Agantrope
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It is not all about oil. It is the diplomacy match and war. China is beating india all the down to hell in this class.
Dragon's teeth
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CHINA DECLARES OPEN SEASON ON INDIA?
By Bhaskar Roy
The inevitable has happened. On September 2, 2010, the Chinese official news agency, Xinhua, which is an authoritative source, reported Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Jiang Yu's statement on the presence of Chinese troops in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) as follows:
"China on Wednesday rejected reports of the presence of over 11,000 Chinese troops in North Pakistan, saying such "groundless reports" were made with "ulterior motives". "We believe the attempts of some people To fabricate stories to provoke China-Pakistan or China-India relations are doomed to fail" said Foreign Ministry spokesperson Jiang Yu in a statement".
The Xinhua news item went on to record "Gilgit-Baltistan as a region of Pakistan.
Ms. Jiang Yu further underscored "About our visa policy towards inhabitants in the Indian-controlled Kashmir region, the policy (stapled visa) remains unchanged.
This was a masterly crafted official statement, used when the Chinese do not resort to unsavory rhetorics and unprovoked insults.
By saying that certain people fabricated the report of 11,000 Chinese soldiers in Gilgit-Baltistan area of Pakistan to China-India relations, it obviously tried to mislead the gullible among Indians. More importantly, it gave a handle to the hard line pro-China political elements to argue that the Americans were trying to foment India-China antagonism. The presence of 7000 to 11,000 Chinese troops working on roads in Gilgit-Baltistan was first published in the New York Times.
The Chinese authorities are banking on the same Indian political section who declined to condemn the 1962 Chinese attack on India, and opposed the India-US civilian nuclear agreement in Parliament, to maintain silence if not back China.
It is abundantly clear that China is fronting Pakistan in a much larger strategy in the region, extending to the Gulf and the Middle East on one side, and the Central Asian States on the other. In between, however, there is India to deal with – the Kashmir issue, India's acceptance among the Afghan people in a historical relationship, similar Indian relations with Central Asian States and their people, as well as no-friction exchanges and trade and economic relations with the Gulf and the Middle East. This is a huge diplomatic, political and economic ensemble.
India is not a member of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC). Yet, India maintains cordial relationship with most IOC members individually and bilaterally, save Pakistan. The OIC conference releases are based on consensus and, therefore, Pakistan's position on Kashmir is taken into account. Otherwise, no OIC member is interested in the Kashmir issue. This has frustrated the Pakistani Army and connected establishment including the foreign service establishment.
A short time before the Gilgit-Baltistan issue camp up, a Pakistani newspaper alleged to be closed to the Pak intelligence agency, the ISI, hinted that the Kashmir issue was a tripartite one involving Pakistan, India and China. The game was given away.
In terms of regional peace and stability, China's official statement of September 02, may have turned the whole Kashmir question and territorial issues involving India on its head. And this is going to change equations for times to come.
The withdrawal of the Chinese Foreign Ministry on "Northern Kashmir" from their website subsequently is viewed by some in India including in the government, as correcting a faux Pas or China signaling that their position was not a significant issue. The Chinese recorded their new position on POK, tested Indian reaction, closed the issue for the time being. The Chinese Foreign Ministry's and the Xinhua's position stays, to be brought up at an appropriate time.
China has changed the India-Pakistan map, which poses a serious threat to India's security and integrity.
The historically and UN recognized Jammu and Kashmir region has been desecrated. According to the Chinese Foreign Ministry formulation there is no Kashmir question. The POK or the Pakistani "Azad Kashmir" has been washed away.
Yet, Jammu and Kashmir, which is part of India's sovereign territory has been deviously projected as the disputed region between India and Pakistan.
The projection made by China has very serious implications on territorial issues for India. Bilaterally (China-Pak) converting POK into a part of Northern Pakistan, addresses the 1963 China-Pak agreement according to which Pakistan ceded approximately 5,400 sq. kms. of POK to China, through which the China-Pakistan Karakoram highway runs.
One clause of the 1963 agreement was that China will re-negotiate on this piece of territory with the party which won sovereignty over it once the Kashmir issue was resolved. But the new position makes this clause redundant as it becomes Pakistani territory as per the two sides.
Apart from the 1947-48 UN resolutions on the Kashmir issue which was never implemented because of Pakistan's refusal to go with the parameters of the resolutions, the Kashmir issue remained a lame duck, and has died with time and demographic changes.
Now, this whole issue is about to change. Chinese territory makes a sharp bridge head into Northern Pakistan, going by the Siachen Glacier. Siachen is also covered by Pakistan and its military deployment on one side. This would put tremendous pressure on India's position in Siachen, a critical enemy gateway to J&K.
It has now been revealed that the Chinese workers in Gilgit-Baltistan are no ordinary labourers. They are from the PLA Logistics Department, engineers and soldiers involved in construction. Technically, they belong to the PLA and the PLA is on active duty on foreign soil. Deployment for UN Peace Keeping forces is something totally different. The PLA activity in Gilgit-Baltistan lays bare the much touted deceptive proclamation that not a single Chinese soldier will be placed on foreign soil.
There is clearly a need to recognize the fact that when the Chinese make an official statement, its impact, prospects and consequences are very carefully weighed, looking to future strategy for which the blue print is already in place. They never make mistakes or slip-ups. When changing, they quote change in circumstances critical to their security.
In this context, it merits to revisit what is generally believed in India that China recognized Sikkim as an integral part of India in 2005. Visiting Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao only showed a map to concerned Indian officials showing Sikkim as a part of India. China's foreign ministry website showing Sikkim's status in unreliable and can be changed at any time.
China can be nailed down to its words only if there is an official statement. More than that, there has to be written and signed agreements. The Sikkim issue is very much alive. After Wen Jiabao's visit to India, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman in Beijing made it abundantly clear that the Sikkim issue will be resolved along with the border issue. This is the moot point.
As regards the boundary question, the Chinese never wanted to resolve it at this phase. They wanted stable and secure neighbourhood to secure economic and military development. Having achieved their objectives, the Beijing leaders appear to have embarked on the next stage of strategic domination in Asia.
The "Watch and Wait" approach by India, Japan and some of the South East Asian countries are fraught with serious danger. China's territory hungry surge supported by military means, is becoming louder.
A point to note is the expanding designation of "core interest" territories. From Taiwan and Tibet it has expanded to the South China Sea and its island and the so-called first chain of islands, to Japanese territory emphatically, in the past months.
India may wake up sooner than later with China's claims on Indian territories designated as "core interest" territories. This would mean that either submit to China's claims or prepare for a war to protect them.
What exactly that territory would be is not known. Beijing has not agreed to exchange maps of the Western and Eastern Sectors, the most strategic sections, with the Indian interlocutors. Evidence exists with the Indian side that China is encroaching upon more Indian land surreptitiously, especially in the Western Sector.
India does not have the leeway to sweep more Chinese dirt under the carpet. The carpet is now too small to hide it all. It is now time not only to use quiet diplomatic channels with China, but show that India can also hurt China.
India may have signed in 2003 that Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) is Chinese territory. The operative part of this agreement in the "autonomy" of TAR. If autonomy of TAR as defined by several international treaties is addressed by Beijing, then the agreement stays. If not, the Agreement is dead, and India can revert to its original position on the entire Tibet issue, the true history of Tibet be brought out to demolish the history of Tibet concocted by China, and refuse to give visas to those Chinese officials including military officials who have served in TAR and Xinjiang Autonomous Region where Beijing has launched a scorched earth policy against pro-independent Uighurs.
Tibetans coming to India, whether on official duty or private visits, be given "paper", not "stapled" visas and their Chinese passports not recognized.
There are issues regarding Taiwan, the Dalai Lama, and Uighur leaders in exile like Rebiya Kadeer is still palpable around the world.
China need not think that it has drunk the elixir from the Cup of Life, and that it is invincible. The responsibility lies entirely on the Mandarins of Beijing. There is more to international behavior then a bag full of money, nuclear weapons and distortion of history.
(The author is an eminent China analyst with many years of experience. He can be reached at [email protected])
China-Africa: Evaluating a growing partnership
Rajiv Bhatia
It covers all facets, helping China to project itself as a global power.
The journalist Justus Ondari wrote recently in Kenya's Daily Nation: "The Chinese influence, in the form of its people, investment and business, is sweeping across the African continent like a wildfire." If China is 'a complex actor' and Africa 'a complex continent', it follows that their relationship is complex too. A staunch opponent of colonialism, China is now being projected by some as manifesting neo-colonialist tendencies. Is the China link a blessing or bane for Africans?
While this debate unfolds elsewhere, it does not receive much notice in India. But it should, because expanding China-Africa relations have global implications.
A look at the past
Western media tend to suggest that China has appeared suddenly on the African stage in recent years. China's publicists would have us believe that the relationship has ancient origins. Neither view is accurate.
The only important chapter in the history of these relations pre-dating the rise of Communist China pertains to Zeng He. Hailed as 'the Chinese Columbus', he undertook eight voyages during the 15th Century to the region west of China, at the behest of Ming Emperor Cheng Zu. A few of these journeys took him across the Indian Ocean to Africa's eastern and southern seaboard, e.g. Mogadishu, Malindi and Madagascar. His aim was to explore and to spread China's influence and trade. Chinese scholars stress that conquest and colonialism did not result from them.
