Defence Ministry panel to trim forces

Indx TechStyle

Kitty mod
Mod
Joined
Apr 29, 2015
Messages
18,240
Likes
55,879
Country flag
Who are you? Why did you hacked @sasum's account? What happened to him?
Tell me. :biggrin2:
News is even not confirmed but we have started slapping each other.
Isn't my friend SGU? :D
I agree. Only hitch, India's ability to sustain large number of army personnel with pay, allowances, pension, lodging, Medicare etc.
Commie derailed my favour. :facepalm:
Look buddy, here's not problem of Ability.
We have enough economic growth to sustain it.
Here's, what's better ?
And gone are the days, when idealistic teenagers would volunteer to defend motherland for free.
Talking about yourself? I can bet Marxists even won't defend country for money.
You said in your signature that you're an atheist but not commie. But you're entire posts have been like a commie.
Seriously man, what India has taken of communists that you guys always put entire $h1t against India? :lol:
@Sakal Gharelu Ustad If you guys have recorded IP address of @sasum when he joined the forum, it will be interesting to compare with his current IP address.
His behaviour has much changed since he has joined the forum. Please, do it if permitted.[/USER]
 

rock127

Maulana Rockullah
Senior Member
Joined
Aug 12, 2009
Messages
10,569
Likes
25,230
Country flag
  • Government has said only that they will not increase numbers. We are just speculating that it may be trimmed as well.
    if trimmed, that even to a very small extent.
  • China and Pakistan may have twice army's combined. But for sake of common sense, will it likely that China would intervene directly. They have to keep India neutral in SCS. Also, Neither India will send 1.3 million at once to fight, nor China and pak will send their 1.8 millions and 0.7 millions to fight at once. Troops come in battalion always. There are two scenario's,
  1. Most likely Scenario
  2. Worst case Scenario
We kept being afraid of two front war and put ourselves downperforming in modern techniques.
Others too are doing same. So, what's problem?
A quality force on the cost of small decrease(because we aren't terminating half of army.)
  • Government also may not be half braincell to trim the manpower without equipping with some better firepower. :p

Was the troll needed?
If you'll read my post, I said it will only be decreased if soldiers would be armed with better firepower.
For defense purchases to indigenization, if there are failures, there are successes as well.
Don't act like commies, genius, CrYsIs.
Try to praise when something valuable is being tried to be done.
http://defenceforumindia.com/forum/...rts-likely-to-surge-40-this-year.74433/page-2
Slight decrease may not affect if the ammo + equipment is better BUT the problem is when are we going to get the new toys? Defense deals takes centuries to get on the ground and thanks to Anti-National Congress who looted India in all defense deals and made us dependent on foreign maal.

IAF is crucial and we immediately need 4+ Gen fighters.
 

Indx TechStyle

Kitty mod
Mod
Joined
Apr 29, 2015
Messages
18,240
Likes
55,879
Country flag
Slight decrease may not affect if the ammo + equipment is better BUT the problem is when are we going to get the new toys? Defense deals takes centuries to get on the ground and thanks to Anti-National Congress who looted India in all defense deals and made us dependent on foreign maal.

IAF is crucial and we immediately need 4+ Gen fighters.
I can understand your point but PSUs and DRDO's style of working too is being changed as well.
Lo w end tech is being given you private Co's. Thanks to the strategy that DRDO has been able to complete 238 crucial projects in 2 years of rule of NDA.
Though it's nor good, still better than worse, that's why government is further improving it.
http://defenceforumindia.com/forum/...e-exports-likely-to-surge-40-this-year.74433/

http://defenceforumindia.com/forum/posts/1162958/

I'm happy that at least something is cooking and government is trying to improve this pathetic and blunderbuss socialist style policy.
Let's hope they succeed.
Anyway, go thorough entire threads from where I have given you links. :)
 

sasum

Atheist but not Communists.
Senior Member
Joined
Jan 14, 2016
Messages
1,435
Likes
761
Who are you? Why did you hacked @sasum's account? What happened to him?
Tell me. :biggrin2:
News is even not confirmed but we have started slapping each other.
Isn't my friend SGU? :D

Commie derailed my favour. :facepalm:
Look buddy, here's not problem of Ability.
We have enough economic growth to sustain it.
Here's, what's better ?

Talking about yourself? I can bet Marxists even won't defend country for money.
You said in your signature that you're an atheist but not commie. But you're entire posts have been like a commie.
Seriously man, what India has taken of communists that you guys always put entire $h1t against India? :lol:
@Sakal Gharelu Ustad If you guys have recorded IP address of @sasum when he joined the forum, it will be interesting to compare with his current IP address.
His behaviour has much changed since he has joined the forum. Please, do it if permitted.[/USER]
:bounce:Ha Ha Ha..rest assured my friend, nobody has hacked my account. About IP address :-
These days, under IPv4 protocol, nobody uses static IP address for reasons of connectivity and privacy. Under DHCP (Dynamic host control protocol), your carrier allots you an IP address (four sets of numbers separated by dots) through their DHCP servers every time you log in. This address contains both host & network identity and may or may not be the previous one.
 

garg_bharat

Senior Member
Joined
Dec 12, 2015
Messages
5,078
Likes
10,139
Country flag
@sasum, your opinion is critical of fundamental principles of founding of Indian State.

Defence of country is an obligation of every Indian citizen, irrespective of caste or religion. If you disagree then you should give up your Indian citizenship.

While there may be many Indian who may refuse to serve in the Indian army: the number who are willing is quite substantial.
 

