Defeating Cruise Missiles

Discussion in 'Strategic Forces' started by LETHALFORCE, Mar 30, 2009.

  1. LETHALFORCE

    LETHALFORCE Moderator Moderator

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    http://www.ausairpower.net/Analysis-Cruise-Missiles.html

    Defeating Cruise Missiles

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    Raduga Kh-55SM Kent with conformal fuel tanks. China illegally acquired samples from the Ukraine to permit the development of a cloned variant for the PLA. This weapon is also a candidate for new production Badgers (RuMOD).


    When Fieseler's engineers perfected the FZG-76/Fi-103 V-1 doodlebug in 1944, little could they have imagined the long term impact of their creativity. The V-1 became the forerunner of a family of weapons which has decisively influenced many aspects of modern air warfare since then, and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future.

    The best starting point is the definition of what a cruise missile is. The media definition of a cruise missile is any weapon similar to the US Navy UGM/RGM-109 Tomahawk/TLAM or US Air Force AGM-86 ALCM/CALCM. The technical definition is any weapon which automatically flies an essentially horizontal cruise flight profile for most of the duration of its flight between launch and its terminal trajectory to impact. In the framework of technical cruise missile definition, weapons are further divided into tactical / sub-strategic / theatre weapons, and strategic weapons, and then divided by warhead into nuclear and conventional. A further division, somewhat arbitrary with the arrival of the SLAM/Block II Harpoon and Russian analogues, is the split between Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCM) and Land Attack Cruise Missiles (LACM).

    The most widely deployed are ASCMs, which typically start with ranges of tens of nautical miles, warhead sizes around 100 kg, and subsonic cruise profiles. The Exocet, Harpoon, Kh-35U and YJ-8 families are the most widely used examples. At the opposite end of this spectrum are the Russian heavyweights, like the rocket propelled subsonic 2.5 tonne class Styx family (Chinese C-601/611 Kraken), the Mach 3+ 6 tonne class Kh-22M Burya (AS-4), the ramjet Mach 2+ 4.5 tonne class Kh-41 Sunburn and 3 tonne class Kh-61 Yakhont/Brahmos.

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  3. LETHALFORCE

    LETHALFORCE Moderator Moderator

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    continued

    Less widely deployed but increasingly available are LACMs in various categories, including derivatives of ASCMs. The most widely used weapons in this class to date are the UGM/RGM-109 TLAM family and AGM-86C CALCM, with the EADS Apache / Storm Shadow, KEPD-350, AGM-158 JASSM, Kh-55/65 (AS-15), 3M-54 / 3M-14 (SS-N-27) and Chinese clones now appearing in service inventories.

    From a technology perspective, the commodification of GPS, Ring Laser Gyro, 3rd Generation microprocessor, and Monolithic Microwave IC technologies will have a major long term impact in the market, reducing guidance package costs, but also resulting in the breakdown of the historical technology barriers which limited large scale inventories to the US and USSR. Modern guidance technology has already seen the absorption and reuse of Cold War era cruise missile warstocks, with the remanufacture of US Navy UGM/RGM-109 Tomahawk Anti-Ship Missile (TASM) and US Air Force AGM-86B (nuclear ALCM) airframes into conventional LACMs. The large remaining warstock of Russian weapons may also see reuse, the recent guidance upgrade package for the Kh-22M being a good example, as well as the ever evolving Chinese C-601/611.

    Strategically, precision guided cruise missiles can have significant military effect, but even inaccurate guidance permits their use as terror weapons against civilians, as the Scud has been used.

    Historically, the main attraction in cruise missiles has always been in the often very significant stand-off range provided, keeping the delivery platform out of the reach of most if not all air defence weapons. An equal attraction has been the difficulty in detecting, tracking and killing a small, and often very low flying cruise missile.

    The drawback in all cruise missiles has always been economic - the fraction of warhead weight to total weapon weight has typically been less than 50%, while the cost of these weapons has been of the order of 50 times or greater than guided bombs. Complex guidance and propulsion systems have been the main cost drivers. While the US have repeatedly performed large scale bombardments using up to several hundred weapons per bombing campaign, the cost proved unsustainable even for the US budget. The current effort to field the low cost US$500k class JASSM and Tactical Tomahawk weapons reflects this reality - even at half of the cost of legacy cruise missiles these weapons will be used primarily to kill heavily defended high value targets.

    For the ADF cruise missiles will become the principal missile defence and air defence issue in coming decades, reflecting not only the wide proliferation of shorter ranging ASCMs and land attack missile derivatives, but also the strategic impact of China's introduction of TLAM/CALCM class weapons as these mature, and Badger/Backfire delivery systems.

    The fact that cruise missile defence did not rate a mention in the RAAF force structure rationale presented to parliament on the 4th June is remarkable - more so since this issue has been repeatedly raised in parliamentary submissions since November, 2000, and is also appearing in US defence publications.

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  4. LETHALFORCE

    LETHALFORCE Moderator Moderator

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    The arrival of cruise missiles in the region presents genuine long term issues for Australia's air defences. The north hosts a large oil/gas industry, and key runways for air defence. Both are high value strategic targets, be it in economic terms or in stripping away air defence capability across the north. This map compares launch footprints for cruise missile of various ranges against fighter intercept radii (Author).


    Delivery Techniques for Cruise Missiles

    Since the 1940s cruise missiles have been launched by aircraft and surface launchers, the latter at first fixed and mobile ground launchers, and by the 1950s ships and surfaced submarines. The Tomahawk extended the latter domain to include submerged submarines. Today, a cruise missile could be fired by a large aircraft, a fighter, a surface ship, a submerged submarine and a ground based Transporter Erector Launcher (TEL). An alternative repeatedly canvassed in the US debate of recent has been the covert maritime tramp freighter, or its equivalent, the pretend charter air transport - the latter reflecting US proposals for 747 ALCM carriers, and UK proposals for A340 ALCM carriers.