Cut to the 20th century. China-Africa relations were initially driven by common experience and ideology: shared subjugation by the West; a resolve to end colonialism and to launch economic development. Afro-Asian unity was forged at the Bandung Conference, with Nehru's India introducing the new China to African leaders. In 1956, Egypt became the first African country to establish diplomatic relations with China. Premier Zhou Enlai's historic visits to Africa in 1963 and 1964 created a lasting impact. The 'One China' policy took quick strides: in 1960 only five of 22 independent African states recognised the People's Republic of China; in 2010, only four of 54 African states maintain relations with Taiwan. China began extending economic and military assistance to African countries, but the Cultural Revolution introduced aberrations. China's inclination 'to export revolution' amounted to violating its own traditional adherence to the principle of non-interference.
From the early 1980s, China's policy marked a shift from an emphasis on 'war and revolution' to 'peace and development'. Economic cooperation assumed greater importance. During the 1990s, visits to Africa by top Chinese leaders became progressively more frequent and extensive. Since 1991, the Chinese foreign minister follows the tradition to inaugurate his annual calendar of foreign visits by first visiting a few African capitals.
Forum on cooperation
Sino-African relations have been institutionalised in the past decade through the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). It has traversed through four important milestones, namely three ministerial conferences (held in 2000, 2003 and 2009) and the climax in 2006 — "China's Africa Year" — when the ministerial conference was followed by the first summit in Beijing, attended by leaders of 48 African countries.
Two FOCAC documents stand out. The Beijing Summit Declaration proclaimed solemnly "the establishment of a new type of strategic partnership between China and Africa featuring political equality and mutual trust, economic win-win cooperation and cultural exchanges." The Sharm-el-Sheikh Declaration (of November 2009) stressed that Sino-African cooperation had produced "fruitful results", making it "a good example of South-South cooperation."
Relations today
China's relations with Africa cover all facets — political, defence, economic and other areas of cooperation. Shared perceptions on regional and international issues have been highlighted repeatedly. The growing China link has helped put a global focus on Africa. Similarly, relations with Africa help China to project itself as a global power. New assertiveness of the Chinese Navy in the western Indian Ocean is noteworthy. China seems to be working actively to advance the FOCAC process. Over two dozen Confucius Institutes have been established in 18 African countries.
China-Africa trade, valued at $10 billion in 2000, shot up to $107 billion in 2008. China, to a large extent, imports minerals and crude oil, and exports manufactured goods. Currently, China imports over 20 per cent of its oil requirements from Africa. Over 1,600 Chinese companies have investment or an operational presence on the continent today. However, Chinese investment is barely 10 per cent of accumulated investment by foreign countries in Africa. Seven special economic zones being set up by China in five African countries have drawn special attention.
The 'China in Africa' phenomenon has triggered conflicting reactions and assessments. Supporters have argued that China's approach is to promote mutual benefit and a balance of advantages. China does not interfere in internal affairs nor impose conditions and refrains from neo-colonialist actions. Unlike the West, it did not embark on colonialism, impose its religion and languages, conquer territory and practice slave trade. China has only challenged the exploitative Western dominance of Africa. It has contributed to Africa's integration, enhancement of Africa's importance in world affairs as well as to rise in prices of African commodities and growth in Africa's GDP.
On the other hand, critics have argued that China is an 'exploitative' and 'extractive' mercantilist power with its own neo-colonialist inclinations. It buys raw materials and sells manufactured products. Its economic policy damages Africa's development, delays industrialisation, ruins local industry, does not involve a transfer of technology nor value addition, contributing very little to employment as China prefers to bring its own labour. Besides, the quality of Chinese goods is poor. China jeopardises good governance in Africa, supports dictatorships, corruption, and a violation of human rights (as in Sudan and Zimbabwe). China is basically interested in Africa's natural resources, not in its long-term development.
Perhaps the truth lies somewhere between the two positions. In theory, China's engagement could be beneficial or harmful, with the actual mix varying from country to country. It may largely depend on how an African government manages to enhance benefits and reduce harmful effects.
The India angle
India's relations with Africa have been deeper, stronger and more substantive for long. The two sides were linked through trade, cultural influences, migration as well as shared struggles, ideals and icons throughout the 19th and the 20th Centuries. However, in recent years, the gap between India's and China's profile in Africa has been widening, to our disadvantage. Perhaps China is now a decade ahead of India.
Denying the fact of rivalry with China is not a feasible option. Many Africans are convinced that the two Asian powers are vying for Africa's attention, assets, markets and support for their political agenda.
Neither is it desirable to merely lament nor to suggest copying or 'beating China in its own game.' A balanced view indicates that India should leverage its many natural advantages and core strengths. The most sensible choice would be to closely monitor China's activities in Africa and to intensify and broaden our cooperation with African countries selectively.
Recently a thoughtful African ambassador in Delhi told me: "China is doing more, but India is doing better." China's presence in Africa is set to expand. It is time for India to enhance its engagement wisely and rapidly. A sustained combination of greater activism, sensitivity and synergy is essential. Then, India may be seen as doing both better and more.
( The writer served as India's High Commissioner to Kenya and later to South Africa and Lesotho.)
India Racing Ahead of China
As the world prepares for the second decade of the twenty-first century it is increasingly clear that the now subtle rivalry between China and India is only likely to exasperate.
China, though formally a Communist nation with a mixed market economy, has been able to achieve economic superiority compared with India which is trying to catch up by stressing its democratic politics, civil society and peaceful intentions.
The approach most suitable to India's character and ambitions is one of "soft power," a term coined by Harvard international relations scholar Professor Joseph Nye. Nye argued that "power is the ability to alter the behavior of others to get what you want, and there are three ways to do that: coercion (sticks), payments (carrots) and attraction (soft power). If you are able to attract others," he explained, "you can economize on the sticks and carrots."
In his book, The Paradox of American Power (2002), Nye took the analysis of soft power beyond the United States. Other nations too, he suggested, could acquire it. In today's information era there are three types of countries likely to gain soft power and so succeed:
Those whose dominant cultures and ideals are closer to prevailing global norms (which now emphasize liberalism, pluralism, autonomy); those with the most access to multiple channels of communication and thus more influence over how issues are framed; and those whose credibility is enhanced by their domestic and international performance.
Though a country's respect and prestige on the world stage is very much determined by its latent military power, it must also be supplemented with soft power. Otherwise in plain terms the former could be understood as arrogance.
Nye had a point in explaining the need of soft power in any nation's overall impact on the world. With the United States struggling with two wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the world views the superpower in negative terms. To improve that image abroad, Joseph Nye advocated the projection of soft power.
In India's case, a soft power approach could be the trump card. To start, apart from democracy, India has the ability to be an information power. Many students from Africa, Latin America and Southeast Asia are interested in studying in India at much cheaper rates. India should implement a better infrastructure of absolving them. In that regard, the passage of the Nalanda University Bill by parliament may indicate that India is preparing to unleash its soft power onto Asia and the world. This perception is reinforced by the efficient completion of the South Asian University project under the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation's header and India's decision to open up its higher education sector to global inputs and competition.
Moreover, there aren't many countries in the world which resent India's growing power. This is another main factor. From Singapore to the Sudan, from Angola to Afghanistan, from Australia to Argentina countries regard India with respect, not fear. What this means is that there is no need for a any power outside Eurasia to initiate a classic balance of power with or against India. This is certainly not the case with China.
China has actually a very limited ability to boost its soft power credentials. Its foreign policy has little regard for human rights and democracy while supportive of regimes that China does business with. The islands of Fiji are a case in point. It is very much because of the security umbrella provided by China that Fiji's military dictator is able to withhold democratic elections. India doesn't have any such constrains.
In the short run, India may not be able to match China's three trillion dollar currency reserve nor, indeed, its robust industrial growth, but it can project a more favorable image of itself to the world through a policy of soft power. That may well, in the long run, turn out to be much more beneficial to its economy as well as its people.
Illusive
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The thing after reading these articles is China has always taken the first step and then India, India is slow in this matter. Chinese get provoked easily if touched upon a sensitive matter, now whats sensitive here, a lot of things. China has a whole lot of sensitive issues than India has, now all India needs to do here is play smart, ask dalai lama to let India Choose the next one, this will certainly piss off China and here when the game starts, recognize Tibet as sacred land of Buddhism which China is trying to destroy with human rights violations commited there justifying it because China doesn't treat Tibet as its own people and it doesn't deserves to hold control over it since its people want to have Tibet as a separate state.
If India claws into this matter , dragons teeth will certainly decay in the border and move its attention to Tibet to show its control.
If India claws into this matter , dragons teeth will certainly decay in the border and move its attention to Tibet to show its control.
Pakistan seceding control of Gilgit-Baltistan to china is like Ayub seceding control of Shaksam valley in 1963.So china has grabbed another piece of indian land without a bullet being fired and without any whimper from GOI.The real thing is that GOI doesn't ever had any plan to deal with china-pak.All this cold start and two front war is just hot air from Babus manning the south block. its the repeat of 1962 without any war thank god lot of precious lives are saved this time as compared to 1962.
Watch out for the Dragon
The Chinese could well be mistaking robust democratic debate in India for weakness. But India does have advantages to exploit. Measured, calculated responses are the best answers to Chinese "assertiveness".
The normally reticent former National Security Advisor, Mr Brajesh Mishra, recently said: "What has created"¦problems for us today is the unmitigated hostility of Pakistan and China towards India. Now, we are facing a situation in which terrorism is going to increase, because for the first time China has now come out openly for Pakistan's position on Kashmir, the issuance of visas on separate pieces of paper, the projects in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir and, of course, the military and nuclear assistance"¦."
There is nothing new about China's assertiveness. When China's Prime Minister, Mr Wen Jiabao, visited India in 2005, he agreed to a boundary settlement along "easily identifiable natural geographical features", adding that in reaching a boundary settlement, "the two sides shall safeguard the interests of their settled populations in border areas". But soon, China upped its border claims, asserting that the whole of Arunachal Pradesh was a part of "South Tibet".
