OBOR News & Developments

[sasum]

China's Xinjiang Inks Two Billion Dollars Deal With Pakistan

The 2 billion dollar agreements covered infrastructure, solar power and logistics, among other projects, signed by companies from Xinjiang with their Pakistan counterparts, the newspaper said, without giving details.

China and Pakistan call each other ‘all-weather friends’ and their ties have been underpinned by long-standing wariness of their common neighbour, India.

While meeting Sharif the two countries agreed to continue working together to fight terrorism, strengthen border controls, maintain regional peace and stability and ensure the economic corridor projects are protected.
http://www.newindianexpress.com/wor...l-With-Pakistan/2016/04/08/article3370106.ece


~~Still waters run deep. ~~from my MiPad using tapatalk

Investing in Pak infrastructure will be foolish. Pak is run by Army & Islamic radicals. Democratic Govt. is for namesake only. To protect her interest in Pak, China will have to colonise the land like she did in Xinjiang.

 

[Indx TechStyle]

Investing in Pak infrastructure will be foolish.

No my brother, China isn't fool. It's the legacy of pak to do slavery of other countries. US, Iran, Turkey etc. in past, PRC, KSA and Russia etc. now and only God knows who in the future. :biggrin2:

 

[aliyah]

there is 1 more road from china via Tajikistan connecting Iran's charabar

 

[porky_kicker]

basically china is making sure that porkiestan is firmly in their gasp in the long run.
US for the very reason seems to be doling out F16s etc.
India needs to be careful , nobody seems to ask or ponder on covert US and Chinese mutual cooperation based on say some select issues. like dividing the countries amongst them for their economic benefit, like US will do if India gets spooked by porky - chini shit and driven into US camp.

I have a feeling these jackass porkies are the lynchpin to some grand catastrophe in the making.
those porkies don't realize that cockroaches :biggrin2: will be the first casualties when the elephants stampede.

 

[amoy]

Largest Infrastructure Project of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor Undertaken by CSCEC Commences

• [ Date：2016-05-11 Visits：15 ]
  　　On May 6 of local time, the groundbreaking ceremony was held in Sukur of Parkistan for Peshawar-Karachi Highway Project (Sukur-Multan Section), the largest transportation infrastructure project of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) undertaken by China State Construction Engineering Corp. Ltd (CSCEC). This ceremony marks a huge progress in infrastructure cooperation of CPEC.
  　　Attendees of the ceremony include Pakistani Prime Minister Sharif, Chief Minister of Sindh Province & Chairman of Pakistan National Highways Authority, Tarar, and officials from central and local governments. Charge D’affaires Zhao Lijian of the Chinese Embassy in Pakistan, Vice President Zheng Xuexuan of CSCEC, and representative from Export-Import Bank of China also attended the ceremony, along with some other 2000 personages of all circles from China and Pakistan.
  　　PM Sharif unveiled the nameplate in the ceremony. In the speech he delivered, the Prime Minister expressed that as the economic artery connecting northern and southern Pakistan, the Peshawar-Karachi Highway has long been expected to be built by the Pakistani people since the 1990s. And now, he added, the most important section of the Highway, Sukur to Multan, was formally commenced with the support of the Chinese government, which would greatly boost the economic growth of Pakistan and contribute to the building of CPEC.
  　　Zhao Zhijian gave his remarks on behalf of the Chinese Embassy in Pakistan, when he said that the Peshawar-Karachi Highway Project (Sukur-Multan Section) was one of the “Two Major Projects of Early Harvest” under the framework of government cooperation of the two countries in CPEC, and that it was also the largest infrastructure project in CPEC. He stressed that the successful commencement of the project marked significant progress having been made in areas of CPEC infrastructure cooperation, which, upon completion, would greatly improve traffic conditions in Pakistan, and play a positive role in interconnections between China and Pakistan. Before ending his words, the Charge D’affaires reiterated China’s full support to the project.
  　　VP Zheng Xuexuan expressed in his remarks that the undertaking of the largest infrastructure project in CPEC by CSCEC reflected high-trust and expectations placed on his company from the Chinese and Pakistani governments. CSCEC, he said, would make full use of the group’s comprehensive advantage and rich experience of working on super-large projects around the world to produce a model project in CPEC cooperation. With the support and guidance from the two governments, CSCEC, he pledged, would cooperate closely with local companies, use local resources, fulfill social responsibilities, increase local employment and contribute to local people’s livelihood.
  　　The Peshawar-Karachi Highway Project (Sukur-Multan Section), with a total length of 392km and the designed speed of 120km per hour, is Pakistan’s largest transportation infrastructure project, and the initial major project of “One Belt One Road”. The Chinese and Pakistani governments have listed it as “Projects of Early Harvest” of CPEC. The project starts from Pakistan’s largest city, Karachi, in the south, passes the second largest city, Lahore, and reaches the northwest key border city, Peshawar, in the north. The Sukur-Multan section which runs through the two strong economic provinces of Pakistan is undertaken by CSCEC. Once completed, it will vastly enhance traffic conditions of Pakistan, and will not only directly drive the economic and social development of the two provinces along the highway, but also benefit all other regions of Pakistan. At the same time, the project will also contribute to the interconnections and exchanges of the two countries.
  

