Draining the Swamp : Reforming our PSU and Building our R&D Base

Discussion in 'Economy & Infrastructure' started by Bahamut, Mar 18, 2017.

  1. Bahamut

    Bahamut Senior Member Senior Member

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  3. Indx TechStyle

    Indx TechStyle Perfaarmance Naarmal Senior Member

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    Shut Down Laboratories And Overhaul The DRDO, Expert Committee Tells Defence Ministry
    All non-core research activity of the DRDO must stop.
    [​IMG]
    HINDUSTAN TIMES VIA GETTY IMAGES
    The Arjun tank stationed on the Parliament House premises for an exhibition in August 2016 in New Delhi, India.
     
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  4. Bahamut

    Bahamut Senior Member Senior Member

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  5. Indx TechStyle

    Indx TechStyle Perfaarmance Naarmal Senior Member

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    It would be a grave injustice to DRDO if i don't add that with just 2% of total defense budget DRDO has often delivered more than a monkey, sometimes Stallions.


    Ya, the monitoring way needs to amended.

    For example for studying a new concept first, DRDO persons get a paid tour or leave for researching or studying existing concepts of weapon for few months.
    (Correct me If I'm wrong).

    It's a nice step to result nice designing but problem occurs when most of these guys use this as a holiday.

    Care to research ever, how many of them submit reports?
     
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  6. Bahamut

    Bahamut Senior Member Senior Member

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  7. Bahamut

    Bahamut Senior Member Senior Member

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    I am presently reading about South Korea which is regarded as the main emerging exporter of weapons developed it industry.Yes we have to spend more on R&D ,its time that we reduce the fertilizer subside for scitefic R&D.Also I found that almost all scientifically advances country have a gifted children program to get the best out of their best.Lets talk about some reforms-
    1.DRDO sending design team on the ground to talk with the user as well as meeting with high ranking military official and involving them in design phase.
    2.Get rid of forign arm lobing.
    3.Bring more automation in DRDO workshops
    4.A center for advance technology that develops domestic technology and a center to look at weapons system of other country and analyzing them.
    5.Seperated budget for R&D,automation form basic budget of DRDO used for paying the staff.
    6. Promote Meritocracy ,like the recent project of HTT 40 is developed in good way ,promote them they will increase our efficency.
    7.Avoid situation like these
    http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/...efence-minister-says/articleshow/17500066.cms
     
  8. Indx TechStyle

    Indx TechStyle Perfaarmance Naarmal Senior Member

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    India's defence procurement and modernisation: Can a new organisation fix the persisting problems?
    Posted: Mar 07, 2017
    By: Lt Gen Philip Campose (Retd)