This, however, is only one aspect of Chinese muscle-flexing along many fronts.
BACKING PAKISTAN
Pakistan has long been a convenient stalking horse for a China bent on "containment' of Indian influence.
While China's reference to Gilgit and Baltistan as "Northern Pakistan," may have been inadvertent, the refusal of a visa to India's Northern Army Commander is clearly provocative. All this is very different from the advice tendered to Pakistan by former President, Mr Jiang Zemin, who told his Pakistani hosts in 1996 that they should settle the Kashmir issue through patient bilateral negotiations with India.
China backed Pakistan's efforts to block the UN Security Council's moves, supported by the US, to declare Hafiz Mohammed Saeed's Jamat ud Dawa as an international terrorist organisation. China also appears to have struck a deal with pro-Taliban warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar to ensure its citizens working on its investments in copper mining in north-eastern Afghanistan are not attacked.
Following the 26/11 terrorist outrage, Chinese "scholars" proclaimed that the Mumbai attack reflected "the failure of Indian Intelligence". They claimed that India was blaming Pakistan to "enhance its control over disputed Kashmir" and warned that "China can support Pakistan in the event of a war," while asserting that in such circumstances China may have the option of resorting to a "strategic military action in Southern Tibet (Arunachal Pradesh) to thoroughly liberate the people there".
China has since agreed to co-produce 240 JF-17 fighters and supply 30 J-10 fighters, apart from supplying four frigates, tanks and AWACS capabilities to Pakistan. Pakistan's nuclear weapons and missile capabilities are being upgraded by China. India has to carefully analyse if Pakistan is being assisted to shift its nuclear weapons from the unstable Baluchistan Province to tunnels in the remote parts of Gilgit-Baltistan.
MARITIME MIGHT
China is becoming increasingly "assertive" on its maritime boundaries, claiming that like Taiwan and Tibet, the entire South China Sea is an area of "core interest". The Yellow Sea and the East China Sea are claimed to be parts of China's "sphere of influence".
The simmering differences over maritime boundaries between China and its ASEAN neighbours, (particularly Vietnam) came to the fore at the recent Hanoi meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum. Chinese "assertiveness," including statements by senior Chinese military officials suggesting that the US should accept the Eastern Pacific and Indian Oceans as a Chinese "sphere of influence," has raised eyebrows in Washington.
Is China manifesting premature hubris, in the belief that US power is declining relatively and can be challenged? After displaying incredible naiveté in its initial months in office, Obama Administration officials now acknowledge the China's global economic policies are "mercantilist" and its export-led growth responsible for exacerbating global economic imbalances. Will China's rise be peaceful and non-threatening is a question being asked not just in New Delhi, but across the world.
INDIA'S OPTIONS
The Chinese could well be mistaking robust democratic debate in India for weakness. But India does have advantages to exploit. Apart from Pakistan, there is virtually no other country that accuses us of territorial ambitions, or of greed in seeking access to their natural resources. Major centres of power — the US, Russia, Japan and the European Union — seek to engage China, but deeply distrust Chinese long-term ambitions. This gives us access to defence, space and industrial technology, not available to China.
It would be counterproductive for India to respond in kind to aggressive Chinese rhetoric. But diplomatic inaction is hardly an appropriate response to Chinese "assertiveness". While India's "Look East" policies are paying dividends in our engagement with ASEAN, our growing defence and strategic ties with Japan, South Korea and Vietnam have not escaped notice in China.
Would it not be worthwhile to equip Vietnam with cruise and ballistic missiles, together with the supply of safeguarded nuclear power and research reactors and reprocessing facilities?
Can we not, like the ASEAN countries, commence ministerial-level economic exchanges with Taiwan? Should we not suggest that since China and the Dalai Lama signed a 17 Point Agreement in 1951, we hope both sides agree to abide by and implement this agreement in letter and spirit?
The Chinese are involved in what amounts to cyber warfare against India, while seeking to penetrate sensitive nuclear, space and defence installations. It would, therefore, not be prudent to give Chinese communications companies, which are state-owned, access to communications networks in India. Measured, calculated responses are the best answers to Chinese "assertiveness".
(The author is a former High Commissioner to Pakistan. [email protected])
amoy
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Good, China finally departs from Deng's outdated "hide your sheen and bide your time" thinking , and adapts to the line of "Offence is the best defence"
During my lifetime we'll all witness completion of all those great projects
* rail link (and oil/gas pipelines?) to Gwadar port our gateway to Arabian Sea from Kashgar of Xinjiang through G&B then onto network to Iran
* gas pipeline to Burma from Yunnan Prov.
* railway to Nepal from Lhasa
* railway/highway to Bangladesh through Burma that enables a direct land link btwn B & B
* port expansion of Chittagong and Colombo
* dam project on Bumaputra (Yarlung Zanbo)
The best way is help those neighbors get self sustainable (economically, militarily and beyond) by infrastructures and investment, and bail them out of India's shadow. Of course meanwhile China has a lot to gain as being mercantilistic.
And in the end smash India's daydream of joining the US' chorus of encircling China.
During my lifetime we'll all witness completion of all those great projects
* rail link (and oil/gas pipelines?) to Gwadar port our gateway to Arabian Sea from Kashgar of Xinjiang through G&B then onto network to Iran
* gas pipeline to Burma from Yunnan Prov.
* railway to Nepal from Lhasa
* railway/highway to Bangladesh through Burma that enables a direct land link btwn B & B
* port expansion of Chittagong and Colombo
* dam project on Bumaputra (Yarlung Zanbo)
The best way is help those neighbors get self sustainable (economically, militarily and beyond) by infrastructures and investment, and bail them out of India's shadow. Of course meanwhile China has a lot to gain as being mercantilistic.
And in the end smash India's daydream of joining the US' chorus of encircling China.
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neo29
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^^^^
But all the listed things are easily destroyable if an actual war takes place. I mean though these things favor China it also has huge vulnerabilities and risk. Besides some of them may not bother India.
Compare our current status to 1962. 10k troops with no proper equipment and living quarters and no co-ordination with the top brass and fighting an enemy with ww2 enfield rifles. PLA on the other hand having 50k+ troops with automatic rifles and grenades completely prepared. Still if we compare the statistics, though we are on the back foot we still give them heavy damage.
The current scenario is totally different. We just need to secure the borders properly with artillery and sam's. Nothing else to worry about.
But all the listed things are easily destroyable if an actual war takes place. I mean though these things favor China it also has huge vulnerabilities and risk. Besides some of them may not bother India.
Compare our current status to 1962. 10k troops with no proper equipment and living quarters and no co-ordination with the top brass and fighting an enemy with ww2 enfield rifles. PLA on the other hand having 50k+ troops with automatic rifles and grenades completely prepared. Still if we compare the statistics, though we are on the back foot we still give them heavy damage.
The current scenario is totally different. We just need to secure the borders properly with artillery and sam's. Nothing else to worry about.
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Good to see you coming out!
Why have you left out the projects in Sri Lanka – the ports; one in the South and one in the East?
Bail them out of India's shadow and bring them into China's shadow, right?
US is biding its time. For them it is a bonanza. Uighurs and Tibetans are their allies. These allies are also waiting eagerly that the projects in their homeland finishes within their lifetime.
Myanmar has been goaded by the West to hold elections. Watch the outcome. Bangladesh is equipoising itself!
Yeh kia hua, kia hua?
Oil has to reach Gwadar port. The US Navy controls the Straits of Hormuz!
China is nowhere in a position to challenge the US Navy and that too in the Indian Ocean!
Manmohan Singh, as the saying goes, the wise old owl who speaks less and observes more, is watching the proceedings. Why should he soil his hands when others are keen to do so?
The sun rises in the East and sets in the West. India's shadow will always fall on its sides, (whoever be there on the sides) like it or not!
Peking bahut door!
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Sino-Indian Rivalry Heating Up
The two Asian giants are gearing up for a showdown almost similar to that of the Cold War. China and India are growing at an incredible pace and with Western influence fading, both are increasingly gaining footholds in distant corners of the world through bilateral trade, investment and security relations.
In this classic greater power rivalry, China intends to keep India's ambitions at bay by denying permission, for instance, to a lieutenant general posted in Jammu and Kashmir to visit China. The officer was planning to travel abroad in August of this year to attend a high level defense exchange between the countries.
Policy makers in New Delhi meanwhile are fretting about reports that 7,000 to 11,000 Chinese troops may be present in or near the city of Gilgit in Pakistani occupied Kashmir. The Government of India is attempting to verify these rumors which Pakistan's envoy to Beijing has persistently denied.
Supposedly, the Chinese soldiers in Gilgit-Baltistan are to work on the construction of railroads as well as the extension of the Karakoram Highway. Such infrastructure projects could connect China more directly with Afghanistan and beyond; parts of the world which the resource hungry Chinese economy is anxious to reach.
Other reports indicate that the commander of the militant United Liberation Front of Assam in northeast India, Paresh Baruah, has received a six month visa to visit China. In response to what appears to a posturing more aggressive than usual, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh summoned a meeting of the Cabinet Committee of Security in Delhi. India's ambassador to Beijing, S. Jaishankar briefed the committee on the current state of India-China relations during which the prime minister is supposed to have bursted that China intends to keep India at a "low level equilibrium."
With the United States' newfound policy of strategic reassurance evidently failing and the current administration unwilling to contain China, Beijing appears to have decided that it can have a free go throughout the world. To make that happen, it first has to establish a firm foothold in its own region from where to spread its "sphere of interest" to Africa and Latin America.