 

[garg_bharat]

I have a feeling these jackass porkies are the lynchpin to some grand catastrophe in the making.

Building roads, ports, power stations etc. is good. Whatever can give poor of Pakistani a decent life.

China has excess capital which it is using to invest in other countries. India also solicits such capital from other countries.

However infrastructure projects have very low returns. The cream is not the road but the factories that come up along the road. We need to see how China succeeds in transforming economy of Pakistan. It is something for the future.

 

[amoy]

Chinese are busy learning from Japanese experience of outbound investment during their economic take-off to avoid the pitfalls Japan suffered.

Will China Repeat Japan's Mistake in Overseas Property Investment?

Japan's booming 1980s economy, its growing trade surpluses and the yen's appreciation because of pressure from trade partners led the country to its highest overseas investment. Unfortunately, those acquisitions ended up mostly as huge losses later. During the high growth period, Japanese businesses were simply too optimistic. Real estate values in the United States were generally much lower than in Japan, leading them to believe that prices would continue to rise

 

[aliyah]

The electricity generating projects are likely to saddle the Pakistani government with a massive fiscal burden but the real cost of CPEC is likely to be felt in the changing civil-military balance.


It has been a year since the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) was launched on a wave of Pakistani euphoria. It was called a game-changer, so Pakistan has played the new game for a year now, and though the rest of the world – and Pakistanis outside government – have no clue what the rules are, it is becoming clear that if ever there was what cricketers call a corridor of uncertainty, this is one. Nawaz Sharif, a batsman in his prime, knows that the best you can hope for in that corridor is the fortuitous reward of a Chinese cut.

Though there are fears in Lutyens’ Delhi that the corridor will be a strategic nightmare for India, there is a greater chance of it becoming an incubus for Pakistan. $34.4 billion of the $46 billion announced are for power projects, of which the government designated 16 as early-harvest, the yield presumably its re-election in 2018. These will add 10,400 MW of generating capacity to the grid, which the government claimed would resolve Pakistan’s critical shortage of power, now as much a political as an economic problem.

Numbers that don’t add up

This is misleading, for several reasons. Firstly, Pakistan’s power crisis does not flow from a shortage of generating capacity. Installed capacity is 22,800 MW, more than enough for the current demand of 19000 MW. Many thermal plants were idle because of a shortage of feedstock, but in February this year, Pakistan signed an agreement with Qatar, at unit costs 20% less than it paid in 2013, to import 3.75 million tonnes of LNG each year for them, and for the six plants being built in Punjab, which will add 3600 MW to installed capacity.

Secondly, work is also reported to be under way on several hydropower projects, all with international partners, some of them Chinese, which dwarf those of CPEC in scope. Just seven of them – Diamer-Bhasha and Bonji in Gilgit-Baltistan, Neelam-Jhelum, Azad Pattan and Mehl in POK, and Tarbela IV and V and Dasu in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa – will add another 21,129 MW to the grid. That is more than double the early-harvest projects.