Bornubus

Chodi Bhakt & BJPig Hunter
Senior Member
Joined
Oct 13, 2015
Messages
7,494
Likes
17,196
  • Government has said only that they will not increase numbers. We are just speculating that it may be trimmed as well.
    if trimmed, that even to a very small extent.
  • China and Pakistan may have twice army's combined. But for sake of common sense, will it likely that China would intervene directly. They have to keep India neutral in SCS. Also, Neither India will send 1.3 million at once to fight, nor China and pak will send their 1.8 millions and 0.7 millions to fight at once. Troops come in battalion always. There are two scenario's,
  1. Most likely Scenario
  2. Worst case Scenario
We kept being afraid of two front war and put ourselves downperforming in modern techniques.
Others too are doing same. So, what's problem?
A quality force on the cost of small decrease(because we aren't terminating half of army.)
  • Government also may not be half braincell to trim the manpower without equipping with some better firepower. :p

Was the troll needed?
If you'll read my post, I said it will only be decreased if soldiers would be armed with better firepower.
For defense purchases to indigenization, if there are failures, there are successes as well.
Don't act like commies, genius, CrYsIs.
Try to praise when something valuable is being tried to be done.
http://defenceforumindia.com/forum/...rts-likely-to-surge-40-this-year.74433/page-2
Buddy stop making these fanboy post.There is nothing praiseworthy in it.
 

Indx TechStyle

Kitty mod
Mod
Joined
Apr 29, 2015
Messages
18,240
Likes
55,879
Country flag
Buddy stop making these fanboy post.There is nothing praiseworthy in it.
Buddy what's fanboy stuff? :facepalm:
Seriously, think like Chinese President Xi. Just to save one satellite state pak, you'll jump into war with India as well?
No. Very rare.
Other for defense equipment, yes, call it fanboy or what, I'm being positive because of statistics, it's improving.
Small projects were taken away from DRDO and only limited high end are given to them. So, this happened first time in history that DRDO completed 238 projects near schedule (though they missed targets again. :D)

Actually, it should have been done long ago.
Main problem was managing the PSUs and organizations.
:frusty: But Congis and foreign lobbyists didn't let it happen. :mad2:
Seeing some action in PSUs after a long interval of time. Let's see what happens.
Army will only be trimmed if quality equipment will come, and that will come if PSUs make it.
You must not call it fanboy.
Lazy DRDO has been doing something on schedule first time. :rolleyes:
 

Sakal Gharelu Ustad

Detests Jholawalas
Ambassador
Joined
Apr 28, 2012
Messages
7,114
Likes
7,761
Who are you? Why did you hacked @sasum's account? What happened to him?
Tell me. :biggrin2:
News is even not confirmed but we have started slapping each other.
Isn't my friend SGU? :D

Commie derailed my favour. :facepalm:
Look buddy, here's not problem of Ability.
We have enough economic growth to sustain it.
Here's, what's better ?

Talking about yourself? I can bet Marxists even won't defend country for money.
You said in your signature that you're an atheist but not commie. But you're entire posts have been like a commie.
Seriously man, what India has taken of communists that you guys always put entire $h1t against India? :lol:
@Sakal Gharelu Ustad If you guys have recorded IP address of @sasum when he joined the forum, it will be interesting to compare with his current IP address.
His behaviour has much changed since he has joined the forum. Please, do it if permitted.[/USER]
He has always had split personality issues!!:bounce:
 

Sakal Gharelu Ustad

Detests Jholawalas
Ambassador
Joined
Apr 28, 2012
Messages
7,114
Likes
7,761
http://swarajyamag.com/defence/right-sizing-the-army-cold-start-or-cold-feet

The bugle call is sounded, ‘Right Size’ the Army.

‘Right Size’ to fit which politico-military strategy? That is the begging question.

  • War on one front or a two front war?
    A limited war or a protracted war?
    A proactive (cold start) or a strategic restraint (cold feet)?
    “Aar par ki Ladai” or limited forays?
    Restricted to the Line of Control (LC) and /or to the Line of Actual Control (LAC)?
    What about the sanctity of the International Boundaries (IB)?
    What is/are the political objective(s) that are sacrosanct?
These are the vital questions that the government of the day needs to put on the table for the military to work out the scenarios and the corresponding force levels for each scenario panning out independently or simultaneously. Without these vital inputs, asking the Army to ‘Right Size’ would only be a rhetorical pronouncement.

Personal proclivities sans in-depth study and vigorous debates can in the end prove to be disastrous.

Often, technology is taken as a substitute to numbers. This is a fallacy. When the computers were first inducted it was thought that here was technology replacing loads of manpower. But that has not been the case.

On the contrary, the sheer magnitude of input needing to be fed to the computers and the colossal volume of data generated required more manpower than was required prior to the induction of computers.

It is now a similar situation with regard to the armed forces. As a result, there are fewer men in an actual combat and more in manning numerous way points of technology.

It would not be out of place to delve into a bit of theory.

What is it in war that will not change and what is it that will change? Undoubtedly, wars are but controlled violence; controlled by the polity and not by the military. As defined by Hedley Bull, war is “organised violence carried out by political units against each other,” and by Colin S. Grey it is “the use that is made of force or the threat of force for the ends of policy.”

Quite evidently, wars were and are a political instrument (violent assertive ‘diplomacy’?) to achieve policy objectives. The pro-Clausewitz lobby asserts that war has this basic ‘nature’—primordial violence, chaotic and prone to escalation—which is unchanging.

On the other hand, the ‘character of war’ is ever changing as societies, political entities and technologies change. It may be that future land warfare be dominated by the revolutionary impact of new military technology and its applications that, through new concepts could produce dramatically more effective forms of land warfare Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)’.