India challenges China's predominance in South and East Asia. With a population of more than one billion, an economy that is rapidly expanding, a workforce that is likely to remain vast for generations to come and a subtle latent power, India is as much as Asian superpower as China is. What's more, India is a natural leader in the geopolitics of South Asia and it has amplified its influence in the east in recent years. Countries as Japan and South Korea, searching for active strategic partnerships, are ready to cooperate with India.
Beyond the region, India has promoted diplomatic and economic ties within both the Indo-African Business Forum and the Pacific Islands Forum. It is engaging expatriates in service of India's interests; the Indo-US civilian nuclear agreement of 2005 probably wouldn't have happened without the active lobbying of Indian Americans. This has pushed India to initiate a "forward policy" in its foreign relations.
Beijing has been irritated with this relatively new activity from India's side. It understands that in order to clip the wings of spreading India, it has to box it in in South Asia first. That is why China continues to support Pakistan. With India distracted in the west, China can quickly gain influence in the east.
On the whole, India hasn't been similarly proactive in attempting to counterbalance China's rise. Part of the reason is that the political class in India is not too concerned with international relations. Foreign policy finds very little emphasis in the contours of day to day politics in New Delhi. Manmohan Singh has been something of an exception but even his statesmanship cannot prevent the system from largely looking inward.
Iran is a case in point. While the United States were trying to engage with Iran, in part through China, India, a traditional Iranian ally, was left in the dark.
With India's politicos largely indifferent or incompetent in the realm of foreign relations, the military has assumed responsibility for a significant chunk of the country's external policy. It is understood that China and India are both continental as well as naval powers. In order to challenge China's "string of pearls" strategy, India is developing a naval diplomacy of its own.
Evidence of China's intentions can be seen in Sri Lanka where it is constructing a deep water port in the once sleepy fishing town of Hambantota, as well as in Pakistan, where it developed the Gwadar harbor. China is also courting the littoral states in the Indian Ocean including the Maldives, Mauritius and the Seychelles and has helped them with funds to boost their economy. In return, China expect to build more bases.
India, on the other hand, is regularly dispatching naval officers to these countries to participate in exchanges. It is also helping the Maldives in establishing a network of radars that will benefit the island nation which does not have a navy of its own.
The Sino-Indian rivalry is the story of the first part of the twenty-first century much like the rivalry between Germany and the United Kingdom defined the first half of the twentieth. As John Mearsheimer explained in The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (2001), "Great powers behave aggressively not because they want to or because they possess some inner drive to dominate, but because they have to seek more power if they want to maximize their odds of survival." Such realism has dictated China's conduct on the world stage for decades.
India's foreign policy by contrast has always flirted with moralistic notions. Only with the start of this century did it appreciate the importance of realpolitik. India's politicians are well trained in this regard when it comes to domestic affairs. Now they need to show similar genius in the field of international relations. If they can, India may stand up to China's rapid ascend.
Understanding China's Strategy
The Department of Defense released its reports on Military and Security Developments in the People's Republic of China (PDF) earlier this week, a few months overdue and outdated but still reflective of the Pentagon's natural inability to decide whether China is a friend or foe. Among other things, the report sought to assess China's strategy in relation to its defense and foreign policy.
The report's authors admit that "limited transparency" on China's part leaves "many uncertainties" about its military modernization projects and planning. Nonetheless there is some sense to be made of the Middle Kingdom's strategy, starting with how it describes its own objectives:
upholding national security and unity and ensuring the interests of national development; achieving the all-round coordinated and sustainable development of China's national defense and armed forces; enhancing the performance of the armed forces with informatization as the major measuring criterion; implementing the military strategy of active defense; pursuing a self-defensive nuclear strategy; and fostering a security environment conducive to China's peaceful development.
"Much more could be said by China about its military investments, the strategy and intentions shaping those
investment choices, and the military capabilities it is developing," notes the report, which is hardly surprising considering that the above summary, from China's most recent Defense White Paper (2008) actually says very little.
The report is careful to note that the study of China's military strategy remains an "inexact science." Outside observers have little direct insight into the formal strategies motivating the expansion of China's armed forces, the leadership's thinking about the use of force, the contingency planning that shape the military's structure and doctrine, or into the linkages between strategic pronouncements and actual policy decisions, especially in crisis situations. "It is possible, however, to make some generalizations about China's strategy based on tradition, historical pattern, official statements and papers, and emphasis on certain military capabilities and diplomatic initiatives."
For starters, Beijing makes decisions based on the following set of strategic priorities: perpetuate Communist Party rule; sustain economic development and growth; maintain domestic political stability; defend China's national sovereignty; secure China's status as a greater power. These are all defensive goals, meaning that they aim at preventing crises which might upset China's precious sense of security. But China's leaders are also recognizing a "window of opportunity" at the start of this twenty-first century, meaning that they will seek to promote regional preeminence and global influence for their country.
Realizing that China's economic growth will inevitably prompt domestic challenges and that China's entry on the world stage as a greater power means that it is no longer isolated from international affairs, China's leaders appear have decided that, "through 2020, they should focus on managing or exploiting external tensions, especially with the great powers, to maintain an environment conducive to China's development."
This attitude is confusing both American and Russian policy makers with China expanding its claims in the South China Sea, vying for influence in Central Asia, obstructing international climate change legislation at Copenhagen, squabbling with Google over Internet freedom, trying to water down sanctions against Iran and refusing to outright denounce North Korea over sinking a South Korean corvette.
The apparent schizophrenia on China's part may be part of a deliberate scheme aimed at contesting US global leadership but so far, Beijing has shown little willingness to accept a more responsible role on the world stage. It works with Russia to preserve a favorable balance of power on the Eurasian landmass, trying to prevent more Western-backed color revolutions for instance and launching the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, but in 2008, it refused to support the independence of the breakaway Georgian provinces which Russia claimed to defend. Beijing and Moscow haven't really been seeing eye to eye since.
China's ambiguity toward the rest of the world may be reflective rather of a division within China's leadership, with hardliners in the military and in the party convinced that America is conniving to deceive China and keep it poor while Foreign Ministry officials and businessmen understand the value of maintaining peaceful ties with the West.
(One Chinese general recently spoke out, writing in Hong Kong's Phoenix magazine that China must democratize after the American example lest is succumb to Soviet-style stagnation. The fact that such dissent is aired publicly is evidence of China's move away from authoritarianism. It will likely take some time for Beijing's mandarins to get used to being criticized though.)
In either event, China, like any state, pursues its own interests before anything else. It will do so in the South China Sea and on the Korean Peninsula, especially when its policy there is driven by hardliners who like to think of geopolitics as a zero-sum game. It will not allow anyone to dictate the pace of its inevitable democratization process and as such, it will censor Internet access if it feels it has to. And it will obstruct foreign efforts to curtail its growth in the name of environmentalism because it won't pay the price for two centuries of Western pollution.
The Defense Department report points at several factors that could compel China to turn inward again, including rising nationalism, demographic pressure and the sustainability of Communist Party rule, but overall, Beijing knows that China "cannot develop in isolation from the rest of the world, nor can the world enjoy prosperity and stability without China." And that's a direct quote from China's 2008 Defense White Paper again.
So the dragn has started to bare its teeth. It will be interesting to see what happens in the next few decades.
China has huge vulnerabilities. All the investments in Indian periphery and in distant lands may work or may not. An aggressive posture hegemonic posture will only show the true intent behind the "peaceful rise" facade and keep us prepared. China still doesn't have the capabilities to match its intentions.
China has huge vulnerabilities. All the investments in Indian periphery and in distant lands may work or may not. An aggressive posture hegemonic posture will only show the true intent behind the "peaceful rise" facade and keep us prepared. China still doesn't have the capabilities to match its intentions.
China..India – And or Versus
The latest round of events of snapping Defence ties based on rejection of Visa to a General has cast a shadow over the uneasy relations between the two Asian Tigers and has started a fresh debate on the Sino Indian relations.
The relations between the two neighbours have never been easy at the best of times, ever since the 1962 War. However despite booming trade between the two countries this recent bout of needling appears to be motivated. Of late China has increased the stakes in Arunachal Pradesh and issued "plain paper" visas to Indians born in Jammu and Kashmir. Then there was the uproar about Dalai Lama's visit to Arunachal Pradesh. Increased border violations have been noticed in Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh. Chinese activities in Indian neighbourhood – its plans to dam the Brahmaputra and extend the Tibet rail link into Nepal are other aspects of continuing Chinese assertiveness. The operationalisation of rail and additional air infrastructure in Tibet for the first time are again signals of an assertive China.
This post, though not related to the incident perse, throws some light on the dynamics of "and" or "versus" theories in the relationship between the two countries. Then there are colours of American and Pakistan relations painting this relationship.
What we hear least about is the tangled weave of national interests that means China courts Pakistan as a proxy for it's own competition with India, to the point where Pakistani experts concede that, given a choice between alliance with the US or China, Pakistan's military will choose China "every day of the week, and twice on Fridays".
This relationship is at the back of a lot of Chinese man oeuvres in the region to keep America and India at bay.
As per Vikram Sood, the ex Chief of RAW, US and China have their own geostrategic rivalries to settle, and the Chinese may have assessed that their moment has come.
"Yet China remains concerned with its intricate trade and financial links with the US, and also with the security of its trade and supply routes that transit the Malacca Straits. It has endeavoured to develop extensive land routes through Central Asia, but these are inadequate. It is a matter of time before China will make its presence more visible in the Indian Ocean. It has port facilities in Hambantota and Gwadar, and a presence in the Arabian Sea as it battles Somali pirates. China has expanded its contacts with Iran, more in competition with Russia than the US, it seeks mineral wealth in Afghanistan, its relations with Pakistan need no elucidation and it has developed strong ties with Burma." This Burmese angle may resolve China's Malacca Dilemma.
