mahmud Abdul Karim, a Pakistani national born and brought up in Kuwait, and that he had lost his passport. His report was recorded.
* Between December 3 and December 27,1992, he made a number of telephone calls to Balochistan. Several of them were conference calls to a few key numbers, a geographical plotting of which suggested that they were related to his probable escape route through Pakistani and Iranian Balochistan across the Arabian Sea to Oman, after which the telephone trail ended. After the New York World Trade Centre explosion, it was confirmed that he had fled from the USA through Pakistani Balochistan.

* On December 31,1992, he went to the Pakistani Consulate in New York and submitted a copy of the report recorded by the Jersey City Police about the loss of his passport along with xerox copies of his lost passport to show that he was a Pakistani national with the name Abdul Basit Mahmud Abdul Karim and applied for a new passport. The Consulate issued to him a temporary passport under this name with which he escaped from the USA after the explosion.

* The archives of the Kuwait Government did have the papers and finger-prints of one Abdul Basit Karim, a Pakistani national born in Kuwait, but without xerox copies of his passport. The archives also contained a note that Abdul Basit and his family had left Kuwait for Balochistan via Iraq and Iran on August 26,1990.

* After finding out that Ramzi had fled the USA after the explosion as Abdul Basit, a Pakistani national, the US Immigration sent his finger prints to the Kuwaiti authorities who confirmed that they tallied with the finger prints in their records.

* Thereafter, the US authorities presumed that Ramzi's real name was Abdul Basit, that he entered the USA as Ramzi Ahmed Yousef, an Iraqi national, and fled after the explosion as Abdul Basit, a Pakistani national. For some reasons, which remained unclear, they chose to prosecute him as Ramzi Yousef and not as Abdul Basit.

26. After her research, Mylorie voiced the suspicion that Ramzi was probably an agent of the Iraqi intelligence which had prepared a legend for him by placing his finger prints in the the file of the real Abdul Basit when Kuwait was under Iraqi occupation. However, no satisfactory explanation was available as to how they allowed him to enter the USA with an Iraqi passport, which could have created suspicions of a nexus with Iraq. The Pakistani media has always been referring to Ramzi Yousef by that name and not by the name of Abdul Basit. They also always describe him as a person of Middle Eastern background.
27. The Pakistani daily "News" of March 27,1995, reported as follows: "Pakistani investigators have identified a 24-year-old religious fanatic Abdul Shakoor residing in Lyari in Karachi, as an important Pakistani associate of Ramzi Yousef. Abdul Shakoor had intimate contacts with Ramzi Ahmed Yousef and was responsible for the June 20,1994, massive bomb explosion at the shrine Imam Ali Reza in Mashhad. The Iranian Government had earlier held the rebel Mujahideen Khalq group responsible for the explosion. Some analysts suspect Ramzi's connection with the Mujahideen Khalq because of his Iraqi background."

28. It added: "Independent reports suggested that in Moharrum last year (1994), Ramzi travelled to Iran via Turbat in Balochistan. Abdul Muqeem, another long-time resident of Karachi and identified as a brother of Ramzi, had also spoken about Ramzi's involvement in the bomb blast at Mashhad. Ramzi is understood to have strong connections in the Pakistani and Iranian side of Balochistan.

29. "Abdul Shakoor shared with Ramzi, besides a Middle Eastern origin, some very strong anti-Shia feelings. Authorities said that Abdul Shakoor was also an active worker of SSP and, during his interrogation, Shakoor provided interesting details that showed that Ramzi also had some ties with that organisation.

30." Last year (1994), Ramzi's associates in Karachi were given the task to murder Maulana Salim Qadri, the chief of the Sunni Tehrik, an organisation of moderate Sunnis from the Barelvi school of thought. Several important chracters of the conspiracy were arrested in Karachi last week.

31. "Pakistani investigators are now sure of Ramzi's ties with Sipah Sahaba. These ties flourished mostly in the military training camps inside Afghanistan designated for Arabs and Pakistanis. Orthodox Sunni religious schools in Pakistan serve as feeders for these military training camps. Besides Shakoor, investigators believed that Abdul Wahab, owner of Junaid Bakery in the Lyari area of Karachi and the unit in charge of the Sipah Sahaba in Chakiwarah, neighbourhood of Karachi, was another close associate of Ramzi. Raids to arrest Abdul Wahab in Karachi remained unsuccessful.

32."Ramzi also ran a network of Saudi nationals committed to destabilising the royal family in that country. There is no evidence available to suggest that the Sipah Sahaba was in any way aware of Ramzi's anti-kingdom operations inside Saudi Arabia. A nationwide hunt is currently on to trace Munir Madni, a suspected Saudi national and a resident of Bahadurabad in Karachi. Evidence confirmed that Ramzi, through Munir Madni, had established a front import-export company that used to get a gift of "Aabe Zam Zam" (holy water) from Saudi Arabia worth many millions of rupees. At one point last year (1994), the same front company generated about Rs.7 million by selling the holy water. The money was later used by Ramzi to finance Saudi extremist groups.

33. "A highly informed source connected with a large Pakistani Islamic organisation said in the middle of last year (1994) that a group of Saudis had visited Pakistan as the guest of that organisation and sought political and material support for their campaign inside the kingdom. The source said the group during that visit was provided apparatus and technical knowledge to install transmitters to relay radio broadcasts from a secret location inside Saudi Arabia. Several members of that Sunni group had participated in the Afghan jehad against the Communists.

34. "Officials said acts of violence committed by these groups inside Saudi Arabia are not known to the outside world. The official investigation has also revealed that dozens of Saudis committed to jehad all over the world have been visiting the military training camps inside Afghanistan. "These training camps are ideal places to rub shoulders with persons like Ramzi and to learn from his experience," said an official who believed that Ramzi's colleagues in Pakistan and Afghanistan were still busy in fuelling unrest in the kingdom.

35. "Sources estimated that at least 2,000 persons, mostly Pakistanis and Arabs of different nationalities, are currently engaged in military training in those camps for jehad in Kashmir and elsewhere in the world. These sources estimated that since the expulsion of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, at least 10,000 Pakistanis belonging to the Islamic parties such as the Jamaat-e-Islami, Harkat-ul-Ansar, Markaz Dawa Al Irshad and Jamiat Ulema Islam have acquired training in making bombs, hurling grenades, firing from light and heavy weapons and in laying mines.

36. "Abdul Shakoor, who himself was associated with a military training camp run by a Palestinian by the name of Abu Mahaz and a Pakistani named Commander Taslim near Kabul, stunned his interrogators by disclosing that his camp also provided training for hijacking. It was the first time that such a claim was made, but it was not confirmed independently," the paper concluded.

37. Quoting Afzal Ali Shigri, the then Inspector-General of Police of Sindh, the "News" reported on April 4,1995: "Strong evidence is available for any independent scrutiny that the people involved in the most horrible cases of terrorism in Karachi were taking orders from top people in the SSP and MQM (H). Though no evidence has yet surfaced that would directly connect the Haqiqis with the terrorist outfit run by Ramzi, the disclosures unveiled a strong connection between SSP militants in the Lyari area and Ramzi's associates."

38. The "Nation" reported on April 15,1995, that the Pakistani authorities had placed Maulana Azam Tariq, the then deputy chief of the SSP who is now the chief, Afaq Ahmed, the head of the MQM (H), and Maulana Masood Azhar, then belonging to the Harkat-ul-Ansar and now the head of the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM), on the exit control list following suspicion expressed by the USA's Federal Bureau of Investigation that their followers were most probably responsibe for the murder of two members of the staff of the US Consulate in Karachi on March 8,1995,in retaliation for the arrest and transfer of Ramzi to the US by the Pakistani authorities in February, 1995. It also said that the organisations to which these three belonged had close links with Ramzi.

39. There was a massive explosion from a vehicle driven by a suicide bomber outside the Egyptian Embassy in Islamabad on November 19,1995, killing 17 persons. The Pakistani authorities suspected that the explosion had been carried out by Egyptian associates of Ramzi to punish Egypt for its efforts to pressurise the Benazir Government to expel from Pakistan the Egyptian dregs of the Afghan war of the 1980s. Fifty-six persons were killed in another explosion by unidentified elements in Peshawar on December 21,1995, the responsibility for which could not be definitively established.

40. In 1996, cadres of the SSP/LJ, the LET, the HUJI and the HUM (then known as the Harkat-ul-Ansar), encouraged by the ISI, entered Afghanistan in their thousands to help the Taliban in its successful assault on Jalalabad and Kabul. After the capture of Kabul by the Taliban in September,1996, they stayed behind in Afghanistan to help the Taliban in its fight against the Northern Alliance. It was the SSP/LJ elements, which had joined the Taliban, which carried out the massacre of the Shias in the Hazara belt.

41. When bin Laden moved over to Afghanistan from the Sudan in 1996, he did not have to create a new terrorist infrastructure to help him in his operations against the US and Israel. A well-motivated and well-trained infrastructure already existed on the ground consisting of trained Arabs as well as Pakistanis and he took over their leadership. After he formed his International Islamic Front For Jehad Against the US and Israel in 1998, the Pakistani organisations---the HUM, the HUJI, the LET, the JEM and the SSP/LJ--joined it and fought against the Northern Alliance and then against the international coalition led by the US. Subsequently, after the collapse of the Taliban, this infrastructure moved over to Pakistan, along with the surviving leaders and cadres.

42. Following the death of Lal Mohammad alias Laloo, one of the most wanted LJ terrorists of Karachi in the first week of April,2002, the "News" reported as follows on April 8, 2002: " Police said the "most wanted killer" also worked for one of the most violent Afghan-trained terrorist groups---Lashkar-e-Omar. The group, according to Interior Ministry sources, is also behind the attack on Islamabad's church in which four foreigners and an unidentified person were killed, besides recent abortive attacks on several high profile personalities in Islamabad and Karachi.

43. "According to sources, Lashkar-e-Omar is a new group recently formed with the conglomeration of Harkat-ul-Jehad-al-Islami (HUJI), Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Jaish-e-Mohammad. Whereas the group provides new cover for terrorist actions of Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Jaish-e-Mohammad, it also includes several like-minded freelancers. Its operational area is Karachi. Sheikh Omar, who had kidnapped Daniel Pearl, was one of the instructors of this group back in Afghanistan.

44. " According to police, almost 10 hardcore sectarian terrorists are on the loose in Karachi and are working for the Lashkar-e-Omar. They include Naeem Bukhari, Omar, Asif Ramzi and Qari Asad. Police analysts maintain that what makes Lashkar-e-Omar a serious threat is the fact that most of its activists are members of the same class and camp trained by Amjad Faruqi. Faruqi, a leader of the HUJI, is wanted by the US for his involvement in the murder of journalist Daniel Pearl," the paper concluded.

45. On May 16,2002, the Karachi Police claimed to have recovered the remains of an unidentified dead body cut into 10 pieces, which were found buried in a nursery (Gulzare Hijri) on a plot of land in the outlying Gulshan-e-Maymar area of Karachi. They further claimed that the remains were recovered following a tip-off from a human source and that, according to the source, the remains were of Pearl. The local media also reported that there was an improvised shed on the plot where Pearl was suspected to have been held in captivity before his murder and that the plot belonged to Al Rashid Trust of Karachi. The results of the DNA and other forensic examination to determine whether the remains were really those of Pearl are still awaited.

46. Some years ago, Al Rashid Trust was floated and got registered by the ISI as a charitable organisation to receive funds from abroad and channel them to the Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan as well as to the Pakistani Punjabi jehadi organisations in J & K. It is not clear as to who gave the information to the Karachi Police about the burial of these remains in a plot of land belonging to the Al Rashid Trust----a human source as claimed by the Police or by some new suspects who have been picked up by the Police, but whose arrest has not been shown in Police records?