    Each of these delivery techniques presents its own unique challenges to a defender, and none can be ignored when planning a cruise missile defence strategy.

    Large aircraft such as strategic bombers, theatre bombers, and modified transports present the capability to move a respectable number of cruise missiles over regional or global distances in hours or tens of hours, at cruise speeds of the order of 450 KTAS. Range and speed afford flexibility in timing attacks, and in choosing launch points to best disadvantage the defender. On a typical profile the aircraft would fly to a preplanned launch point, spend several minutes releasing the weapons, upon which the bomber can depart. Support jamming to confuse defences is an option. This is the concept pioneered by the B-52/ALCM system, and since adopted by the Russians with the Bear/Blackjack/Kh-55/55M/555 system. It is expected to be used by the PLA-AF once its H-6H/ALCM system and Backfire mature.

    There are many variations on this theme possible, the performance of the delivering aircraft and weapon. The Backfire / Kh-22M series penetrating to the launch point supersonic and high is one extremity, whereas the B-52 going in low armed with AGM-86C is the other. The nearer the bomber can get to an opponent's defensive perimeter, the deeper the weapons can penetrate and the more flexibility the weapon has in routing its flightpath around known defences.

    The use of tanker supported fighters presents another variation on the same theme. While fighters are inherently more survivable than lumbering heavy bombers, their supporting tankers are not and present similar opportunities to a defender. The operational economics of this game continue to favour heavy bombers.

    Surface warships have been used extensively by the US Navy to deliver TLAMs, and regional weapons like the 3M-54/14 series will eventually become a feature of regional surface warship inventories. The key issue for the attacker is the range of the weapon, as the warship must remain outside opposing defences.

    Submarines are the most viable naval delivery system as they permit surprise not available to a surface warship. This was central to Soviet AV-MF sea control operations, with weapons suitable for submerged launches developed. Depth and subsurface topology permitting, a submarine can get quite close to an opponent's coastline before launch, thus reducing warning time and presenting only low signature cruise missiles in flight to opposing air defences. This tactical advantage comes at a the price of the high acoustic signature of multiple launches. This is easy to detect and the missiles in flight also betray the area in which the submarine is operating. While weapons like the TLAM and 3M-54/14 are compatible with attack submarine torpedo tubes, this style of launch is at the expense of torpedo payloads. The favoured approach are vertical or slant launch tubes. Last December the US Navy contracted to have the Ohio class SSBNs USS Ohio, Michigan and Georgia converted into SSGN 726, 727 and 729 respectively, each armed with 154 TLAMs in vertical tube packs, replacing the SLBM launch tubes.

    The third technique for launching cruise missiles is the mobile ground based TEL, typically using a large all wheel drive truck or semi-trailer. This is yet another a variation of the theme of Wernher von Braun's truck mobile A-4/V-2 launchers used in 1944. The most widely deployed modern ground based cruise missile system was the BGM-109G Gryphon four round TEL deployed in 1983 to counter Soviet SS-20 IRBMs. The Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty saw the 500 or so BGM-109Ls scrapped by 1991. India's BrahMos TELs, China's Seersucker TELs and the plethora of coastal defence missile TELs present other examples.

    Ground mobile TELs present the same advantages and disadvantages as ballistic missile TELs. If dispersed and well camouflaged before the onset of hostilities, they provide surprise as SLCMs do, but also expose their TELs in a similar fashion. Their slow transit speeds present similar problems to submarines and warships in sustaining a high rate of fire, and in successfully egressing launch areas after firing.

    There is a clear split in capabilities between air launched and surface/subsurface launched weapons. While the latter offer surprise, they lack the mobility and transit speeds for rapid escape and to sustain a high rate of fire. Air launched weapons offer less surprise, but easily offset this limitation by the tenfold or greater speeds of the launch aircraft and the distances over which the weapons can be quickly delivered, and repeat strikes launched.

    In the Australian/regional context air and submarine launched delivery matter most, as these permit strikes across the sea-air gap. Surface warship and ground launched cruise missiles are of less concern, although the latter are an issue for RAN surface fleet operations and especially amphibious operations in the region.

    Cruise Missile Defence Strategies

    Since 1944 cruise missile defence has remained a persistent headache. As defensive systems have evolved, so has the cruise missile threat. Stealth techniques have complicated the issue, with the cancelled 1990s US AGM-137 TSSAM and its replacement, the current AGM-158 JASSM designed from the outset for true very low observable performance. As cruise missiles are easier to design for low radar signature than a full sized aircraft is, it is inevitable now that second generation EU, Russian and indigenous regional weapons will follow the US lead.

    A key contributor to Soviet bankruptcy was the deployment of the AGM-86B on the B-52 and its contemporary, the BGM-109L GLCM. The Soviet response was to field large numbers of expensive MiG-31P Foxhounds, Su-27 Flankers, S-300P semi-mobile SAM batteries, S-300V mobile SAM batteries, and supporting assets. With hundreds of each of these systems deployed to counter a modest inventory of US cruise missiles, Soviet PVOS and V-PVO budgets bloated out of control during the 1980s. This remains the classical case study of the assymetric use of technology to effect massive strategic damage on an opposing economy.

    With regional ALCM/SLCM proliferation, including weapons with hundreds of nautical miles of range, Australia is presented with similar geo-strategic / technological problems to those faced by the Soviets two decades ago, albeit not on that scale. Siberia and Australia's deep north share the common topographical problem of widely separated population centres, military bases and industrial facilities, and the dilemma of an enormous coastline to cover with a finite pool of assets. They also share the advantages of a sea-air gap to the north.

    While Australia does not face at this time the threat of nuclear armed cruise missiles, the damage effect produced by even conventional cruise missiles against the gas/oil infrastructure would be similar in effect due to the combustible nature of the targets involved. With the Burrup Peninsula and Gorgon/Barrow LNG tank farms each storing when full energy equivalent to a 1 Megatonne TNT class weapon, the warhead issue is truly moot for these economic targets.