China's enunciation of its strategic interests in South China Sea and the Yellow Sea through naval exercises as a caution on US – Korean enterprise in Jul 2010 is a reminder that China is now ready to assert itself. Thus while we may agonise over challenges across our land frontiers, we would be ignoring the new challenge in the Indian Ocean unless we plan countermeasures now. He further articulates that:
China pretty much owns Pakistan and will own Afghanistan within a decade. India would be better served, in my opinion, by turning its back upon both in their entirety, rather than shackle itself to a ball and chain designed by China. Although national pride demands that something, anything, be "done now" about terrorism, the truth is that such attacks are gnats stinging an elephant, doing more damage by distraction than by the pain they inflict.
The recent concessions by Pakistan to China over the Karakoram highway and now greater autonomy to PLA Army to operate in Gilgit and Baltistan underscores Pakistan's need to play by Chinese rules in keeping India away. In the bargain connecting China to Iran for gas and trade.
As per this report in BBC, India can match China in next 20 years, if it retains its focus and manages its maritime interests unshackled from the tactical friction on its Western borders.China and India, accounting for roughly 40% of the 6.5bn plus people on PlanetEarth, are not merely the two fastest growing major economies in the world at present, but are among the few countries that have continued to expand at a time when the economies of most countries have contracted. The article also asks the pertinent economic question, "Can the lumbering elephant overtake the hyperactive dragon?" But that is an economic assessment of 2009 and even if were to happen, "Can the two march together – geopolitically?"
Check this out for the relationship matrix between India and China:
China has strategically allied itself with Pakistan in a geopolitical move against India which concentrates as much on economics as on military support – although in Pakistan's military-heavy economy the two are inseparable. For instance, dredging the harbor at Gwadar has given both China and Pakistan an important economic asset as well as China an advance naval base. But the overall aim of Chinese sub-continent policy, and its alliance with Pakistan, is to cut off India's overland access to Europe, the Middle East and Asia while enhancing China's own.That's why Afghanistan is the battleground for these geopolitical rivals. Between Pakistan and China, India is effectively blocked from land routes into the continent, effectively an island should its rivals wish it.
In deference to China and wooing Pakistan for an Afghan exit, America appears to have forgotten India almost entirely. Although Indians must pursue their own strategic independence, that's no reason why America and India should not have closer ties which would help India see its national interests as more parallel to America's. In that respect, George Bush got something right and Obama seems to be floundering.
However, the American people are howling at the gates of Congress to end these trillion dollar, decade-long wars of occupation and aggression, and there is simply no conceivable military solution to any of our problems – whether that's Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, or even Iran. Diplomacy has to be the way to go. Huffington Post of 25 Aug explains this. A must read into the political and diplomatic muddle that the triumvirate has gotten Pakistan into.
This is where Obama finds himself in a logjam if he does not take India on board. In the present geopolitical environment America has to find a regional solution to the Afghan mess and think beyond Pakistan. The two names that come to mind immediately are India and China. How, has been discussed in an earlier post "Afghanistan after America". Economically though, China is edging past America to be the next super power which complicates this relationship.
Theoretically speaking, the two Asian giants need to come together to make this century a truly Asian one. But there are impediments of geopolitics, suspicion and of course Pakistan. Pragmatic realism demands a multiple track diplomacy with China and USA which fructifies "India and China" rather than "India Versus China".
The irritants of the present must thus be tackled from a position of equality with clear Quid Pro Quo.
Article from People's daily..................................Take it with pinch of salt in view of recent events.
16:50, September 19, 2010
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By Li Hongmei
China-Indo rivalry has again been hyped up recently by some American media as well as the hawkish media in India. But the China-India discord they singled out to cook up still fall into the empty political platitudes—Kashmir issues; the so-called China's "String of Pearls" to encircle India, and "the acute need for India-US cooperation to counterbalance China's presence in Indian Ocean"; and the legacies of border disputes and Tibet-related issues.
And this, actually in a similar vein to the just subdued but still simmering South China Sea disputes, is intentionally heated up by the Western media to drive a wedge between China and its neighbors, and is, in essence, the theory of "China Threat" in a new but more insidious formula.
The West has all along viewed the China-India relations with a complicated mindset, particularly at the time, when the old-line capitalist markets are on the uphill path to recovery, the emerging economies like China and India are well on their way to restoring the galloping growth rate, which has seen the respectively 8% and 7% for China and India. Out of jealousy or what else, the Western powers, with the century-old dominance over the world structure, would find it hard to face up to the bitter reality that the international political and economic layout is no more designed solely by the used-to-be powerful hands, but turns out a result combined with the nascent strength.
It is therefore highly understandable that the conventional powers attempt so desperately to strike a nerve with China-India relations, as they assume, by reopening the wound and repeatedly spraying salt into it, that the normal tempo of Sino-Indo relations would be dislocated and their hidden motive to borrow India's resentment and hand to contain China's rise, which also frays the nerves of the West world, would be fulfilled, all unnoticed.
Why the West inclines to make a big issue of China-India relations may also rest on the reality of the two Asian giants: When it comes to population, two countries stand out heads and shoulders above all others: India and China with over a billion people each. Additionally, economic growth is driving the rise of the two powers. Since 1978, when China had decided to partake in the world economic order, the country's economy has grown at fantastic speed. India's reforms, which first began to be implemented in the 1990s, are now bearing the fruits of similarly dizzying growth.
And what the West concerns most is that the trade relations between the two have all these years remained steadfast in development and improvement, albeit the occasional rubs and imbalances. The two sides have been always trying to settle the trade spats through dialogue and consultations, and are endeavoring to perfect the mechanism for more effective bilateral communications.
More over, the two governments have generally kept on good terms, even though the good old days of Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai (Indians and Chinese are brothers) in Nehru's day is already a golden memory in the diplomatic history. However, all this seems to just run counter to the "Cold War" mentality held obstinately by some Western powers. They would be more ready to accept the estranged, or even hostile China-India relations, given that India, in their eyes, is of one feather, being a capitalist democracy, while China is a socialist country with its own characteristics.
On top of that, to secure their access to Asia, and maintain their coveted preeminence over the region, the West has to pull one to its side to check and beat the other, and it bets on India. But the wise Indian government, walking on the tight rope between doves and hawks at home, is not so willing to place the China-India ties at stake, the time-honored bilateral relations entering its 60th anniversary, and keeping a far-reaching significance.
As a matter of fact, it is not China that intends to encircle India, but the West that is launching a preemptive encirclement round Asia, not physically but strategically.
It is perfectly obvious that China and India have not only the shared border, but beyond it, more common interests. And mutual trust is not just a have-to before achieving the win-win goal, but a great blessing to both peoples of 2.5 billion in all.
The articles in this column represent the author's views only. They do not represent opinions of People's Daily or People's Daily Online.
Hawks pecking at the brittle nerves of India
16:50, September 19, 2010
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By Li Hongmei
China-Indo rivalry has again been hyped up recently by some American media as well as the hawkish media in India. But the China-India discord they singled out to cook up still fall into the empty political platitudes—Kashmir issues; the so-called China's "String of Pearls" to encircle India, and "the acute need for India-US cooperation to counterbalance China's presence in Indian Ocean"; and the legacies of border disputes and Tibet-related issues.
And this, actually in a similar vein to the just subdued but still simmering South China Sea disputes, is intentionally heated up by the Western media to drive a wedge between China and its neighbors, and is, in essence, the theory of "China Threat" in a new but more insidious formula.
The West has all along viewed the China-India relations with a complicated mindset, particularly at the time, when the old-line capitalist markets are on the uphill path to recovery, the emerging economies like China and India are well on their way to restoring the galloping growth rate, which has seen the respectively 8% and 7% for China and India. Out of jealousy or what else, the Western powers, with the century-old dominance over the world structure, would find it hard to face up to the bitter reality that the international political and economic layout is no more designed solely by the used-to-be powerful hands, but turns out a result combined with the nascent strength.
It is therefore highly understandable that the conventional powers attempt so desperately to strike a nerve with China-India relations, as they assume, by reopening the wound and repeatedly spraying salt into it, that the normal tempo of Sino-Indo relations would be dislocated and their hidden motive to borrow India's resentment and hand to contain China's rise, which also frays the nerves of the West world, would be fulfilled, all unnoticed.
Why the West inclines to make a big issue of China-India relations may also rest on the reality of the two Asian giants: When it comes to population, two countries stand out heads and shoulders above all others: India and China with over a billion people each. Additionally, economic growth is driving the rise of the two powers. Since 1978, when China had decided to partake in the world economic order, the country's economy has grown at fantastic speed. India's reforms, which first began to be implemented in the 1990s, are now bearing the fruits of similarly dizzying growth.
And what the West concerns most is that the trade relations between the two have all these years remained steadfast in development and improvement, albeit the occasional rubs and imbalances. The two sides have been always trying to settle the trade spats through dialogue and consultations, and are endeavoring to perfect the mechanism for more effective bilateral communications.
More over, the two governments have generally kept on good terms, even though the good old days of Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai (Indians and Chinese are brothers) in Nehru's day is already a golden memory in the diplomatic history. However, all this seems to just run counter to the "Cold War" mentality held obstinately by some Western powers. They would be more ready to accept the estranged, or even hostile China-India relations, given that India, in their eyes, is of one feather, being a capitalist democracy, while China is a socialist country with its own characteristics.
