Denucleaization of Pakistan For more than six decades, Pakistan has been at war with itself, the events that have unfolded so far this year -- the assassination of Governor Salman Taseer for expressing moderate views, killing benazire butto by radicals inside within Pakistan, the killing of Osama bin Laden in Pakistan's most conspicuously military town. The attack on Sunday, May 22 2011, by Taliban fighters on the Mehran naval air base in Karachi , the militaristic precision with which it was executed , carried a message: Pakistan is no longer a contested territory. The reins of official power may not be in their hands yet, but the men with whom they rest dare not challenge the extremists' conception of Pakistan. Moderate Pakistan, if such a thing ever existed, is dead. The Taliban insists that the attack on Mehran was payback for bin Laden's "martyrdom." This means that it took them less than three weeks to select their target, identify its assets -- the Orion P-3C aircraft -- and map out its most vulnerable points of entry. The attacks occurred on a day when U.S. personnel, more valuable than the aircraft, were on-site. It is inconceivable that this attack could have materialized without insider support. It was always known that a substantial number of Pakistan's armed forces -- 30 percent, by some estimates -- sympathized with the objectives of the forces they were fighting. The world now acknowledges the fact that Pakistan's military is so deeply riven, its loyalties so thoroughly fractured, that it is incapable not only of defending Pakistan but is also dangerously unfit to be the custodian of its nuclear arsenal. It is time for US and rest of the world, Pakistan's principal paymaster in the West, to pursue the option of comprehensively denuclearizing Pakistan. It is often said that Pakistan's decision to build the bomb was motivated by India's explosion of its own device in 1974. But in reality Pakistan's nuclear program was in response to the loss of East Pakistan in 1971. In 1972, Bhutto assembled Pakistan's top scientists and demanded a bomb in three years , Bhutto authorized a young Pakistani metallurgist working on nuclear plants in the Netherlands to steal sensitive information. The 1975 arrival of Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan considerably advanced these efforts. Dr. Khan is a German-trained metallurgist who brought with him knowledge of gas centrifuge technologies that he had acquired through his position at the classified URENCO uranium enrichment plant in the Netherlands. Dr. Khan also reportedly brought with him stolen uranium enrichment technologies from Europe. He was put in charge of building, equipping and operating Pakistan's Kahuta facility, which was established in 1976. Under Khan's direction, Pakistan employed an extensive clandestine network in order to obtain the necessary materials and technology for its developing uranium enrichment capabilities. In 1985, Pakistan crossed the threshold of weapons-grade uranium production, and by 1986 it is thought to have produced enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon. Pakistan continued advancing its uranium enrichment program, and according to Pakistani sources, the nation acquired the ability to carry out a nuclear explosion in 1987.Pakistan's nuclear program is based primarily on highly enriched uranium (HEU), which is produced at the A. Q. Khan research laboratory at Kahuta, a gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facility. The Kahuta facility has been in operation since the early 1980s. By the early 1990s, Kahuta had an estimated 3,000 centrifuges in operation, and Pakistan continued its pursuit of expanded uranium enrichment capabilities. On May 28, 1998 Pakistan announced that it had successfully conducted five nuclear tests. The Pakistani Atomic Energy Commission reported that the five nuclear tests conducted on May 28 generated a seismic signal of 5.0 on the Richter scale, with a total yield of up to 40 KT (equivalent TNT). Dr. A.Q. Khan claimed that one device was a boosted fission device and that the other four were sub-kiloton nuclear devices. On May 30, 1998 Pakistan tested one more nuclear warhead with a reported yield of 12 kilotons. The tests were conducted at Balochistan, bringing the total number of claimed tests to six. It has also been claimed by Pakistani sources that at least one additional device, initially planned for detonation on 30 May 1998, remained emplaced underground ready for detonation. Pakistani claims concerning the number and yields of their underground tests cannot be independently confirmed by seismic means, and several sources, such as the Southern Arizona Seismic Observatory have reported lower yields than those claimed by Pakistan. Indian sources have also suggested that as few as two weapons were actually detonated, each with yields considerably lower than claimed by Pakistan. However, seismic data showed at least two and possibly a third, much smaller, test in the initial round of tests at the Ras Koh range. Pakistan Nuclear Arsenal Single test on 30 May provided a clear seismic signal. 