For a military to adopt the path of the ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’ over the sedate mundane process of ‘evolution’, it will be contingent on the availability of the indigenous cutting edge R&D, the robust defence industrial base and the foresight in military leadership backed by a strong political will.

That said, it is also true that never at any time was technological superiority the sole factor that decided which side in a war would emerge victorious and which side would go down to defeat. Other things being equal, it was very often the numbers that decided the end result. Iraq and Afghanistan are recent examples. These wise words need to be heeded.

A study of the wars that India has fought since its Independence indicates that the military had not been assigned any clear political objectives. Except, probably, in 1971 where, ironically, by the sheer weight of the military victory a so called ‘political objective’ emerged. In all other cases the military was left to fight till a cease fire was brought about. The cease fires were dictated entirely by the political entity without taking the military into confidence and being unmindful of whether a favourable end situation existed on the ground or not.

The negotiations after the war were also entirely devoid of the military advice. These may be harsh statements but are historically true. As India’s stature grows, the military becomes the ‘hard power’ tool of the government to exercise options of coercive diplomacy, influence operations, and of ‘suasion and plain and simple deterrence’. Along with all the other elements of national power at its disposal it can employ a combination of its soft power and its hard power to imprint ‘smart power’ to secure its interests.

While there is a cry for ‘Right Sizing’ the Army, there also seems to be no hesitation in increasing the size of the Border Guarding and the Central Armed Police Forces. The recent announcement of the ITBP getting an additional of 26 battalions seems so out of place. There is no debate or discussion on the optimal size and the quantum of the CAPF (CRPF, CISF, RAF, Railway Police, etc.) and the Border Guarding forces (BSF, ITBP and SSB); neither are the budget expenditures for these forces are debated in public. The last time when India blundered with the premise that the country did not require an army and that the police are sufficient to deal with all situations resulted in the 1962 debacle. The country does not need another debacle to draw lessons on ‘Right Sizing’.

The increasing sophistication of communication equipment requires a commensurate induction of the expert manpower. The requirement of round the clock surveillance will also draw its share of the manpower.

The army has, suo moto, undertaken an exercise to get a more favourable balance in the ‘teeth-to-tail’ ratio. Earlier a similar exercise in the late 1990’s looked at the Non Field Force (NFF) to achieve the same end result and was to be implemented ruthlessly but also seems to have fallen by the way side, since then. Induction of the technology has bloated the supporting services to a large extent.

However, this is not without reason. The army has equipments in service, in three categories, viz, obsolesce, mid-life and new; and since our dependence on the import of defence is considerable, the maintenance support of these three categories of equipment increases the inventory loads and the manpower to maintain these increases too.

As said before, the increasing sophistication of communication equipments requires a commensurate induction of the expert manpower. The definition of an ‘expert’ suggests that ‘one who knows more and more of less and less’, he is of little use outside his field of expertise which is another reason for bloating of the supporting services of the Army.

A precedent exists on how not to go about cutting on an existing resource without a suitable replacement by way of technology. Around the end of 1998, there was a concerted move in the Army Headquarters to disband Animal Transport Units (AT) of the Army Supply Corps. It was visualised that the loads that were then being carried by the AT would be carried by the utility helicopters which were envisaged to be inducted in the future, by the Army Aviation Corps. In that measure it was a legitimate anticipatory action to disband the AT Units for a future induction of technology.

When the process was about to be implemented, the Kargil War had broken out. There was an immediate call to stop the disbandment and move a substantial portion of the AT to Kargil. These Units did yeoman service in maintaining the troops in the difficult rugged areas which had no motor-able roads or tracks. Their deployment continued long after the war for stocking and maintaining the newly inducted forces which had taken up defences in the entire Kargil sector. However, as a starter, the Army could look at the operational validity of the Horsed Cavalry in modern wars!

Its 18 years down the line but the AT is yet to be replaced by the utility helicopters of the Army Aviation Corps. Thus, it is more than evident that ‘Right Sizing’ the Army is contingent on the detailed guidelines of the government on how and in what form will the armed forces be employed in the future. Although, an important question that needs to be raised is, what is the technology that is available?

A national security strategy doctrine covering all the aspects of a comprehensive national power needs to be enunciated to derive the synergy of all the contributing factors of the nation towards its security. It cannot be a ‘cold start’ being held back by the ‘cold feet’.
 

Navnit Kundu

Pika Hu Akbarrr!!
Senior Member
Joined
Mar 22, 2016
Messages
1,395
Likes
3,098
http://swarajyamag.com/defence/right-sizing-the-army-cold-start-or-cold-feet

The bugle call is sounded, ‘Right Size’ the Army.

‘Right Size’ to fit which politico-military strategy? That is the begging question.

  • War on one front or a two front war?
    A limited war or a protracted war?
    A proactive (cold start) or a strategic restraint (cold feet)?
    “Aar par ki Ladai” or limited forays?
    Restricted to the Line of Control (LC) and /or to the Line of Actual Control (LAC)?
    What about the sanctity of the International Boundaries (IB)?
    What is/are the political objective(s) that are sacrosanct?
These are the vital questions that the government of the day needs to put on the table for the military to work out the scenarios and the corresponding force levels for each scenario panning out independently or simultaneously. Without these vital inputs, asking the Army to ‘Right Size’ would only be a rhetorical pronouncement.

Personal proclivities sans in-depth study and vigorous debates can in the end prove to be disastrous.