47. However, the "News" (May 23,2002) reported that the information about the remains was given to the Karachi Police by one Fazal Karim -- a resident of Rahim Yar Khan and a father of five-- who was in Police custody, but had not been shown as arrested. According to the paper,Fazal Karim had identified Lashkar-e- Jhangvi's Naeem Bukhari as the ring leader of the group that also included "three Yemeni-Baluch" (father Yemeni and mother Baloch) who took part in Pearl's kidnapping, his murder and disposal of his body parts. Naeem Bukhari is wanted by police in Punjab and Karachi in more than a dozen cases of anti-Shia killings. Fazal Karim reportedly confirmed Omar Sheikh's role in planning Pearl's kidnapping.

48.The "News" further reported as follows: "Fazal Karim has also revealed that major Pakistani cities may soon witness more suicidal attacks against the westerners and key government personalities, officials with direct knowledge about the interrogation of this new accused person in the Pearl case divulged here on Wednesday. Pakistani security officials believe that because of increased monitoring activities by the military services in the tribal areas, scores of the foreigners, earlier hiding there, have now moved with the help of their trusted Pakistani religious supporters to the populous urban centres, such as Karachi. "There are scores of Arabs and their Pakistani loyalists who are desperate to blow themselves up to settle score with the Americans and other westerners," an official quoted Fazal Karim as saying. "These Arabs residing in various neighbourhoods in the outskirts of Karachi are on do-or-die missions," he added. Fazal told his investigators, "Our Arab friends hosted us in Afghanistan when we were on the run, now it's our turn to pay them back."

49. "Giving more specific information about the new terrorist threat in Karachi, Fazal is believed to have disclosed that the Airport hotel near Karachi airport, where the western military personnel of International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) were staying, had been selected by his group for a possible suicidal strike.

50. "Informed diplomats in Islamabad termed "a watershed" and "very dangerous" the evidence that previously friendly groups have merged operationally. Al-Qaeda signatures, not seen previously in Pakistan, were starkly visible in the recent attacks apparently carried out principally by the Pakistanis: detailed planning, western targets and, in the two attacks, suicide bombers, " the paper concluded.

51. Intriguingly, on May 14,2002, two days before the recovery of the remains of a dead body, claimed to be that of Pearl, by the Karachi Police, the Punjab Police claimed that Riaz Basra, the long absconding leader of the LJ and three of his associates were killed in an encounter in a Punjab village when they had gone there to kill a Shia leader. Sections of the Pakistani media expressed doubts over the Police version and alleged that Riaz Basra was in the informal custody of a sensitive Pakistani intelligence agency (ISI) since January,2002, without its taking any action against him and that the Police, now for reasons not clear, have shown him as having been killed in an encounter.

52. On May 19, 2002, Pakistani journalists received phone calls from a person identifying himself as Musa of Hezbullah Alami, claimimg responsibility for the kidnapping and murder of Pearl, the grenade attack on an Islamabad church on March 17,2002, and the suicide bomb attack on the French experts in Karachi on May 8,2002. The person strongly criticised Musharraf's pro-US policies and his co-operation with the US in its war against the Taliban and the Al Qaeda and reportedly hinted that the remains recovered by the Karachi Police were not those of Pearl. He also reportedly claimed that neither the HUJI nor the LJ had anything to do with Pearl's kidnapping and murder. He also said that it was the Al Saiqua, the organisation to which reference had been made by this writer in his comments on the attack on the French experts available at www.saag.org, which had now renamed itself as Hezbullah Alami. No further details of this organisation are known.

53. The Pakistani media reported after the car bomb blast outside the US Consulate-General in Karachi on June 14, 2002, that two hardcore activists of the LJ--- Akram Lahori and Attaur Rehman alias Naim Bukhari-- had been picked up by the Karachi Police and informally detained for questioning and that they had confessed to their involvement in the blast. The "News" reported on June 27, 2002, that both of them were subsequently taken to Punjab and on their pointation, a joint team of the Punjab police and the FBI conducted raids at several places and arrested dozens of activists of the SSP and the LJ. It also reported that before they were taken to Punjab, the Karachi Police recovered on the basis of the information given by them 134 new AK-47 rifles, dozens of rocket launchers, a large quantity of explosive material and other weapons.

54. On June 28, 2002, the Sindh Home Department announced offers of rewards amounting to Rs 17 million for anyone giving information leading to the arrest of eight terrorists of the LJ wanted in several terrorist cases. Two of them --- Naveed-ul-Hussain and Shah Rib with Rs1.5 million and Rs 2 million head money --- have been declared as being involved in the US Consulate bombing. The others wanted by the Police are: Asif Ramzi (Rs3 million head money), Abdur Rehman Sindhi (Rs1.5 million), Mohammad Faisal Bhatti, alias Zubair Chishti (Rs3 million), Ata-ur-Rehman, alias Naeem Bokhari (Rs3 million) and two unknown men (each with Rs1.5 million as head money).

55. These developments have given rise to the following questions, which cast doubts on the sincerity of the Musharraf regime in its professed desire of wanting to eliminate terrorism of any kind from Pakistani territory:

* On August 14,2001, Musharraf, in the face of growing public criticism of his failure to control anti-Shia violence, had banned the LJ. On January 15, 2002, he had banned the SSP. The Government had claimed to have rounded up a large number of terrorists of these organisations. How is it that these organisations have still been able to continue their acts of terrorism undeterred by the action ostensibly taken by Musharraf against them?
* According to Omar Sheikh, he had voluntarily surrendered to a retired ISI officer on February 5, 2002, but he was shown as arrested by the Punjab Police on February 12, 2002, when Musharraf was in Washington DC. It has now come out that Riaz Basra was also with the ISI since around end-January/beginning February. Whereas Omar Sheikh was shown as arrested, Riaz Basra has been shown as killed in an encounter. Were both these incidents connected and what was their linkage with the Pearl case? The alleged encounter death of Riaz Basra has almost coincided with the new version put out by the Karachi Police about the involvement of the LJ in the murder of Pearl. Instead of interrogating him on this, why did the ISI choose to have him killed in an alleged encounter?

* The Pakistani media has been reporting for over a week that Naeem Bokhari is already in the custody of the Karachi Police and had given them information about the involvement of the LJ in the blast outside the US Consulate. Why has a reward been offered now for information that could lead to his arrest? Has he been eliminated or has he been allowed to escape? If so, why?

56. The US media ("Time", of June 17, 2002) has recently been speculating about the role of Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, described as an uncle of Ramzi, in orchestrating the September 11, 2001, terrorist strikes in the US. No information bearing on their relationship is as yet available.
 

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INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR -- PAPER NO. 34
AL QAEDA, THE IIF & INDIAN MUSLIMS


by B. Raman

On March 3, 2006, coinciding with the visit of President George Bush to Afghanistan, India and Pakistan, the ABC News of the US carried an article titled " Why Al Qaeda Is At Home In Pakistan : Terror Organization Believed to Be Drawing Less From Arabs, More From South Asia". It was written by Alexis Debat, Senior Fellow at George Washington University's Homeland Security Policy Institute and contributing editor for "The National Interest" in Washington, D. C. He is also a consultant to ABC News.

2. This article has since been widely disseminated online as indicating a Pakistanisation of Al Qaeda. In this connection, reference is invited to the article titled "THE TERRORIST METEORITES & THE PAKISTANISATION OF AL QAEDA" written by me on June 21, 2002, at http://www.saag.org/papers5/paper480.html.

3. Can there be an Indianisation of the International Islamic Front (IIF) of Osama bin Laden? Have Al Qaeda and the IIF started looking for volunteers from amongst the Indian Muslim youth for assisting them in their operations against the US? Before attempting an answer to this question, one has to make a distinction between the radicalisation of the Indian Muslim youth and their pan-Islamisation.

4. The trend towards the radicalisation of the Indian Muslim youth started in the late 1980s when the late Rajiv Gandhi was the Prime Minister. Groups of Muslim youth from Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) started going across the Line of Control (LOC) to Pakistan and were trained and armed by Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). After the training, some of them were taken to Afghanistan to get an exposure to jihad as practised by the Afghan Mujahideen. The Indian intelligence missed this development. It was detected by KHAD, the then Afghan intelligence service, which alerted the then Afghan President Najibullah, who, in turn, alerted Rajiv Gandhi.

5. Around the same time, a small group of Indian Muslim youth from outside J&K, headed by one Bashir, a Keralite, of the Students' Islamic Movement of India (SIMI), clandestinely went to Pakistan and met Qazi Hussain Ahmed and other leaders of the Jamaat-e-Islami (JEI). Thereafter, they were trained in a camp organised by the JEI and their instructor was a Sudanese, who gave his name as Salauddin. During their discussions, the ISI and the JEI urged the SIMI to operate jointly with the terrorist organisations of J & K and the Khalistani terrorists of Punjab.

6. The Indian intelligence missed this development too. The visit of the SIMI team to Pakistan and its training there came to notice for the first time during an interrogation of a member of the SIMI belonging to Uttar Pradesh, who was arrested in connection with some explosions in trains organised by the SIMI after the demolition of the Babri Masjid by a group of Hindutva cadres in December, 1992. The arrested SIMI member also disclosed during the interrogation that Salauddin, accompanied by an office-bearer of the JEI, had subsequently visited Uttar Pradesh clandestinely and discussed with the SIMI office-bearers their future plans.

7. The year 1993 saw the beginning of the infiltration of the Pakistani jihadi terrorist organisations by the ISI into J&K and their spread to other parts of India. These Pakistani organisations had three agendas---- a Kashmiri agenda to have J&K annexed with Pakistan; an Indian agenda to drive a wedge between the Hindus and the Muslims and to "liberate" the Muslims of North and South India and set up two more independent "Muslim homelands"; and a pan-Islamic agenda to work towards an Islamic Caliphate in South Asia, which would ultimately form part of an international Islamic Caliphate.

8. The Indian Muslim youth looked with suspicion at their pan-Islamic agenda because, in their view, pan- Islamism meant adoption of the anti-US policies of the Al Qaeda and the IIF. They were not prepared to do this. The Kashmiri terrorist organisations felt that they would not be able to achieve their political objective without the implicit support, if not the complicity, of the US. This view was shared by the Muslim youth in other parts of India too.

9. The Pakistani jihadi terrorist organisations, which are members of the IIF, as well as Al Qaeda itself, therefore, faced difficulty in recruiting members or supporters from the Muslim youth in India. The first Indian Muslim recruits to the Pakistani jihadi terrorist organisations came not from India, but from the Indian Muslim diaspora in the Gulf where the Indian Muslim youth were easily infected by the anti-US feelings of the Arabs.

10. The LET (Lashkar-e-Toiba) set up branches in Dubai and Saudi Arabia and the HUJI (Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami) in Dubai. Their objective was to recruit Indian Muslims from the local diaspora and to co-ordinate their operations in Western and Southern India from the Gulf. Al Qaeda was not able to get supporters from the Indian Muslim youth even in the Gulf. However, it managed to get the support of two Gujarati Muslims----one living in the UK and the other in South Africa. The Muslim living in the UK (Bilal al-Hindi), whose family had migrated to the UK from East Africa, was frequently used by Al Qaeda to visit the US, Thailand and even India to collect information for possible use in Al Qaeda's anti-US operations. The name of the Muslim from South Africa came up in connection with the London explosions of July last year. However, no further details of his alleged links with Al Qaeda are available.

11. Till August, 2003, the success of the LET and the HUJI in recruiting Indian Muslims was confined largely to the diaspora in the Gulf. Since the twin bomb explosions in Mumbai in August, 2003, there are indications that the LET and other Pakistani organisations have made a break-through in overcoming the resistance of the Indian Muslim youth to their joining the Pakistani jihadi organisations. Till August 2003, the SIMI was prepared to take assistance from the Pakistani organisations and the ISI for carrying out its own anti-Hindu agenda, but it was disinclined to help the Pakistani organisations in recruiting members in India for their pan-Islamic and anti-US agenda.

