Very Thought Provoking and Eye Opening Post courtesy BR Forums Rudradev - Super analysis BTW !
Some dots (data points) to connect here. As always, I proffer the disclaimer that data points can be interlinked in any number of ways, potentially yielding a great diversity of patterns; my own preferred algorithm for connecting them, and the particular pattern generated, reflect the limitations of my personal knowledge, experience and reasoning capacity. Still, here goes.
I believe that the GOI's assessments and working assumptions regarding India's border security (and wider national security as well) have undergone a dramatic shift, sometime around June or July of 2013. This shift has not yet produced any discernible change in the GOI's response to border provocations (or lack thereof) between January-April 2013 and the present; yet, I believe it exists, and has profoundly impacted strategic thinking (or lack thereof) in New Delhi.
Why?
Well, let's see.
In January 2013, we had a situation where the US was gearing up to abandon Afghanistan, and badly needed the good graces of Pakistan to cover its exit rather than humiliate it with a widely-broadcast kicking on the way out. This US position has only solidified as John Kerry took over as Secretary of State. Under Hillary Clinton, the State Dept was not shy about speaking frankly on the subject of Pakistan's double-game, even if the overall policy still tended to be one of appeasing Pakistan at all costs... there was at least the appearance of sticks in addition to carrots. Now there is only GUBO, and it is Unkil who is quietly bending over.
Accordingly, in the early part of 2013, we saw a few actions on India's borders which amounted to clear attempts by our enemies to test the waters. In this Phase I of testing the waters, we first saw the beheading of L/NK Hemraj Singh by the SSG at the LOC. While the GOI came up with platitudes about how "it can no longer be business as usual with Pakistan", the following weeks and months made it clear that inaction (and uninterruptible dialogue) were still the only responses New Delhi was willing to offer.
Now we can assume that New Delhi's response to the beheading was governed by a specific Set of Assumptions (let us call this Set A). The assumptions of Set A include:
Quote:
1) We should not attack Pakistan overtly, because this will provide a platform to unite the various centrifugal groups fighting each other in Pakistan, and may affect the forthcoming Pakistan general elections in a way inimical to Indian interests.
2) Keeping the US happy will present rewards.
3) Related assumption to (2)... the US will prevent the Pakis from going too far with provocations, so it is better to simply ride out whatever comes. Assaults on Internal Security in the rest of India, such as by Indian Mujahedin, can be explained away as arising from Hindu Terror; use this valve to confuse public opinion and avoid taking actions that would inconvenience the US.
4) Related assumption to (2)... the US sees India as a desirable counterweight to China. The US will not allow China to attack or humiliate India.
Unfortunately for the GOI, the Chinese incursion into Depsang in April 2012 was crucially damaging to this set of assumptions. India capitulated pathetically, agreeing to destroy our own fortifications deep within our own territory, and to restrict the ambit of the Indian Army to patrol within our own land.
This, of course, completely did away with Set A Assumption 4. It also strengthened a growing international perception that had ensued from the GOI's non-response to the beheading of L/NK Hemraj Singh: that the Indian Army was incapable of mounting any sort of effective response to cross-border provocation, either because it lacked the readiness and capacity to do so, or because it was being politically undermined to the point of paralysis as a national institution, or both.
The GOI did not take any action to correct this perception, of course. Meanwhile, it continued to formulate policy based on the remaining three Assumptions of Set A.
Quote:
1) We should not attack Pakistan overtly, because this will provide a platform to unite the various centrifugal groups fighting each other in Pakistan, and may affect the forthcoming Pakistan general elections in a way inimical to Indian interests.
2) Keeping the US happy will present rewards.
3) Related assumption to (2)... the US will prevent the Pakis from going too far with provocations, so it is better to simply ride out whatever comes. Assaults on Internal Security in the rest of India, such as by Indian Mujahedin, can be explained away as arising from Hindu Terror; use this valve to confuse public opinion and avoid taking actions that would inconvenience the US.
Now in the months of May, June and July, some critical events took place.
Firstly, general elections in Pakistan resulted in a victory for the PML(N), throwing up a civilian leadership under Nawaz Sharif, whose deep connections with the ISI and ties to jihadi tanzeems have been well established since 1999. In so doing, these elections abolished even the fiction that perhaps some meaningful steps towards peace had been made through engagement with the previous PPP civilian government, and that the GOI could capitalize on these steps by continuing its policy of inaction and infinite tolerance for Pakistani terrorism.
Secondly, in July, John Kerry visited India in his capacity as US Secretary of State.