Thirdly, the real problem with Pakistan’s power generation and distribution companies is a crisis of circular debt, which increasing production will not solve, but which the CPEC agreement announced in February 2016 will exacerbate. The government has approved the establishment of revolving funds, equal to 22% of monthly invoicing, “backed by sovereign guarantees to ensure uninterrupted payments to Chinese sponsors of CPEC energy projects”. If the purchaser fails to replenish the account, the ministry of finance will. Since distribution companies will default, because tariffs are low, and even those are not paid, the government will pay, up front, at least 22% of the bills of the Chinese companies.

Other sponsors, and their Pakistani partners, hardly likely to run plants at a loss, will lobby for the same treatment, which the government cannot concede, because even the guarantee to the Chinese will be a huge drain on the budget. They will then let their plants go idle, which will return Pakistan to a power crisis, even if the CPEC plants run well, or approach the courts for injunctions against a government decision that patently discriminates between companies engaged in the same line of business.

How large is the liability the government has taken on? Suki-Kinari, which will generate 870 MW of hydropower in the corridor, has announced that it will add 3050 gigawatt/hours to the grid at a tariff of 8.84 cents/kwh. This translates to invoices of $270 million annually, of which the government of Pakistan has now guaranteed $59 million. If all other projects have similar outputs and tariffs, the early-harvest projects will entail the government paying at least $700 million each year as guaranteed fees to the Chinese sponsors, assuming that local companies will be forced to default. In the parlous state of Pakistan’s finances, that is not sustainable. (And if the courts rule that the favour must be extended to all others, it will become even more so.)

For all its brave talk, these realities seem to have now dawned upon the government, which, from some of its recent decisions, appears to be dragging its feet on CPEC projects, drawing criticism from two quarters, China and the Pakistan army. The planning ministry had asked for Rs.350 billion in the 2016-17 budget for CPEC projects, which it oversees: it was given Rs.124 billion, a third of what it needed. It has allocated 90% of this to road projects, not to the power plants, which might seem to reflect a shift of priorities towards the road sector (and raise suspicions in India), but this is just 15% of the Rs.762 billion that the highway authority had asked for, so even this work is not really galloping on.


If CPEC is a game-changer, it seems odd that the government should be starving it of funds. Either it is not, or the government is so strapped that it cannot possibly give more without creating major privations and serious problems elsewhere. (As an order of comparison, all the Sharif government was able or willing to allot this year as its share in the building of the CPEC power projects was Rs.13 billion. Once these are up and running, it would have to find Rs.72 billion every year to pay the guaranteed 22% to the Chinese operators.)

The one project the government is pressing ahead with, brushing aside all opposition, including from two UN special rapporteurs, on cultural rights and on the right to housing, is the Lahore Metro, which is peripheral to the economic and strategic objectives of CPEC, but which the ruling party believes will swing voters towards it in the Punjab, which is its heartland. The project has run into heavy weather in the courts, and it remains to be seen if the government can continue with the demolitions of heritage sites and private buildings, and the forced displacements that follow, if the Lahore high court rules against it. If in its desperation it does, it might invite more serious trouble later, since the courts in Pakistan are no longer supine.

Army stakes it claim

And the army is lying in wait. Details of how CPEC will be funded, how much of it is a grant, how much of the investment is in the form of loans which Pakistan will have to repay, and on what terms, are mysteries, the entire agreement being opaque. What is transparent, even if extraordinary, is the army’s close interest in what is supposedly a purely economic project. To some, this simply reflects the army’s greed; since it has major commercial interests, promoted through its two foundations, it sees enormous new opportunities if the corridor throws up economic zones on its fringes, and plans to corner the lion’s share. That might well be true, but the army is playing a deeper and older game.

After the attack on the school in Peshawar in December 2014, Pakistan adopted a national action plan (NAP) against terrorism, which gave the army a leading role, including the right to have terrorists tried in military courts. But shortly thereafter, the army announced the formation of apex committees in provinces wracked by terrorism, including Sindh. Formally chaired by the chief minister, these would include the local corps commander. These were not part of the NAP, but the government acquiesced in their formation, giving the army an institutional role in policing and law and order issues, which it did not have. There are reports that it is the corps commander whose writ runs in these committees.