12. Despite some Indian Muslim youth in Mumbai, New Delhi, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and Uttar Pradesh joining the Pakistani member-organisations of the IIF, the Muslim youth in other parts of India, in deference to the wishes of the Kashmiri organisations, which still count on support from the US, took care not to adopt an anti-US line. This was evident from the fact that the Indian Muslims by and large did not demonstrate when the US launched its military operations against Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan in October, 2001, and invaded and occupied Iraq in March-April, 2003. The allegations over the violation of the human rights of the Muslims by US security forces in Abu Garaib and the Guantanamo Bay also did not evoke any significant protest demonstrations from the Indian Muslim youth.

13. However, the position started changing in November, 2004, following the US air strikes in Falluja in Iraq. The allegedly extremely disproportionate use of force by the US Marines and Air Force against the civilian population of Falluja in order to teach them a lesson for opposing the US occupation, sent a wave of anger across the Islamic world. The hundreds of Islamic web sites in the cyber space carried detailed accounts of what the US troops allegedly did in Falluja, with pictures of the suffering of the local population.

14. Since then, anti-US and anti-Western feelings have become an important motivating factor of sections of the Indian Muslim youth. The result: Their gravitating towards the IIF in larger numbers than in the past and their willingness to join in or organise anti-US demonstrations either over the affair of the Danish cartoons caricaturising their Holy Prophet or over the visit of President Bush to India.

15. The number of Indian Muslim youth involved in anti-US activities and in support of the pan-Islamic objectives of Al Qaeda and the IIF is estimated to be still small, but larger than in the past. For the first time, this could provide an opening to Al Qaeda and the IIF to recruit Indian Muslim youth for their terrorist strikes directed against the US. Till now, the Indian Muslim youth, whether in India or the Gulf or in the West, were not subject to the same close surveillance by the Western intelligence agencies as the Arabs and the Pakistanis were. Thus, recruitment of Indian Muslims in India or abroad would provide Al Qaeda and the IIF with the possibility of recruiting volunteers for their anti-US operations, who will be able to evade detection by the Western intelligence agencies much easier than the Arabs or the Pakistanis. This is a danger which should not be lightly dismissed.
 

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Terrorist Meteorites And Pakistanisation Of Al Qaeda

Mufti Nizamuddin Shamzai of the Binori madrasa and Qari Saifullah Akhtar of the HUJI are increasingly exercising a leadership role in the the terrorist incidents in Pakistan.
B. RAMAN
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Osama bin Laden wears two hats. He is the head of the Al Qaeda and, simultaneously, of a united front of like-minded Islamic terrorist organisations called the International Islamic Front For Jehad (also called Crusade) Against the USA and Israel.

2. The Al Qaeda is a Saudi-centric organisation consisting exclusively of about 500 to 600 Arabs, mostly Saudi and Yemeni tribes plus some Egyptians, Algerians, Moroccans, Palestinians and others. Its objectives are the overthrow of the Saudi monarchy, the withdrawal of the Western troops from Saudi territory and assistance to the Palestinians in their struggle against Israel. It is also responsible for the physical protection of bin Laden.

3. To make the organisation penetration-proof, bin Laden deliberately kept its strength small and did not recruit non-Arabs into it. Before October 7, 2001, it had its own training camp in Afghan territory run by its so-called 055 Brigade to which non-Arabs were not admitted. Latest reports from Afghanistan indicate the Western---essentially US--- assessment of the Al Qaeda having thousands of members to have been highly over-estimated.

4. This over-estimation occurred because of the failure of US analysts to make a clear distinction between the Al Qaeda and the International Islamic Front, which is a united front of the Al Qaeda, the Taliban, five terrorist organisations of Pakistan, three of Egypt, two of Uzbekistan and one each of the Philippines (the Abu Sayyaf) and Xinjiang. Other nationalities, which were fighting in Afghanistan such as the Chechens, the Rohingya Muslims of the Arakan State of Myanmar, the Bangladeshis, the Thais, the Malaysians, the Indonesians, the Americans and the West Europeans, were doing so as members of the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM) and the Harkat-ul-Jehad-al-Islami (HUJI) and in some cases of the other three Pakistani organisations and not of the Al Qaeda.

5. Past reports had estimated the strength of the united front at about 20,000 plus, but latest reports indicate that all the components of the Front together had an estimated strength of nearly 60,000, of whom 40,000 plus were Pakistani nationals serving in the Taliban as well as in the five Pakistani organisations -- namely, the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM), which was designated by the US as a foreign terrorist organisation in October, 1997, the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), which was designated by the US as a foreign terrorist organisation in December, 2001, the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM), which was also designated by the US as a foreign terrorist organisation in December, 2001, the Harkat-ul-Jehad-al-Islami (HUJI), which has not yet been so designated despite its being the most active and the most ruthless of the Pakistani terrorist organisations born in the 1980s and the closest to the Taliban and the Al Qaeda, and the Sipah-e-Sahaba, a Sunni extremist organisation. These organisations had their own training camps in Afghan territory, which were kept separate from those of Al Qaeda and where training was imparted to the cadres of the organisations by Arab instructors from the Al Qaeda's 055 Brigade.

6. Of these, the HUM was a founding-member of the International Islamic Front and its leader Fazlur Rahman Khalil had co-signed bin Laden's first fatwa against the US and Israel in 1998. The other Pakistani organisations joined the Front later. During the most active phase of the fighting in Afghanistan, these five Pakistani organisations sustained fatal casualties of about 8,000, with the HUJI suffering the largest number. No definitive estimate is available of the number of Pakistanis taken prisoner by the US and the Northern Alliance, but tentative estimates indicate their number at about 1,000. Excluding the fatal casualties and those taken prisoner, the surviving Pakistani nationals in the five Pakistani organisations, according to the latest reports, are estimated to be about 30,000 plus.

7. No estimate -- definitive or tentative -- of the number of survivors in the Al Qaeda, the Taliban or other constituents of the International Islamic Front are available. However, over 75 per cent of the senior leadership of the Al Qaeda and the Taliban are estimated to have survived, including possibly bin Laden himself and Mulla Mohammad Omar, the Amir of the Taliban.

8. Amongst the foreign nationals who fought in the International Islamic Front as members of the Pakistani organisations were American Muslims (mostly Afro-Americans), nationals/residents of West European countries, Thais, Malaysians, Singaporeans, who projected themselves as Malays from Malaysia and Indonesians. Their total number is estimated to be about 200. Practically all of them had been recruited by HUM and HUJI teams, which went to these countries posing as preachers of the Tablighi Jamaat (TJ), brought to Pakistan and trained in the various madrasas with funds provided by the TJ and then taken to Afghanistan to get jehad inoculation.

9. In addition to those mentioned above, there are presently 400 foreign students recruited by the HUM and the HUJI from Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand, who are studying at the various madrassas in Pakistan prior to their being inducted into the jehad. Of these, 190 are being trained in jehad in the madrasas of Sindh, 151 in the madrasas of Punjab and 59 in those of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP).

10. Of the 190 being trained in Sindh, 86 are from Malaysia, 82 from Thailand and 22 from Indonesia. Of the 151 being trained in the Punjab 61 are from Malysia, 49 from Thailand and 41 from Indonesia. Of the 59 being trained in the NWFP, 21 are from Indonesia, 20 from Malaysia and 18 from Thailand. Thus, there are presently 167 Malaysians, 149 Thais and 84 Indonesians being trained in the various madrasas of Pakistan. They were all recruited by the HUM and the HUJI and the expenditure on their training is met by the TJ. There are no reports of any Filippinos of the Abu Sayyaf presently under training in Pakistan.

11. The TJ came into existence in British India for the purpose of teaching Muslims to be good Muslims, spreading knowledge of the Holy Koran and doing humanitarian work. Its headquarters for South Asia are still in India . The Indian branch of the TJ still does the humanitarian work for which it was originally created and has not come to notice for any extremist views, but its Pakistani branch has been clandestinely involved in jehadi work. The Pakistani law treats the TJ as a humanitarian organisation and not as a religious-political one. Hence, there is no ban on serving Government servants, members of the Armed Forces and the nuclear and missile scientific community joining the organisation and working for it during the off-duty hours. They can even hold office in it as members of its executive etc.

12. Many Government servants, military officers and scientists devote at least part of their annual leave to do voluntary work for the TJ. LT. Gen. (retd) Hamid Gul, Lt. Gen .(retd) Javed Nasir, and Lt. Gen.(retd) Naseem Rana, former Directors-General of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), and Dr. A.Q.Khan and Sultan Bashiruddin Ahmed of the nuclear establishment were and still are closely involved in the TJ's Tableeghi work In fact, Nasir headed the TJ while he was the DG,ISI under Nawaz Sharif (1990-93). After his removal from the ISI under US pressure in 1993, he was involved full-time in Tableeghi work and used to head Tableeghi delegations going to the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Central Asian Republics, Chechnya, Dagestan and Somalia. Nassem Rana is presently the Pakistani High Commissioner to Malaysia.

13. It is said that the Tableeghi's annual conventions at Raiwind in Pakistani Punjab attract the second largest religious congregation in the Islamic world after the Haj in Saudi Arabia. It is reputed to be the richest religious organisation in Pakistan and recruits students in other countries and brings them to Pakistan at its expense for studies in the madrasas. The HUM and the HUJI have close links with the TJ and recruit their cadres in Pakistan as well as abroad through the TJ Often, to avoid attracting the adverse notice of foreign intelligence agencies, recruiting teams of the HUM and the HUJI go abroad under the cover of preachers of the TJ. bin Laden also used the HUM and HUJI teams going abroad under the garb of preachers of the TJ for communicating instructions to his network of non-Arab organisations in different countries.

14. Before October 7, 2001, the International Islamic Front's infrastructure was based partly in Afghanistan and partly in Pakistan. The Afghanistan-based infrastructure, which consisted of the trained cadres of all the constituents of the Front, focussed on operations against the Northern Alliance, the US and Israel. The Pakistan-based infrastructure, which consisted essentially of the trained cadres of the five Pakistani constituents of the International Islamic Front, concentrated on operations against India.

15. Since the beginning of this year, the surviving dregs of the entire Afghanistan-based infrastructure have moved over into Pakistan, with the knowledge/connivance of the ISI. Initially, they moved into the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan and have since spread out from there, with many of the Pakistani elements moving over to the Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK), including the Northern Areas (Gilgit and Baltistan), and some Pakistani elements and most of the non-Pakistani elements, including the Arabs of the Al Qaeda, moving over to Karachi, which has a large number of Pashtuns, Balochis and Yemeni-Balochis who have been providing them shelter. Many of the Arabs have taken shelter in the madrasas of Sindh, particularly in the Binori madrasa of Karachi. Some have also taken shelter in Punjab.

16. There are contradictory reports about bin Laden. Some say he is dead; some say he is alive and active as ever and keeps moving in the Pashtun belt of Pakistan; and some other reports claim that he has been physically and mentally disabled by a sharpnel injury and is protected by the Pashtun tribal chiefs. If one dismisses the reports of his death, whether alive and active or alive, but disbled, he appears to be no longer in a position to act as the rallying point of the various components of the International Islamic Front to the same extent as he was doing before October 7, 2001.

17. The presence of a large number of American communication experts from the National Security Agency (NSA) all over Pakistan and Afghanistan and their vigorous monitoring of all communications have greatly weakened his ability to communicate with and direct and co-ordinate the activities of his own surviving followers in the Al Qaeda as well as the cadres of the various components of the International Islamic Front scattered across Pakistan. bin Laden has been forced to increasingly depend on the Pakistani members of the International Islamic Front not only for communications through couriers, but also for his own protection. The Yemeni-Balochi members of these organisations are being used for this purpose.

18. In the absence of centralised direction emanating from a single source (bin Laden), the various Arab, Pakistani and other non-Arab foreign components have been operating increasingly autonomously against targets of opportunity identified with the US. In the apparent absence of the guiding hand of bin Laden, Pakistani terrorist leaders close to him and Mulla Mohammad Omar such as Mufti Nizamuddin Shamzai of the Binori madrasa and Qari Saifullah Akhtar of the HUJI have been increasingly exercising a leadership role over these terrorist meteorites. All the terrorist incidents since January in Pakistan---the kidnapping and murder of Daniel Pearl, the American journalist, the grenade attack in an Islamabad church, the murder of French experts who were mistaken for Americans and the explosion outside the US Consulate in Karachi on June 14, 2002, ---carry their signature and not that of bin Laden.