28 May 1998 - 25-36 kiloton total 9-12 kiloton Fission device - 8 May 1998 12 kiloton Low-yield device - 28 May 1998 sub-kiloton Low-yield device - 28 May 1998 sub-kiloton Low-yield device - 28 May 1998 sub-kiloton Fission device - 30 May 1998 - 12 kiloton 4-6 kiloton Fission device not detonated - 12 kiloton Table lists the nuclear tests that Pakistan claims to have carried out in May 1998 as well as the announced yields. Other sources have reported lower yields than those claimed by Pakistan. The Southern Arizona Seismic Observatory reports that the total seismic yield for the May 28th tests was 9-12 kilotons and that the yield for the May 30th tests was 4-6 kilotons. According to a preliminary analysis conducted at Los Alamos National Laboratory, material released into the atmosphere during an underground nuclear test by Pakistan in May 1998 contained low levels of weapons-grade plutonium. The significance of the Los Alamos finding was that Pakistan had either imported or produced plutonium undetected by the US intelligence community. But Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and other agencies later contested the accuracy of this finding. In the 1990s Pakistan began to pursue plutonium production capabilities. With Chinese assistance, Pakistan built the 40 MWt (megawatt thermal) Khusab research reactor at Joharabad, and in April 1998, Pakistan announced that the reactor was operational. According to public statements made by US officials, this unsafeguarded heavy water reactor generates an estimated 8-10 kilotons of weapons grade plutonium per year, which is enough for one to two nuclear weapons. The reactor could also produce tritium if it were loaded with lithium-6. According to J. Cirincione of Carnegie, Khusab's plutonium production capacity could allow Pakistan to develop lighter nuclear warheads that would be easier to deliver with a ballistic missile. The Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) estimates that Pakistan has built 24-48 HEU-based nuclear warheads, and Carnegie reports that they have produced 585-800 kg of HEU, enough for 30-55 weapons. Pakistan's nuclear warheads are based on an implosion design that uses a solid core of highly enriched uranium and requires an estimated 15-20 kg of material per warhead. According to Carnegie, Pakistan has also produced a small but unknown quantity of weapons grade plutonium, which is sufficient for an estimated 3-5 nuclear weapons. Pakistani authorities claim that their nuclear weapons are not assembled. They maintain that the fissile cores are stored separately from the non-nuclear explosives packages, and that the warheads are stored separately from the delivery systems. In a 2001 report, the Defense Department contends that "Islamabad's nuclear weapons are probably stored in component form" and that "Pakistan probably could assemble the weapons fairly quickly." However, no one has been able to ascertain the validity of Pakistan's assurances about their nuclear weapons security. Pakistan's reliance primarily on HEU makes its fissile materials particularly vulnerable to diversion. HEU can be used in a relatively simple gun-barrel-type design, which could be within the means of non-state actors that intend to assemble a crude nuclear weapon. The terrorist attacks on September 11th raised concerns about the security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. According to press reports, within two days of the attacks, Pakistan's military began relocating nuclear weapons components to six new secret locations. Shortly thereafter, Gen. Pervez Musharraf fired his intelligence chief and other officers and detained several suspected retired nuclear weapons scientists, in an attempt to root out extremist elements that posed a potential threat to Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. Concerns have also been raised about Pakistan as a proliferant of nuclear materials and expertise. In November, 2002, shortly after North Korea admitted to pursuing a nuclear weapons program, the press reported allegations that Pakistan had provided assistance in the development of its uranium enrichment program in exchange for North Korean missile technologies. Pakistan's acquisition of the bomb was an improvised effort, involving high-level theft of data and undetected procurement of material by flouting Western export controls. AQ Khan Pakistans nuclear godfather toured the world with his blueprints, selling varying levels of nuclear know-how to Iran, Iraq, North Korea, and Syria, among other rogue states. The United States tracked