    A committee nominated by India’s Ministry of Defence has recently submitted its recommendations for integrating and streamlining the defence acquisition process by raising a Defence Procurement Organisation. As per information available, this new organisation, headed by a Secretary-level official, will function as a new ‘vertical’, directly under the Defence Minister, with the objective of optimising and integrating the procurement process, media reports suggest.
    No doubt, such a measure was long awaited and will remove some of the glitches in the existing system. However, keeping in view that many past changes, structural and procedural, to energise the defence acquisition process have fallen by the wayside, without providing discernible dividends for the military, it may be useful to analyse this new development critically to predict whether the outcome on account of this change will be any different.
    Any measure of success of attempted improvements in the defence procurement system would be best determined by measuring the likely resultant outcomes, both qualitative and quantitative, in ‘capability development’ of the Armed Forces.
    Will introduction of the new organisation help the three Services in acquiring long pending needs of artillery guns, fighter aircraft, assault rifles, air defence weapons, submarines, helicopters and drones in a timely manner -- say, in the next three to five years? Will it ensure that the operational needs and war-wastage reserves of the three Services, in terms of requisite scales of ammunition, equipment spares, stores and vehicles, will be made up immediately? Or, will the bigger problems like inadequate budget and corruption charges continue to dog the procurement process and prevent capability building of the military?
    It is common knowledge that capability development of the three Services is lagging far behind targets due to a combination of problems like inadequacy of defence capital budget, delays in decision-making, bureaucratic prevarication, monopoly by defence public sector undertakings (resulting in keeping out the private industry), frequent changes in qualitative requirements (QRs) by the Services, infirmities in the system of trials, and frequent charges of corruption, which result in ‘blanket’ blacklisting of vendors in a thoughtless of manner.
    Unless all these deficiencies are addressed by the new system, it will be ‘business as usual’, with lack of improvement in predictable outcomes.
    Let us take the more prominent of the existing infirmities one by one, to examine whether the new system will address these effectively.
    Firstly, the problems of delays in decision-making, combined with the risk averseness of the bureaucracy.
    The reasons for these delays and problems are on account of fear of wrongdoing by those involved in the process, especially due to the presence of unscrupulous middlemen, who exist on the sidelines to facilitate corrupt practices. Hopefully, the new system will provide better clarity, transparency and accountability, and concurrently, plug the existing loopholes which enable such wrongdoings. Otherwise, ‘big ticket’ proposals (which are critically needed for capability development) will continue to fall victim to risk-avoidance strategies of the bureaucracy.
    Secondly, the infirmities in the system of formulating General Staff Qualitative Requirements (GSQRs) and for carrying out trials by the Services.
    Blind adherence to the ‘L1’ principle (instead of ‘T1-L1’) leaves space for qualitative inadequacies. Will the new system ensure that GSQRs are correctly formulated and vetted to ensure that they are practicable, and yet, enable procurement of the best available equipment at the most competitive prices? Has it addressed the earlier infirmities in trial methodologies, which enable vendors to keep seeking additional time to correct faults in their equipment -- resulting in inordinate delays and resultant scope for wrongdoing?
    Thirdly, does the new system provide a level playing field to our private defence industry?
    Unless the new system provides equal opportunity to the best of our private defence industry and entrepreneurs to compete fairly with the public sector units, defence procurement and the related ‘Make in India’ policy will continue to be just a pipe dream -- as far as the more critical defence procurements like guns and aircraft are concerned.
    Fourthly, will the new organisation ensure that complaints -- malicious or justified -- do not hold the system to ransom and scuttle the entire procurement process?
    Have measures been instituted to ensure that a delay afflicted case like the ‘replacement helicopters’ proposal (where a complaint resulted in long-drawn investigations, leading to multi-fold cost penalty) do not occur in future? Our procurement system must learn to deal effectively with the flurry of complaints and corruption charges, which inevitably pursue every procurement proposal, and yet procure the desired item in time.
    And finally, the problem of inadequacy of capital modernisation budget -- which is the primary reason why the military is not able to put into effect their plans for acquisition of ‘big ticket items’ to achieve their modernisation plans.
    Will the new organisation and system be able to ensure that adequate budget is allocated and that capital funds for capability-building, once allocated, cannot be withdrawn or re-appropriated (surrendered?) by the Ministry of Defence or Ministry of Finance for any other purpose? Obviously, if the new organisation does not result in better availability of capital budget, no amount of structural or procedural changes can bring about better results in terms of capability-building outcomes.
    In sum, the actual reason that we are unable to procure critically needed weapons, equipment and ammunition are larger strategic questions like the ‘Guns vs Butter debate’, for which the country has yet not found satisfactory answers.
    The Defence Minister’s continuing efforts at structural improvements are commendable and would make a positive effect on capability-building if adequate capital budget was allocated to the defence forces. But, unless we resolve the larger issues mentioned herein, that have prevented the existing system to come up with favourable outcomes in the past, the new Defence Procurement Organisation may end up only being described as ‘old wine in a new bottle’, with no major benefits accruing to the military.
    (The author is a former Vice Chief of Army Staff. Comments and suggestions on this article can be sent to [email protected])

    Source Link:http://southasiamonitor.org/news/in...isation-fix-the-persisting-problems-/sl/22437
     
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  9. Bahamut

    Bahamut Senior Member Senior Member

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    We need some thing similar to USAF Plant 42 for are air force
    United States Air Force Plant 42 (Plant 42) (IATA: PMD, ICAO: KPMD, FAA LID: PMD) is a classified United States Government aircraft manufacturing plant, used by the United States Air Force. It is also used by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).

