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How Pakistan’s nuclear weapons could be jeopardised | | DAWN.COM
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ISLAMABAD: It's a nightmare scenario: al
Qaeda militants gain control of a Pakistani
nuclear weapon, either through a base
assault, theft or a rogue commander's
cooperation, possibly in the event of
hostilities with nuclear-armed neighbour
India.
While most experts believe Pakistan's strategic
nuclear arsenal is safe, items such as low-yield,
mobile nuclear delivery systems— called "shoot
and scoot" tactical nuclear weapons — could be
highly vulnerable.
The Nasr (Hatf-9) system being developed is a
short-range, surface-to-surface multi-tube ballistic
missile system. With a range of 60 km (37.5
miles), it's designed for battlefield use.
Deploying small, portable nuclear weapons onto
a battlefield increases the risk of things going
wrong, either through miscalculation, an accident
or possible infiltration by militant groups, nuclear
experts say.
Here are some scenarios of how Pakistan might
lose control over some of its nuclear arsenal.
Fog of (Nuclear) War
In the event of hostilities between India and
Pakistan, militants could seize control of a Hatf-9
system— essentially a rocket launcher on a
truck. But could they use it?
It's necessary to understand the circumstances.
In case of war between Islamabad and New
Delhi, India is developing a"Cold Start" doctrine,
which envisions armored battle groups quickly
pushing into Pakistani territory, holding key
pockets and then forcing Islamabad to the
negotiating table.
The plan is to avoid antagonizing Pakistan to the
point that it would retaliate with ballistic missiles
against Indian cities, but Pakistani doctrine— and
the Hatf-9 system — appears to envision using
tactical nuclear weapons, possibly on its own soil,
against the invaders.
But deploying tactical weapons to the battlefield
means command and control has to be
dispersed to individual military units.
And while Pakistan normally separates warheads
and delivery systems, in times of crisis, weapons
would be armed and deployed, although still
"locked" by authentication codes, says Professor
Shaun Gregory, director of the Pakistan Security
Research Unit at the University of Bradford.
"However in a fluid battlefield context such codes
will likely be released to prevent the weapons
being overrun before they can be used," he told
Reuters in an email. "In such a 'release delegated'
state "¦ it's possible that terrorists could seize a
functioning weapon."
Pakistan says its weapons have indigenously
developed safety systems to prevent misuse, but
it has never allowed outsiders to inspect these
systems, Rahul Roy-Chaudhury, senior fellow for
South Asia at the International Institute for
Strategic Studies in London, told Reuters.
Rogue Commanders
Another scenario is the "rogue commander".
Militant groups have had varying degrees of
success in infiltrating the Pakistani military, but it's
unclear how deeply they go.
In addition to mechanical safety systems,
Pakistan says its nuclear weapons are secure
because of rigorous background checks and
continuous monitoring of personnel for extremist
sympathies.
That monitoring appears insufficient.
As far back as 2006, the United States was
reporting in diplomatic cables, recently published
by Wikileaks, that Pakistani pilots and flight crew
were engaging in"petty sabotage" of American
F-16s to prevent them being used against Taliban
militants in the northwest.
The bodyguards for Punjab governor Salman
Taseer were also heavily screened, but he was
killed by an extremist who managed to get
assigned to his security detail.
Speculation is also rife that the Taliban assaults on
the PNS Mehran naval base in Karachi this month
and on the Army General Headquarters in
Rawalpindi in 2009 were aided by sympathisers
from within the military.
While a commander going rogue is unlikely, "this
is an ongoing struggle," Roy-Chaudhury said.
"The expected increase in radicalisation, especially
within the Pakistani army after the U.S. raid and
killing of Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad"¦ raises
additional concerns."
Rogue commanders could, in a conflict with
India, hand over codes and weapons to militants
or cooperate with them. The more mercenary
types might simply sell them.
Seizing A Tactical Weapon From A Base
Another possibility doesn't require a fight with
India. The PNS Mehran attack shows militants
have developed the ability to attack and hold
ground inside sensitive military bases. And while
no nuclear facilities have been penetrated yet the
possibility has caused great concern.
"I think the attack on PNS Mehran (and on the
GHQ in 2009) show that terrorists are developing
tactics which enable them to penetrate highly-
secure bases and hold space within them for
hours," Gregory said. "This suggests nuclear
weapons security is increasingly vulnerable."
Because of their smaller size, tactical weapons are
more portable. And while the warheads wouldn't
be armed, the fissile materials of the cores could
conceivably be extracted and used with
conventional explosives to create a"dirty bomb".
Militants could attack a base, seize a warhead or
its core materials and then escape. A Pakistani
tactical nuclear weapon might contain as little as
15-20kg (33-44 lbs) of enriched uranium.
"Responsible Pakistani stewards of their nuclear
assets have no choice but to re-evaluate their
security requirements and procedures," said
Michael Krepon, director of the South Asia and
Space Security programs for Stimson, a
Washington-based think tank for international
security.