Immediately after the bomb blast in the Gulshan-e-Iqbal park in Lahore on Easter this year, the army demanded an apex committee in Punjab, which the Sharif brothers have resisted, since this is their bailiwick. If they cede Punjab to the army, they lose their political base. General Raheel Sharif has not given up there, but he has opened another front in CPEC to keep the government under pressure.

China, for which the corridor is a flagship programme in its One Belt, One Road project, knew its workers would need protection in Balochistan and elsewhere. The Pakistan Army announced that it would raise a force specifically to protect them, but it has since played on Chinese fears that CPEC might stall. General Sharif has repeatedly and stridently played up its importance, the threats to it from India, and the army’s determination to see it through, projecting the army as the best ally China has on CPEC.

From late last year, with the apex committees under its belt, the army has pressed for an institutional role in CPEC. In April, 2016, the minister for planning told a Pakistani newspaper that he had received an “informal proposal” six months back for the establishment of a CPEC Authority, in which the army would have a role, and for CPEC to be made part of the NAP against terrorism. The government did not accept these ideas, but General Sharif has not given up. In mid-May, he was in Beijing again, where he met Premier Li Keqiang, who, according to Xinhua, said that military-to-military relations had reinforced China-Pakistan ties, and economic cooperation and security collaboration between the two countries should be pushed forward “like two wheels”. Two wheels need an axle to move together: that is the Pakistani army.


The ISPR account of the meeting wasjust as revealing. The Chinese leaders, it said, appreciated the army’s role in CPEC security, and the faster development of CPEC would “realise dream of prosperity across the region”. The subtext was clear: the Chinese believed CPEC was being held up, but trusted the Pakistan Army. Therefore, give the army a greater role and all would be well. As the civilian government tries to cling on to the remnants of its power against General Sharif’s determined attempts to whittle them down, wedging the army into institutional roles in internal security and economic development, it would appear that the Chinese, at least implicitly, are backing the army to get CPEC moving faster.

All it will need is a substantial attack on Chinese workers on the corridor, which can be blamed on India, to force the government to cave in and agree to the army’s demand. If that attack coincides with some other crisis which would already have placed the government under pressure, a common enough predicament for Nawaz Sharif, the army will get what it wants, in the administration of CPEC and beyond. CPEC may or may not resolve one power crisis; it is likely to set off another. The game will change in Pakistan, but perhaps not in the way the government had expected.

 

[tsunami]

Ab CPEC ka kya hoga

 

[Zulfiqar Khan]

Man you guys seem more concerned about CPEC than Pakistanis themselves.

Whatever China/Pak is doing it seems it must be working!

 

[for truth]

The electricity generating projects are likely to saddle the Pakistani government with a massive fiscal burden but the real cost of CPEC is likely to be felt in the changing civil-military balance.


It has been a year since the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) was launched on a wave of Pakistani euphoria. It was called a game-changer, so Pakistan has played the new game for a year now, and though the rest of the world – and Pakistanis outside government – have no clue what the rules are, it is becoming clear that if ever there was what cricketers call a corridor of uncertainty, this is one. Nawaz Sharif, a batsman in his prime, knows that the best you can hope for in that corridor is the fortuitous reward of a Chinese cut.

Though there are fears in Lutyens’ Delhi that the corridor will be a strategic nightmare for India, there is a greater chance of it becoming an incubus for Pakistan. $34.4 billion of the $46 billion announced are for power projects, of which the government designated 16 as early-harvest, the yield presumably its re-election in 2018. These will add 10,400 MW of generating capacity to the grid, which the government claimed would resolve Pakistan’s critical shortage of power, now as much a political as an economic problem.

Numbers that don’t add up

This is misleading, for several reasons. Firstly, Pakistan’s power crisis does not flow from a shortage of generating capacity. Installed capacity is 22,800 MW, more than enough for the current demand of 19000 MW. Many thermal plants were idle because of a shortage of feedstock, but in February this year, Pakistan signed an agreement with Qatar, at unit costs 20% less than it paid in 2013, to import 3.75 million tonnes of LNG each year for them, and for the six plants being built in Punjab, which will add 3600 MW to installed capacity.