    Plant 42 and Palmdale Regional Airport (PMD) are separate facilities that share a common runway at the site. The facility is located in the Antelope Valley, approximately 60 miles from downtown Los Angeles.
     
  10. vinuzap

    vinuzap Regular Member

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    http://www.defencenews.in/article/O...ydesperatelyneedsaParrikar20asDefenceMinister

    In 28 months, Manohar Parrikar as defence minister developed easy relationships with the top brass of the three Services as was rarely ever witnessed before.

    He threw caution to the winds and managed to pull the forces out of a downward spiral in operational capabilities.
    Editor-in-Chief and long-time contributos Nitin A Gokhale takes stock of what Parrikar achieved and the challenges that await his successor.

    Now that Manohar Parrikar’s return to Goa is done and dusted, the immediate priority for Prime Minister Narendra Modi will be to find an equally hard working, transparent and approachable Raksha Mantri for India.

    Though Arun Jaitley, the perennial ‘go-to’ man, has been given additional charge of the defence ministry, surely he cannot be expected to handle two large and critical ministries simultaneously.

    However, whosoever is the new occupant in South Block in the coming months will find it a hard act to follow since Parrikar, in his 28-month stint, had brought in a new sense of vigour and purpose in the largely moribund MoD.

    Before Parrikar took over as defence minister, he had been variously described to me as a reluctant politician, an even more reluctant minister at the Centre and an outsider in the power corridors of Delhi.

    To my mind, after getting acquainted with him over the past two-and-a-half years, Parrikar can be best described as a simple man who is not a simpleton; a man of frugal habits who shunned all visible trappings of power and was quick to understand complex issues.


    Those attributes not only allowed him to grasp the intricacies and complexities of the important ministry, but also enabled him to put his own stamp on the day-to-day functioning of the MoD.

    There have been slip-ups and some embarrassments too because well-entrenched vested interests tried to undermine his authority.

    I remember meeting him for the first time in February 2015 (before that, I had only heard of Parrikar as an unusual politician).

    One of the questions he had was: “What, in your view, is the biggest challenge here?”

    At first, because of unfamiliarity with him, I had thought of playing safe and gave a standard reply that, “It is a large, sensitive and important ministry and therefore not easy to understand quickly.”

    But his easy manner encouraged me to be bolder and remark: “Your greatest challenge will be the status quo mindset that pervades through the civil and military bureaucracy. Everyone will tell you that such and such thing cannot be done because there has been no precedent to it. If you can overcome that trend, maybe you would have made a big start.”

    I cannot judge if Parrikar took that input (not advice) seriously, but whoever I came across since then — whether in the Services or in the defence industry — swore by Parrikar’s efforts to re-engerise the MoD and bring in more accountability.

    This in itself is a big change because at the best of times, the MoD is a lumbering giant, slow to stir and act.

    It is not only entrusted with the defence of the country but is also the administrative ministry for India’s nearly 15 lakh military personnel (Army, Navy, Air Force and Coast Guard).

    It also has one of the largest budgets in the government. For 2017-18, for instance, it has been allocated Rs 359,854 crore ($53.5 billion).

    Critics have quibbled over the comparatively low increase in the defence budget this year. But that is the least of the challenges.

    Instead, reducing timelines for acquisitions, better and optimum utilisation of available resources, bringing in more accountability and transparency in the MoD’s functioning and making sure most critical voids in India’s defence preparedness are made up in quick time, have been the focus areas in South Block.

    But above all, the MoD under Parrikar saw to it that the prime minister’s Make in India initiative gets the necessary impetus in defence production.

    was the first step towards making fundamental changes in the way weapons platforms are acquired in India.

    The Buy IDDM (Indigenously Designed, Developed and Manufactured) category, introduced in DPP-2016, now gets the topmost priority among six categories that constitute the new DPP, which is the guiding document for all defence purchases in India.


    In effect, this means all those Indian companies who have the capability of designing and developing their products indigenously will from now on get the first preference in most purchases that the three armed forces undertake.

