Estimation of Indian Nuclear Arsenal.- Present and Future

olivers

Regular Member
Joined
Mar 25, 2010
Messages
123
Likes
93
This is 2011. He says, enrichment is not the largest in the world. But Chitradurga will be substantial. Google images is about RMP construction. He hasn't confirmed or denied that expansion! So yes our civil industrial capacity is very good. He confirms why we need ENR. We want civil ENR for the foreign plants.

He also says our reprocessing is industrial scale! Hmmz, I wonder what gives. I think it's all about money. Chitradurga being brought up is expensive. Doing that for all our civil plants will indeed be very expensive. If we can tie new nuclear reactors to them setting up ENR it will be cheaper. Plus if we spend all the money and ENR is civil only as it will have to be for future expansion that's money time and materials wasted which we can use for the military program.
(If we keep too many facilities are military as we invest in them, the rest of the world will go crazy on the number of our weapons.)

'Enrichment capacity enough to fuel nuke subs'
New Delhi: Dr Srikumar Banerjee, chairman of Atomic Energy Commission of India (AECI), spoke to Saurav Jha, author of The Upside Down Book of Nuclear Power, recently at the former's South Bloc office on a gamut of issues concerning the state of nuclear power development in India.

Saurav Jha:Is your current enrichment capability sufficient to fuel India's emerging nuclear submarine fleet or will that be attained only with Chitradurga? If not then will Chitradurga be used only for civilian power reactors?

Dr Srikumar Banerjee: Our existing site is more than adequate for feeding the fleet. And this fleet is of course more than one.


As far as the new facility in Chitradurga is concerned, it will not be a safeguarded facility. We are keeping the option open of using it for multiple roles.

Chitradurga could of course be used to produce slightly enriched uranium (SEU) with about 1.1 per cent U-235 content to fuel our pressurized heavy water reactor (PHWR) units which would boost the fuel burn-up to as much as 20000 MWd/tonne.

Saurav Jha:That is almost half of what new generation light water reactor technology is achieving and quite impressive.

Dr Srikumar Banerjee: Yes.

Saurav Jha:Will Chitradurga also be used to create enriched uranium for powering DAE's own indigenous 700 MWe Light Water Reactor(LWR) design which it plans to roll out by 2020?

Dr Srikumar Banerjee: Yes, that option is always there.

Saurav Jha:Has this indigenous design grown out of the work DAE has done for India's nuclear submarine project?

Dr Srikumar Banerjee: Well a lot of work has been put into developing the 700 MWe LWR. In any case you would note that pressurised water reactor designs worldwide have essentially grown out of naval propulsion units.

Saurav Jha:Were you surprised by the recent amendment at the Nuclear Supplier's Group that debars members from transferring enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) technologies to non-NPT members and thereby India?

Dr Srikumar Banerjee: We did have an inkling that 'full civil nuclear cooperation' wouldn't really be forthcoming from all NSG members despite the atmospherics. Statements have been made from the major nuclear supplier countries that the recent NSG resolution will not affect their commitments made earlier. Take for instance, the Americans – It was never really that clear that their cooperation with us would genuinely extend to the ENR sphere. In the case of the French however, there had been statements indicating that it probably will. As far as the Russians are concerned there are some things that need to be ironed out, but they will be in all likelihood.

Now I must state categorically that reprocessing is fundamental to our closed fuel cycle philosophy which involves reprocessing of spent fuel and waste management. In the case of imported fuel, we have of course agreed to keep under safeguards and reprocess in separate dedicated facilities. We see no reason why we should be embargoed in sourcing equipment for those new safeguarded facilities. And that is the crux of the matter, it isn't so much that we need access to ENR technologies – we have developed our own- it is that when we set up additional facilities to address safeguard requirements we shouldn't be unnecessarily debarred from importing equipment and forced to rely only on domestic sources when we are addressing international norms, quite in keeping with our impeccable record on such matters.

Saurav Jha:So that brings us to our next question. Have our ENR technologies matured enough to be regarded as commercial grade?