On top of that, to secure their access to Asia, and maintain their coveted preeminence over the region, the West has to pull one to its side to check and beat the other, and it bets on India. But the wise Indian government, walking on the tight rope between doves and hawks at home, is not so willing to place the China-India ties at stake, the time-honored bilateral relations entering its 60th anniversary, and keeping a far-reaching significance.
As a matter of fact, it is not China that intends to encircle India, but the West that is launching a preemptive encirclement round Asia, not physically but strategically.
It is perfectly obvious that China and India have not only the shared border, but beyond it, more common interests. And mutual trust is not just a have-to before achieving the win-win goal, but a great blessing to both peoples of 2.5 billion in all.
The articles in this column represent the author's views only. They do not represent opinions of People's Daily or People's Daily Online.
X-posting.....
Tiananmen is long past. Right now, it's time to wake up and smell the gunpowder. As the Asian Century unfolds, India must get its act together to prevent its powerful northern neighbour from usurping the country's future
Deng Xiaoping was given to one-liners. "Cross the river by feeling the pebbles," China's former premier famously said on the adoption of market reforms. But the analogy goes well with attempts to bridge the gulf between a belligerent China on the rise and a nail-chewing India on the lookout—and the pebbles are not smooth.
The 20th anniversary of China's brutal suppression of the Tiananmen uprising may have kept democracy wonks occupied across the world last week. Yet, the relationship between China and India, as they emerge from their colonial past to reclaim their economic trajectories and prosperity, could well be the biggest story of the so-called 'Asian Century'. It is a story of new global competition and old mutual suspicion, of economic growth yet diplomatic distance. Of dangerous unsettled borders and a potent arms race. It is a tale of international diplomacy trying to offset regional intrigues.
In other words, a new Great Game is playing out. It is apparent in China's encirclement of India through military aid, diplomatic support and manoeuvres to gain port access in the South Asian region. It is visible in remote oil fields and bauxites mines in Africa, where both compete. It is palpable even in Silicon Valley, as India cedes cyberspace to a newly computer-savvy China. Signs can be seen even on Indian shopshelves, as China storms the market with low-priced factory products on the back of a mighty manufacturing machine and an artificially cheap currency.
What, really, is India's counter plan?
Is there a China strategy at all?
These are worrying questions, and they demand hard answers. The thing is, China does not even consider India in the same league as itself. "India suffers from diplomatic myopia," says Bharat Karnad, national security expert at Delhi think-tank Centre for Policy Research, "China is a nation which recognises only the language of power. After the Pokhran II nuclear blasts, we had a window of opportunity to come level with China. However, we were too timid. India must assess the complexity and scope of Chinese power. The Chinese compete with us on all levels and this has to be recognised."
A recent example of that rivalry was the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) waiver, where China tried till the very end to scupper India's admission to the nuclear club. That its opposition was a surprise reveals complete complacency on India's part. "We fell yet again for the verbal trap," rues a diplomat who was in Vienna for the NSG deal, "The Chinese assurances to our leaders counted for nothing at the table." Déjà vu 1962? As then, the reality now is sobering; it's Kissingerian. Think 'interests'. China has an interest in India's isolation. It would give it command of the Asian Theatre. This new Great Game has four aspects: economic, military, diplomatic and bilateral relations, particularly the vexed border question. India needs to define its options and work out how to calibrate its moves on each.
ECONOMIC DIMENSION
The great leap ahead of India that China has taken is relatively recent. In the late 1970s, both countries were roughly at par—closed and in poverty. They had little integration with the global economy. Controls on capital, investment and trade characterised both their economic profiles. But by 1980, China had initiated tentative reforms, with legitimacy given to once-secret (and successful) private farming, and allowances made for market incentives in other sectors. Investment and exports zoomed, and the country's economic emergence is now spoken of as a historic phenomenon. Never in the world have so many risen out of poverty so fast, ever.
With a 2008 GDP of $4.4 trillion, China is the world's third largest economy, and the fastest growing as well. With an investment rate of an annual 40 per cent of GDP, its growth has sizzled in double digits for two decades or more (dipping to high single digits only these past two years). Foreign direct investment has played a stellar role, a good $90 billion in 2008. And if those gleaming cities, superhighways, maglev trains and other infrastructural marvels aren't enough to boast of, China holds the world's largest cache of foreign currency reserves at $2 trillion.
India's $1.1 trillion economy is modest in comparison on every count. And with the country's GDP growth panting to get anywhere close, global analysts such as Parag Khanna are already saying the race is over. China has pulled itself far ahead, with no hope that India can catch up. To put this in perspective, China's exports alone at $1.4 trillion in 2008 are larger than India's GDP.
Optimists believe that China's success in goods exports to the West, which has spawned regional trade linkages within Asia, could boost India's own trade prospects. True, Sino-India trade has risen from just $2 billion in 2000 to over $35 billion in 2007. Yet, the terms of trade are distinctly neo-colonial, with India shipping raw materials such as iron ore, minerals, cotton and other commodities, and getting value-added products such as machinery and appliances. "The devil is in the details," says Ajay Sahai, director general of the Federation of Indian Export Organisations, "Sino-Indian trade is skewed in China's favour. In the first nine months of 2008, we had a trade deficit with China to the order of $9 billion."
If this were a simple matter of comparative advantage, each country delivering what it is relatively better at, it may still be okay. But Chinese policy distorts economics. It is known to deploy State resources towards export dominance, which gives its export factories a cost structure that's hard to match. Take its subsidy regime. "China is a threat because their legendary productivity has an opaque origin," says Rafeeque Ahmed, managing director of Farida, a Rs 580 crore leather export house, "The Chinese currency is still undervalued, its labour laws are not as restrictive as in India, and they have access to cheap capital as State-owned and quasi-State-owned enterprises there get loan write-offs as a matter of course."
India's commodity exports, meanwhile, "may be a short-term gain but it will result in long-term dependence on China", warns Sahai. What's worse, India is falling behind China in the global race to secure oil, gas and mineral assets overseas to fuel the blistering economic growth. Nowhere is this more in play than Africa. China does $40 billion of trade with the continent, most of it buying raw materials and fossil fuels. In Sudan, India and China have a rare partnership in the Greater Nile Oil Project, an oil venture in which China has 40 per cent stake and India's own ONGC Videsh has 25 per cent. However, China has 4,000 troops and support infrastructure on the ground, with no qualms about exercising its diplomatic clout in shielding the Sudanese regime (and its interests) from Western pressure over the Darfur crisis. China's voice has the backing of a gilt-edged fact: it is the US government's single largest creditor. When Chinese officials discuss the dollar's value, the world listens.
That's a measure of power projection, a concept alien to Indian diplomatic circles. Money talks. "India lacks the ready availability of domestic and foreign capital which is available in China," says Barry Bosworth, an expert of Sino-Indian economic relations at the Brookings Institution, a Washington DC think-tank, "It moves very slowly to strengthen infrastructure, and lags behind in creating opportunities for low-skilled labour. Both services and those parts of manufacturing where India does well tend to rely on high-skilled labour inputs. India needs to expand financial resources. Longer term, there is a need to fix a dysfunctional public education system."
In that, Bosworth touches upon India's great big hope: education. Free democracies tend to generate intellectual capital in large numbers, and so industries that use this as an input ought to spell an advantage for India. Yet, even in infotech exports, China is showing signs of success. It exports only $1 billion of the stuff, compared to India's $46 billion odd, but a 2007 report on the Chinese challenge by Nasscom says, 'IT in China is witnessing growth. Leading Chinese firms have reported above average growth rates of 40-50 per cent over the past few years. Venture capital investors have also announced significant investments demonstrating their conviction in the China IT-BPO story. Chinese firms are beginning to receive a steady stream of business enquiries from Western customers.' Clearly, India needs to get beyond the rhetoric on education.
THE BORDER QUESTION
As flashpoints go, the Sino-Indian border is potentially the most dangerous in the world. It's that one dispute between the two countries that could turn volatile at less than a moment's notice. India and China have held several rounds of high-level border talks, but nothing has come of it. The trouble can be traced to the 1962 war, in which India got a hiding from China's People's Liberation Army (PLA). The humiliation has left India scared. So much so that the Government commissioned Henderson-Brooks report on the war is still a State secret. All that's known is what it did to Jawaharlal Nehru's earlier 'Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai' policy—made it a laughing stock.
The current scenario? India claims 10,000 sq km in the northern sector in the region of Aksai Chin, which is under Chinese control. On its part, China lays claim to all of Arunachal Pradesh in the eastern sector (apart from some nooks in the mid sector facing Uttarakhand). For China, Arunachal is 'Southern Tibet', a term increasingly used by Chinese foreign policy think-tanks. China not only refuses to recognise the McMahon Line, a border drawn by the British, it has made some 30 incursions into Indian territory here. It also flouts border decorum by refusing to authenticate the ground positions of its army stationed in the sector.
India had hoped that recognising Tibet as an 'autonomous part of China', during former Prime Minister AB Vajpayee's 2003 visit to Beijing, would cool relations down. If anything, China's position has hardened. "China clearly thinks it is in a position of advantage," says an Indian diplomat, "Its economic growth and military modernisation, as well as the issue with Taiwan, call for buying time on the India border question. This is exactly what it is doing."
In 1962, China had overrun all of Arunachal before it withdrew its forces. India fears a repeat. "India is in a humiliating position," says Karnad, "The more we postpone the border issue, the more ground we lose. Time is on China's side." As a pre-emptive measure, India has a massive development programme underway in Arunachal to minimise any local disaffection. "Make no mistake," says a Planning Commission official, "This is a mini Marshall Plan, a project to make Arunachal modern." Besides turning the state into a hydropower major, it could rouse local support and thus give India a bigger bargaining chip with China in settling the dispute. A comprehensive deal, though, may involve the forfeiture of Aksai Chin. What India wouldn't want is a test of force, since jaw-jaw is always better than war-war, though it would be foolish not to be prepared even for such an eventuality.