Secondly, work is also reported to be under way on several hydropower projects, all with international partners, some of them Chinese, which dwarf those of CPEC in scope. Just seven of them – Diamer-Bhasha and Bonji in Gilgit-Baltistan, Neelam-Jhelum, Azad Pattan and Mehl in POK, and Tarbela IV and V and Dasu in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa – will add another 21,129 MW to the grid. That is more than double the early-harvest projects.

Thirdly, the real problem with Pakistan’s power generation and distribution companies is a crisis of circular debt, which increasing production will not solve, but which the CPEC agreement announced in February 2016 will exacerbate. The government has approved the establishment of revolving funds, equal to 22% of monthly invoicing, “backed by sovereign guarantees to ensure uninterrupted payments to Chinese sponsors of CPEC energy projects”. If the purchaser fails to replenish the account, the ministry of finance will. Since distribution companies will default, because tariffs are low, and even those are not paid, the government will pay, up front, at least 22% of the bills of the Chinese companies.

Other sponsors, and their Pakistani partners, hardly likely to run plants at a loss, will lobby for the same treatment, which the government cannot concede, because even the guarantee to the Chinese will be a huge drain on the budget. They will then let their plants go idle, which will return Pakistan to a power crisis, even if the CPEC plants run well, or approach the courts for injunctions against a government decision that patently discriminates between companies engaged in the same line of business.

How large is the liability the government has taken on? Suki-Kinari, which will generate 870 MW of hydropower in the corridor, has announced that it will add 3050 gigawatt/hours to the grid at a tariff of 8.84 cents/kwh. This translates to invoices of $270 million annually, of which the government of Pakistan has now guaranteed $59 million. If all other projects have similar outputs and tariffs, the early-harvest projects will entail the government paying at least $700 million each year as guaranteed fees to the Chinese sponsors, assuming that local companies will be forced to default. In the parlous state of Pakistan’s finances, that is not sustainable. (And if the courts rule that the favour must be extended to all others, it will become even more so.)

For all its brave talk, these realities seem to have now dawned upon the government, which, from some of its recent decisions, appears to be dragging its feet on CPEC projects, drawing criticism from two quarters, China and the Pakistan army. The planning ministry had asked for Rs.350 billion in the 2016-17 budget for CPEC projects, which it oversees: it was given Rs.124 billion, a third of what it needed. It has allocated 90% of this to road projects, not to the power plants, which might seem to reflect a shift of priorities towards the road sector (and raise suspicions in India), but this is just 15% of the Rs.762 billion that the highway authority had asked for, so even this work is not really galloping on.


If CPEC is a game-changer, it seems odd that the government should be starving it of funds. Either it is not, or the government is so strapped that it cannot possibly give more without creating major privations and serious problems elsewhere. (As an order of comparison, all the Sharif government was able or willing to allot this year as its share in the building of the CPEC power projects was Rs.13 billion. Once these are up and running, it would have to find Rs.72 billion every year to pay the guaranteed 22% to the Chinese operators.)

The one project the government is pressing ahead with, brushing aside all opposition, including from two UN special rapporteurs, on cultural rights and on the right to housing, is the Lahore Metro, which is peripheral to the economic and strategic objectives of CPEC, but which the ruling party believes will swing voters towards it in the Punjab, which is its heartland. The project has run into heavy weather in the courts, and it remains to be seen if the government can continue with the demolitions of heritage sites and private buildings, and the forced displacements that follow, if the Lahore high court rules against it. If in its desperation it does, it might invite more serious trouble later, since the courts in Pakistan are no longer supine.

Army stakes it claim

And the army is lying in wait. Details of how CPEC will be funded, how much of it is a grant, how much of the investment is in the form of loans which Pakistan will have to repay, and on what terms, are mysteries, the entire agreement being opaque. What is transparent, even if extraordinary, is the army’s close interest in what is supposedly a purely economic project. To some, this simply reflects the army’s greed; since it has major commercial interests, promoted through its two foundations, it sees enormous new opportunities if the corridor throws up economic zones on its fringes, and plans to corner the lion’s share. That might well be true, but the army is playing a deeper and older game.