(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai)
 

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DANIEL PEARL'S CASE: Curiouser & Curiouser and Murkier & Murkier


by B. Raman

The case relating to the kidnapping and brutal murder of Daniel Pearl, the American journalist who belonged to the "Wall Street Journal", is getting curiouser and curiouser ---and murkier and murkier.
In the case as projected by the Karachi Police investigators till recently, there were three principal accused, who masterminded the act of terrorism, and three others who played a peripheral role only in the events relating to the dissemination by E-Mail of the photograph of Pearl in captivity with a list of the demands of the terrorists.

While Gen. Pervez Musharraf himself and the military-intelligence establishment projected the principal accused as belonging to the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM) led by Maulana Masood Azhar, the Karachi Police continued to project them as activists of the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM) and the Harkat-ul-Jihad- al-Islami (HUJI) led by Qari Saifullah Akhtar, which, amongst all the Pakistani jehadi organisations, is estimated to have the largest following in the lower and middle ranks of the Army.

The Police suspicion on the HUJI and the HUM was based on the modus operandi (MO) followed by the kidnappers for killing Pearl---cutting open the throat and then beheading -- which, according to them, is not used by any other terrorist organisation in the Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) State of India, Pakistan or Afghanistan and on the known HUJI/HUM background of some of the dramatis personae.

Among the dramatis personae named by the Police as belonging to the HUJI/HUM were Omar Sheikh himself, Mansur Hasnain alias Imtiaz Siddiqui alias Hyder, Amjad Hussian Farooqui,and Muhammad Hashim Qadir alias Arif. The Police quoted Omar Sheikh as saying that Mansur Hasnain, a Pakistani Punjabi from the Toba Tek Singh District of Punjab, was the leader of the HUM group, which had hijacked an Indian Airlines plane to Kandahar in December,1999, to secure the release of Maulana Masood Azhar and Omar Sheikh. Omar surrendered to a retired ISI officer in Lahore on February 5, 2002. Mansur Hasnain and Farooqui are still absconding. The peripheral accused have all been arrested.

According to the Police, Amjad Hussain Farooqui, also a Pakistani Punjabi, belongs to the HUJI . The "News" of February 16,2002, quoted a Pakistani Police officer involved in the investigation as saying as follows on Farooqui: ": " He is a jehadi who has been mainly active in Afghanistan, but he lives in Karachi. The HUJI is the main Pakistani backer of the Taliban. About 1,800 of its 5,000 members were killed in northern Afghanistan during the US-led air strikes and the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance offensive. The HUJI members are believed to be part of a network of cells involved in the kidnapping. The operation was planned very intelligently, using cells unknown to each other."

It was said that Muhammad Hashim Qadir alias Arif, a resident of Bhawalpur, whom Pearl met first, belonged to the HUM. Omar Sheikh reportedly told the Police that the kidnappers operated in three groups. Omar himself and Arif won the confidence of Pearl. Mansur Hasnain and Amjad Hussain Farooqui kidnapped Pearl and kept him in custody and Omar, with the help of Adil Mohammad Sheikh, a member of the staff of the Special Branch of the Sindh Police, and his cousins Suleman Saquib and Fahad Nasim arranged for taking the photograph of Pearl in custody, having it scanned and sending the E-Mail with his photograph to the media and others making their demands. According to the Police, Saquib and Nasim belonged to the JEM, thereby indicating the possibility that the kidnapping and murder might have been jointly planned and carried out by the HUJI, the HUM and the JEM.

The HUM, the JEM and the HUJI are members of Osama bin Laden's International Islamic Front for Jehad against the US and Israel. The HUM was designated by the US as a foreign terrorist organisation in 1997, but it has not so far been banned by Musharraf. The US had designated the JEM as a foreign terrorist organisation in December, 2001. This was followed by an ostensible ban on the organisation imposed by Musharraf on January 15, 2002, and the detention of Azhar and about 500 of his followers, who have all been released since then on the ground that there was no evidence of terrorism against them.

The HUJI, which is considered the most ruthless and the most anti-American amongst the terrorist organisations of Pakistan after the Sunni extremist Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), which has also been ostensibly banned by Musharraf since January 15,2002, has not so far been banned. Nor has the US designated the HUJI as yet as a foreign terrorist organisation.

The HUJI was associated in 1995 in a coup plot with a group of Army officers led by Maj. Gen. Zahir-ul-Islam Abbasi, former head of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) set-up in the Pakistani High Commission in New Delhi in the late 1980s, who was subsequently punished by the late Gen. Asif Nawaz Janjua, the then Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), for undertaking an unauthorised raid into an Indian Army position in the Siachen, which ended disastrously for the Pakistani Army.

The plot was detected in time and Abbasi and other officers were court-martialed by Gen. Abdul Wahid Kakkar, the then COAS, and sentenced to various terms of imprisonment. Abbasi, who was and continues to be a close personal friend of Musharraf, was released last year. It is not known whether he has completed his term of imprisoment or was the beneficiary of a remission given by Musharraf. Qari Saifullah Akhtar and some other leaders of the HUJI, who were also arrested by the ISI during the investigation of the plot, were never prosecuted and were subsequently released.

Since his release, Abbasi has formed an organisation called Hizbollah and has been carrying on anti-American propaganda among ex-servicemen in different parts of Pakistan and trying to motivate the various jehadi organisations to keep up their jehad against India and the US.

After the suicide bomb attack in Karachi on May 8, 2002,which killed 11 French experts working in a submarine project, Khaled Ahmed, the well-known Pakistani analyst, wrote an article titled "The Biggest Militia We Know Nothing About" in the prestigious "Friday Times" of Lahore. In this article, he stated as follows: "ARY DIGITAL TV's host Dr Masood, while discussing the May 8 killing of 11 French nationals in Karachi, named one Harkat al-Jahad al-Islami as one of the suspected terrorists involved in the bombing. When the Americans bombed the Taliban and Mulla Umar fled from his stronghold in Kandahar, a Pakistani personality also fled with him. This was Qari Saifullah Akhtar, the leader of Harkat al-Jahad al-Islami, Pakistan's biggest jehadi militia headquartered in Kandahar. No one knew the name of the outfit and its leader. A large number of its fighters made their way into Central Asia and Chechnya to escape capture at the hands of the Americans, the rest stole back into Pakistan to establish themselves in Waziristan and Buner. Their military training camp (maskar) in Kotli in Azad Kashmir swelled with new fighters and now the outfit is scouting some areas in the NWFP (North-West Frontier Province )to create a supplementary maskar for jehad in Kashmir. Its 'handlers' (in the Inter-Services Intelligence) have clubbed it together with Harkatul Mujahideen to create Jamiatul Mujahideen in order to cut down the large number of outfits gathered together in Azad Kashmir. It was active in Held Kashmir under the name of Harkatul Jahad Brigade 111.

"The leader of Harkat al-Jahad al-Islami, Qari Saifullah Akhtar was an adviser to Mulla Umar in the Taliban government. His fighters were called 'Punjabi' Taliban and were offered employment, something that other outfits could not get out of Mulla Umar. The outfit had membership among the Taliban too. Three Taliban ministers and 22 judges belonged to the Harkat. In difficult times, the Harkat fighters stood together with Mulla Umar. Approximately 300 of them were killed fighting the Northern Alliance, after which Mulla Umar was pleased to give Harkat the permission to build six more maskars in Kandahar, Kabul and Khost, where the Taliban army and police also received military training. From its base in Afghanistan, Harkat launched its campaigns inside Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Chechnya. But the distance of Qari Saifullah Akhtar from the organisation's Pakistani base did not lead to any rifts. In fact, Harkat al-Jahad al-Islami emerged from the defeat of the Taliban largely intact. In Pakistan Qari Akhtar has asked the 'returnees' to lie low for the time being, while his Pakistani fighters already engaged are busy in jehad as before.

"The Harkat is the only militia which boasts international linkages. It calls itself 'the second line of defence of all Muslim states' and is active in Arakan in Burma, and Bangladesh, with well organised seminaries in Karachi, and Chechnya, Sinkiang, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. The latest trend is to recall Pakistani fighters stationed abroad and encourage the local fighters to take over the operations. Its fund-raising is largely from Pakistan, but an additional source is its activity of selling weapons to other militias. Its acceptance among the Taliban was owed to its early allegiance to a leader of the Afghan war, Maulvi Nabi Muhammadi and his Harkat Inqilab Islami whose fighters became a part of the Taliban forces in large numbers. Nabi Muhammadi was ignored by the ISI in 1980 in favour of Hekmatyar and his Hezb-e-Islami. His outfit suffered in influence inside Afghanistan because he was not supplied with weapons in the same quantity as some of the other seven militias.

"According to the journal Al-Irshad of Harkat al-Jahad al-Islami, published from Islamabad, a Deobandi group led by Maulana Irshad Ahmad was established in 1979. Looking for the right Afghan outfit in exile to join in Peshawar, Maulana Irshad Ahmad adjudged Maulvi Nabi Muhammadi as the true Deobandi and decided to join him in 1980. Harkat Inqilab Islami was set up by Maulana Nasrullah Mansoor Shaheed and was taken over by Nabi Muhammadi after his martyrdom. Eclipsed in Pakistan, Maulana Irshad Ahmad fought in Afghanistan against the Soviets till he was killed in battle in Shirana in 1985. His place was taken by Qari Saifullah Akhtar, which was not liked by some of the Harkat leaders, including Maulana Fazlur Rehman Khaleel who then set up his own Harkatul Mujahideen.

"According to some sources, Harkatul Mujahideen was a new name given to Harkatul Ansar after it was declared terrorist by the United States. Other sources claim that it was Harkat al-Jahad al-Islami that had earlier merged with Harkatul Ansar. But relations with Fazlur Rehman Khaleel remained good, but when Maulana Masood Azhar separated from Harkatul Mujahideen and set up his own Jaish-e-Muhammad, Harkat al-Jahad al-Islami opposed Jaish in its journal Sada-e-Mujahid (May 2000) and hinted that 'you-know-who' had showered Jaish with funds. Jaish was supported by Mufti Shamzai of Banuri (Binori) Mosque of Karachi and was given a brand new maskar in Balakot by the ISI.

"The sub-militia (of the HUJI) fighting in Kashmir is semi-autonomous and is led by chief commander Muhammad Ilyas Kashmiri. Its training camp is 20 km from Kotli in Azad Kashmir, with a capacity for training 800 warriors, and is run by one Haji Khan. Harkat al-Jahad al-Islami went into Kashmir in 1991 but was at first opposed by the Wahhabi elements there because of its refusal to criticise the grand Deobandi congregation of Tableeghi Jamaat and its quietist posture. But as days passed, its warriors were recognised as 'Afghanis'. It finally had more martyrs in the jehad of Kashmir than any other militia. Its resolve and organisation were recognised when foreigners were seen fighting side by side with its Punjabi warriors.

"To date, 650 Harkat al-Jahad al-Islami mujahideen have been killed in battle against the Indian army: 190 belonging to both sides of Kashmir, nearly 200 belonging to Punjab, 49 to Sindh, 29 to Balochistan, 70 to Afghanistan, 5 to Turkey, and 49 collectively to Uzbekistan, Bangladesh and the Arab world.

"Because of its allegiance to the spiritual legacy of Deobandism, Harkat al-Jahad al-Islami did not attack the Tableeghi Jamaat, which stood it in good stead because it became the only militia whose literature was allowed to be distributed during the congregations of the Tableeghi Jamaat, and those in the Pakistani establishment attending the congregation were greatly impressed by the militia's organisational excellence. It contained more graduates of the seminaries than any other militia, thus emphasising its religious character as envisaged by its founder and by Maulvi Nabi Muhammadi. It kept away from the sectarian conflict unlike Jaish-e-Muhammad but its men were at times put off by the populist Kashmiri Islam and reacted violently to local practices.