his activities for years, and in 2004, under increasing U.S. pressure, Pakistan placed Khan under house arrest. In a confession broadcast live on television, Khan claimed to be the sole salesman of Pakistan's nuclear technology. A report by the U.S. Congressional Research Service updated confirmed that al Qaeda had sought Khan's assistance. If Khan's statement was false, then who else was complicit in his nuclear trade? In 2005, a report by the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction stated that al Qaeda "had established contact" with other Pakistani scientists to develop a nuclear weapon. A majority of Pakistan's nuclear sites are located in areas now dominated by the Pakistani Taliban, and between 2007 and 2008, they launched spectacular attacks on installations in Sargodha, Kamra, and Wah. Nuclear weapons have earned Pakistan the illusion of prestige, but not security. Yet Pakistan latches on to them. Why? There are two reasons. The first is India. Pakistan's sense of itself as the authentic home of India's Muslims cannot be vindicated as long as India remains a secular state encompassing the Muslim-majority province of Kashmir. Pakistan has waged three wars to wrest Kashmir from India, but the experience of defeat led Islamabad to wage low-cost terror warfare. Pakistan has repeatedly dispatched highly trained mobile teams to attack high-profile Indian targets -- from the attack on India's Parliament in 2001 to the bombing of its embassy in Afghanistan in 2008 and the siege of Mumbai the same year -- but India's ability to retaliate, even with surgical strikes on terrorist headquarters, is severely restricted by the threat of an all-out nuclear war. The nuclear weapons shield Pakistan from accountability. The second reason is aid. Pakistan's ruling elite believes that America, terrified by the potential cost of dealing with nuclear Pakistan's failure, will always pay the price for its survival. It's an extraordinary pattern: Pakistan commits a crime, threatens instability, evades prosecution, and receives a bribe. But it cannot be sustained. Khan once boasted about bestowing nuclear prestige on a country "where we can't even make a bicycle chain." Take away those nuclear weapons and Pakistan is a veritable basket case. It has no manufacturing base, and in the first four months of 2011 it managed to attract all of $50 million in equity investment -- $650 million less than Bangladesh managed in the depression year of 2009. Pakistan would benefit in more meaningful ways if it channeled its India obsession into energizing its economy. Pakistanâ€™s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation andSecurity Issues Operation Pentagon has already working on programs where US troops will be deployed in Pakistan if the nationâ€™s nuclear installations come under threat from terrorists out to avenge the killing of Osama bin Laden. The plan, which would be activated without President Asif Ali Zardariâ€™s consent or Pakistan military. Barack Obama would order US highly special NBC elite forces to parachute in to protect key nuclear missile sites. These include the air forceâ€™s central Sargodha HQ, home base for nuclear-capable F-16 combat aircraft and at least 80 ballistic missiles. The plan is green lit and the president has already given green light where US will be willing to deploy troops in Pakistan if he feels it is important for national security. News of the plan has further increased tension between the US and Pakistan with relations already at an all-time low after the Operation Geronimo raid by the US Navy Seal special forces team that killed bin Laden at the house where he had been hiding in Abbottabad, near to a Pakistan military academy and attack on Pakistan's vital important Naval base. The United States places its own national security issues above all other sovereignty issues and trust in Pakistanâ€™s abilities are extremely low. This operation wont be done alone by US it self but NATO and India will be participants. Surprise attack on nuclear installation will be carried out supported by massive aircover from east , west and south. Possible participants in the aircover will be F-22 , F-18`s , Eurofighter , SU-30`s with B2 bombers on standby for carpet bombing on Air bases to prevent PAF to do any interference. What Pakistan can do ? Pakistan cannot do anything with small fire fight to prevent denuclearization of it. It cannot launch missile , fighter jets or naval force to stop US and world to do this. After this happens then US and Pakistan wont be allay anymore and there are chances of war break down between India and Pakistan to take control of complete Kashmir. Nukes will be taken off by one way or another but its Pakistan have to decide whether hand it over to world and get aid for the survial of it people or let it become another Afghanistan.