After the attack on the school in Peshawar in December 2014, Pakistan adopted a national action plan (NAP) against terrorism, which gave the army a leading role, including the right to have terrorists tried in military courts. But shortly thereafter, the army announced the formation of apex committees in provinces wracked by terrorism, including Sindh. Formally chaired by the chief minister, these would include the local corps commander. These were not part of the NAP, but the government acquiesced in their formation, giving the army an institutional role in policing and law and order issues, which it did not have. There are reports that it is the corps commander whose writ runs in these committees.

Immediately after the bomb blast in the Gulshan-e-Iqbal park in Lahore on Easter this year, the army demanded an apex committee in Punjab, which the Sharif brothers have resisted, since this is their bailiwick. If they cede Punjab to the army, they lose their political base. General Raheel Sharif has not given up there, but he has opened another front in CPEC to keep the government under pressure.

China, for which the corridor is a flagship programme in its One Belt, One Road project, knew its workers would need protection in Balochistan and elsewhere. The Pakistan Army announced that it would raise a force specifically to protect them, but it has since played on Chinese fears that CPEC might stall. General Sharif has repeatedly and stridently played up its importance, the threats to it from India, and the army’s determination to see it through, projecting the army as the best ally China has on CPEC.

From late last year, with the apex committees under its belt, the army has pressed for an institutional role in CPEC. In April, 2016, the minister for planning told a Pakistani newspaper that he had received an “informal proposal” six months back for the establishment of a CPEC Authority, in which the army would have a role, and for CPEC to be made part of the NAP against terrorism. The government did not accept these ideas, but General Sharif has not given up. In mid-May, he was in Beijing again, where he met Premier Li Keqiang, who, according to Xinhua, said that military-to-military relations had reinforced China-Pakistan ties, and economic cooperation and security collaboration between the two countries should be pushed forward “like two wheels”. Two wheels need an axle to move together: that is the Pakistani army.


The ISPR account of the meeting wasjust as revealing. The Chinese leaders, it said, appreciated the army’s role in CPEC security, and the faster development of CPEC would “realise dream of prosperity across the region”. The subtext was clear: the Chinese believed CPEC was being held up, but trusted the Pakistan Army. Therefore, give the army a greater role and all would be well. As the civilian government tries to cling on to the remnants of its power against General Sharif’s determined attempts to whittle them down, wedging the army into institutional roles in internal security and economic development, it would appear that the Chinese, at least implicitly, are backing the army to get CPEC moving faster.

All it will need is a substantial attack on Chinese workers on the corridor, which can be blamed on India, to force the government to cave in and agree to the army’s demand. If that attack coincides with some other crisis which would already have placed the government under pressure, a common enough predicament for Nawaz Sharif, the army will get what it wants, in the administration of CPEC and beyond. CPEC may or may not resolve one power crisis; it is likely to set off another. The game will change in Pakistan, but perhaps not in the way the government had expected.

Brilliantly said.

Just a few days ago there was a news about political leaders expressing serious doubts over western route of CPEC, and even said that western route was a "lie".

Just a few things that I have come to know-- the shortage of electricity in Pakistan(which pakistani government claims is around 3000 MW) is actually around 6000 MW. As with all things, pakistani govt hasn't got it's equation right, and there were major loopholes in it's calculation of electricity shortfall--this was revealed in an recent article.

Secondly, the problem is not about supply and demand, it is also about infrastructure. There was a beautiful article in which it was detailed out that the existing grid infrastructure in Pakistan not having enough capability to handle increased load. Along with new plant's, they will have to upgrade the grid too to handle the increased load.

i remember reading a comment by someone in Pakistan who said it beautifully-- CPEC will fail, the Pakistani govt doesn't have the money to pay for it's part of share. And the leaders of different provinces will whip up ethnic tensions to get greater share of whatever is coming through.

 

[Indx TechStyle]

Whatever China/Pak is doing it seems it must be working!