"The leader of Harkat al-Jahad al-Islami in Uzbekistan is Sheikh Muhammad Tahir al-Farooq. So far 27 of its fighters have been killed in battle against the Uzbek president Islam Karimov, as explained in the Islamabad-based journal Al-Irshad. Starting in 1990, the war against Uzbekistan was bloody and was supported by the Taliban, till in 2001, the commander had to ask the Pakistanis in Uzbekistan to return to base.

"In Chechnya, the war against the Russians was carried on under the leadership of commander Hidayatullah. Pakistan's embassy in Moscow once denied that there were any Pakistanis involved in the Chechnyan war, but journal Al-Irshad (March 2000) declared from Islamabad that the militia was deeply involved in the training of guerrillas in Chechnya for which purpose commander Hidayatullah was stationed in the region. It estimated that 'dozens' of Pakistani fighters had been martyred fighting against Russian infidels.

"When the Harkat al-Jahad al-Islami men were seen first in Tajikistan, they were mistaken by some observers as being fighters from Sipah Sahaba, but in fact they were under the command of commander Khalid Irshad Tiwana, helping Juma Namangani and Tahir Yuldashev resist the Uzbek ruling class in the Ferghana Valley. The anti-Uzbek warlords were being sheltered by Mulla Umar in Afghanistan.

"Maulana Abdul Quddus heads the Burmese warriors located in Karachi and fighting mostly in Bangladesh on the Arakanese border. Korangi is the base of the Arakanese Muslims who fled Burma to fight the jehad from Pakistan. A large number of Burmese are located inside Korangi and the area is sometimes called mini-Arakan. Harkat al-Jahad al-Islami has opened 30 seminaries for them inside Korangi, there being 18 more in the rest of Karachi. Maulana Abdul Quddus, a Burmese Muslim, while talking to weekly Zindagi (25-31 January 1998), revealed that he had run away from Burma via India and took religious training in the Harkat seminaries in Karachi and on its invitation went to Afghanistan, took military training there and fought the jehad from 1982 to 1988. In Orangi, the biggest seminary is Madrasa Khalid bin Walid where 500 Burmese are under training. They were trained in Afghanistan and later made to fight against the Northern Alliance and against the Indian army in Kashmir. The Burmese prefer to stay in Pakistan, and very few have returned to Burma or to Bangladesh. There are reports of their participation in the religious underworld in Karachi.

"Harkat al-Jahad al-Islami has branch offices in 40 districts and tehsils in Pakistan, including Sargodha, Dera Ghazi Khan, Multan, Khanpur, Gujranwala, Gujrat, Mianwali, Bannu, Kohat, Waziristan, Dera Ismail Khan, Swabi and Peshawar. It also has an office in Islamabad. Funds are collected from these grassroots offices as well as from sources abroad. The militia has accounts in two branches of Allied Bank in Islamabad, which have not been frozen because the organisation is not under a ban. The authorities have begun the process of reorganisation of jehad by changing names and asking the various outfits to merge. Harkat al-Jahad al-Islami has been asked to merge with Harkatul Mujahideen of Fazlur Rehman Khaleel who had close links with Osama bin Laden. The new name given to this merger is Jamiatul Mujahideen. Jamaat Islami's Hizbul Mujahideen has been made to absorb all the refugee Kashmiri organisations. Jaish and Lashkar-e-Tayba have been clubbed together as Al-Jahad. All the Barelvi organisations, so far located only in Azad Kashmir, have been put together as Al-Barq. Al-Badr and Hizbe Islami have been renamed as Al-Umar Mujahideen, " the article concluded.

The trial of Omar Sheikh and the peripheral accused has been going on in a special anti-terrorism court in Hyderabad, Sindh, for more than a month, with neither the Judge nor the prosecution nor the defence showing any interest in an early conclusion. Despite the provision in Pakistan's Anti-Terrorism Act that recording of evidence should be held on a day to day basis without adjournment and the trial completed within a week, the defence has been given one adjournment after another under some pretext or the other.

Moreover, Omar Sheikh, who had during the investigation confessed to his role not only in the kidnapping of Pearl, but also in the terrorist attacks on the J&K Assembly in Srinagar on October 1,2001, on the Indian Parliament at New Delhi on December 13,2001, and on the security personnel outside the American Centre in Kolkata (Calcutta) on January 22,2002, has now retracted his entire confession and has been denying any role in Pearl's kidnapping.

In the meanwhile, in a sudden and surprise development, the Pakistani military-intelligence establishment and the Karachi Police have mounted an operation the purpose of which could be to draw suspicion away from the HUM and the HUJI, which are close to the Army, and hence have not so far been banned and to direct the suspicion towards the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), the Sunni extremist organisation, its militant wing Lashkar Jhangvi (LJ) and the JEM. The LJ was banned by Musharraf on August 14, 2001, and the SSP itself and the JEM on January 15, 2002.

On May 16, 2002, the Karachi Police claimed to have recovered the remains of an unidentified dead body cut into 10 pieces, which were found buried in a nursery (Gulzare Hijri) on a plot of land in the outlying Gulshan-e-Maymar area of Karachi. They further claimed that the remains were recovered following a tip-off from a human source and that, according to the source, the remains were of Pearl. The local media also reported that there was an improvised shed on the plot where Pearl was suspected to have been held in captivity before his murder and that the plot belonged to Al Rashid Trust of Karachi. The results of the DNA and other forensic examination to determine whether the remains were really those of Pearl are still awaited.

Some years ago, Al Rashid Trust was floated and got registered by the ISI as a charitable organisation to receive funds from abroad and channel them to the Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan as well as to the Pakistani Punjabi jehadi organisations in J & K. In an investigative report published by the "Asia Times" on October 26,2001, Pepe Escobar wrote as follows: " The Pakistani-based Al-Rashid Trust is one of the key organizations included in America's black book of terrorist groups. American intelligence -- for many a cynic, a contradiction in terms - may think that the elusive Osama bin Laden is the main source of hard cash for Al-Rashid. But in fact it is the other way around: Al-Rashid is one of Osama's many sources of income.

"Asia Times Online has learned from a key source how the trust is "very much part of Osama's international network" and that it is closely linked with the Taliban and with separatists fighting in Kashmir. The source says that "they [members of the trust] are financially helping the Taliban, Al-Qaeda and Jaish-i-Mohammad.

"Mufti Rashid is the amir (leader) of the trust. Mufti Abu Lubaba is the ideologue, while Maulvi Sibghatullah of the Dar-ul-Uloom (religious school) in Karachi is the director of the trust in Kandahar, the southern Afghan city that serves as the headquarters for the Taliban. Only the two muftis have direct access to bin Laden.

"Al-Rashid is also closely linked with the Jaish-i-Mohammad, a Pakistan-based militant religious organization, which is now also on the US terrorist list. Al-Rashid and Jaish-i-Mohammad share office buildings across the country, although some are strictly for the use of the Jaish-i-Mohammad. The groups also have common cadres, who undertake fundraising activities for both organizations. Indeed, it is often difficult to distinguish between the two outfits. Maulana Masood Azhar of the Jaish-i-Mohammad regularly writes for the weekly newspaper of Al-Rashid, the Zarb-I-Momin.

"Zarb-i-Momin, a weekly, reports the jihadi activities of the Taliban and the Jaish-i-Mohammad. It was closely associated with the Harakat-ul-Ansaar (another one on the US terror list) before the Jaish-i-Mohammad was founded in early 2000. The paper spews ultra-venomous propaganda against Hindus, Jews and Christians.

"Pakistani banks, after President General Pervez Musharraf's spectacular pro-US realignment, froze Al-Rashid's bank accounts, but this does not seem to pose a problem: the trust opened new accounts in the names of individuals. The biggest source of funds for Al-Rashid are the Middle East and everywhere where Pakistanis can be found, especially in Britain. The trust also has a network in South Africa. Al-Rashid also raises a lot of money in Pakistan. And Osama bin Laden, even if he cannot access an ATM in Kandahar, obviously remains an elite financial recipient."

In "the Washington Times" of November 6, 2001, Julian West reported as follows: "The Taliban regime is receiving weapons from Pakistani arms dealers who are funded by sympathetic local businessmen and a religious trust linked to al Qaeda, the international terror network headed by fugitive Osama bin Laden.

"Intelligence sources in Pakistan have described how arms are sent to the Taliban from the arms bazaars of Pakistan using a complex network of money changers, arms dealers and smugglers.

"According to these sources, the main sponsor of the illicit trade is Al Rashid Trust, a Karachi-based extremist organization whose bank accounts recently were frozen by the Pakistani government after it was suspected of channeling funds to al Qaeda, the prime suspect in the September 11 attacks on the United States. The other principal backers are a few wealthy businessmen based mainly in Lahore, Pakistan.

"In the past few weeks, Al Rashid Trust is believed to have smuggled an undetermined quantity of weapons and ammunition in trucks containing relief supplies such as blankets or wheat.

"The arms have been shipped through the desert border crossing at Chaman, near the Pakistani city of Quetta. >From there, the weapons, bought in the arms bazaars of Karachi, are being trucked along the straight desert road that leads to Kandahar, the Taliban heartland.

"The Al Rashid Trust is totally involved in supplying ammunition and weapons," said a former Pakistani intelligence source, who could not estimate the number of arms supplied. "They are sending in heavy weapons under blankets and foodstuffs; it's nonsense to believe this has stopped."

"An Afghan shipper in Peshawar, who until recently ferried fruit and other goods to and from Afghanistan, also confirmed that relief trucks had been used to transport arms during the period when the Taliban regime was under U.N. sanctions."

As pointed out in this writer's article titled "Pakistan & Terrorism: The Evidence" (http://www.saag.org/papers4/paper390.html ), while making a pretense of freezing the accounts of the Al Rashid Trust, Musharraf has not acted against any of its office-bearers.

It is not clear as to who gave the information to the Karachi Police about the burial of these remains in a plot of land belonging to the Al Rashid Trust----a human source as claimed by the Police or by some new suspects who have been picked up by the Police, but whose arrest has not been shown in Police records, lest the USA's Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) wants to interrogate them or seeks their extradition to the US?

The "News" (May 23, 2002), the prestigious daily of Pakistan, reported that the information about the remains was given to the Karachi Police by one Fazal Karim -- a resident of Rahim Yar Khan and a father of five-- who is in Police custody, but has not been shown as arrested. According to the paper,Fazal Karim had identified Lashkar-e- Jhangvi's Naeem Bukhari as the ring leader of the group that also included "three Yemeni-Baluch" (father Yemeni and mother Baloch) who took part in Pearl's kidnapping, his murder and disposal of his body parts. Naeem Bukhari is wanted by police in Punjab and Karachi in more than a dozen cases of anti-Shia killings. Fazal Karim reportedly confirmed Omar Sheikh's role in planning Pearl's kidnapping.

The "News" further reported as follows: "Fazal Karim has also revealed that major Pakistani cities may soon witness more suicidal attacks against the westerners and key government personalities, officials with direct knowledge about the interrogation of this new accused person in the Pearl case divulged here on Wednesday.Pakistani security officials believe that because of increased monitoring activities by the military services in the tribal areas, scores of the foreigners, earlier hiding there, have now moved with the help of their trusted Pakistani religious supporters to the populous urban centres, such as Karachi. "There are scores of Arabs and their Pakistani loyalists who are desperate to blow themselves up to settle score with the Americans and other westerners," an official quoted Fazal Karim as saying. "These Arabs residing in various neighbourhoods in the outskirts of Karachi are on do-or-die missions," he added. Fazal told his investigators, "Our Arab friends hosted us in Afghanistan when we were on the run, now it's our turn to pay them back."

"Giving more specific information about the new terrorist threat in Karachi, Fazal is believed to have disclosed that the Airport hotel near Karachi airport, where the western military personnel of International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) were staying, had been selected by his group for a possible suicidal strike.

""Informed diplomats in Islamabad termed "a watershed" and "very dangerous" the evidence that previously friendly groups have merged operationally. Al-Qaeda signatures, not seen previously in Pakistan, were starkly visible in the recent attacks apparently carried out principally by the Pakistanis: detailed planning, western targets and, in the two attacks, suicide bombers, " the paper concluded.