Dr Srikumar Banerjee: Well in the case of reprocessing, certainly. We may yet not be setting up reprocessing plants as big as Rokkasho in Japan or Sellafield in UK but the new reprocessing facilities that are slated to come up in the next decade or so are going to be appreciably bigger than what we have now. Even the one that is nearing completion in Kalpakkam is a fairly large facility.

The planned integrated nuclear recycle plant for instance will be handling close to 500 tonne/year of heavy metal and will be sited at Tarapur which is in one of our existing sites. During the next plan period we will look at two more such facilities.

Talking about enrichment, we are quite happy with the progress we are making and with the new Chitradurga facility we are closing in on what you could refer to as industrial level capability. Again, this won't be as big as the largest out there but it would be substantial.

Saurav Jha:Will the new BARC campus in Vishakapatnam be focused only on civilian research and will it also have enrichment facilities? Will it be larger than BARC, Trombay?

Dr Srikumar Banerjee: To answer the second part of your question – it will be engaged in enrichment research and not in commercial grade enrichment activities. Like Trombay, it will also be a mixed facility looking at both strategic and civilian research.

To be clear, we want all our facilities to have a certain intellectual orientation and that would mean that we will simply not be looking only at product development either for military or civilian purposes. As always the intention is to foster cutting edge innovation. And you can gauge that from some of the new areas that Vishakapatnam will focus on which goes beyond the straightjacket of 'delivery of a certain number of products'.

Vishakapatnam will therefore take up research in new areas such as concentrated solar thermal power, cutting edge energy conversion techniques, energy storage, biological systems and hydrogen based technologies. The aim is to raise the technological and research capability across the entire spectrum of energy research in India.

All this will of course be accommodated in a larger campus than what we have Trombay. The new campus is spread out over a 3 X 3.5 km area which I think is fairly large.

Saurav Jha:What are some of the new research reactors planned at the new campus?

Dr Srikumar Banerjee: The need for a reactor dedicated to materials testing has been felt for sometime now. In the past we have used power reactors for experiments related to this field but it is now time that we set up a dedicated reactor for this purpose. As such the new campus will host a new multipurpose high flux reactor which besides material testing will also be used for radioisotope production. This reactor will see start of construction during the forthcoming plan period.

In 2017-18 timeframe a new research reactor like Dhruva (which is at Trombay) will also come up at the new campus.

Saurav Jha:Talking about new developmental reactors, what is the status of the AHWR and when will we actually see start of construction?

Dr Srikumar Banerjee: Well, we have had site selection difficulties with the AHWR. Design and development has actually been done. It's just a matter of finding the right site. To give you an idea of the difficulties, even Vishakapatnam is seeing the creation of a new SEZ right next to where a possible site could have been "¦. At the moment it seems we'll have to settle for one of our existing sites. The matter is still in process.

As far as actual start of construction – It'll happen sometime in this decade.

Saurav Jha:Alright, despite the delays in starting the build the AHWR, would you still say that India is a global leader in thorium research?

Oh Absolutely. There is no doubt in my mind that we are indeed a leader in thorium research worldwide.

Saurav Jha:Coming to the second stage of our programme, what is the status of the Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR) and when can we expect to see fuel loading?

Dr Srikumar Banerjee: You'll be happy to know that work on the PFBR is progressing steadily. Physical progress is now at 82 per cent and I am confident that construction will be complete by mid-2012. But of course, commissioning a reactor is a very different game than building one. There are a number of tests that need to be run and experiments carried out. Nevertheless, I am confident that fuel loading will take place at the desired time post completion.

And I must point out, that the PFBR is one of its kind at the moment. I mean, apart from the Russians nobody at the moment operates a commercial grade Fast-breeder and nor is constructing one.

I would just like to add, that materials testing is an area where we can help the thermal power generation sector immensely. The new ultra-supercritical coal based plants need to operate at 750 degrees to achieve over 40 percent efficiency that they are designed for. This, of course, requires special steels and alloys all of which can be made better, via the kind of research being carried out at IGCAR.

Saurav Jha:This is actually an area where we are ahead of the Chinese, isn't it?

Yes that is correct. They only recently commissioned a test reactor while we have had one for decades now.

Saurav Jha:In the area of nuclear waste disposal, have we already identified a geologic deposit? Will international collaboration be sought in this area?