MILITARY IMBALANCE
The real asymmetry in the Sino-Indian relationship is the military one. In 2008, China boosted its defence budget by nearly 20 per cent to $57 billion, more than double of India's. And this is just over 1 per cent of the bigger country's GDP, which leaves room for further increases. From India's perspective, three aspects of the Chinese military upgradation are of particular concern. One, the beefing up of the PLA's rapid action forces. Two, the modernisation of the PLA Navy. And three, by far the scariest in this mad, mad, mad world, the deployment of its latest nuclear missiles.
Backed by new technology and railway supply lines, China has scaled up the presence of its rapid action special forces in Tibet that face India (under the PLA's 13th Army in the Chongdu region and augmented by the 52nd Brigade in nearby Linzi). By Indian intelligence estimates, these forces include tank brigades and rapid airlift capabilities as well as paratroopers. "The Chinese rapid action forces capacity has been significantly beefed up," says General VP Malik, former Chief of Army Staff, "It is a clear immediate challenge for our defence planners."
An equally pressing worry—the PLA Navy's designs in the Indian Ocean. Its new fleet of Russian destroyers and rejigged aircraft carriers may be seen as routine additions. But its new Jin-class nuclear submarines carry nuclear weapons, assuring it deterrent sea patrol capability for the first time. With its JL2 missiles, which can be shot off from under the sea, it can nuke any Subcontinental target.
What also makes India hot around the collar is China's plan for a missile base on Hainan Island, which would bring both the Pacific and Indian Ocean within strike range. Nuclear tipped or not, Chinese missiles have reached quite another quantum level. When China blasted a satellite to smithereens in mid-January 2007, for example, it was the US and Russia that sat up—the only two countries that had achieved such precision targeting in space. In the context of America's 'Star Wars' vision and more recent National Missile Defense shield, it signalled a new order of deterrence by China.
The latest in its arsenal is the Dong Feng 31, an intercontinental ballistic missile with a range of 8,000 km, a solid-fueled, three-stage weapon that can hit targets in the US. For India, an even greater concern is the Dong Feng 21, stationed in Delingha near Tibet, that can strike anywhere in India given its 2,500 km range.
India, in contrast, has stumbled in its missile programme. While its test of the Agni III (range: 3,500 km) was a success, it is far from deployment stage. What's more, Indian missiles are designed for kilotonne payloads, while Chinese rockets can carry warheads of up to one megatonne, making the Agni look like a firecracker. To compound matters, military cooperation between China and Pakistan, even Bangladesh, is getting thicker. Myanmar is another question, and Nepal is slipping into Chinese influence. In all, India could find China running rings around it in South Asia. But then, in risk doth lie opportunity...
Red Storm Rising
Tiananmen is long past. Right now, it's time to wake up and smell the gunpowder. As the Asian Century unfolds, India must get its act together to prevent its powerful northern neighbour from usurping the country's future
Deng Xiaoping was given to one-liners. "Cross the river by feeling the pebbles," China's former premier famously said on the adoption of market reforms. But the analogy goes well with attempts to bridge the gulf between a belligerent China on the rise and a nail-chewing India on the lookout—and the pebbles are not smooth.
The 20th anniversary of China's brutal suppression of the Tiananmen uprising may have kept democracy wonks occupied across the world last week. Yet, the relationship between China and India, as they emerge from their colonial past to reclaim their economic trajectories and prosperity, could well be the biggest story of the so-called 'Asian Century'. It is a story of new global competition and old mutual suspicion, of economic growth yet diplomatic distance. Of dangerous unsettled borders and a potent arms race. It is a tale of international diplomacy trying to offset regional intrigues.
In other words, a new Great Game is playing out. It is apparent in China's encirclement of India through military aid, diplomatic support and manoeuvres to gain port access in the South Asian region. It is visible in remote oil fields and bauxites mines in Africa, where both compete. It is palpable even in Silicon Valley, as India cedes cyberspace to a newly computer-savvy China. Signs can be seen even on Indian shopshelves, as China storms the market with low-priced factory products on the back of a mighty manufacturing machine and an artificially cheap currency.
What, really, is India's counter plan?
Is there a China strategy at all?
These are worrying questions, and they demand hard answers. The thing is, China does not even consider India in the same league as itself. "India suffers from diplomatic myopia," says Bharat Karnad, national security expert at Delhi think-tank Centre for Policy Research, "China is a nation which recognises only the language of power. After the Pokhran II nuclear blasts, we had a window of opportunity to come level with China. However, we were too timid. India must assess the complexity and scope of Chinese power. The Chinese compete with us on all levels and this has to be recognised."
A recent example of that rivalry was the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) waiver, where China tried till the very end to scupper India's admission to the nuclear club. That its opposition was a surprise reveals complete complacency on India's part. "We fell yet again for the verbal trap," rues a diplomat who was in Vienna for the NSG deal, "The Chinese assurances to our leaders counted for nothing at the table." Déjà vu 1962? As then, the reality now is sobering; it's Kissingerian. Think 'interests'. China has an interest in India's isolation. It would give it command of the Asian Theatre. This new Great Game has four aspects: economic, military, diplomatic and bilateral relations, particularly the vexed border question. India needs to define its options and work out how to calibrate its moves on each.
ECONOMIC DIMENSION
The great leap ahead of India that China has taken is relatively recent. In the late 1970s, both countries were roughly at par—closed and in poverty. They had little integration with the global economy. Controls on capital, investment and trade characterised both their economic profiles. But by 1980, China had initiated tentative reforms, with legitimacy given to once-secret (and successful) private farming, and allowances made for market incentives in other sectors. Investment and exports zoomed, and the country's economic emergence is now spoken of as a historic phenomenon. Never in the world have so many risen out of poverty so fast, ever.
With a 2008 GDP of $4.4 trillion, China is the world's third largest economy, and the fastest growing as well. With an investment rate of an annual 40 per cent of GDP, its growth has sizzled in double digits for two decades or more (dipping to high single digits only these past two years). Foreign direct investment has played a stellar role, a good $90 billion in 2008. And if those gleaming cities, superhighways, maglev trains and other infrastructural marvels aren't enough to boast of, China holds the world's largest cache of foreign currency reserves at $2 trillion.
India's $1.1 trillion economy is modest in comparison on every count. And with the country's GDP growth panting to get anywhere close, global analysts such as Parag Khanna are already saying the race is over. China has pulled itself far ahead, with no hope that India can catch up. To put this in perspective, China's exports alone at $1.4 trillion in 2008 are larger than India's GDP.
Optimists believe that China's success in goods exports to the West, which has spawned regional trade linkages within Asia, could boost India's own trade prospects. True, Sino-India trade has risen from just $2 billion in 2000 to over $35 billion in 2007. Yet, the terms of trade are distinctly neo-colonial, with India shipping raw materials such as iron ore, minerals, cotton and other commodities, and getting value-added products such as machinery and appliances. "The devil is in the details," says Ajay Sahai, director general of the Federation of Indian Export Organisations, "Sino-Indian trade is skewed in China's favour. In the first nine months of 2008, we had a trade deficit with China to the order of $9 billion."
If this were a simple matter of comparative advantage, each country delivering what it is relatively better at, it may still be okay. But Chinese policy distorts economics. It is known to deploy State resources towards export dominance, which gives its export factories a cost structure that's hard to match. Take its subsidy regime. "China is a threat because their legendary productivity has an opaque origin," says Rafeeque Ahmed, managing director of Farida, a Rs 580 crore leather export house, "The Chinese currency is still undervalued, its labour laws are not as restrictive as in India, and they have access to cheap capital as State-owned and quasi-State-owned enterprises there get loan write-offs as a matter of course."
India's commodity exports, meanwhile, "may be a short-term gain but it will result in long-term dependence on China", warns Sahai. What's worse, India is falling behind China in the global race to secure oil, gas and mineral assets overseas to fuel the blistering economic growth. Nowhere is this more in play than Africa. China does $40 billion of trade with the continent, most of it buying raw materials and fossil fuels. In Sudan, India and China have a rare partnership in the Greater Nile Oil Project, an oil venture in which China has 40 per cent stake and India's own ONGC Videsh has 25 per cent. However, China has 4,000 troops and support infrastructure on the ground, with no qualms about exercising its diplomatic clout in shielding the Sudanese regime (and its interests) from Western pressure over the Darfur crisis. China's voice has the backing of a gilt-edged fact: it is the US government's single largest creditor. When Chinese officials discuss the dollar's value, the world listens.
That's a measure of power projection, a concept alien to Indian diplomatic circles. Money talks. "India lacks the ready availability of domestic and foreign capital which is available in China," says Barry Bosworth, an expert of Sino-Indian economic relations at the Brookings Institution, a Washington DC think-tank, "It moves very slowly to strengthen infrastructure, and lags behind in creating opportunities for low-skilled labour. Both services and those parts of manufacturing where India does well tend to rely on high-skilled labour inputs. India needs to expand financial resources. Longer term, there is a need to fix a dysfunctional public education system."
In that, Bosworth touches upon India's great big hope: education. Free democracies tend to generate intellectual capital in large numbers, and so industries that use this as an input ought to spell an advantage for India. Yet, even in infotech exports, China is showing signs of success. It exports only $1 billion of the stuff, compared to India's $46 billion odd, but a 2007 report on the Chinese challenge by Nasscom says, 'IT in China is witnessing growth. Leading Chinese firms have reported above average growth rates of 40-50 per cent over the past few years. Venture capital investors have also announced significant investments demonstrating their conviction in the China IT-BPO story. Chinese firms are beginning to receive a steady stream of business enquiries from Western customers.' Clearly, India needs to get beyond the rhetoric on education.