Often, technology is taken as a substitute to numbers. This is a fallacy. When the computers were first inducted it was thought that here was technology replacing loads of manpower. But that has not been the case.

On the contrary, the sheer magnitude of input needing to be fed to the computers and the colossal volume of data generated required more manpower than was required prior to the induction of computers.

It is now a similar situation with regard to the armed forces. As a result, there are fewer men in an actual combat and more in manning numerous way points of technology.

It would not be out of place to delve into a bit of theory.

What is it in war that will not change and what is it that will change? Undoubtedly, wars are but controlled violence; controlled by the polity and not by the military. As defined by Hedley Bull, war is “organised violence carried out by political units against each other,” and by Colin S. Grey it is “the use that is made of force or the threat of force for the ends of policy.”

Quite evidently, wars were and are a political instrument (violent assertive ‘diplomacy’?) to achieve policy objectives. The pro-Clausewitz lobby asserts that war has this basic ‘nature’—primordial violence, chaotic and prone to escalation—which is unchanging.

On the other hand, the ‘character of war’ is ever changing as societies, political entities and technologies change. It may be that future land warfare be dominated by the revolutionary impact of new military technology and its applications that, through new concepts could produce dramatically more effective forms of land warfare Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)’.

For a military to adopt the path of the ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’ over the sedate mundane process of ‘evolution’, it will be contingent on the availability of the indigenous cutting edge R&D, the robust defence industrial base and the foresight in military leadership backed by a strong political will.

That said, it is also true that never at any time was technological superiority the sole factor that decided which side in a war would emerge victorious and which side would go down to defeat. Other things being equal, it was very often the numbers that decided the end result. Iraq and Afghanistan are recent examples. These wise words need to be heeded.

A study of the wars that India has fought since its Independence indicates that the military had not been assigned any clear political objectives. Except, probably, in 1971 where, ironically, by the sheer weight of the military victory a so called ‘political objective’ emerged. In all other cases the military was left to fight till a cease fire was brought about. The cease fires were dictated entirely by the political entity without taking the military into confidence and being unmindful of whether a favourable end situation existed on the ground or not.

The negotiations after the war were also entirely devoid of the military advice. These may be harsh statements but are historically true. As India’s stature grows, the military becomes the ‘hard power’ tool of the government to exercise options of coercive diplomacy, influence operations, and of ‘suasion and plain and simple deterrence’. Along with all the other elements of national power at its disposal it can employ a combination of its soft power and its hard power to imprint ‘smart power’ to secure its interests.

While there is a cry for ‘Right Sizing’ the Army, there also seems to be no hesitation in increasing the size of the Border Guarding and the Central Armed Police Forces. The recent announcement of the ITBP getting an additional of 26 battalions seems so out of place. There is no debate or discussion on the optimal size and the quantum of the CAPF (CRPF, CISF, RAF, Railway Police, etc.) and the Border Guarding forces (BSF, ITBP and SSB); neither are the budget expenditures for these forces are debated in public. The last time when India blundered with the premise that the country did not require an army and that the police are sufficient to deal with all situations resulted in the 1962 debacle. The country does not need another debacle to draw lessons on ‘Right Sizing’.

The increasing sophistication of communication equipment requires a commensurate induction of the expert manpower. The requirement of round the clock surveillance will also draw its share of the manpower.

The army has, suo moto, undertaken an exercise to get a more favourable balance in the ‘teeth-to-tail’ ratio. Earlier a similar exercise in the late 1990’s looked at the Non Field Force (NFF) to achieve the same end result and was to be implemented ruthlessly but also seems to have fallen by the way side, since then. Induction of the technology has bloated the supporting services to a large extent.

However, this is not without reason. The army has equipments in service, in three categories, viz, obsolesce, mid-life and new; and since our dependence on the import of defence is considerable, the maintenance support of these three categories of equipment increases the inventory loads and the manpower to maintain these increases too.

As said before, the increasing sophistication of communication equipments requires a commensurate induction of the expert manpower. The definition of an ‘expert’ suggests that ‘one who knows more and more of less and less’, he is of little use outside his field of expertise which is another reason for bloating of the supporting services of the Army.

A precedent exists on how not to go about cutting on an existing resource without a suitable replacement by way of technology. Around the end of 1998, there was a concerted move in the Army Headquarters to disband Animal Transport Units (AT) of the Army Supply Corps. It was visualised that the loads that were then being carried by the AT would be carried by the utility helicopters which were envisaged to be inducted in the future, by the Army Aviation Corps. In that measure it was a legitimate anticipatory action to disband the AT Units for a future induction of technology.

When the process was about to be implemented, the Kargil War had broken out. There was an immediate call to stop the disbandment and move a substantial portion of the AT to Kargil. These Units did yeoman service in maintaining the troops in the difficult rugged areas which had no motor-able roads or tracks. Their deployment continued long after the war for stocking and maintaining the newly inducted forces which had taken up defences in the entire Kargil sector. However, as a starter, the Army could look at the operational validity of the Horsed Cavalry in modern wars!

Its 18 years down the line but the AT is yet to be replaced by the utility helicopters of the Army Aviation Corps. Thus, it is more than evident that ‘Right Sizing’ the Army is contingent on the detailed guidelines of the government on how and in what form will the armed forces be employed in the future. Although, an important question that needs to be raised is, what is the technology that is available?