Dr Srikumar Banerjee: At the moment we are setting up underground laboratories to study various facets of effectively burying waste such as percolation, diffusion etc. We have also begun aerial surveys for locating stable rock formations that could serve as geological deposits in the future.

International collaboration in this area is always a possibility and is actually easier to secure. We will of course be open to developing new technology in this area. The French for instance are saying that it may be possible to actually bury waste even in clay. So there are possibilities at this stage.
 

olivers

Regular Member
Joined
Mar 25, 2010
Messages
123
Likes
93
This is 2010: He tails off on the set of: part .... It's more than 4 submarines. I wonder how many more ... Also he confirms the 2010 expansion. 2011 expansion of RMP caught on google satellite images is what I based the new estimates on. It's industrial military in RMP. Chitradurga is commercial with possible use for military if the requirement arises. It's also interesting how he uses the phrase, "We have not started doing it for large-scale commercial nuclear power stations, which require a much larger quantity of enriched uranium." i.e. we are doing it for the military where the enrichment is much much higher. Also industrial scale at RMP. We have not moved to tonnes of low enriched uranium which will happen in Chitradurga for power plants. It's a nice twist on industrial. It's industrial when the supply chain processes tonnes of fuel as opposed to SWU/yr based industrial capacity.

The Hindu : Opinion / Op-Ed : ‘In the event of a nuclear incident, victims must get prompt compensation'

It is a year since India's nuclear-powered submarine, Arihant, was launched. Has the Light Water Reactor (LWR), using enriched uranium as fuel, on board the submarine been started up?

Our nuclear steam supply system is ready 100 per cent. From our (DAE) side, everything is ready. We are only waiting for other systems to become operational so that we can start the commissioning activity of the reactor. I really do not know when the harbour trials will be done.

The Navy will need three or four nuclear-powered submarines for this arm to be a viable force. Will you build more LWRs for these submarines?

We are already doing that. I will not be able to tell you the number, but it is a fact that we are in that game. The next nuclear steam generating plants are getting ready for future applications.

Where will the enriched uranium for these boats come from? There is only one Rare Materials Plant at Ratnahalli, near Mysore, to produce enriched uranium. Will the proposed Special Material Enrichment Facility in Chitradurga district in Karnataka be helpful?

Chitradurga will come a little later, not immediately. Our Ratnahalli plant capacity has been enhanced. But more than that, there is significant improvement in our technology. Usually, a term called Separating Work Units (SWUs) defines the technology level that we have achieved in this, and I can assure you that there has been considerable improvement in SWUs of our next generation caskets of centrifuges. The separating capacity of our centrifuges has improved. So total capacity enhancement at Ratnahalli has been done. We are confident of supplying the entire fuel for the set of"¦.

You cannot say anymore that India does not have enrichment technology. India has its own technology and we can produce [enriched uranium]. We have not started doing it for large-scale commercial nuclear power stations, which require a much larger quantity of enriched uranium. We will be able to do that once we go to Chitradurga.
 
Last edited:

olivers

Regular Member
Joined
Mar 25, 2010
Messages
123
Likes
93
Olivers,

Thanks for the informative posts.

Could you give a relationship, or for that matter, a plot, showing how SWU relates to enrichment percentage?
There is a formula for SWU to enrichment % on wikipedia. It's a mess to use. Please use the figures from this article instead. It's rough calculations. It's good enough.

Rough estimates on Iran's planned centrifuge enrichment activities

Kilograms, pounds, and long tons

1 kg = 2.2. lbs
1000 kg = 2,200 lbs = a long ton

Number of kgs of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) required to make a nominal 20 kiloton-yield weapon

5 kilograms if there is no wastage and you have a high technology
weapons design

20 kilograms if you have large amount of wastage and a very
low-technology weapons design

Rough Number of Separative Work Units (SWUs) required for a variety of nuclear tasks

Approximate number of SWUs needed to make 1 kg of HEU = 200

Approximate number of SWUs needed to make a 20-kg HEU bomb = 4,000 SWUs

Estimated SWU performance of Iranian designed (aka. North Korean and possibly Pakistani modified aluminum) centrifuges