    Defensive strategies for dealing with cruise missile threats fall broadly into two categories, the first being the denial or deterrence of launch and counterforce strategies, the second being the interception of launched weapons.

    Deterrence strategies amount to threatening credible retaliation, regardless of weapons used. If Australia pursues current force structure plans then this approach will not be credible, given the limitations of the JSF supported by a small number of tankers. Retaliatory pinprick strikes maketh not for deterrence.

    Counterforce strategies amount to pre-emptive destruction of the opponent's cruise missile capability before it can be deployed or launched. This approach requires similar capabilities to deterrence, but involves much more specific targeting. With a lightweight JSF-centric future strike force, this too is not a credible future option for Australia.

    Denial of launch strategies amount to shooting the archer, not the arrow paraphrasing the 1980s US Maritime Strategy. This involves killing cruise missile carrying aircraft, sinking cruise missile armed ships/subs, or destroying ground mobile TELs before they have the opportunity to fire. This approach also requires a robust force structure, including good maritime and land strike capabilities, good air defence capabilities, and good ASW capabilities.

    Interception of launched cruise missiles presents its own challenges, especially in terms of fighter persistence, speed, missile payload, radar performance, tanker and AEW&C numbers. However, in strategic terms it is often the only option left, especially during the period preceding an outbreak of full scale hostilities. As cruise missiles present an attractive first strike weapon to disrupt air defence infrastructure, their use is most likely in the opening round of a conflict.


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    http://www.ausairpower.net/H-6M-Prototype-1S.jpg

    The two most important regional strategic developments over the last two years have been the PLA-AF's June 2004 disclosure of its intent to purchase Tu-22M-3 Backfires, and the 2002 development of the cruise missile carrier H-6H Badger derivative. US sources claim at least 25 H-6H are planned. At this stage it is not known whether the 20,000 lb bomb bay fuel tank used with the H-6U tanker has been incorporated, or whether a refuelling probe will be fitted. The photograph is part of the Zhuhai 2002 AVIC I promotional video, depicting the prototype on takeoff, carrying four Kh-55/65 class missile bodies
     
  5. LETHALFORCE

    LETHALFORCE Moderator Moderator

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    The US Air Force model for cruise missile defence envisages inner and outer zones, patrolled by E-3 AWACS and E-8 JSTARS respectively, with F/A-22A providing outer zone intercepts, and AESA equipped legacy fighters inner zone intercepts. Current RAAF planning leaves gaps in inner zone X-band surveillance capability, and totally inadequate fighter capability in terms of radar performance, supersonic persistence and missile payloads. This chart depicts an alternative model for the RAAF (Author).

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    The gap in RAAF inner zone cruise missile defence surveillance capabilities could be plugged by fitting an X-band AESA such as the MP-RTIP to an LRMP aircraft. This provides a dual role cruise missile defence and littoral/battlefield GMTI capability. The AFTS/RLM MMSS proposal for the AP-3C would provide a low cost/risk means of introducing this capability (Author).

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    The only two fighters ever specifically built for cruise missile / bomber defence were the Russian MiG-31 Foxhound and US Navy F-111B. The MiG-31P was built to kill B-52/B-1 and the F-111B the Backfire. These airframes are nearly identical in cardinal weight/size parameters, built to carry large look-down/shoot-down radars, IRST systems and similar R-33/AA-9 and AIM-54 missiles (US DoD).
     
  6. LETHALFORCE

    LETHALFORCE Moderator Moderator

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    Implementing Cruise Missile Defence

    To implement either deterrent or direct counterforce strategies to defeat an opposing cruise missile force requires significant targeting and strike capability. This strategy requires that a opposing force armed with cruise missiles be attacked and destroyed in situ, for instance by demolishing airfields, launch aircraft and missile stocks on the ground, or by analogous strikes against naval bases hosting cruise missile armed warships or submarines.

    Targeting, with the exception of ground mobile TELs, is less challenging as airfields and naval bases are large fixed infrastructure which can be effectively surveilled using satellites or human intelligence assets, although timeliness can be an issue if signs of strike preparation are the trigger for a pre-emptive attack. Cruise missile warfare like ballistic missile warfare to a large extent obeys the use them or lose them rule, and there are strong incentives to fire off as much of the warstock as early as possible in a campaign.

    Interdicting cruise missile armed submarines, or intercepting cruise missile carrying aircraft, also present interesting challenges. However, while a riskier strategy than counterforce strikes in situ, interdiction/interception achieves a similar effect by inflicting cumulative attrition on the opponent's delivery force. Rather than destroying the force in a small number of concurrent or closely timed strikes, the attrition occurs overs days or weeks as the opponent's assets are ground down to impotence. In political terms counterforce strikes, especially if pre-emptive, are problematic, but interdiction/interception of delivery platforms presents a clear cut case of defensive action with clear hostile intent by an opponent. The risk is that not every opposing platform is stopped before it launches, and that many will escape to attack yet again.

    When interdiction of a submarine or interception of a strike aircraft fails, and cruise missiles are launched, the default strategy is then to engage and destroy these before they reach their targets.

    In practice any model for defeating a cruise missile armed opponent must be multi-layered, even if the counterforce strike option is not implementable due to inadequate strike capabilities. Launch platforms must be detected, tracked and engaged, and if this fails, the cruise missiles must be detected, tracked and engaged. The air-sea gap is valuable in this respect, as it provides a defacto free-fire zone for fighters tasked with cruise missile intercepts, and the distances involved provide for repeat engagement opportunities, fighter fuel and weapon payloads permitting.

    Reliance on land based SAM systems for terminal defence of target areas is a popular but relatively ineffective strategy, as high performance SAMs with expensive high power-aperture radars are required, and even with mast mounted antennas to improve coverage the footprint is bounded by ranges of miles to at most tens of miles. Placing SAM batteries on warships increases this expense for some gain in mobility.

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    Undesignated PLA cruise missile, possibly a DH-10 prototype.