A national security strategy doctrine covering all the aspects of a comprehensive national power needs to be enunciated to derive the synergy of all the contributing factors of the nation towards its security. It cannot be a ‘cold start’ being held back by the ‘cold feet’.
It appears like the author is trying to make a point but it is difficult to make out what that point is. It's just prose after prose without even the slightest hint of any real analysis. That pompous tone of intellectual pontificating is a result of quasi-Marxist writers which SwarajyaMag has hired. Just a quick glance through the post and there is not a single numerical calculation, not even a precursory one, to support an hypothesis, if there is any. This is the typical argumentative Indian way of communicating things when one doesn't really have a coherent point to make : "There needs to be..." "we need to.." "the government needs to..." "society must do this...", theek hai bhai, samajh gaya sabko ki tum intellectual ho, abh kaam ki baat karo.

The last time I read, 60% of our annual expenditure goes to paying salaries, and only 40% to equipment procurement. On top of this, pensions and OROP is going to put more pressure. If the forces are trimmed properly into smaller groups with larger firepower, we could achieve a lot on the battlefield, at a lower cost. The defense establishment has hypothesized that short wars will become the norm due to the nuclear hangover. In that case, are we ready to deliver a quick blow? Right now, we maintain Mahabharata type large standing army and whenever a provocation like Kargil, Parliament attack, 26/11 happens the only binary options available to us are : either full scale invasion or do nothing. That's no good as a deterrent as everyone knows that we have a trepidation to not let it escalate that far.

We need smaller forces which are at a high operational readiness level and well equipped to create an assorted 'rate card' of retribution for each type of provocation, which, by nature of its quick execution becomes a factor in the enemy's mind while plotting to attack us. Once your rate card is visible to everyone, along with the readiness of each individual task force dedicated to execute the same, all adversaries will take you more seriously. Instead, what we have is Indian jernails writing blog posts on defense blogs recommending more and more legacy systems like cavalry to appease their own ego. There has to be a cold and calculated reevaluation of our threat matrix and subsequent response to the problems, devoid of emotion or nostalgia for old systems and large standing forces. Check how the Russians trimmed their force even before going into the Ukraine-Syria quagmire.



How Putin Made Russia’s Military Into a Modern, Lethal Fighting Force

There's no need to conflate the trimming down of flab as being the equivalent of downgrading the military. It's just the opposite.
 
Last edited:

Sakal Gharelu Ustad

Detests Jholawalas
Ambassador
Joined
Apr 28, 2012
Messages
7,114
Likes
7,761
It appears like the author is trying to make a point but it is difficult to make out what that point is. It's just prose after prose without even the slightest hint of any real analysis. That pompous tone of intellectual pontificating is a result of quasi-Marxist writers which SwarajyaMag has hired. Just a quick glance through the post and there is not a single numerical calculation, not even a precursory one, to support an hypothesis, if there is any. This is the typical argumentative Indian way of communicating things when one doesn't really have a coherent point to make : "There needs to be..." "we need to.." "the government needs to..." "society must do this...", theek hai bhai, samajh gaya sabko ki tum intellectual ho, abh kaam ki baat karo.

The last time I read, 60% of our annual expenditure goes to paying salaries, and only 40% to equipment procurement. On top of this, pensions and OROP is going to put more pressure. If the forces are trimmed properly into smaller groups with larger firepower, we could achieve a lot on the battlefield, at a lower cost. The defense establishment has hypothesized that short wars will become the norm due to the nuclear hangover. In that case, are we ready to deliver a quick blow? Right now, we maintain Mahabharata type large standing army and whenever a provocation like Kargil, Parliament attack, 26/11 happens the only binary options available to us are : either full scale invasion or do nothing. That's no good as a deterrent as everyone knows that we have a trepidation to not let it escalate that far.

We need smaller forces which are at a high operational readiness level and well equipped to create an assorted 'rate card' of retribution for each type of provocation, which, by nature of its quick execution becomes a factor in the enemy's mind while plotting to attack us. Once your rate card is visible to everyone, along with the readiness of each individual task force dedicated to execute the same, all adversaries will take you more seriously. Instead, what we have is Indian jernails writing blog posts on defense blogs recommending more and more legacy systems like cavalry to appease their own ego. There has to be a cold and calculated reevaluation of our threat matrix and subsequent response to the problems, devoid of emotion or nostalgia for old systems and large standing forces. Check how the Russians trimmed their force even before going into the Ukraine-Syria quagmire.



How Putin Made Russia’s Military Into a Modern, Lethal Fighting Force

There's no need to conflate the trimming down of flab as being the equivalent of downgrading the military. It's just the opposite.
You have not given numbers either!!

What does cutting the flab means? Modernization is needed but what is the right mix?

Also, I do not think your description of short quick war is apt for the future. There will be lots of internal turmoil before the next war. We will need numbers there.

But, yes- I did not make comment on what is the ideal figure here either. But it has to be arrived keeping in mind that quantity also will play a big role in the future. The foes we face have much bigger armies than faced by Russia. Also, Russian doctrine should be looked at from the point of view of a weak and not growing economy, Indian case is very different.
 

Indx TechStyle

Kitty mod
Mod
Joined
Apr 29, 2015
Messages
18,240
Likes
55,879
Country flag
http://swarajyamag.com/defence/right-sizing-the-army-cold-start-or-cold-feet

The bugle call is sounded, ‘Right Size’ the Army.

‘Right Size’ to fit which politico-military strategy? That is the begging question.

  • War on one front or a two front war?
    A limited war or a protracted war?
    A proactive (cold start) or a strategic restraint (cold feet)?
    “Aar par ki Ladai” or limited forays?
    Restricted to the Line of Control (LC) and /or to the Line of Actual Control (LAC)?
    What about the sanctity of the International Boundaries (IB)?
    What is/are the political objective(s) that are sacrosanct?
These are the vital questions that the government of the day needs to put on the table for the military to work out the scenarios and the corresponding force levels for each scenario panning out independently or simultaneously. Without these vital inputs, asking the Army to ‘Right Size’ would only be a rhetorical pronouncement.