Reported number of Pakistani centrifuges required to make 100 kgs.
HEU/year = 3,000

Number of SWUs needed to produce 100 kgs. of HEU = 20,000 (i.e., 200 swus x 100 kgs of HEU)

SWUs/year/number of Pakistani-type centrifuges = 6.7 SWUs

Adjusted SWU performance accounting for Iranian aluminum vice steel centrifuge design = 2-4 SWUs

Estimated SWU/Iranian-designed centrifuge requirements to maintain the fueling of a two one-gigawatt Light Water Reactor (i.e., Iran's projected enrichement requirements)

Approximate annual fuel reload requirement for a 1-gigawatt LWR = 20,000 kgs of 3.5 % low enrichment uranium

Approximate SWUs needed to meet this requirement = 80,000 SWUs

SWUs needed to meet this annual requirement for two one-gigawatt LWRs = 160,000 SWUs

Approximate number of Iranian-type centrifuges needed to meet this
requirement = ~ 50,000

Centrifuge and related bomb making capacity of planned Iranian centrifuge facilities

Iran has floor space for at least 50,000 centrifuges and it claims it intends to make this many machines. 50,000 centrifuges are needed to produce 160,000 SWU,-- i.e., enough to meet the annual fuel requirements for two 1,000 MWe LWR reactors.

Possible kgs of HEU/yr from 50,000 Iranian-type centrifuges = 160,000 SWU

Divided by 200 SWU per kg HEU = 800 kgs HEU or 40 bombs' worth assuming 20 kgs of HEU per bomb.

Enrichment requirements for making a large number of bombs starting with low enrichment uranium as feed for the HEU line

To give an idea of how much better one can do starting with LEU as feed consider the following: To make 20 kg of HEU (90%) starting with natural uranium takes about 20x200 = 4,000 SWU. But starting with 3.5% LEU it can take only a little over 700 SWU if you "skim the cream"--reject the tails at an assay of 2%. In other words, in terms of separative work, the 3.5% material is already most of the way to 90%. The 700 SWUs entail using about 200 Iranian -type centrifuges. This small cascade of machines would take a feed of a little over a ton of the LEU. In this way, by diverting the LEU from two LWR reload of 20 tons-for a total of 40 tons-you could produce nearly 40 bomb quantities of HEU with an input of a little over 40x700 SWU, or about 30,000 SWU, which is a lot less than the 160,000 that it takes starting with natural uranium.
 

pmaitra

Senior Member
Joined
Mar 10, 2009
Messages
33,262
Likes
19,594
Ok, so let's say we are using UF[SUB]6[/SUB] fluid and passing them trough the cascade of centrifuges. One we have 2% 'cream' and the rest 98% 'milk,' do we not recycle that 'milk' back into the first centrifuge of the cascade again?

This way, the enrichment level of the starting fluid concentration will look like a constant + negative exponential curve, or roughly a Taylor series curve, and as a result of that, we will be able to skim slightly more than 2% of the cream once enough recycling has been done? Correct me if my understanding is wrong.
 

olivers

Regular Member
Joined
Mar 25, 2010
Messages
123
Likes
93
Ok, so let's say we are using UF[SUB]4[/SUB] fluid and passing them trough the cascade of centrifuges. One we have 2% 'cream' and the rest 98% 'milk,' do we not recycle that 'milk' back into the first centrifuge of the cascade again?

This way, the enrichment level of the starting fluid concentration will look like a constant + negative exponential curve, or roughly a Taylor series curve, and as a result of that, we will be able to skim slightly more than 2% of the cream once enough recycling has been done? Correct me if my understanding is wrong.
The centrifuges are in cascade. The central higher enriched uranium is fed to higher cascade. The lower "milk" is fed to lower cascade. The lower cascade will also pump in higher for that lower cascade into it's higher level cascade and accept the lower "mlik" into it's cascade for recycling. This goes on until there is very little U-235 maal left in the lowest cascade.This milk is now butter milk. Discarded. Depleted stream. The higher U-235 rich gas keeps moving up the cascade chain.