    Defeating Submarine Launched Cruise Missiles

    SLCM defence is inherently dual pronged, and involves using LRMP (Long Range Maritime Patrol) aircraft, warships and submarines to engage the launch platform, and AEW&C, tankers and fighters to destroy any missiles which are launched. The range of the opposing SLCM type will critically determine the effectiveness of either prong in this model. A shorter ranging 160 NMI missile like the regional 3M-54/14 series forces the submarine into a relatively small zone surrounding the target, increasing opportunities for ASW forces to find and kill it, especially once it has fired its SLCMs off. Conversely, with a 450 KTAS SLCM cruise speed, aerial interception opportunities are compressed into a 20 minute time window, making the odds of successful missile strikes greater.

    A 400 to 650 NMI range class SLCM frustrates ASW operations as the footprint to be patrolled increases with the square of missile range, but it also much increases opportunities for aerial interception by tripling if not quadrupling SLCM flight duration over water.

    The conventional force structure model used for defeating SLCMs is inherently expensive - 24/7 ASW patrols using aircraft and naval assets must be combined with 24/7 AEW&C, tanker and fighter patrols. While ground alert interceptors are an option, the ten minutes required to get them airborne on station reduces available time to effect engagements against the inbound SLCMs. Supersonic climb-out and sustained dash would minimise the time to station, but this is not an option for F/A-18A and JSF.

    The biggest cost burden in defending against SLCMs lies in the need for concurrent airborne patrols using LRMP aircraft and AEW&C aircraft, effectively doubling up on the required airborne ISR component of the defending force. This is a byproduct of the niche specialisation of these systems.

    LRMP aircraft on station searching for submarines being positioned for launches present an opportunity to free up AEW&C aircraft for other tasks - if the LRMP aircraft is equipped with radar/datalink capability to cue interceptors to SLCMs in flight. Existing search radars on LRMP aircraft have neither the power-aperture performance nor azimuthal coverage to be credible in this role. A viable radar for this role is an X-band active phased array in the class of the MT-RTIP family of radars planned for the E-8 JSTARS upgrade, the E-10 MC2A and growth Global Hawk variants. These radars will be used by the US Air Force for cruise missile defence, mobile ground target tracking, and likely by the US Navy for the BAMS maritime search role on UAVs - the Global Hawk being a leading candidate.

    An LRMP aircraft equipped with such a radar acquires an inherent capability to detect and track SLCMs, in addition to gaining improved ASW and ASuW surface search capabilities, and JSTARS-like littoral GMTI search capabilities. This is an important synergy in functions which should not be ignored. Supplementary AEW&C capability for naval surface action groups, and over the horizon midcourse guidance and illumination for shipboard SAMs are also feasible.

    While SLCMs lack the sustainable rate of fire, and achievable weight of fire of air launched cruise missiles, they do present a complex equation for a defender.
     
  7. LETHALFORCE

    LETHALFORCE Moderator Moderator

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    Defeating Air Launched Cruise Missiles

    The force structure demands required to defeat cruise missile armed aircraft, and cruise missiles once launched are similar, but the latter presenting greater demands both in fighter missile payloads and air intercept radar performance. Supersonic cruise missiles impose further demands on fighter dash speed and supersonic persistence. The conceptual model for cruise missile defence is the combined use of AEW&C, fighters, tankers and in many instances, airborne X-band surveillance radars to detect, track and engage both launch aircraft and cruise missiles.

    A key issue in killing launch aircraft is the range of cruise missile being carried. A weapon which has 160 NMI of range offers good opportunities for the defender, especially if the AEW&C aircraft and CAPs can be positioned between the intended targets and known threat axis from which the opponent appears. Australia's JORN and the geography of the sea air gap are especially useful, providing the opponent does not exploit JORN blind periods to get a head start before detection.

    These advantages decline with increasing ALCM range. A weapon in the 400 to 650 NMI range class presents opportunities to launch against a coastal target even if the AEW&C/CAP packages are orbiting well over the sea air gap. The upside for the defender is that a 60 to 90 minute ALCM flight duration presents excellent detection and repeat engagement opportunities.

    Historically only two fighters were custom designed for cruise missile / bomber defence. The first was the US Navy F-111B, the second the MiG-31P Foxhound. It is no accident that both designs have similar empty weight, internal fuel load, high supersonic performance, huge radar bays, and carried similar payloads of similar sized AIM-54 and R-33/AA-9 Amos missiles.

    Current US Air Force thinking on cruise missile defence envisages a two zone scheme. The outer zone comprises the E-3 AWACS, E-8 JSTARS / E-10 MC2A and the F/A-22A, and is intended to detect, track and kill launch aircraft and cruise missiles which might be launched. This outer zone is supplemented by an inner zone, comprising E-8 JSTARS / E-10 MC2A equipped with MP-RTIP X-band radars to track cruise missiles, and a mix of F/A-22A, JSF and AESA equipped F-15C/APG-63(V)2 or F/A-18E/F to destroy leakers which might penetrate the outer zone of F/A-22A defence. The US are currently introducing fusing changes to the AIM-120C-6 AMRAAM to improve its ability to kill cruise missiles.

    The limited look-down performance of the E-3 radar forces the use of the E-8 JSTARS as a gap-filler. The more capable E-10 MC2A will later absorb most of this role. The heavy reliance on the F/A-22A in the US model is a direct consequence of the F/A-22A's exceptional X-band radar performance and supersonic persistence, which allows it to patrol a much larger footprint than a conventional fighter does, and its ability to operate in contested airspace. The performance of the APG-77 permits head on engagements, and after passing the targets the F/A-22A would reverse heading for a repeat pass against any surviving cruise missiles.

    The US Air Force envisage attackers launching waves of cruise missiles, the aim being to deplete fighter missile payloads and fuel, to create openings for a following wave of cruise missiles. The two zone model provides a mechanism to stop a second wave while outer zone interceptors are replenished.