Personal proclivities sans in-depth study and vigorous debates can in the end prove to be disastrous.

Often, technology is taken as a substitute to numbers. This is a fallacy. When the computers were first inducted it was thought that here was technology replacing loads of manpower. But that has not been the case.

On the contrary, the sheer magnitude of input needing to be fed to the computers and the colossal volume of data generated required more manpower than was required prior to the induction of computers.

It is now a similar situation with regard to the armed forces. As a result, there are fewer men in an actual combat and more in manning numerous way points of technology.

It would not be out of place to delve into a bit of theory.

What is it in war that will not change and what is it that will change? Undoubtedly, wars are but controlled violence; controlled by the polity and not by the military. As defined by Hedley Bull, war is “organised violence carried out by political units against each other,” and by Colin S. Grey it is “the use that is made of force or the threat of force for the ends of policy.”

Quite evidently, wars were and are a political instrument (violent assertive ‘diplomacy’?) to achieve policy objectives. The pro-Clausewitz lobby asserts that war has this basic ‘nature’—primordial violence, chaotic and prone to escalation—which is unchanging.

On the other hand, the ‘character of war’ is ever changing as societies, political entities and technologies change. It may be that future land warfare be dominated by the revolutionary impact of new military technology and its applications that, through new concepts could produce dramatically more effective forms of land warfare Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)’.

For a military to adopt the path of the ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’ over the sedate mundane process of ‘evolution’, it will be contingent on the availability of the indigenous cutting edge R&D, the robust defence industrial base and the foresight in military leadership backed by a strong political will.

That said, it is also true that never at any time was technological superiority the sole factor that decided which side in a war would emerge victorious and which side would go down to defeat. Other things being equal, it was very often the numbers that decided the end result. Iraq and Afghanistan are recent examples. These wise words need to be heeded.

A study of the wars that India has fought since its Independence indicates that the military had not been assigned any clear political objectives. Except, probably, in 1971 where, ironically, by the sheer weight of the military victory a so called ‘political objective’ emerged. In all other cases the military was left to fight till a cease fire was brought about. The cease fires were dictated entirely by the political entity without taking the military into confidence and being unmindful of whether a favourable end situation existed on the ground or not.

The negotiations after the war were also entirely devoid of the military advice. These may be harsh statements but are historically true. As India’s stature grows, the military becomes the ‘hard power’ tool of the government to exercise options of coercive diplomacy, influence operations, and of ‘suasion and plain and simple deterrence’. Along with all the other elements of national power at its disposal it can employ a combination of its soft power and its hard power to imprint ‘smart power’ to secure its interests.

While there is a cry for ‘Right Sizing’ the Army, there also seems to be no hesitation in increasing the size of the Border Guarding and the Central Armed Police Forces. The recent announcement of the ITBP getting an additional of 26 battalions seems so out of place. There is no debate or discussion on the optimal size and the quantum of the CAPF (CRPF, CISF, RAF, Railway Police, etc.) and the Border Guarding forces (BSF, ITBP and SSB); neither are the budget expenditures for these forces are debated in public. The last time when India blundered with the premise that the country did not require an army and that the police are sufficient to deal with all situations resulted in the 1962 debacle. The country does not need another debacle to draw lessons on ‘Right Sizing’.

The increasing sophistication of communication equipment requires a commensurate induction of the expert manpower. The requirement of round the clock surveillance will also draw its share of the manpower.

The army has, suo moto, undertaken an exercise to get a more favourable balance in the ‘teeth-to-tail’ ratio. Earlier a similar exercise in the late 1990’s looked at the Non Field Force (NFF) to achieve the same end result and was to be implemented ruthlessly but also seems to have fallen by the way side, since then. Induction of the technology has bloated the supporting services to a large extent.

However, this is not without reason. The army has equipments in service, in three categories, viz, obsolesce, mid-life and new; and since our dependence on the import of defence is considerable, the maintenance support of these three categories of equipment increases the inventory loads and the manpower to maintain these increases too.

As said before, the increasing sophistication of communication equipments requires a commensurate induction of the expert manpower. The definition of an ‘expert’ suggests that ‘one who knows more and more of less and less’, he is of little use outside his field of expertise which is another reason for bloating of the supporting services of the Army.

A precedent exists on how not to go about cutting on an existing resource without a suitable replacement by way of technology. Around the end of 1998, there was a concerted move in the Army Headquarters to disband Animal Transport Units (AT) of the Army Supply Corps. It was visualised that the loads that were then being carried by the AT would be carried by the utility helicopters which were envisaged to be inducted in the future, by the Army Aviation Corps. In that measure it was a legitimate anticipatory action to disband the AT Units for a future induction of technology.

When the process was about to be implemented, the Kargil War had broken out. There was an immediate call to stop the disbandment and move a substantial portion of the AT to Kargil. These Units did yeoman service in maintaining the troops in the difficult rugged areas which had no motor-able roads or tracks. Their deployment continued long after the war for stocking and maintaining the newly inducted forces which had taken up defences in the entire Kargil sector. However, as a starter, the Army could look at the operational validity of the Horsed Cavalry in modern wars!

Its 18 years down the line but the AT is yet to be replaced by the utility helicopters of the Army Aviation Corps. Thus, it is more than evident that ‘Right Sizing’ the Army is contingent on the detailed guidelines of the government on how and in what form will the armed forces be employed in the future. Although, an important question that needs to be raised is, what is the technology that is available?