Your feed is Natural Uranium your waste is depleted Uranium. How much U-235 do you want to leave in depleted uranium? 0.2%? 0.3% or 0.4%? What is you NU feed stock U-235? 0.5 to 0.8% in NU? If you want to enrich U-235 from 0.6 to 5% and feed out .4% uranium your SWU will be less than if you want depleted uranium going out at 0.2%. If NU is cheap you discard more at the depleted end and save SWU as enrichment capacity is less or it's expensive like our 1st generation enrichment units.

Depleted 0.2% U-235 requires more SWU than 0.3% U-235 depleted.But 0.2% U-235 depleted will require less feed NU than 0.3% U-235 depleted tail out.

On the curve, If one axis is U-235% in higher cascades and the other axis is SWU, then yes we will see an the negative exponential curve with an initial constant. If we start with higher % of U-235 we will move up faster. However we don't have the luxury of starting with LEU. We don't divert nuclear maal. We start from NU.

I am not sure what you mean by more than 2% part. We decide the depleted uranium output % and this determines the SWU required. It's our calculation based on cost/time. Objective and availability of NU or lack thereof.


iran's nuclear facilities and uranium enrichment program has nice videos on this process.
 
Last edited:

pmaitra

Senior Member
Joined
Mar 10, 2009
Messages
33,262
Likes
19,594
I have corrected my error. It should be UF[SUB]6[/SUB].
 

pmaitra

Senior Member
Joined
Mar 10, 2009
Messages
33,262
Likes
19,594
Olivers,

If you see the cascade, at the end of the entire cycle, you'll have a lot of depleted UF[SUB]6[/SUB], but it will still have some U[SUP]235[/SUP] left in it, at a lower %. My question is, can we not recycle this depleted UF[SUB]6[/SUB] through a further cascade, to extract as much as of those few remaining UF[SUB]6[/SUB] with U[SUP]235[/SUP]?

In theory, I don't see why not. Will it be feasible?
 

olivers

Regular Member
Joined
Mar 25, 2010
Messages
123
Likes
93
Olivers,

If you see the cascade, at the end of the entire cycle, you'll have a lot of depleted UF[SUB]6[/SUB], but it will still have some U[SUP]235[/SUP] left in it, at a lower %. My question is, can we not recycle this depleted UF[SUB]6[/SUB] through a further cascade, to extract as much as of those few remaining UF[SUB]6[/SUB] with U[SUP]235[/SUP]?

In theory, I don't see why not. Will it be feasible?
I answered this question a well. It depends on how costly your SWU/yr is. You need a lot of electricity to run your cascades. If you don't have enough NU then you might want to extract as much as possible when you send it out of the tail end.

The longer you run the cascades for the higher your enrichment will be at the higher cascade. The lower cascade on the other hand will keep going lower and lower to 0.3% depleted, 0.2% depleted and so on. 0.197% depleted etc. For every thing beyond 0.2% depleted the energy required to remove the uranium 235 out of this 0.2% depleted will keep increasing. If you have enough cheap NU it's not economical to use your enrichment plant to extract more from this depleted uranium at 0.2%.

Now even if we transfer 0.2% U-235 Uranium to a different cascade with only this material in it. Nothing change. You still have to expend the same energy as in the earlier cascade to extract uranium 235 out of the mixture. Why? At 0.2% U-235 there is very little U-235 to be separated out and you need to run your centrifuges for hours to extract the same amount.

So it's a function of economics on how much the tail out should be. The factors being the cost of NU, availability of NU, the % of U-235 in NU, the cost of electricity used in the centrifuges, the cost of the centrifuges, the number of SWU's available as a whole in your country for your enrichment, the mean time between failure of your centrifuges and also any timeline for your enriched uranium. Last but not the least is it for civilian power generation or stratergic program.

I will explain a couple of the factors. I will trust the rest will follow from this exposition.
Timeline for enriched uranium. Your nuclear submarines need let's say 50 tons of HEU. I have no idea what the real figures are. You can look it up. If you have 3 of these and each of them needs to be brought into operational mode in 3 years as construction proceeds you need 50 tons of HEU every 3 years for the commissioning. If you need a reload of HEU every 10 years, at the end of 9 years you will need to produce 150 tons and at the end of the 13 years you will need 200 tons and so on. This is of course assuming you don't induct more submarines after the initial three. Now if I need to produce 50 tons in 3 year then knowing all the other factors my tail out will be decided based on this fixed factor 150 tons in 3 years. The tail out maybe 0.2% or 0.1% Depleted uranium.