    Current long term planning for the RAAF leaves Australia in an invidious position as regional ALCM/SLCM capabilities develop over the coming decade, especially with the Backfire now proliferating. While JORN and Wedgetail provide excellent outer zone defensive capabilities, JORN blind periods and Wedgetail numbers will remain as real problems. The absence of a JSTARS-like capability seriously limits inner zone surveillance and tracking capabilities, especially against SLCM threats, constraining locations of Wedgetail orbits to cover both outer and inner zone areas.

    The bigger hole in RAAF capability however lies in the plan for a lightweight fighter fleet, centred in F/A-18A and later JSF, with minimal tanker support. The F/A-18A and JSF are not F/A-22As in radar capability, missile/fuel payload or supersonic persistence.

    Sadly, the plan to kill off the F-111 deprives the RAAF of a very economic inner zone cruise missile defence interceptor airframe, and Backfire interceptor. The combination of persistence and supersonic dash performance, and large payload, provides the F-111 with the ability to cover inner zone patrol areas without tanker support, in an environment where its lack of close-in air combat agility is irrelevant. An F-111 can orbit on station 200 nautical miles from a runway for about 4 hours without refuelling, simply impossible for an F/A-18A or JSF. Retrofitting a suitable radar like an APG-79, APG-80 or APG-81, a JTIDS terminal and clearing the AMRAAM are relatively cheap given the return on investment, especially in reduced tanker demand and supersonic intercept capability against the Backfire - regardless of resulting gains in F-111 strike capability.

    In perspective, growth in regional cruise missile and long range bomber capabilities are now an inevitability. The big question which remains is whether Defence will make any effort to address the changing environment in RAAF force structure planning. Recent public statements are anything but encouraging.

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    The US Air Force solution for outer zone cruise missile defence is the F/A-22A, which will exploit its supersonic persistence and large APG-77 radar to kill cruise missiles and delivery aircraft (US Air Force).
     
  8. kuku

    kuku Respected Member

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    Australia is really cut off from the rest of the world, it really is down there and as different from India as it can get (fewer number of population centers, military targets, the only way to approach is thorough a featureless sea where air defence destroyers will already be waiting in case of a war along with other long range detection systems etc.), In the Indian context the situation is very complex, consider the huge land border with Pakistan and China.

    With the EL/M-2083 aerostat air search radar we have a good chance of picking up such missiles in places where the terrain doesn't help the cruise missile evade detection at long ranges and directing fighter towards them, the upcoming AESA radar mounted MMRCA planes will prove to be very effective in such roles, we can also use the data to get the land based measures ready to respond.

    No impenetrable defence exists hence the ability to hit before the blow is received will be better.

    When we consider that USA could not find enough cruise missiles to make a difference in the two wars with iraq and had to use a lot of different weapons to take out the targets one thing is clear the nearly broke Pakistan will not be able to have enough cruise missiles and any defence will make its task harder, PLA will present more challenges.
     
  9. LETHALFORCE

    LETHALFORCE Moderator Moderator

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    we need to make our own indigenoues AESA ,I am sure it will be a big factor in our MRCA choice.
     
  10. vijaytripoli

    vijaytripoli Regular Member

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    But how can we able to defend ourself fron chinese moskit supersonic cruisse missile acquired from RUSSIA . Detection from areostate radar is different thing but getting it down is far more difficult!
    Chau
     
  11. kuku

    kuku Respected Member

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    From what is known on open source PLA-AF has the following Russian precision missiles in service:
    Kh-29T (range: 10 km)
    Kh-59 (50 km)
    Kh-31P (110km)
     
  12. vijaytripoli

    vijaytripoli Regular Member

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    what about kh-41 moskit ( sunburn )?
    chau
     
  13. Dark Sorrow

    Dark Sorrow Respected Member Senior Member

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    How good are R-77 , R-73 . AIM-120 and AIM-9 against cruise missiles.
     
  14. Soham

    Soham DFI TEAM Senior Member

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    The SLAMRAAM versions of the AIM-120Cs would be the cheapest bet against cruise missiles in short-range, for their capability to destroy evolving air-threats such as helicopters, UAVs , cruise missiles etc.


    It would look something like this..

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  15. K Factor

    K Factor A Concerned Indian Senior Member

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    The Pantsyr system is supposed to be great against CMs and even other PGMs like LGBs !!! Hope India acquire some, they are a great deal better than the Tunguskas and ZSUs that India has.
     
  16. LETHALFORCE

    LETHALFORCE Moderator Moderator

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    http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/program/jlens.htm

    Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor [JLENS]

    The Joint Land-Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor System (JLENS) consists of an aerostat with radars to provide over-the-horizon surveillance for defense against cruise missiles. JLENS is primarily intended to tackle the growing threat of cruise missiles to US forces deployed abroad. The system enhances cruise missile detection and engagement ranges with current air defense weapons such as PATRIOT, Navy SM-2 missile, the Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile, and ultimately the Medium Extended Air Defense System and the Corps Surface-to-Air Missile System.

    JLENS will operate at altitudes between 10,000 and 15,000 feet; be capable of detecting long range, terrain masked targets; and provide an effective fire control solution for joint theater air and missile defense weapon systems. Additionally, it can operate from sites on both land or sea, and is tactically relocatable. Comparing these capabilities against the performance of our current sensor systems, the value added of JLENS is readily apparent.

    JLENS is a large, unpowered elevated sensor moored to the ground by a long cable. From its position above the battlefield, the elevated sensors will allow incoming cruise missiles to be detected, tracked, and engaged by surface-based air defense systems even before the targets can be seen by the systems. The elevated sensors have several characteristics, which may make them especially suited to CMD. They are less expensive to buy and operate than comparable fixed-wing aircraft. This makes them the most affordable alternative for achieving a near-term CMD. The elevated sensors can stay aloft up to 30 days at a time providing 24-hour per day coverage over extended areas.