What's meaning of writing China-Pak together? We are concerned about only one, who can and is doing.

 

[amoy]

Chinese Suitors Said to Vie for $1.5 Billion Stake in K-Electric

Chinese clean-energy group Golden Concord Holdings Ltd. is competing with Shanghai Electric Power Co. for control of K-Electric Ltd., the $2.3 billion Pakistani utility, people with knowledge of the matter said. The two Chinese companies are among bidders asked to submit binding offers by the end of this month for Abraaj Group’s 66 percent holding in K-Electric, according to the people.

French utility Engie SA and at least one investment fund are also in the final round, one of the people said, asking not to be identified because the information is private. The stake was valued at about $1.5 billion based on the company’s stock price Thursday in Karachi, according to data compiled by Bloomberg.

Any transaction would add to the $129.1 billion of utility deals announced globally this year, up from $60 billion during the same period in 2015, the data show. K-Electric, formerly known as Karachi Electric Supply Co., serves more than 2.2 million customers in and around the Pakistani city and employs about 11,000 people, according to its website.

 

[Mikesingh]

What is transparent, even if extraordinary, is the army’s close interest in what is supposedly a purely economic project.

This isn't a purely economic project which we are led to believe it is. The CPEC is a logistics life line from Kashgar in Xinjiang to Gwadar which is the future PLAAN base being set up there. A Chinese naval base here would have three geostrategic advantages:

1. Dominate the Strait of Hormuz.

2. Dominate the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean Region.

3. A Chinese naval base along with the Pak Navy at Gwadar will be a guarantee against any Indian strike on Gwadar and other Pakistani military assets there in war due to the presence of the Chinese navy.

4. Lateral movement of Pakistan Army reserve field formations from one theater to another would become much faster during war, thus reducing reaction time considerably.

That's the prime reason why the Pakistani Army is interested in getting the CPEC moving and completed as soon as possible. As a first step, Gwadar Port has already been handed over lock stock and barrel to the Chinese on an extendable 40 year lease.

 

[LordOfTheUnderworlds]

https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/145151-Chinese-engineers-working-on-CPEC-clash-with-police

Chinese engineers working on CPEC clash with police
MULTAN: Heavy contingents of police beat Chinese engineers working on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor project at Multan-Sukkar Motorway in Shujaabad near Chinese engineers base camp on continuation of their work, The News has learnt.

Police insiders disclosed that two Chinese engineers sustained major injuries while the rest received minor injuries in Moza Chaddhar in Shujaabad. The said police smashed the fingers of Chinese engineer Leu while Chwoo received serious injuries on his back.

At least 20 Chinese engineers are working there and the government had provided them residence at Multan PC Colony on Sher Shah Road. They continued work Tuesday night at 11:30pm and decided to stay at the base camp that night. Chief Security Office Inspector Yousaf Haroon, appointed for their security, raised objection to their stay without an NOC and demanded that they leave the site.

Meanwhile, the CSO called Raja Ram police to force the Chinese engineers to leave the site. SHO Muhammad Ashraf came with force, exchanged hot words and beat them; however, he also received head injuries. The Chinese told the police that they had to stay to finish the work.

Acting Multan SP Operations Rizwan Ahmed said at a press conference on Wednesday that the matter did not concern him and CPO Azhar Ikram was investigating the matter. Azhar was contacted repeatedly but he was not available and his operator said he was busy in meetings. SHO Ashraf said it took place in Basti Malok jurisdiction. When contacted, a Chinese interpreter refused to give any details.

Astaghfirullah! My feelings are expressed by a Pakistani member's comment. BTW there is actually a website for Pak-China news.

http://pakchinanews.pk/unfortunate-incident-between-chinese-engineers-working-on-cpec-and-police/
Ahmad says:AUG 26, 2016


I’m feeling so embarrassed right now. China, we’re sorry!
We have the worst police in the world. They behave even worse with us.
Army should take the security of our esteemed guests in its own hands.
Peace!