Now let's take another example. I am under attack or likely to be in a year or so. I want to move from 100 nuclear devices to 200 devices. It might make more sense for me to keep my tail outs very high at 0.4% depleted and store it for later while I use new NU at 0.7% to get the enrichment going faster. As the depleted uranium percentage goes lower I need to spend more time and energy to get out u-235. So it's an asymptotic. It's harder to score 100 compared to 99. Going from 50% to 90% is relatively easy. But getting 95% is exponentially harder.

So it's really what you want. What is economical. New NU at 0.7% available cheaply ? Do you have 500,000 cascades ? Do you power available cheaply? Do you plan to make only bombs/ power submarines? Do you plan to use it for civil power generation?

If it's bombs only other factors may take a backseat. If there is a crunch on NU your tail out % will decrease.If on the other hand you want to produce electricity you should consume less electricity than the electricity your reactor produces by a large enough factor to keep the cost of electricity from the reactor low.

I hope this helps. Changing cascades is the same as using the same cascade. There is no advantage there in tail out at 0.2% then move to a new cascade, if all cascades are at same SWU/yr.
 

olivers

Regular Member
Joined
Mar 25, 2010
Messages
123
Likes
93
On the 0.2% depleted to other enrichment levels. Russians exported .7% NU which was actually 0.2% depleted enriched to 0.7% NU in the 1990's and early 2000. Their power needs were met by smart reductions and down blended HEU from the dismantled nuclear weapons. They even exported this stuff to US and will do so until 2013. The cost of uranium has been low in the international markets due to this HEU down blended supply. Since the centrifuges were not being used the Russians used the depleted uranium reserves to get .7% NU for export as their economy had pretty much crashed and they needed cash. So it might make sense depending on the economics of the situation as getting forex is worth investing more electricity which is already available due to installed capacity and under-utilization after an economic crash and using the cascades even consuming more than the power production cost by going this route(I don't know how much the real values are. It might be less than the power production costs as well, just for the sake of illustrating the point.) but less than the 0.7%NU extraction cost from mining.

BTW there might be mistakes in my posts. I am only reading tea-leaves. I am no expert on Uranium Enrichment. I have just read enough papers and stuff to understand how this stuff works and what the process variables are.
 
Last edited:

olivers

Regular Member
Joined
Mar 25, 2010
Messages
123
Likes
93
Chitradurga could of course be used to produce slightly enriched uranium (SEU) with about 1.1 per cent U-235 content to fuel our pressurized heavy water reactor (PHWR) units which would boost the fuel burn-up to as much as 20000 MWd/tonne.

Chitradurga will come a little later, not immediately. Our Ratnahalli plant capacity has been enhanced. But more than that, there is significant improvement in our technology. Usually, a term called Separating Work Units (SWUs) defines the technology level that we have achieved in this, and I can assure you that there has been considerable improvement in SWUs of our next generation caskets of centrifuges. The separating capacity of our centrifuges has improved. So total capacity enhancement at Ratnahalli has been done. We are confident of supplying the entire fuel for the set of"¦.

You cannot say anymore that India does not have enrichment technology. India has its own technology and we can produce [enriched uranium]. We have not started doing it for large-scale commercial nuclear power stations, which require a much larger quantity of enriched uranium. We will be able to do that once we go to Chitradurga.

Taking this forward. Russians used sub-critical centrifuges for the most part up until 2010. Their philosophy was different to Urenco which wanted more SWU/yr and pushed into more expensive but more reliable carbon fiber deigns. The Russians had super-critical centrifuges from 1959 if I am not mistaken. They however used sub-critical for mass production of reactor feed. The Russians have followed this path even today. Their 2010 Super-Critical designs are still not carbon fiber only. They use metal enclosed in carbon fiber. This will help mass production, keep the costs low. So any damaged centrifuges are cheaper to replace instead of higher reliability.