    The internal pressure of JLENS is about the same as the exterior pressure. This makes them extremely difficult to shoot down. These elevated sensors can absorb lots of punctures before they lose altitude. When they do, they come down so slowly that they can be reeled in, repaired easily, and sent right back up. In the long term, JLENS would complement fixed-wing aircraft performing a similar mission, and this will provide the U.S. more robust and flexible CMDs. Mooring systems for large JLENSs covering major portions of a theater of operations would probably be relatively permanent. For short or medium range surveillance and fire control, JLENSs would be smaller and the mooring systems could be transportable or ground-mobile.

    In January 1996, the Army was directed by the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to take the lead in establishing an Aerostat Joint Project Office (Army, Navy, and Air Force). The (then) U.S. Army Space and Strategic Defense Command was formally tasked to stand up the Aerostat Joint Project Office in Huntsville, Ala. The Navy and the Air Force were directed to provide full-time deputy program managers and share in providing other services support to the program. The JLENS Project Office initiated concept studies and related risk reduction efforts following approval of the JLENS acquisition strategy. The concept studies phase of the program was completed on Aug. 1, 1997. A request for proposal for one JLENS sensors demonstration system was released in late June 1997.

    On 30 January 1998 the US Army Space and Missile Defense Command (SMDC) awarded a big contract for the JLENS system to Raytheon Company in Huntsville, AL. The JLENS demonstration program has three primary objectives: mitigation of the risk associated with the execution of the program; design, development, procurement, fabrication, integration, test, demonstration, and maintenance of a system which meets the performance specification; and development of an operational "leave behind" system for user evaluation and for use in the event of a contingency deployment. Total program value, including options for system development/demonstration and operation and sustainment is approximately $300 million. Raytheon’s efforts on the JLENS program will be conducted in Raytheon facilities in Massachusetts, California, Florida, and Virginia. Major subcontractors are TRW, TCOM, L.P., Mercury Computer, and Hewlett Packard.

    Using an aerostat provided by the Air Force, the JLENS Project Office participated in the 1996 Roving Sands Demonstration and provided an over-the-horizon air picture to interested participants for the duration of the exercise. A connection to the Multi-Link Translator and Display System local area network allowed JLENS to inject tactical data information link-J messages into the Joint Tactical Information Distribution System, or JTIDS, network. JLENS transmitted the full air picture, including a number of targets that had not been reported before because the surface-based sensors did not have the capability to send track messages over a JTIDS network to Patriot, THAAD, AEGIS and SHORAD. A German Patriot unit reported killing a cruise missile with JLENS’ track number, demonstrating cueing by the JLENS. The exercise also allowed the JPO to identify and evaluate battle management/command, control, and intelligence interface requirements; provide training and hands-on experience for JLENS launch, recovery, and ground station operations; and establish a test bed for follow-on testing and program risk reduction efforts. The Roving Sands Exercise demonstrated that from its highest altitude of 15,000 feet above ground level, the JLENS sensor can locate and track targets, providing the battlefield commander with early warning of air and ground threats previously hidden from view.

    JLENS proved its operational utility in the joint arena in the All Service Combat Identification and Evaluation Team ‘99, or ASCIET ‘99, exercise. A 15 m aerostat was deployed with a Cooperative Engagement Capability, or CEC, relay on a mobile mooring station. This relay allowed the Army’s Patriot air defense system and the Navy’s Aegis weapon system to exchange radar data, share a Single Integrated Air Picture, or SIAP, and conduct simulated engagements for the first time in an operational environment. JLENS also demonstrated at ASCIET the high operational availability potential for elevated CEC and JTIDS relays, and the JLENS Prototype Processing Station’s capability to process, correlate and display a SIAP from multiple sensor sources.

    In mid-1999 the JLENS team participating in the US Army's Roving Sands Exercise is conducted tests aimed at extending the system's flight time in poor weather. Roving Sands ’99 will showed JLENS current capability as a blue force player, participating under the sponsorship of the US Army’s 32d Air and Missile Defense Command. Building on ASCIET successes, JLENS merged air tracks from multiple elevated aerostat based radars with tracks obtained from JTIDS and Tactical Information Broadcast Service. JLENS air tracks were reported to exercise players over JTIDS. JLENS relay work from ASCIET was expanded to include the Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System and the Enhanced Position Location Reporting System to support the overall exercise. During the Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration portion of Roving Sands, the JLENS objective capability was demonstrated using simulated surveillance track data processed and transmitted over the JTIDS network to the other blue force players.

    The aerostat used by the JLENS Project Office in the exercise at White Sands Missile Range, N.M., is 233 feet long; is filled with 590,000 cubic feet of non-explosive, non-flammable helium; and has a hull volume two and a half times the volume of the largest advertising blimps flying today. Aerostats differ from blimps in that blimps are powered while aerostats are tethered or anchored to the ground. The tether also supplies electrical power to the aerostat.

    JLENS was designated an Acquisition Category II program in March 1999. Long term acquisition requirements call for 12 complete systems at an estimated value of $1.6 billion.
     
  17. LETHALFORCE

    LETHALFORCE Moderator Moderator

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    http://www.sindhtoday.net/south-asia/72363.htm


    India’s ballistic missile defence system to be operational by 2011

    New Delhi, Mar 9 (ANI): India’s indigenous Ballistic Missile Defence System, which will be able to intercept and destroy enemy missile, will be ready for deployment by 2011.

    India on Friday inched closer towards its endeavour to put in place its own home-grown ballistic missile defence system as it successfully carried out the third Interceptor test on March 6 from Integrated Test Range (ITR) at Wheeler Island in Orissa.

    DRDO Chief Controller (research and development) and Air Defence Programme Director, Dr. V K Saraswat, today said that at least five repeated tests are needed before making the missile defence system operational.

    ‘The tests will be completed by the end of year 2010 and the interceptor missile system will be ready for deployment by 2011,’ Dr. Saraswat added.

    Talking about the capability of the missile in taking on numerous targets, he said that the BMD could handle multiple targets simultaneously.

    Dr. Saraswat further said that to get the required kill, there would be salvo of missiles fired at the incoming target simultaneously.