    Under the new category for IDDM equipment, it will be mandatory for 40 per cent of the content to be sourced locally.

    The new DPP has many fresh ideas designed to accelerate defence acquisitions while encouraging indigenous companies under the flagship programme of Make in India.

    For instance, in order to cut down delays, the DPP henceforth mandates that all Acceptances of Necessity of a particular platform will be valid only for only six months as against the 12 months deadline that it currently provides.

    Moreover, no AON will be notified until it is accompanied by a finalised RFP (Request for Proposal or detailed tender).

    In essence, this eliminates one intermediate stage since notifying an RFP after an AON used to be inordinately delayed.

    Prioritisation of projects was the first step.

    Defence acquisitions are expensive and since very little was purchased in the past five years, the backlog just added to the problem.

    A review of proposed projects made over the previous five years found that the bureaucracy in the ministry — both civil and military — was sitting on some 400-odd big and small projects that were critical to the three armed forces.

    A thorough review revealed that nearly one-third of the 400-odd projects were now irrelevant. So they were discarded.

    About 50 projects were accelerated since they were of critical importance.

    Next, important schemes across the three services that needed immediate funding and implementation were identified.

    The figures speak for themselves: The MoD cleared a total of 124 new contracts worth Rs 209,751 crores since the Modi government came to power.

    These include artillery guns, attack and medium lift helicopters for the Army (Chinook and Apache helicopters from the US); frigates and mine counter-measure vessels for the Navy and Akash missiles for the Air Force.

    Post-September 2016, when India conducted ‘surgical strikes’ against Pakistan, it seemed for a while that Pakistan may mobilise for a larger conflict,

    India’s Cabinet Committee on Security authorised the three forces to make fast track acquisitions worth nearly Rs 20,000 crores making it one of the most productive years for the MoD.

    This had to be done on priority because the previous government had neglected even the basic requirements.

    The previous Comptroller and Auditor General report tabled in Parliament made for grim reading.

    ‘Stocking of ammunition even at “minimum acceptable risk level” was not ensured, as availability of ammunition as on March 2013 was below this level in respect of 125 out of a total of 170 types of ammunition.’

    Also, in 50 per cent of the total types of ammunition, the holding was ‘critical’ — insufficient for even 10 days of fighting, the report added.

    This has now been corrected by making sure that ammunition for 10 days of intense fighting is always in stock.

    Once that objective is achieved, the ministry will look at further replenishing the stocks.

    The delegated financial powers for the vice-chiefs of the three Services and army commanders have been enhanced to allow speedier purchases.

    This is a big change in the notoriously slow and opaque functioning that has historically besieged the MoD.

    In another major decision, the government opened up the defence sector for FDI, allowing 49 percent FDI through the automatic route and up to 100 percent FDI on a case to case basis.

    Also, the restrictions on what was ‘state-of-the-art technology’ has been reduced to ‘modern technology’. This would increase the number of defence companies investing in India.

    Procurement and modernisation of three services apart, the biggest decision by the Modi government was to grant the One Rank One pension — a 40-year-old demand of the veterans.

    Although there have been some voices of disgruntlement on the issue, the fact is, this government showed the necessary political will and resolve to give due dignity to military veterans.

    Significantly, the MoD has now allowed and eliminate delays or cancellation of contracts because of anonymous complaints. Anonymous letters are now a no-go.

    The ministry wants to use the power to ban a firm only in the rarest case. The previous government had indiscriminately blacklisted over a dozen firms, severely restricting the options of the forces to source equipment.

    Despite Parrikar’s efficiency and good intentions, a toxic legacy left behind by a decade and more of lethargy and timidity under A K Antony will take sustained efforts by Parrikar’s successor to ensure that the MoD effectively discharges its duties towards securing the nation.

    Half-done initiatives like choosing the strategic partners for making defence platforms in India, reforming higher defence management (appointing a CDS — even if 4-star), creating joint commands for space, cyber and special operations will have to be followed upon by Parrikar’s successor.

    It is for Prime Minister Modi to choose the right man — or woman — to do that, and do it fast.
     

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