If we really go with the Russian design philosophy we might have the older generation centrifuges in Chitradurga. Or we might move some of the older generation centrifuges to Chitradurga and add a mixed blend of super-critical cascades too. Our orders for the centrifuges in 2005 were for machine crafted components with bellows. These bellows indicate super-critical centrifuges. It might also make sense to give follow-on orders to these folks for the new plant given their investment to meet our initial orders. These are super-critical as well. So Chitradurga might have 20 SWU/yr units older units being moved out of RMP as well. Some carbon-fiber units might be placed there as well. carbon-fiber units are more expensive and initially I think we might just want industrial scale mass movement of SEU out of Chitradurga just like the Russians. Cutting edge isn't the concern. Getting a lot of SEU out is. So it's interesting. These older units may well be replaced if they wear out with newer ones as and when this happens and it might be cheaper given the already existing supply chain as of 2005/2006.

Of course as always these are extrapolations based on the Russian path. I am not sure what the Indian path is to SEU on a large scale. However the indications are we want cheap industrial scale civil capacity. This might well be the economical route for us. So this is a civil facility for all intends and purposes and will serve the civil program. It's out of safeguards to prevent estimates of our nuclear weapons program in numbers and the submarines planned. It's also likely that we don't want the world to see the technology used in these plants. It might looks like some other centrifuges. These designs are possibly different from the Urenco ones or quiet close to them. There may be some unique twists in our centrifuges which make them more reliable or cheaper to produce or both. So this should set those inquisitive minds at ease as to the Chitradurga being for nukes. I don't think this is for the strategic program.

We also can glean from this that RMP centrifuges have undergone a SWU enhancements and capacity addition through new centrifuges. Numbers and technology. So those old unit's are likely headed to Chitradurga with additional new units of unknown technology and generation. Interesting. I have tried to connect the dots. As always any mistakes are mine. I have combined two news reports to get to the base. The person who gave these interviews is the same. So this should serve as a good tea leaf read to help arrive at the capacity.

Maybe the RMP estimates are at the lower end if this numbers and technology upgrade is considered. If our nuclear program isn't really HEU based this can only mean one thing ... We don't know if it is ...
 
Last edited:

olivers

Regular Member
Joined
Mar 25, 2010
Messages
123
Likes
93
The last sentence above should read Nuclear weapons program .... We don't know if our nuclear weapons program is HEU dependent.
 
Joined
Feb 16, 2009
Messages
29,876
Likes
48,566
Country flag
The last sentence above should read Nuclear weapons program .... We don't know if our nuclear weapons program is HEU dependent.
Almost all of our fissile material is Plutonium not HEU?
 
Last edited:

sayareakd

Mod
Joined
Feb 17, 2009
Messages
17,734
Likes
18,952
Country flag
@olivers can you explain it in plane English as to what it means.
 

Yusuf

GUARDIAN
Super Mod
Joined
Mar 24, 2009
Messages
24,324
Likes
11,757
Country flag
@olivers can you explain it in plane English as to what it means.
What he means is we have some kickass centrifuges which India is using to ramp up enriched uranium production.

Olivers, like I said earlier, it only means that we have plans for many nuclear powered naval vessels.
 

Yusuf

GUARDIAN
Super Mod
Joined
Mar 24, 2009
Messages
24,324
Likes
11,757
Country flag
Olivers, some of the info you have given has no source. It may be you have some knowledge of inner workings of the nuclear program. Is it okay to have it on a public forum? Western intel is yet to confirm any advancement in centrifuges of the scale you are talking about.
 

olivers

Regular Member
Joined
Mar 25, 2010
Messages
123
Likes
93
Olivers, some of the info you have given has no source. It may be you have some knowledge of inner workings of the nuclear program. Is it okay to have it on a public forum? Western intel is yet to confirm any advancement in centrifuges of the scale you are talking about.
Yusuf all the information is from public sources.I have no other sources of information and the extrapolations and the nuclear centrifuges are based on basic nuclear physics. These are easy to find through a google search. It's also on wikipedia. The doubling of RMP has been reported by the western intel and was reported by the Hindu. I just connected the dots on the doubling of the new facility and technical data available from news paper reports of the data circulated.