    He said that it would take two to three minutes to identify and fire the missile at a incoming target, and pointed that radars located at Paradip and Pune would take 30 seconds to identify the incoming missile, adding ‘Our radars are capable of handling 200 targets at a time.

    On Friday, the home grown BMDS scored a ‘hat-trick’ launch, as the previous two tests have also been successful. The difference this time was that the interceptor missile met the target at an altitude of 75 km, the highest so far.

    The target was ship launched ballistic missile Dhanush that was performing the role of an enemy missile during the trail.

    Dhanush was launched from 100 km inside the Bay of Bengal from the warship INS Subhadra at 4.19 p.m. After two minutes, Prithvi Air Defence (PAD) missile was fired from a mobile launcher at the Integrated Test Range in Wheeler Island.

    The PAD missile successfully intercepted and destroyed Dhanush, said officials. The entire process of eliminating the enemy missile took less than six minutes. DRDO scientists claimed that all the mission objectives were met.

    The first trial took place in the exo-atmospheric region when the enemy missile was intercepted at 48 km altitude on November 27, 2006. The second test took place in endo-atmospheric region at 15 km altitude using Advanced Air Defence (AAD) missile on December 6, 2007. (ANI)



    Here is the answer to the barrage of cruise missile question
     
  18. Singh

    Singh Phat Cat Administrator

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    011
    Delilah-2 co-developed with Israeli force is also used by PLAAF.

    Moskit doesn't have an Air Launched version its used on PLAN ships.
    PLAAF is going for Yakhont ALCM similar to Brahmos.
     
    LETHALFORCE likes this.
  19. LETHALFORCE

    LETHALFORCE Moderator Moderator

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    cross posted

    http://www.military.com/features/0,15240,110199,00.html

    DoD Finds Cruise Missile Defense 'Gaps'

    A Pentagon assessment of the U.S. capability to defend the homeland against incoming enemy cruise missiles has found what it calls “capability gaps” that may not be solved until 2015.

    As a result, the Air Force's directorate of operational capability requirements is leading a Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System study “to determine the best approaches for mitigating high-risk joint gaps in the [Homeland Air and Cruise Missile Defense of North America] mission area,” according to an Aug. 9 request for information posted on Federal Business Opportunities.

    Officials from the Army and Navy counterpart organizations, as well as the Air Force's Air Combat Command, the North American Aerospace Defense Command and U.S. Northern Command are also taking part, according to an Air Force official.

    In May, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council directed the Air Force to lead a so-called “Functional Solutions Analysis (FSA) for Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD),” to include the Homeland Air and Cruise Missile Defense of North America. The following month, the Air Force Requirements for Operational Capability Council approved the “FSA Study Plan,” which included a “call for concepts” via an RFI, the Air Force official tells Inside Missile Defense.

    “We are soliciting ideas for materiel approaches from industry to address the high priority capability gaps identified in a Functional Needs Analysis (FNA) accomplished by the joint services and combatant commands,” the RFI reads. “As a part of this study, we also solicit inputs for Non-Materiel approaches that may be known by you to solve or mitigate these capability gaps.”

    The Army, along with the other services and combatant commands, led the FNA, which took place from March 2005 through September 2005, according to the Air Force official.

    Materiel solutions involve weapons, platforms, communications systems, etc., while non-materiel approaches could involve “recommended changes or improvements to doctrine, organization, training, leadership and education, personnel and facilities governed by joint instructions,” the service official said.

    Pentagon and Missile Defense Agency officials increasingly are concerned with the threat of terrorists using a cargo ship to fire cruise and ballistic missiles just off U.S. shores but outside its territorial waters.

    “I am concerned about that,” MDA Director Lt. Gen. Trey Obering said at a breakfast with reporters in July 2005. Lockheed Martin is proposing an architecture of Patriot missile batteries and Aegis systems to protect the United States against Scuds fired offshore, he explained.

    “We have also taken steps to upgrade certain [continental U.S.]-based radars to provide a coverage against an asymmetric threat,” Obering added. “We are looking at other alternatives that will provide coverage and would provide some protection.”

    In August 2004, MDA provided a target to the Israeli Arrow program during an intercept test off the coast of California where a Scud target missile was launched from an ocean-going platform.

    “It was not hard,” Obering said last year. “It was very easy to do. It was not technically challenging to do.”

    When asked how that compares to a cruise missile, Obering said: “The thing about cruise missiles is we have a capability to shoot them down today. As long as we can detect them. We don't have the capability over wide areas to do that with ballistic missiles.”

    According to the RFI released last week, the “Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) FNA identified capability gaps in both proficiency and sufficiency out to the year 2015.” The proposed Air Force JCIDS study will address nine of those gaps.

    In addressing those gaps, potential respondents are asked to consider three scenarios:

    · “A 9/11 type terrorist hijacking of an airliner within the continental United States.

    · “A general aviation aircraft loaded with weapons of mass destruction which launches from a Canadian airport and is headed for the continental United States.

    · “A rogue maritime platform fires a cruise missile off the coast of Maryland targeting a major metropolitan area.”

    The first capability gap the joint study identified is that North American Aerospace Defense Command mission analysts tend to not get the right information from different sources to obtain a “common operating picture” tailored to their individual needs, according to the RFI.

    “What materiel/non-materiel approaches are you aware of that could provide an air defense analyst with 1) automatically fused information 2) specific sources or data formats in a multilevel security network-centric environment, and how they are handled?” the RFI asks.

    The second capability gap has to do with insufficient surveillance coverage of NORAD's area of operations, along with endurance shortcomings in operating in all weather conditions “by the current or planned Wide Area Air Surveillance Family of Systems (FoS),” according to the request.

    “What materiel/non-materiel approaches are you aware of for wide-area air surveillance and what is their mobility/flexibility with respect to deployment?” the RFI asks, also requesting the listing of “any capability, even if the capability is not yet fully operational, identifying known coverage modes, associated strengths and challenges. Are we maximizing the capability of those systems?”