Intriguingly, on May 14, 2002, two days before the recovery of the remains of a dead body, claimed to be that of Pearl, by the Karachi Police, the Punjab Police claimed that Riaz Basra, the long absconding leader of the LJ and three of his associates were killed in an encounter in a Punjab village when they had gone there to kill a Shia leader. Sections of the Pakistani media have expressed doubts over the Police version and alleged that Riaz Basra was in the informal custody of a sensitive Pakistani intelligence agency (ISI) since January, 2002, without it taking any action against him and that the Police, now for reasons not clear, have shown him as having been killed in an encounter.

On May 19, 2002, Pakistani journalists received phone calls from a person identifying himself as Musa of Hezbullah Alami, claimimg responsibility for the kidnapping and murder of Pearl, the grenade attack on an Islamabad church on March 17, 2002, and the suicide bomb attack on the French experts in Karachi on May 8, 2002. The person strongly criticised Musharraf's pro-US policies and his co-operation with the US in its war against the Taliban and the Al Qaeda and reportedly hinted that the remains recovered by the Karachi Police were not those of Pearl. He also reportedly claimed that neither the HUJI or the LJ had anything to do with Pearl's kidnapping and murder. He also said that it was the Al Saiqua, the organisation to which reference had been made by this writer in his comments on the attack on the French experts available at www.saag.org , which had now renamed itself as Hezbullah Alami. No further details of this organisation are known.

These intriguing developments have given rise to many more questions without answers such as:

* According to Omar Sheikh, he had voluntarily surrendered to a retired ISI officer on February 5, 2002, but he was shown as arrested by the Punjab Police on February 12, 2002, when Musharraf was in Washington DC. It has now come out that Riaz Basra, considered one of the most dreaded terrorists of Pakistan, was also with the ISI since around end-January/beginning February. Whereas Omar Sheikh was shown as arrested, Riaz Basra has been shown as killed in an encounter. Were both these incidents connected and what was their linkage with the Pearl case?
* The alleged encounter death of Riaz Basra has almost coincided with the new version put out by the Karachi Police about the involvement of the LJ in the murder of Pearl. Instead of interrogating him on this, why did the ISI choose to have him killed in an alleged encounter?

* Why are Musharraf and the ISI repeatedly trying to steer the suspicion away from the HUM and the HUJI and why has Musharraf not banned these organisations?

* Was the ISI aware where Pearl had been kept in custody? If so, why it did not try to rescue him?

* Was it aware where the remains of Pearl had been buried? If so, why it did not earlier try to recover them?

* Why are Musharraf and the military-intelligence establishment not keen on an early conclusion of the trial of Omar Sheikh?

* Has the Hezbullah Alami been got floated by Musharraf himself in order to make the US believe that the terrorists are now targetting him because of his co-operation with the US in Afghanistan and, therefore, the US should not press him too hard to crush terrorism against India?

* Why is the USA not vigorously following up the case and holding Tricky Mush and the ISI accountable for the various acts of commission and omission and blatant lies in the Pearl case?

(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-Mail: [email protected] )
 

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Failure To Tackle Gilgit Violence Is Unforgivable


7 December 2005
The Daily Times

Islamabad: The latest news is that the intelligence agencies have unearthed a plot by Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Sipah Sahaba to use suicide bombers to kill Shia members of the legislative council of the Northern Areas. The suicide bombers are said to include women and children to be sent from outside Gilgit. There is a rumour that the extremist clerics in the Punjab are trying to recruit potential terrorists from the quake- hit areas of Azad Kashmir and the NWFP, distributing publications like Zarb-e-Momin among them for this purpose. It is said that Maulana Ghulam Kibriya of Rahim Yar Khan has been assigned to arrange for these children's admission to seminaries in southern Punjab. It is clear that preparations are being made for another bout of sectarian attacks. On Monday, a Sunni cleric from Multan was gunned down in Karachi to avenge the murder of a Shia cleric in Balochistan a day earlier. The entire country has become linked in a network of terrorism which now boasts Al Qaeda-style suicide-bombing. If you look at the map of the country, the territories under challenge comprise the Northern Areas, the North and South Waziristan Agencies in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and all of Balochistan, the largest province comprising 40 percent of Pakistan's territory. One can easily say that half of Pakistan is in the grip of people whose way of life is violence. And who is responsible for this if not the government which has been unable to tackle the problems that give rise to this violence? The biggest mess is in Gilgit, the administrative centre of the Northern Areas. And the mess dates back to the army's decision to deploy an extremist anti-Shia Lashkar-e- Tayba during the Kargil Operation of 1999 in tandem with regular troops. The administration in Gilgit has shown a criminal lack of understanding of the majority population (60 percent) of the city, the Shia, while deciding matters such as the content of school textbooks. Thus it would shock the world to know that Gilgit and the surrounding areas have seen a consistent pressure from the Shia community demanding changes in the textbooks for the last half decade and that the government, with all its intellectual resources, was not able to satisfy it. Nor was it able to prevent the target-killing of prominent Shia leaders, which enlisted the sectarian emotion of the entire community in the country. One glaring example of Islamabad's lack of sensitivity came to the fore this year when the new chief commissioner of Gilgit was appointed. The ministry concerned appointed a fundamentalist Sunni as chief commissioner despite its awareness that the Shias of Gilgit panic at the appointment of officers holding extreme Sunni views. What it ignored was the message contained in the earlier murder of a retired Sunni IG. Chief Commissioner Major (retd) Nadeem Manzur, a strict practising Sunni officer and a son-in-law of General (retd) KM Arif, carries no blot but his almost fanatic observance of Sunni faith should have alerted the ministry to his unsuitability. In the event, he proved ineffective and has recently been recalled. Why was he sent to Gilgit in the first place? One fears that the ministry itself could be infected with sectarian passions. To get a perspective on how the Gilgit unrest affects the rest of the country, let us go over this year's toll of terrorist casualties. On January 8, Shia leader Agha Ziauddin Rizvi was killed in Gilgit. On January 31, a leader of Sipah Sahaba Maulana Haroon ul Qasimi was killed in Karachi. On March 23, former Northern Areas IG Sakhiullah Tareen, a Sunni hardliner, was ambushed and killed in the Northern Areas. On April 1, Allama Najafi, head of a major Shia seminary in Lahore, was murdered. On May 27, a suicide bombing killed 20 at the Barri Imam shrine near Islamabad. On May 30, the Shia seminary Jaamiat ul Ulum in Karachi was attacked by a suicide-bomber. On June 24, Mufti Rehman and Maulana Irshad, leaders of the Deoband-Sunni headquarters, Banuri Mosque in Karachi, were target-killed. The government should not wait helplessly for what the suicide-bombers of Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Sipah-e-Sahaba have in store for the nation in the coming days. Islamic states tend to be sectarian. Iran is overtly a Shia state where the Sunnis may find themselves discriminated against. The Sunni utopia created by the Taliban in Afghanistan was intensely sectarian and anti-Shia. After 20 years of jihad and Talibanisation, Pakistan too is showing clear signs of being a sectarian state. Saudi influence, spearheaded by Saudi funds to hardline Sunni seminaries, has changed Pakistan's traditionally non-sectarian character. Its conduct in Shia-majority localities has been extremely violent. Gilgit is a case in point where in 1988 the state began its cycle of violence together with Parachinar in Kurram Agency. The pattern is that Sunni extremists will focus on areas where there is a concentration of Shias. The year 1988 was crucial to these Shia populations. That year General Zia allowed the mujahideen to attack Parachinar to break the Shia resistance to their operations inside Afghanistan. The same year he allowed Sunni lashkars of Sipah Sahaba to attack Gilgit, resulting in high Shia casualties. The same year the chief of the Shia party in Pakistan, Allama Arif ul Hussaini, was murdered in Peshawar. Thousands of people have died since then in this sectarian war. The future of Pakistan has been rendered uncertain by a group of powerful clerics who are now able to deploy suicide-bombers. If their violence against the minority communities is not stopped, they will turn on new, more high-profile, targets after they are done with the minorities. No one is safe.
 

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Sectarianism in Gilgit – Baltistan

Posted on29 April 2009. Tags: Baltistan, Gilgit, Sectarianism
Gilgit is capital of the so – called Northern Areas of Pakistan and if, at some point in time, this region becomes 'the fifth province', as some of the residents envisage, this is the city most qualified to be the provincial capital. It is a small and beautiful city, surrounded by mountains, with river Hanisara, having origin in the world famous Shandur region, flowing through the city. It is densely populated and a commercial hub of the entire region, with lesser breathing space for the original inhabitants.
The entire region is severely divided on sectarian lines since late eighties, after a group of Jihadis attacked a Shia village called Jalalabad, located at the periphery of Gilgit city, and burnt it down, killing men, women, children and even animals, without discrimination. The remnants of Afghan "Jihad" wanted to capture the Northern Areas and establish their rule in the region. The exact number of people killed in that most brutal of attacks on civilians in Gilgit – Baltistan is not known. Neither have we known anything about the perpetrators, executioners, financiers and the planners of the attack. No one has been punished, needless to say. Justice has not been done.
Nowhere else, in the entire region, are the sectarian divisions more visible than Gilgit city. There are Sunni localities and then there are strictly Shia localities. These localities become no – go areas during times of sectarian clashes.
After that attack, launched in 1988, there have been several sectarian riots in the region. Members of opposite sects (including Shias and Ismailies) have been slaughtered on the Karakuram Highway, shot in the streets of Gilgit city and tormented throughout the region. This is not to mean that only the Sunnis are taking guns in hands, the Shias have also killed members of their opposite sects. Several Ismailies have also been killed in the "cross fire".
On January 8, 2005, after the murder of Agha Zia Udin Rizvi, an influential local leader of the Shia community, eighteen people, including director of a government department, were killed in broad daylight in Gilgit city. Schools, colleges and the region's only university, the Karakuram International University, remained closed for more than ninety days because of the resulting sectarian tension built.
The most relevant question might be who is behind all this Sectarian killings in Gilgit – Baltistan are recent phenomena. People in the region had been living in peace for centuries, with negligible or no sectarian rift. What has suddenly changed in the region that the peaceful people have turned into extremist sect lovers?
Nationalists and other centrifugal forces point fingers the establishment, the agencies and other government elements, as is the 'norm' in other parts of the country as well. Some segments of the society blame the Indians and other world powers for the sectarian history of Gilgit – Baltistan. The position of the government is not known, because any inquiries, if held, are not shared with the public.
Nationalists argue that through sectarianism the region is kept divided, to avert attention from the denied constitutional rights of the region. This lack of transparency and justice has fueled suspicion and brewed alienation from the state, to threatening degree.
Lack of justice has coupled with the feeling of betrayal triggered by the state's refusal to bring the region into the national political mainstream, has helped create and environment where the state is looked at with suspicion and distrust. Trained sectarian militias exist in the region, because of this feeling of insecurity.
Very recently, a week ago, deputy speaker, Syed Asad Zaidi, of the region's toothless "legislative assembly", was shot dead in Gilgit city. Fortunately, prudence prevailed and the tragic murder of Mr Zaidi didn't trigger sectarian clashes in the region. Otherwise, the plot seems to have been executed pretty well: a Shia leader killed in a Sunni locality is enough to unleash the zealots with guns.
That the government needs to win trust of the region's populace cannot be emphasized more. Confidence building measures, like inclusion of the region into the national political mainstream, dispensation of justice to victims and survivors of the sectarian clashes, including the 1988 tragedy, and emphasizing more on economic development of the region can be three of the many vital steps that are overdue, and hurting.
 

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Story of Gilgit deaths foretold


At least 14 people were killed, six of them burnt alive and 14 injured during sectarian attacks in Gilgit on Saturday, after which a curfew was imposed on the city and troops deployed to restore order. The clashes took place after "unidentified" people shot at the car of Agha Ziauddin, a Shia community leader and imam of the main Gilgit mosque, killing two of his bodyguards and seriously wounding him. One of the assailants was shot dead when fire was returned.