We have no idea what the message was that Kerry brought to New Delhi (other than the usual platitudes about "growing strategic partnership" that were widely reported in the media.) However, my contention is that Kerry's message catastrophically changed the GOI's Set A of Assumptions into something very different. This is indicated by a few circumstantial, but distinct clues amongst the events that followed.
i) Joe Biden visited India shortly after Kerry, and was received with a remarkable degree of frostiness. The visit was so unattended, unreported and otherwise downplayed by Indian media that I would never have noticed it at all, except for some sparse mentions on Twitter. Was there even one televised press conference of Biden with any GOI official? Contrast this to the visit of Obama, who was treated like a rock star (the Indian media was buzzing and blustering about his sojourn for months before and a good while after it occurred). Biden is, after all, the second-highest office holder in the US after Obama. However, even John Kerry's own visit, at least initially, attracted more attention than Biden's.
This suggests to me that the GOI were very much angered, and felt highly betrayed, by whatever Kerry had told them on his visit, shortly preceding Biden's. The message from Kerry must have completely demolished whatever remained of Assumption Set A that I've outlined above.
ii) A second clue emerges from the fact that, shortly after the PML(N) victory in the May elections, the Chinese perpetrated a fresh border incursion in June that was strongly played down by the GOI. Moreover, after the Kerry visit, the Chinese have followed up with a whole series of incursions, each more aggressive than the last, throughout the months of July and August.
This in itself does not directly support the hypothesis that John Kerry demolished the GOI's Set A of working Assumptions during his visit; however, the GOI's response to the fresh onslaught of Chinese incursions, i.e. continued inaction and capitulation, provides some indication of the new Set B of Assumptions that they are currently left with.
iii) Finally, the 6th Aug incursion by Pakistan resulting in the deaths of five Soldiers from 21st Bihar and Maratha LI... and the ongoing non-response to this incursion as well... make it even more obvious that the GOI is foundering based on a new Set B of Assumptions, so radically different from Set A that it has no idea how to compensate in terms of policymaking.
The Ek Crore Ka Sawaal, for me, is: what did John Kerry tell the GOI in July that has so radically altered their working assumptions as to produce complete policy paralysis?
I will take a stab at guessing what the Assumptions of Set B are comprised of. This is admittedly the product of guesstimation, so if anyone here has any better ideas, please contribute them.
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1) With the election of Nawaz Sharif in Pakistan, the idea that there is only violent dissonance between different factions within Pakistan no longer holds good. There are still many warring factions; however, there is far greater alignment than before, between the Pakistan Army, ISI, Civilian Government and Jihadi Tanzeems in terms of formulating an active strategy to re-ignite the Kashmir jihad.
2) India is on its own. It cannot rely on the US for anything. The US will not back India against China, and the US washes its hands of any commitment to pressure Pakistan against ratcheting up border tensions with India.
3) Worse yet, the US will openly support Pakistan, diplomatically and militarily, if India undertakes any retaliatory action against Pakistan that would hamper the US' exit strategy from Afghanistan. Meanwhile, the US is resigned to Afghanistan falling back into the hands of the Taliban, and plans to engage with the forthcoming Taliban regime in Kabul, Indian interests be damned.
The result of being faced with this new Set B of Assumptions, radically and shockingly different from Set A, has made a fundamental difference to the GOI's policy-making apparatus. From where we sit, as observers from the ranks of common citizenry, the difference is not apparent: there was inaction and capitulation before, and there is more inaction and capitulation now.
However, I believe that earlier (January-April 2013), the GOI had willingly formulated a strategy of non-response to Pakistani provocation, and "tactical withdrawal" before Chinese incursions, based on the Assumptions of Set A. New Delhi believed that its measures provided for a superior long-term solution given the Set A Assumptions, or at least could try and justify them in this way.
Given the sudden shift in Assumptions to Set B, however, the GOI has found the floor falling away beneath its very feet. It is now a deer in the headlights, or more appropriately a headless chicken... it's "head", i.e. reliance on the US as an honest broker and reliable strategic partner, has been chopped off. Dependence on the US' best intentions was the entire basis of the Set A Assumptions; having been disabused of this notion, the GOI finds itself in complete and total paralysis. This is being exposed in many ways: most notably the open censorship, reversal and flip-flopping evident in AK Anthony's statements, and the easily discernible panic behind the blustery comments that GOI officials (such as Salman Khurshid, JP Chacko and Rajiv Gowda) have taken to making before the media in the last few days. They have completely abandoned their well-coached poise, and start off by shouting defensively about Kargil and IC 814 at the very beginning of interviews.
The helpless, paralyzing fear in these people is so obvious and tangible that you can taste it. What they are afflicted with is no mere crisis of governance, but a total and complete collapse in their ability to enact foreign policy or maintain national security. Meanwhile, the Chinese, Pakistanis and Americans have tasted our fear as well. We have much, much worse in store for us than we've had to face thus far.