    The third capability gap involves an inability to detect small, low-speed, low-altitude targets. The military also “cannot adequately protect joint maneuver/maneuvering forces from reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition (RSTA) and the full array of potential aerial threats, including rockets, artillery and mortar (RAM) projectiles,” the request for information states.

    “What materiel/non-materiel approaches are you aware of that could partially or fully mitigate any or all of these limitations?” the RFI asks. “For approaches identified in Gap 2, provide details on the predicted and measured performance of the sensors against small, high-speed and small, low and slow targets as well as the percent of that resource needed to maintain track.”

    The fourth capability gap involves the “current or planned Wide Area Air Surveillance” family of systems' inability to automatically fuze the information they obtain into a common operating picture in a way that NORAD analysts can use effectively, according to the RFI. “For example, when air defense analysts encounter a suspect air or cruise missile target, they desire a single presentation of sensor information within the NORAD common operating picture.”

    Consequently, the Air Force wants to know, “what sensor fusing capabilities (including but not limited to magnitude of data, types of sensors and data, number of sensors, latency and bandwidth of data, and visualization/output capability) are you aware of that could provide air defense analysts with automatically fused data (identify analyst interface and actions) from current and planned sources in a multisecurity-level, network-centric environment?”

    The fifth capability gap identified by the joint services and combatant commands involves the current air defense sensors' inability to reliably provide adequate tracking information -- such as type, tail number, nation of origin, flight plan, etc. -- of an incoming aircraft or cruise missile.

    “What capabilities or materiel/non-materiel approaches are you aware of that can provide identification data (identify levels of identification and reliability for each level) for air and cruise missile vehicles (any airborne vehicle)?” the RFI asks, while requesting that respondents “include cueing/input assumptions and provide [a] timeline.”

    The sixth capability gap has to do with air defense sensors' inability to determine or predict the intent of an aircraft or cruise missile with 100 percent reliability, according to the RFI.

    “What classification capabilities are you aware of to determine the intent of airborne vehicles and/or to predict the actions of an air and cruise missile vehicle and crew (psychological, cultural, or criminal profile etc.)?” the RFI asks.

    The seventh capability gap involves an inability by the current and planned family of sensor systems to provide senior military officials with enough information to make an adequate “engagement decision recommendation” -- i.e. whether to engage a target using lethal or non-lethal force, continue to monitor it, etc.

    “What assessment capabilities are you aware of that could be provided to a decision-maker operating in a time-critical environment and how is this transferred/portrayed to a decision-maker?” the RFI asks.

    The eighth capability gap identified by the joint study involves the inadequate supply of information to NORAD analysts from other government agencies. “The Homeland Air Cruise Missile Defense system is unable to support decision-makers with the requisite accuracy of information to assess NORAD Homeland Air Cruise Missile Defense events with 100 percent reliability,” the request for information states.

    “What information/mission services or planning capability can your organizations provide that shortens the time required to prepare accurate information for decision-making?” the Air Force asks. “How can assessments be made uniformly characterized across disparate sensors, and how does the capability handle future data inputs?”

    The final capability gap involves not having enough weapons-delivery platforms available to cover the North American continent, according to the RFI, and even then, many of the available platforms are unable to “negate advanced cruise missiles and other irregular platforms.”

    “What approaches/tools are you aware of that could assist decision makers in selecting/tasking the most efficient combination of capability to defeat an air and cruise missile threat and what is the level of analyst involvement?” the Air Force asks in the RFI.

    In addressing these gaps, material or non-material approaches proposed by respondents to the RFI can look at solutions at the system -- “integrated solution for a major capability gap”; component -- “a fix for a specific shortfall described in the capability gap”; or functional -- “a contributing capability but insufficient in and of itself to either fix a major capability gap or fix a specific shortfall within a capability gap” -- levels, according to the Air Force.

    Responses to the RFI are due by Sept. 29, according to the FedBizOpps notice. Analysis of those responses will run approximately four to six months, according to the Air Force official.

    Developing a robust capability to intercept a cruise missile launched from a ship offshore is “very controversial around town,” with some believing a more likely scenario would be terrorists smuggling a weapon of mass destruction in a container cargo ship into a U.S. port, according to Ben Stubenberg, chief of analysis and scenarios at MDA.

    However, the threat of a missile attack from commercial vessels off the coast “is something we need to worry about very much,” he said April 28 at a conference sponsored by Defense News.

    Offshore bombardment “is not something new historically,” Stubenberg said. “Ever since the cannon was invented and they put those cannons and rockets and so forth on ships, this has been a problem.”

    The challenge for the United States is that its long coast and dependence on shipping are among the factors that render it vulnerable to seaborne attack, he said.

    U.S. Strategic Command chief Gen. James Cartwright had a similar take on the issue earlier this year.

    Looking at cruise missile defense as merely defending a small footprint like an airport is too narrow a focus, the Marine Corps general told attendees of a March 20 missile defense conference sponsored by the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics.

    “To me, one of the key attributes that we have to start to pick up in cruise missile defense is to move from point defense to area defense,” Cartwright said. “If you don't move this to area defense, the solution is unaffordable -- you cannot do a point defense for every place in the United States and you certainly can't do a point defense for every place that our forces go or that our allies are.”

    Cartwright advocated thinking about cruise missile defense in the same way that ballistic missile defense is considered and analyzed.

    “That has not really been where our focus has led us over the past few years,” he said. “We've got to change that; we've got to focus in on the area capability. Most of our weapon systems on the weapons end of this equation have substantially greater range than the sensors that we're using to employ this. You've got to move from the sensor grid to an area grid.”

    While he acknowledged the technological challenge such an undertaking represents, “we've already started down that path in command and control and sensors for ballistic missiles,” Cartwright said in March. “To throw that out and build an entirely separate architecture for cruise missiles makes no sense to me and it's probably unaffordable. You've got to figure out what the synergies are, take advantage of them, and then move to an area-type construct versus a point-type construct.”
     

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