A national security strategy doctrine covering all the aspects of a comprehensive national power needs to be enunciated to derive the synergy of all the contributing factors of the nation towards its security. It cannot be a ‘cold start’ being held back by the ‘cold feet’.
Relax Buddy, nothing is finalized yet. :bounce:
 

Navnit Kundu

Pika Hu Akbarrr!!
Senior Member
Joined
Mar 22, 2016
Messages
1,395
Likes
3,098
You have not given numbers either!!

What does cutting the flab means? Modernization is needed but what is the right mix?

Also, I do not think your description of short quick war is apt for the future. There will be lots of internal turmoil before the next war. We will need numbers there.

But, yes- I did not make comment on what is the ideal figure here either. But it has to be arrived keeping in mind that quantity also will play a big role in the future. The foes we face have much bigger armies than faced by Russia. Also, Russian doctrine should be looked at from the point of view of a weak and not growing economy, Indian case is very different.
Yup, I haven't given numbers, but that's why I didn't write an article on an authoritative site with a lot of readers. People expect more from them. We are just forum posters indulging in banter among ourselves, we are allowed to slack off a bit.

I'm not a military man, so my ideas are only vague. I want the expansion of NCC type feeder schools which will find early talent and feed highly motivated students into the army. Also, simply by reducing 10% infantrymen from our army, we could probably put 10X NCC cadets through their paces, (don't have figures, just an assumption). Cutting flab doesn't have to be something drastically stupid like Maulana Nehru did by recommending disbanding the army to let police do the job of national security but going by commentators like Bharat Karnad, there is a lot of scope for trimming but the army leaders just want to retain the legacy systems for reasons of pride. He has actually done war gaming on computer simulations and arrived at a conclusion that we don't need 3 strike groups which we currently have on our western border, we can do with one and transfer the remaining 2 on the China border, but the 'idea of Pakistan' is so emotional to Indian planners, both military and civilians that they overdo their preparations against Pakistan while taking incessant provocations against China.


Cut down on infantry (10%) and reallocate those funds to make sure the remaining troops have airborne mobility and work towards expeditionary capabilities as a long term vision, as opposed to just ground based strike corps.
Here he discusses what needs to be done, and see how the military personnel simply dismiss him. Also, for internal jobs, the fund allocation has to come from the state as it is the states which are so proud about their autonomy.

Right from our independence, the army has been helping the nation in tackling all sorts of internal issues from riots, to terror, to flood rescue to border patrol, so it was justified to have a large force with a lot of infantry men. BUT, the condition has improved considerably compared to the last time we fought a war, as we have allocated a dedicated branch for each of the internal issue (NDRF, Coast Guard, BSF, CRPF, CISF, state police commandos and others), these institutions have taken off the load and the main fighting force can be restructured such that we spend more money per soldier instead of treating them as if they are some low quality cannon fodder reservists (remember they were used in Sri Sri's event to build bridges even though CISF or NDRF could have easily done it).

Take a look at what other nations of interest are doing, they have retained only the most skilled and the most highly equipped personnel who are indispensable to operating their industrial war machine and removed everyone else. They are increasingly outsourcing the small-arms/ infantry type jobs to paid mercenaries and jihadi assets, so their own soldier casualties are low. One might argue that their threat matrix is different but then one can also argue that these nations are also engaged in more theaters simultaneously than India is. For every western infantryman deployed on the ground, there are at least 10X mujaheddin assets who are already fighting on behalf of the crown. By the time the first soldier lands in a foreign theater, most of the gritty tasks have already been taken care of, and the soldier simply acts like some sort of a technician who designates targets for their artillery, and airsupport to pound. This also reduces casualty rate. It's a completely different mindset from our "DIY" mindset.

Having a smaller force allows you to spend more on transportation and logistics, which allows quick maneuver dominance over your adversary. Have we really learnt any lessons from our sluggish mobilization during Op Prakram? Somehow it hurts our pride to discusses our weaknesses so we'd rather not discuss them and cover them up with a sense of overconfidence. "We can crush Pakistan, what more do you want?" Well..if we want to become a serious power then we need to have a vision for how our force structure will look after Pakistan is balkanized. Too much attention on Pakistan has induced a sense of tunnel vision.

Even Yusuf said in his lecture that we don't even have the capability to project force in SCS. One needs to think on those lines : What are the newer capabilities we will be able to afford if we trim our bloated infantry divisions.
 
Last edited:

Indx TechStyle

Kitty mod
Mod
Joined
Apr 29, 2015
Messages
18,240
Likes
55,879
Country flag
Why Defence Ministry Is Considering A Cut In Standing Military