The Gilgit population, which is 60 percent Shia, then came out of their homes and rioted, setting fire to several government and private buildings and torching the home of forest officer Taighun Nabi, burning him and five others alive. In another attack, the local health department chief, Dr Sher Wali, was shot dead by the infuriated mob. A male passer-by was also killed. The injured included the Northern Areas home secretary's assistant and a Gilgit municipal committee member. The Northern Areas home secretary has stated that the one killer shot dead in the return-fire was from 'outside' Gilgit.

Let us note that on December 27, 2004, four masked men killed two workers of the Aga Khan Health Services Office in Chitral and burnt four vehicles belonging to the charity organisation. The police registered a case against "unknown assailants" and arrested four persons belonging to "a banned organisation". The press later carried the name of the organisation: Harkatul Mujahideen, whose leader Fazlur Rehman Khaleel — known for his close links with Osama bin Laden — had been released from detention the same week by the authorities in Islamabad. The name of the "banned organisation" was changed in some papers to Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, a "blanket" term to conceal the identities of those that the state wished to gloss over. The Lashkar-e-Jhangvi terrorists so far captured have all been Punjabis.

We editorialised in this paper on December 29, 2007: "This kind of violence has happened in the area before but has gained momentum after the MMA campaign against the Aga Khan Foundation in the rest of the country. In the adjacent Northern Areas (Gilgit) the Aga Khan charity institutions have come under attack regularly in the past years after being targeted by the radical religious elements waging jihad in Kashmir.

"Earlier this year, we had news about sectarian unrest in the North for almost six months. Schools were closed and there were instances of sporadic violence in areas where Shia and Ismaili populations are concentrated but where power and influence have passed to Sunni clerics."

We went on to warn the government that: "The truth is that a hidden desire to exclude one more community from the pale of Islam persists after what the religious fanatics have done to non-Sunni majority locations in the North. What was happening so far in the periphery is now threatening to come to the centre. That is why General Pervez Musharraf must take firm action against the elements which have attacked the Aga Khan Health Services Office in Chitral and are working under a scheme to destabilise the country by exacerbating its sectarian conflict. That is also why he should seriously think of displacing the reactionary MMA with a liberal party in his political affections."

Following the incident in Chitral, the chief of the banned Lashkar-e-Tayba, Hafiz Saeed, proclaimed in Lahore that the government was "apostatising" the Muslims of the Northern Areas, meaning that it was supporting the so-called "heresy" of Ismaili and Shia Islam. The Lashkar-e-Tayba gained influence in the Northern Areas during the Kargil Operation in 1999, not without causing some sectarian incidents. From being a completely Ismaili region in history, it has been injected with external populations through natural immigration from the rest of the country. But there have been manipulations too, as a result of which the region has suffered violence.

Let us take a close look at the distribution of population in the Northern Areas according to the various Muslim denominations. Islam came to the region in the 13th century and it was Ismaili Islam. (The Ismailis were in Multan before Muhammad bin Qasim came to Sindh.) But in the following years there was competition of sorts between the big sects, and clerics from other parts of the country introduced the Twelver Shia and Sunni faiths too. Today Gilgit is 60 percent Shia, 40 percent Sunni; Hunza 100 percent Ismaili; Nagar 100 percent Shia; Punial 100 percent Ismaili; Yasin 100 percent Ismaili; Ishkoman 100 percent Ismaili; Gupis 100 percent Ismaili; Chilas 100 percent Sunni; Darel/Tangir 100 percent Sunni; Astor 90 percent Sunni, 10 percent Shia; Baltistan 96 percent Shia; 2 percent Nurbakhti; 2 percent Sunni.

Saturday's killing in Gilgit is a big incident recalling the 1988 massacre which accounted for 44 deaths after "lashkars" sent in by a politician nicknamed the "devil of Hazara" entered the Shia city after travelling the Karakoram Highway which was supposed to be guarded closely by the Pakistan Army. Then it was the high tide of General Zia's jihad in Afghanistan and the Shia — from Kurram Agency to the Northern Areas — were considered "non-cooperative". That year, Parachinar and Gilgit were both subjected to invasions and hundreds of people were put to death. The climax of the anti-Shia campaign was reached when the all-Pakistan Shia leader Allama Arif ul Hussaini — a Turi from Kurram Agency and close companion of Imam Khomeini — was murdered in Peshawar. Shockingly, ten days later General Zia was himself killed in an air-crash in Bahawalpur.

Was the Musharraf government not forewarned? Sadly, it was, when last year there was unrest in the Balti Shia areas and the local population gathered several times in protest against the textbooks being prescribed in their schools. There were also complaints against clerics coming from 'outside' the area and delivering fiery sermons based on sectarian hatred. But nothing was done. The incidents were not treated as a series of connected happenings leading up to a climax. Islamabad seems to be more concerned about mollifying the clergy on "religion entry" in the passports than about thinking of how to save our vulnerable populations from increasingly falling victim to religio-ideological policies. *
 

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Musharraf's Ban: An Analysis


Author: B.Raman
Publication: South Asia Analysis Group
Date: January 18, 2002
URL: http://www.saag.org/papers4/paper395.html
"Don't blame the common man if he does not take the government's orders seriously. What happened to the deweaponization ? The paramilitary forces looked on helplessly when the TNSM activists drove past the check points with guns mounted on their vehicles. Why should the common citizens believe this government when it says that it would take concrete steps against religious extremists and then buckles under such pressures, and withdraws plans to bring about procedural amendments in the controversial blasphemy law?

"Mere tough talk will not convince the people. Action speaks louder than words. How will the government liberate the 'great majority of moderate Pakistanis' held hostage by a minority of religious extremists when it cannot liberate itself from the extremists? People remain unconvinced. They say that the establishment has not divorced its religious allies altogether. This is just a separation. There will be a re-union once the situation cools down in Afghanistan. It will continue to need the support of the religious extremist groups for as long as Kashmir issue remains unresolved.

"Notwithstanding their present hibernation, the Jihadi outfits would continue to operate, along the holy war in Kashmir. They would continue to push political goals in Pakistan as well.

"The government says the extremists stand exposed and that it plans to unveil an action plan against them in the next three weeks or so. The taste of the pudding is in eating it. Time will tell how sincere is the administration in taking on religious extremism."

So wrote Mr. M. Ismail Khan, a Pakistani analyst, in the "Dawn" of Karachi on November 29, 2001, in response to the repeated reiteration by Gen.Pervez Musharraf, since September 11, 2001, of his determination to eradicate extremist and terrorist activities from Pakistani soil. The comments were provoked by the action of the military junta in not preventing the crossing- over of thousands of heavily-armed jehadis from the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan into Afghanistan, at the height of the US air strikes against the Taliban to join the Taliban in its so-called jehad against the US. Thousands of them got killed by the US air strikes and in the fighting with the Northern Alliance.

If many in Pakistan itself have thus been doubting the sincerity of Musharraf in wanting to make a total break from extremism and terrorism, India is totally justified in adopting a cautious approach to his telecast of January 12 and in wanting to see credible action on the ground against terrorists operating against India before appropriately reciprocating to his speech and the follow-up action.

In pursuance of Musharraf's telecast announcement of January 12, 2002, Lt.Gen. (retd) Moinuddin Haider, Pakistan's Interior Minister, issued a notification on January 15, 2002, formally banning the following five organisations under the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1997, which was got enacted by the then Prime Minister, Mr.Nawaz Sharif, and under which Sharif himself was got prosecuted and jailed by Musharraf after capturing power on October 12, 1999: the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LET), the Jaish-e-Muhammad (JEM), the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), the Tehreek-e-Jafferia Pakistan (TJP) and the Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi (TNSM). All of them, except the Shia TJP, have a strong Deobandi-Wahabi orientation. On the other hand, the Sunni Tehreek, which is of Barelvi orientation, was placed only under observation and not banned.

According to the notification, Section 11E of the Act provides that where any organisation is proscribed, the required measures against it will include: its offices, if any, shall be sealed; its accounts, if any, shall be frozen; all literature, posters, banners, or printing, electronic and digital or other material shall be seized.

It said: "Publications, printing or dissemination of any press statements, press conferences of public utterances by or on behalf of or in support of a proscribed organisation shall also be prohibited".

"The proscribed organisation shall submit all accounts of its income and expenditure for its political and social welfare activities and disclose all funding sources to the competent authority designated by the government. The provincial governments have been directed by the federal government to take immediate action. The Interior Ministry has also asked the provincial governments to furnish a report in this regard."

Of the five banned organisations, the TJP and the SSP are registered as political parties under the relevant Pakistani law and had been contesting elections. Registered political parties cannot be banned without the concurrence of the Supreme Court. The military junta got over this requirement under the pretext that since these two organisations had contested the 1997 elections under different names and had subsequently changed their names, they should have got themselves freshly registered as political parties, which they had not done.

The TJP had contested the 1997 elections as the Tehreek-e-Fiquah-e-Jafferia Pakistan and the SSP as the Anjuman-e-Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan. The TJP and the SSP came into existence after the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979. The TJP was formed at the instance of the Iranian Intelligence to protect the interests of the Shias and was funded by the latter. It extended its activities to the Shia majority areas of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and the Northern Areas--NA (Gilgit and Baltistan) and started a movement for constituting these Shia majority areas into a separate province of Pakistan to be called the Karakoram province.

In 1988, there was a violent uprising of the Shias in Gilgit, which was ruthlessly suppressed by Musharraf, who was given the task of dealing with the revolt by Zia-ul-Haq. Musharraf had a large number of Sunni Pashtun tribesmen from the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) led by Osama bin Laden brought into Gilgit. They carried out a massacre of the Shias in the NA as well as the adjoining NWFP areas. It is believed by many in Pakistan that the crash of the aircraft in which Zia was travelling from Bahawalpur in August 1988 resulting in his death was caused by a Shia airman from Gilgit sympathetic to the TJP in retaliation for this massacre.

To keep the Shias of Gilgit under control, Musharraf encouraged the the SSP, which had come into existence in the Punjab in the early 1980s at the instance of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), to extend its activities amongst the Sunni population of Gilgit and to politically organise them against the the TJP. Since then, there have frequently been clashes between the TJP and the SSP followers in Gilgit, the latest outbreak of such violent incidents having taken place in June, 2001, before Musharraf's visit to India for the summit talks with Mr.A.B.Vajpayee, the Indian Prime Minister.

The SSP, which, as stated above, originally came into existence in the Punjab province of Pakistan and spread from there to Sindh, was funded and used by the ISI and the Saudi intelligence for dealing with the Shias in Pakistan and for assisting the Sunni Balochis in the areas of Iran adjoining Pakistan's Balochistan province. The SSP acted in concert with the Iraqi-funded Mujahideen-e-Khalq in fomenting an anti-Teheran revolt amongst the Sunnis of Iran. The revolt was ultimately crushed by the Iranian authorities.

Towards the end of the 1980s, the SSP, much to the discomfiture of the ISI, started demanding that Pakistan should be proclaimed a Sunni Republic and the Shias declared non-Muslims. This led to violent clashes between the two organisations. The SSP and its militant wing called the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LEJ) carried out a massacre of the Shias in Punjab and Sindh. In Karachi, many Shia doctors and other intellectuals were massacred by the SSP. The SSP also carried out murderous attacks on Iranian nationals residing in Pakistan, including an Iranian diplomat in charge of the Iranian Cultural Centre in Lahore, and some Iranian military officers who had come to Pakistan for training.

To protect the Shias, the TJP formed its own militant wing called the Sipah Mohammad (SM).

In 1996, the ISI had used the trained cadres of the SSP from the Punjab and Sindh for helping the Taliban in the capture of Jalalabad and Kabul. Hundreds of SSP cadres took part in the successful Taliban assault on Kabul in September, 1996. The SSP became an important component of the Taliban and joined Osama bin Laden's International Islamic Front For Jehad Against the US and Israel in 1998. It was used by bin Laden and the Taliban for the massacre of the Shias (Hazaras) of Afghanistan.