.
.
.
ISLAMABAD: It's a nightmare scenario: al
Qaeda militants gain control of a Pakistani
nuclear weapon, either through a base
assault, theft or a rogue commander's
cooperation, possibly in the event of
hostilities with nuclear-armed neighbour
India.
While most experts believe Pakistan's strategic
nuclear arsenal is safe, items such as low-yield,
mobile nuclear delivery systems— called "shoot
and scoot" tactical nuclear weapons — could be
highly vulnerable.
The Nasr (Hatf-9) system being developed is a
short-range, surface-to-surface multi-tube ballistic
missile system. With a range of 60 km (37.5
miles), it's designed for battlefield use.
Deploying small, portable nuclear weapons onto
a battlefield increases the risk of things going
wrong, either through miscalculation, an accident
or possible infiltration by militant groups, nuclear
experts say.
Here are some scenarios of how Pakistan might
lose control over some of its nuclear arsenal.
Fog of (Nuclear) War
In the event of hostilities between India and
Pakistan, militants could seize control of a Hatf-9
system— essentially a rocket launcher on a
truck. But could they use it?
It's necessary to understand the circumstances.
In case of war between Islamabad and New
Delhi, India is developing a"Cold Start" doctrine,
which envisions armored battle groups quickly
pushing into Pakistani territory, holding key
pockets and then forcing Islamabad to the
negotiating table.
The plan is to avoid antagonizing Pakistan to the
point that it would retaliate with ballistic missiles
against Indian cities, but Pakistani doctrine— and
the Hatf-9 system — appears to envision using
tactical nuclear weapons, possibly on its own soil,
against the invaders.
But deploying tactical weapons to the battlefield
means command and control has to be
dispersed to individual military units.
And while Pakistan normally separates warheads
and delivery systems, in times of crisis, weapons
would be armed and deployed, although still
"locked" by authentication codes, says Professor
Shaun Gregory, director of the Pakistan Security
Research Unit at the University of Bradford.
"However in a fluid battlefield context such codes
will likely be released to prevent the weapons
being overrun before they can be used," he told
Reuters in an email. "In such a 'release delegated'
state "¦ it's possible that terrorists could seize a
functioning weapon."
Pakistan says its weapons have indigenously
developed safety systems to prevent misuse, but
it has never allowed outsiders to inspect these
systems, Rahul Roy-Chaudhury, senior fellow for
South Asia at the International Institute for
Strategic Studies in London, told Reuters.
Rogue Commanders
Another scenario is the "rogue commander".
Militant groups have had varying degrees of
success in infiltrating the Pakistani military, but it's
unclear how deeply they go.
In addition to mechanical safety systems,
Pakistan says its nuclear weapons are secure
because of rigorous background checks and
continuous monitoring of personnel for extremist
sympathies.
That monitoring appears insufficient.
As far back as 2006, the United States was
reporting in diplomatic cables, recently published
by Wikileaks, that Pakistani pilots and flight crew
were engaging in"petty sabotage" of American
F-16s to prevent them being used against Taliban
militants in the northwest.
The bodyguards for Punjab governor Salman
Taseer were also heavily screened, but he was
killed by an extremist who managed to get
assigned to his security detail.
Speculation is also rife that the Taliban assaults on
the PNS Mehran naval base in Karachi this month
and on the Army General Headquarters in
Rawalpindi in 2009 were aided by sympathisers
from within the military.
While a commander going rogue is unlikely, "this
is an ongoing struggle," Roy-Chaudhury said.
"The expected increase in radicalisation, especially
within the Pakistani army after the U.S. raid and
killing of Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad"¦ raises
additional concerns."
Rogue commanders could, in a conflict with
India, hand over codes and weapons to militants
or cooperate with them. The more mercenary
types might simply sell them.
Seizing A Tactical Weapon From A Base
Another possibility doesn't require a fight with
India. The PNS Mehran attack shows militants
have developed the ability to attack and hold
ground inside sensitive military bases. And while
no nuclear facilities have been penetrated yet the
possibility has caused great concern.
"I think the attack on PNS Mehran (and on the
GHQ in 2009) show that terrorists are developing
tactics which enable them to penetrate highly-
secure bases and hold space within them for
hours," Gregory said. "This suggests nuclear
weapons security is increasingly vulnerable."
Because of their smaller size, tactical weapons are
more portable. And while the warheads wouldn't
be armed, the fissile materials of the cores could
conceivably be extracted and used with
conventional explosives to create a"dirty bomb".
Militants could attack a base, seize a warhead or
its core materials and then escape. A Pakistani
tactical nuclear weapon might contain as little as
15-20kg (33-44 lbs) of enriched uranium.
"Responsible Pakistani stewards of their nuclear
assets have no choice but to re-evaluate their
security requirements and procedures," said
Michael Krepon, director of the South Asia and
Space Security programs for Stimson, a
Washington-based think tank for international
security.