THE BORDER QUESTION
As flashpoints go, the Sino-Indian border is potentially the most dangerous in the world. It's that one dispute between the two countries that could turn volatile at less than a moment's notice. India and China have held several rounds of high-level border talks, but nothing has come of it. The trouble can be traced to the 1962 war, in which India got a hiding from China's People's Liberation Army (PLA). The humiliation has left India scared. So much so that the Government commissioned Henderson-Brooks report on the war is still a State secret. All that's known is what it did to Jawaharlal Nehru's earlier 'Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai' policy—made it a laughing stock.
The current scenario? India claims 10,000 sq km in the northern sector in the region of Aksai Chin, which is under Chinese control. On its part, China lays claim to all of Arunachal Pradesh in the eastern sector (apart from some nooks in the mid sector facing Uttarakhand). For China, Arunachal is 'Southern Tibet', a term increasingly used by Chinese foreign policy think-tanks. China not only refuses to recognise the McMahon Line, a border drawn by the British, it has made some 30 incursions into Indian territory here. It also flouts border decorum by refusing to authenticate the ground positions of its army stationed in the sector.
India had hoped that recognising Tibet as an 'autonomous part of China', during former Prime Minister AB Vajpayee's 2003 visit to Beijing, would cool relations down. If anything, China's position has hardened. "China clearly thinks it is in a position of advantage," says an Indian diplomat, "Its economic growth and military modernisation, as well as the issue with Taiwan, call for buying time on the India border question. This is exactly what it is doing."
In 1962, China had overrun all of Arunachal before it withdrew its forces. India fears a repeat. "India is in a humiliating position," says Karnad, "The more we postpone the border issue, the more ground we lose. Time is on China's side." As a pre-emptive measure, India has a massive development programme underway in Arunachal to minimise any local disaffection. "Make no mistake," says a Planning Commission official, "This is a mini Marshall Plan, a project to make Arunachal modern." Besides turning the state into a hydropower major, it could rouse local support and thus give India a bigger bargaining chip with China in settling the dispute. A comprehensive deal, though, may involve the forfeiture of Aksai Chin. What India wouldn't want is a test of force, since jaw-jaw is always better than war-war, though it would be foolish not to be prepared even for such an eventuality.
MILITARY IMBALANCE
The real asymmetry in the Sino-Indian relationship is the military one. In 2008, China boosted its defence budget by nearly 20 per cent to $57 billion, more than double of India's. And this is just over 1 per cent of the bigger country's GDP, which leaves room for further increases. From India's perspective, three aspects of the Chinese military upgradation are of particular concern. One, the beefing up of the PLA's rapid action forces. Two, the modernisation of the PLA Navy. And three, by far the scariest in this mad, mad, mad world, the deployment of its latest nuclear missiles.
Backed by new technology and railway supply lines, China has scaled up the presence of its rapid action special forces in Tibet that face India (under the PLA's 13th Army in the Chongdu region and augmented by the 52nd Brigade in nearby Linzi). By Indian intelligence estimates, these forces include tank brigades and rapid airlift capabilities as well as paratroopers. "The Chinese rapid action forces capacity has been significantly beefed up," says General VP Malik, former Chief of Army Staff, "It is a clear immediate challenge for our defence planners."
An equally pressing worry—the PLA Navy's designs in the Indian Ocean. Its new fleet of Russian destroyers and rejigged aircraft carriers may be seen as routine additions. But its new Jin-class nuclear submarines carry nuclear weapons, assuring it deterrent sea patrol capability for the first time. With its JL2 missiles, which can be shot off from under the sea, it can nuke any Subcontinental target.
What also makes India hot around the collar is China's plan for a missile base on Hainan Island, which would bring both the Pacific and Indian Ocean within strike range. Nuclear tipped or not, Chinese missiles have reached quite another quantum level. When China blasted a satellite to smithereens in mid-January 2007, for example, it was the US and Russia that sat up—the only two countries that had achieved such precision targeting in space. In the context of America's 'Star Wars' vision and more recent National Missile Defense shield, it signalled a new order of deterrence by China.
The latest in its arsenal is the Dong Feng 31, an intercontinental ballistic missile with a range of 8,000 km, a solid-fueled, three-stage weapon that can hit targets in the US. For India, an even greater concern is the Dong Feng 21, stationed in Delingha near Tibet, that can strike anywhere in India given its 2,500 km range.
India, in contrast, has stumbled in its missile programme. While its test of the Agni III (range: 3,500 km) was a success, it is far from deployment stage. What's more, Indian missiles are designed for kilotonne payloads, while Chinese rockets can carry warheads of up to one megatonne, making the Agni look like a firecracker. To compound matters, military cooperation between China and Pakistan, even Bangladesh, is getting thicker. Myanmar is another question, and Nepal is slipping into Chinese influence. In all, India could find China running rings around it in South Asia. But then, in risk doth lie opportunity...
Drawn in at the borders
Having squandered some of the best years in the history of India's external relations, the UPA government's defence policy is now condemned to deal with some of the worst. Through much of its first term in government, the UPA had a relatively peaceful Jammu and Kashmir, a ceasefire on the borders with Pakistan, a measure of stability in Afghanistan, tranquil borders with China, and improving relations with all the major powers.
That was the moment to undertake some comprehensive defence sector reforms, do the groundwork for rapid military modernisation, alter the internal dynamics of Kashmir, and catch up with China's rising power potential.
Sadly, the UPA government did not. It now confronts the prospect of the Taliban's return to power in Afghanistan, a breakdown in the peace process with Pakistan, a stalled boundary negotiation with China, internal turbulence in Kashmir, China's questioning of India's sovereignty over J&K, and deepening Sino-Pak cooperation across the board, including in Jammu and Kashmir.
Meanwhile, the government's hand-wringing in face of a crisis in Kashmir and the serious internal discord in the Congress party raise questions about the political will of the Indian state under the UPA government. It will be no surprise if India's adversaries want to take advantage of widely perceived fecklessness in Delhi.
As the idea of a two-front military tension gains ground — the thesis that has been argued not just by the former National Security Adviser Brajesh Mishra but also by General Deepak Kapoor, when he was the chief of army staff — amidst a worsening regional security environment, India's military faces great challenges.
There is nothing in the publicly available excerpts from the remarks of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Defence Minister A.K. Antony at the combined commanders meeting last Monday to suggest that Delhi is gearing up. The defence ministry continues to return money approved by Parliament for building arms year after year. The annual spending on defence as a percentage of GDP has fallen to one of its lowest levels since border clashes with China in 1962.
Although arms makers from around the recession-hit advanced world are queuing up in Delhi, our defence ministry seems unable to develop an acquisition process that can grasp the opportunity for a significant expansion of India's defence industrial base.
While the Indian private sector is eager to build advanced arms manufacturing capabilities, the defence ministry seems to think that stuffing contracts down the throat of public sector units that are choking with orders they cannot execute is in the best national interest.
Cynics would say we should forget the tall talk of a defence industrial base when the UPA government cannot even build roads on our borders. The prime minister told the combined commanders that "border infrastructure" is an "integral part" of our defence preparedness and the task must be approached with some "urgency". Well put. But is any one in the government responsible for getting this done?
On his part, Antony told the brass that India "cannot lose sight of the fact that China has been improving its military and physical infrastructure" on our borders. This probably is the understatement of the decade, for China's transformation of the transport infrastructure in Yunnan, Tibet, and Xinjiang, the provinces that border South Asia, has been nothing short of revolutionary. China's decision to build road and rail networks across the borders of these provinces is bound to transform forever the geopolitics of our neighbourhood.
One wonders if Antony's statement that we should not lose sight of the PLA's new mobility along and across its border is an abstract philosophical statement or a commitment to respond.
A recent report from the parliamentary standing committee on defence suggests the progress on road-building on our northern frontiers has been simply pathetic. According to the report, of the 277 roads that the UPA government decided to build a few years ago, only 29 have been completed to date. There is said to be progress of sorts (think Commonwealth Games) on another 168 roads, and work has not even started on 80 projects.
The state of border road-building is symptomatic of the nation's larger defence paralysis. A national disaster like the 1962 debacle with China awaits the UPA government if it does not get its defence act together quickly. In 1962, it was Delhi's failure to understand the significance of Chinese road-building in Ladakh that set off the crisis.
The debacle of 1962 was not really a military disaster. The Indian army lost only a few battles. The air force was barely used. There was not much of a navy to talk about. As China administered a limited amount of force to teach India a lesson, the war was lost in the mind of a Delhi that was utterly unprepared.
The tragedy of 1962 was in essence a failure of the civilian leadership of our military. It was about the naive assumptions about the world that India's political leadership had cherished. Delhi had then misread China's interests, intentions and capabilities.
For many, a national disgrace of the kind seen in 1962 is unimaginable in the current environment. Has not India become a much stronger economy since the early 1990s? Is not its military much more capable than in 1962? The fact, however, is that India's relative defence gains have been outstripped by the more rapid advances in Chinese military power.
As Chinese power today radiates at us not just from across the Himalayas but also the Indian Ocean, Delhi's problem is neither the lack of financial resources nor the absence of military/ technical solutions. It is about the UPA government's political will to address the defence challenges purposefully.
There are two ways in which nations cope with defence challenges. One is to mobilise the nation's own resources and restructure the defence apparatus. The other is to leverage external opportunities. Any serious Indian defence strategy must do both, much like it did after 1962. But is there any one out there in charge of India's defence policy?
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