Concerned over the uncontrollable anti-Shia activities of the SSP and the LEJ in Pakistani territory, Musharraf banned the LEJ and the SM under the Anti-Terrorism Act on August, 14, 2001, but, despite this, the LEJ has continued to be as active as before with the connivance of sympathetic officers of the military-intelligence establishment.

Hundreds of SSP cadres fought along with the Taliban in Mazar-e-Sharif, Kunduz and Kabul post-September 11, 2001, and suffered a large number of fatal casualties due to the US air strikes. The survivors have since returned to Pakistan and it is the fear of an anti-US and anti-Musharraf backlash from them which has led to the ban on the SSP.

The TJP or its SM have not indulged in major acts of terrorism. The TJP had refrained from participating in the post-September 11 anti-US demonstrations in Pakistan. But, Musharraf has banned it too lest a ban only on the Sunni organisations cause anger amongst the Sunnis, who constitute about 80 per cent of Pakistan's Muslim population. The USA views the TJP with suspicion because of its perceived proximity to the Iranian intelligence and would, therefore, have reasons to be gratified by the ban on it.

As a result of the policy of divide and rule followed by Musharraf and the ISI since he seized power in October, 1999, one saw for the first time in Pakistan sectarian terrorism inside the Sunni community itself between the Sunnis of the Deobandi faith belonging to the SSP and the LEJ and those of the Barelvi faith belonging to the Sunni Tehreek formed in the early 1990s to counter the growing Wahabi influence on Islam in Pakistan and the Almi Tanzeem Ahle Sunnat formed in 1998 by Pir Afzal Qadri of Mararian Sharif in Gujrat, Punjab, to counter the activities of the Deobandi Army of Islam headed by Gen. Mohammed Aziz, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee.

This led to frequent armed clashes between rival Sunni groups in Sindh, the most sensational of the incidents being the gunning down of Maulana Salim Qadri of the Sunni Tehreek in Karachi in May, 2001, by the SSP, which led to a major break-down of law and order in certain areas of Karachi for some days.

While banning the strongly Deobandi SSP, Musharraf has refrained from banning the strongly Barelvi Sunni Tehreek and the Tanzeem. The Deobandis became quite powerful under Zia, himself a devout Deobandi, but numerically they are in a minority in Pakistan's Sunni community. By sparing the Barelvi organisations, Musharraf has sought to ensure that the majority Barelvis would not create trouble for him.

The junta has till now applied the ban only to the activities of the five organisations in Sindh, Punjab, the NWFP and Balochistan and has not yet extended it to the Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK) and the NA, but Government spokesmen have been saying that it will be ultimately extended to those areas too.

The position in the NA is complicated by the fact that the 29-member Northern Areas Legislative Council includes ten legislators belonging to the TJP. Haji Fida Mohammad Noshad, the deputy Chief Executive of the Northern Areas, which is the top most post offered to the Council members by Islamabad, is also a member of the TJP though he contested the election independently and later joined the party. The Northern Areas Cabinet includes two TJP members--- Sheikh Haider and Imran Azeem.

The TNSM (Movement for the Implementation of Mohammad's Islamic Law. Official slogan: "Shariat or Shahadat"--Islamic law or martyrdom ) led by Mufti Sufi Mohammad is an exlusively Pashtun organisation of the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), consisting of the tribal areas adjoining the Peshawar, the Kohat, the Bannu and the Dera Ismail Khan districts and the tribal agencies of Bajaur, Orakzai, Mohmand, Khyber, Kurram, and North and South Waziristan.

The FATA, comprising the territories lying between the administered districts of the NWFP and the 'Durand Line', is spread over an area of 10,510 square miles with a population of a little over three million Pashtuns. It is known as Pakistan's Corsica or Wild West. According to the "Dawn" of Karachi, out of 16,988 registered proclaimed offenders in the NWFP, 99 percent have taken shelter in Darra Adam Khel, Orakzai, Kurram, and Khyber Agencies. It has some of the world's largest illegal arms manufacturing and smuggling groups and prosperous narcotics smugglers. The local population has more arms and ammunition than the population of any other Pakistani province or region.

Even though the FATA is supposed to be directly administered by the Federal Government in Islamabad, the local Mullahs and tribal leaders have effective control over the area and its people and had virtually talibanised it long before the Taliban made its appearance in Afghanistan in 1994.

The TNSM first made its appearance in the Malakand area in 1994, when, instigated by the ISI to have the Benazir Bhutto Government discredited, it staged an armed revolt in support of the enforcement of the Shariat. The ISI used it along with the SSP for assisting the Taliban in the capture of Jalalabad and Kabul in September 1996.

Since then, the TNSM, with the ISI's blessings, had established a close working relationship with the Taliban and the Al Qaeda. Nearly 2,000 of its armed cadres are reported to have been killed by the US air strikes in Afghanistan. It is widely believed in Pakistan that despite the detention of Sufi Mohammad by the junta since November, 2001, his followers in the FATA have given shelter and protection to the surviving leaders of the Taliban and the Al Qaeda, including, according to some, bin Laden himself and his family.

Embarrassed by these reports, Musharraf has found himself constrained to ban this orgasnisation too, but there are as yet no reports of any vigorous action by the military-intelligence establishment to smoke out the Taliban and the Al Qaeda leaders.

There were four Pakistani organisations in the Army of Islam of the Afghan war vintage, which the ISI had diverted from Afghanistan to Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) from 1993 onwards---the JEM, the LET, the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen HUM) and the Al Badr. Of these, the first two have been very open in their anti-India activities in Pakistani territory, make no secret of their terrorist activities in J&K and have been indulging in acts of terrorism outside J&K too as was demonstrated by their attack on the Indian Parliament in New Delhi on December 13, 2001.

As against this, the HUM and the Al Badr maintain a comparatively low profile in Pakistan and have in recent months kept their acts of terrorism confined to J&K. While banning the JEM and the LET, Musharraf has refrained from banning the HUM and the Al Badr, thereby indicating that he wants to act only against acts of terrorism in other parts of India and not in J & K.

Moreover, he has attributed the ban on these two organisations to their terrorist activities inside Pakistan and not inside India. The JEM was suspected in the assassination of Moinuddin Haider's brother in Karachi in December, 2001. Apart from this, it was not involved in acts of terrorism in Pakistani territory. However, it is perceived to be anti-Shia and has had a history of links with the SSP. In fact, its leader, Maulana Masood Azhar, started his career as a terrorist under Azam Tariq, the dreaded head of the SSP.

The LET has had no history of acts of terrorism in Pakistan. All its terrorist attacks have been directed against Indian nationals and interests in Indian territory. So far, 1,957 persons belonging to the five banned organisations have been detained and 615 of their offices sealed. Of them, 735 were detained and 336 offices sealed in Punjab; 852 arrested and 180 offices closed in Sindh; 337 detained and 81 offices shut in NWFP; 15 arrested and an equal number of offices sealed in Balochistan; and 18 persons arrested and 3 offices closed in Islamabad.

There has been no action against their leadership, members and infrastructure in the FATA, the POK and the NA. The majority of those arrested belong to the political and administrative cadres of these organisations. There have been practically no arrests of their trained terrorists. They (estimated 5,000) are reported to have either escaped to the FATA, the POK and the NA or gone underground in other parts of Pakistan.

The follow-up action so far has belied expectations that at least this time the junta would give evidence of real sincerity.

(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, and, presently, Director,Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-Mail: [email protected] )
 

ajtr

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Shia killings in Pakistan

Kindly sign the below mentioned petition to show solidarity with the oppressed momineen of Pakistan. Though some one could think this would be useless but still a platform where you can raise your voice atleast. http://www.petitiononline.com/ShiaSOS/petition.html ......................... An account of recent Shia killings in Pakistan (from 1 Jan to 20 Feb 2009) Note: This is only a brief glimpse of systematic and continuous killings of Shia in Pakistan in the last few weeks. For a detailed account of the Shia genocide in the last many years in Pakistan, visit: http://www.shaheedfoundation.org/home.asp 1. On 20 February 2009, a suicide bomber killed at least 32 Shias and injured another 157 who were attending the funeral of an already murdered Shia leader in the southern district of D.I. Khan (Dera Ismail Khan) in the NWFP. Previously on 21 November 2008, 6 Shia were killed and 25 more received severe injuries when a powerful bomb ripped through the funeral procession of a slain Shia leader who was shot the previous night. 2. On 19 February 2009, six Shia were killed in Parachinar when Taliban terrorists opened indiscriminate fire on them at mid-day. They had gone to collect wood from local forest. It may be noted that the Shia are under siege in Parachinar for the past many years. The massacres of hundreds of Shias in Kurram Agency in 2007 and 2008 saw regular trickles of Shias migration. (Over the years, cities like Thal, Hangu and Kohat have developed significant pockets of migrant Shia population. All this area is also the target of the Afghan refugees who have leaked out of the Afghan refugee camps and don't plan on going home because becoming a part of the Al Qaeda fighting machine is more lucrative. They take the identity of Taliban and do a lot of Shia-killing on the side. An informally named ghetto, Shiagarh, is an obvious target, located just 10 miles from Kohat going to the city of Hangu.) 3. On 19 February 2009, a Shia man, Qurban Ali, was killed and another Sabir sustained injuries when terrorists opened fire on their van in the Gilgit area. 4. On 10 February 2009, Mualana Syed Shabeer Hussain Shah was killed near Qureshi Maur; he was a prayer leader at Masjid-e-Kotla-Qaim Shah in D.I. Khan. He was 45 years old. 5. On 9 February 2009, Sardar Ali Baba, 45, was killed in Peshawar. He was the bread-winner of the family and used to run medicines' business. He is survived by four mourning children. 6. On 5 February 2009, at least 35 Shia were killed and more than 50 injured in a suicide attack on a Shia gathering in D.G. Khan. 7. On 3 February 2009, Syed Iqbal Haider Zaidi was killed when terrorists attacked him near Dabal Road, Quetta. He worked in a Wood factory to earn livelihood. 8. On 2 February 2009, Syed Munawar Kazmi of Shia Dialogue Committee was shot in D.I. Khan. 9. On 27 January 2009, Syed Ather Shah was killed by terrorists on Dial Road outside of his home in D.I.. Khan. Syed aged 40 years was the caretaker of Imambargah Faqir Shah Muhallah Totaan Walla. Previously on 18 January, another Shia, Ali Abbas was killed in the same city. 10. On 26 January 2009, Hussain Ali Yousufi president of Hazara Democratic Party was killed in firing by terrorist in today morning at Jinnah Road Quetta. The killing of Shia notables in Quetta, particularly those belonging to Hazara community, has sadly become a frequent occurrence. Some of the killings have been owned by Lashkar-e-Jhangavi, a sister organization of Pakistani Taliban. The number of the Shia community members killed there over the recent years has exceeded 300. Besides religious figures, liberal politicians, businessmen and government officials have been targeted. 11. On 14 January 2009, 3 Shia Police officials named DSP Hassan Ali, Mohammad Baqir and Sifwatullah were killed in Quetta, four were injured. They were going to Police Training Centre Quetta at Saryab Road at 10: 30 AM (PST) when terrorists sprayed fires upon them. All killed and two of injured belong from Shia Community. Four days ago president of Shia Conference was also targeted in Sibi (Baluchistan). On 8th June 2003 12 Shia cadets were also killed on Sariab Road Quetta. 12. On January 2009 in Hangu,17 Shia Muslims were killed and more than 35 injured. Taliban terrorists attacked with heavy weapons on Shia populated areas of Hungo City like; Ali Abad town, Muhallah Ganjanokalay, Muhallah Sangerh and Muhallah Paskaley. 13. On 10 Jan 2009, 4 Shia were killed and another 10 are injured when Taliban attacked the Shia converged for Ashura Procession in Hangu. Note: The world at large has paid little attention to the plight of Shia Muslims in Pakistan. The number of Shias killed in Pakistan in the last one year alone is much larger than the total number of Palestinians killed in the recent Gaza war. Yet, there is little international attention to the plight of Pakistani Shias.
 

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