On the advancements in centrifuges. We have them and we have had them since 2008. Even if it's a stretched crap-shoot of only 20 SWU/yr it's still more than sufficient. We told the world we had these in 2008. If they don't believe us like they don't with our Agni V missile it's the west's take on it. Not our problem. They always underestimate and play you down.

Feel free to ask for any references you feel are missing. I will provide them.
 
Last edited:

olivers

Regular Member
Joined
Mar 25, 2010
Messages
123
Likes
93
Almost all of our fissile material is Plutonium not HEU?
1KG of 30% to 40% HEU will require 90 SWU/year assuming tail out at 0.25% U235 and 0.7% NU. Airhant is said to use this 30 to 40% maal. For every 100,000 SWU you get approximately 1 ton of Arihant fuel per year.

Assuming Airhant is rated at 50,000 shp or slightly less it will require 160Kg of fuel for 10 years. (Note this higher rating is being used to provide an upper bound as much fuel as possible as opposed to an indication of real shp.) Even providing for exceptional extra maneuvering of the American variety it's 300kg of 40% HEU as fuel for 10 years. This assumes the nuclear core will last 10 years.

The largest estimate I have seen calls for 4 SSBNs and 9 SSNs. That's approximately 7 tons of fuel required over 10 years assuming a production rate of more than 1 submarine a year over 10 years.

For 90% HEU used in thermonuclear weapons it will require 210 SWU/year assuming tail out at 0.25% U235 and 0.7% NU. If it's only weapons production it's 571kg of 90% HEU. Modern thermonuclear weapons require a few tens of kgs of HEU. 5kg is a realistic estimate for the trigger and a bit on the upper end. The blanket used in Russian and American devices is also HEU. 25Kg of HEU was common in Russian devices. Depleted uranium can also be used as blanket. Using HEU as blanket will increase the explosive yield of a thermonuclear device.

When the new RMP facility comes up with 300,000 to 400,000 SWU/yr assuming 30 SWU/yr centrifuges are used. That's four tons 40% HEU of Arihant fuel a year or 1.5 tons of 90% HEU. Even on the lower end with the estimates released as of 2007 the RMP can produce 30,000 SWU/yr. Assuming a modest doubling in 2010 as reported it's 60,000 SWU/yr.

That's not all for submarines. So the only way to reconcile these numbers is to assume the rest are for thermonuclear weapons.

2.8 TN weapons a year assuming 25kg of 90% HEU with a 90% HEU blanket or 14.2 TN weapons a year assuming 5kg of 90% HEU and Depleted uranium blankets per 30,000 SWU/yr of operation and one new Arihant nuclear fuel load assuming american standards of propulsion per 30,000 SWU/yr. (Russian standard is half the requirement). Total SWU/yr being 60,000 SWU/yr.

At the higher end of the estimate with reductions for margin of safety on processing losses its:

22.4 TN weapons a year assuming 25kg of 90% HEU with a 90% HEU blanket or 113.6 TN weapons a year assuming 5kg of 90% HEU and Depleted uranium blankets for 270,000 SWU/yr of operation and one new Arihant nuclear fuel load assuming american standards of propulsion per 30,000 SWU/yr. (Russian standard is half the requirement). Total SWU/yr being 300,000 SWU/yr.

Of-course when the RMP doubling is completed these figures hold true. The estimates also assume we are at TC11 standards of 30 SWU/yr in centrifuges and this is the centrifuge used in doubling and not the earlier 20 SWU/yr centrifuge. Western analysts are not going to accept my jingo estimates. I am not worried about them. This also assumes the dimensions of our centrifuges are equal to urenco ones. We don't have any confirmation on this and we will never get it. So it's very uncertain analysis. Everyone can do it. Anyone whose business it is is doing this.

I thought a long time before posting this. If I can estimate this from the information in hindu, frontline and other online publications anyone else who needs to know has this information has this information. The estimates for further accuracy will be using software which has uncertainty analysis(I don't have the time for that so I have made back of the envelope calculations).
 
Last edited:

Global Defence

New threads

Articles

Top