The salary and pension and the revenue expenditure put together is more than the money available to buy new weapons systems this year.
Story Highlights
  • 11-member committee asked to identify areas to 'rationalize manpower'
  • The pension bill is 82,332 crore, about 12,000 crore more than last year
  • One of the casualties of this fund crunch is the Mountain Stike Corps
New Delhi: At 1.5 million strong, the Indian military is the third largest military in the world. But now, it could go in for "right sizing" of "force structure" or in simple terms a drastic cut in manpower. An 11 member committee led by Lieutenant General DB Shekatkar (retired) has been constituted for this.
Sources told NDTV that the committee - which will submit its report by August - has been tasked to look into areas of "overlap" and convergence within the three forces - Indian Army, Navy and Air Force - allowing for a reduction of manpower.
The committee has been also asked to identify areas to "rationalize manpower", examine possible areas of multi-tasking by troops. Finally, the committee will also suggest ways to "optimize" the combat potential by induction of more technology as against more boots on the ground.
The exercise, in part, has been necessitated by a burgeoning revenue, pension and salaries bill. This year the pension bill is a staggering Rs 82,332 crore, about Rs 12,000 crore more from the last financial year. The salary and pension and the revenue expenditure put together is more than the money available to buy new weapons systems this year. And, the rising trend in revenue expenditure is only likely to increase in the coming years.
"If my memory serves me right in 1982, the pension bill was about 300 crore, in 1992 it went up to 12,000 crore and last year (2015-16) the same pension bill stood at about 60,000 crore," Amit Cowshish, a former but one of the most respected Defence Accounts Officer told NDTV.
"Every year there is a huge gap in amount asked for and amount allocated. I don't think it is possible to sustain the growth (in allocation) which is expected by MoD," he said.
One of the casualties of this fund crunch is the Mountain Stike Corps - aimed countering any aggression from China. About 80,000 more men are to be added and it is likely to cost over Rs 60,000 crore. "At this rate you can forget the Cyber Command, the Space Command and the main problem with the Mountain Strike Corps is paucity of funds" Mr Cowshish added.
 

Indx TechStyle

Kitty mod
Mod
Joined
Apr 29, 2015
Messages
18,240
Likes
55,879
Country flag
USA and China cutting down Army strength, will India follow suit?

World's three largest Armies seem to be cutting down on their Army personnel strength to make it more 'lean and mean.'
______________________________
As China catches up on USA in defence capability and starts flexing its muscles on world stage, the two countries are now facing a showdown in South China Sea.
Interestingly, at the same time, both the countries are engaged in major military reforms to make their armed forces lean and mean. In the year 2015, the Indian Defence Minister Parrikar had said “The NDA government had plans to slash non-operational ‘flab’ of the 1.18 million strong Army both in terms of manpower and infrastructure to ensure cost-effectiveness and better teeth-to-tail ratio”.
In November 2015, they scrapped three of the four army headquarters. China has 1.6 million personnels in the Army, 240,000 in Navy and 400,000 in Air Force and has decided to cut the 2.3 million force by 300,000 to 2.0 million. Around 70% of the cut was in the land-based units. China does not anticipate a ground invasion currently. The reorganisation is also a response to the USA’s Asia Pivotstrategy. The plan is to shift resources from land forces to sea and air, and to modernise. China’s slowing economy is having an impact on government spending, including the country’s military budget.
People's Liberation Army (PLA’s) traditional priority to land forces and greater hierarchical position enjoyed by the Army over Navy and Air Force will now change. The aim is to cut troops linked to outdated equipment, office staff and non-combat personnel. China had also seen growth in military wages in recent years, eating into the defence budget. To compete with the modern US Army, China had no choice but to cut flab and modernise. A new “Space Force”would be formed under the PLA Air Force. As part of consolidating power, President Xi has also sacked a few Generals as part of his anti-corruption drive and to streamline layers of command and bureaucracy within PLA. Even when troop reduction is completed in 2017, China will still have the world’s largest army.
As of 2016, the United States spends about $580.3 billion annually to fund its military forces. The projected active duty end strength in the armed forces for 2016 was 1,301,300. The US DoD 2017 budget caters for active strength of 1,281,900. Most cuts are planned in US Army. US Army which had mushroomed over the years; especially after September 2001 attacks will be cut down to pre-World War II size. Dwindling defence budgets are also indicative of the political thinking. The US Army from its recent peak of 570,000 troops in 2010 is planned to be reduced to 440,000 by 2018. It has already cut 80,000 soldiers since 2010. Another 40,000 will be cut by the end of 2018. Thrust will shift to Cyber and Special warfare and unmanned systems. The reduction is planned in spite the operations against Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. Russia, China, North Korea, Iran and the Islamic State continue to be the main threats to the US.
Additionally, reports state that 17,000 Army civilian employees would be laid off. Pentagon may turn increasingly toward the Navy for its primary military needs. As of December 9, 2015, the US Navy has 272 active ships, the lowest since 1916. With the F-35 programme still going strong, and the new long-range strike bomber cleared, USAF is less affected. Shrinking the top brass is one of the number of ideas through command structure changes. Defence Secretary Ashton Carter feels there are too many four-star appointment slots. Headquarters have either become top-heavy or less efficient. Military had to cut many important defence acquisitions due to budget cuts.
Indian Defence Minister has made it clear that there is an urgent need for downsizing in non-operational areas both due to budgetary constraints and unrealistic non-operational holdings. Money saved could go into the urgently needed requirements such as 17 Corps (mountain strike corps) with 90,000 troops at cost of Rs 65,000 crores which is temporarily held back. The areas that could be a target for cuts could be the 'sahayak' (orderly) for officers or deploying soldiers for escort duties or to man unit-run canteens. Many peace area activities like transportation, logistics, cooking and serving etc. are being outsourced. Newer weapon systems require lesser man-power but units are still manned at old scales. Honest open approach can help identify many more areas where non-combat personnel can be shed to convert to combat posts. Many civilian posts can easily be shed if the government has the political will and can be diverted to operational personnel. Indian Army currently has a strength of 1,129,900 active personnel, Indian Air Force has 127,200 and Indian Navy has 58,350, totalling 1,325,450. Para military forces also have 1,300,586 personnel.
Just a peace dividend in J&K could have meant cutting 100,000 soldiers. The cuts may not be physical but savings could be diverted to new raisings to cater to operational units for a two-front war.
 

Latest Replies

Global Defence

New threads

Articles

Top