 

[sorcerer]

Protest Against Human Rights Abuses Related to Brutal Implementation of CPEC, 28 August 2016, London
http://unpo.org/article/19409

 

[musalman]

Protest Against Human Rights Abuses Related to Brutal Implementation of CPEC, 28 August 2016, London
http://unpo.org/article/19409

Of course these people are against it. CPEC will make Sindhis and Baluchis too well off to be bothered by these people. Pushtuns who are nearly 44% of Baluchistan will be the most beneficiary since they control the trucking and food business on the highways in Pakistan

 

[Neo]

.......................

 

[rock127]

An EXCLUSIVE DD-News interview with his Highness Brahamdagh Khan Bugti who is a leader of Baloch Freedom Movement.

At 14:50 he raises very important points since he is asked about CPEC:-

1. CPEC is a BIG THREAT for Balochistan.
   
2. Pakjabis would be settled in Balochistan to outnumber and oppress the native Baloch population.
3. Pakjabis would take control of all resources more than ever.
   
4. Baloch would not get much from the so called "economic corridor" as usual.

DD-News Exclusive: Interview with Baloch Leader Brahamdagh Bugti

 

[amoy]

5 Reasons Gwadar Port Trumps Chabahar
China and Pakistan’s port at Gwadar will see smoother sailing than India and Iran’s alternative.

In New Delhi’s latest bid to flex its economic muscles, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Iran last month and signed an agreement to develop the $500 million Chabahar port. The port, if materialized, would be a gateway for Indian goods into Central Asia. This is indeed a remarkable agreement but every strategic move faces strategic impediments, and Chabahar is no exception. Only 72 kilometers away lies Pakistan’s Gwadar port, which itself holds greater significance and poses tangible economic, commercial, and strategic challenges to Chabahar. Here are five ways Gwadar outflanks Chabahar:

1. Experience: This is the first time India has plunged into a foreign port development venture with such vigor. Chabahar is a geographical reach for New Delhi, since it is not in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) where India not only has several functional ports (Mumbai, Kolkata, and Goa) but has the shield of Indian Navy also. In Chabahar India would be a guest state, whose borders and territorial waters are at a much greater distance. Moreover, the vessels transporting goods to Chabahar would also be subject to the active monitoring of the Pakistani Navy, which would keep a hawk-eyed watch on the high seas and adjacent international waters. On the contrary, Gwadar is not only developed by China — which has a wealth of experience in overseas infrastructure projects — but the government of Pakistan has handed over the control of port to China. Tehran won’t do the same, at least judging by the existing agreement with India.

2. Security: After Chabahar in Iran, the next stop for Indian goods will be Afghanistan, and then subsequently to the Central Asian states. Although India has enjoyed cordial terms with the successive post-2001 governments of Afghanistan together with its $2 billion investment there, the security situation is inadequate in major areas. Besides, the Taliban, the major insurgent group in Afghanistan has no love for India, since the latter historically supported the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance. Gwadar too is witnessing security issues, since Balochistan province is subject to low-scale belligerency. Still, the scope and extent of separatist brawls in the area have decreased in recent years while many militant groups have voluntarily surrendered to security agencies.

3. The Iran Question: One year after the Iran signed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with the P5+1 states, the deal has not lived up to expectations. Iran recently launched a nuclear-capable missile, violating a UN Security Council resolution (which prohibits any Iranian nuclear launch or test). Further, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has vowed that Iran “will not cooperate with America over the regional crisis, Their aims in the region are 180 degrees opposed to Iran’s.” Given this scenario, the prospect of lifting of all sanctions on Iran is again in doubt. The uncertainty regarding sanctions could undeniably have negative consequences for the India-Iran Chabahar deal. Gwadar has no such problems. There are no restrictions on China’s investment anywhere nor is Pakistan subject to any kind of UN sanctions. Furthermore, China holds veto power on the UN Security Council — thus even in the case of a proposed resolution that could impact Gwadar, China could veto the move and continue its economic ventures with Pakistan.

4. The Afghanistan Pressure Point: Despite enhanced Indo-Afghan diplomatic, political, and economic connections, Pakistan’s role and influence in Afghanistan has not withered. Though the central government of Afghanistan leans more toward India, Pakistan has connections with several ethnic groups who represent a major portion of Afghan society. Additionally, Pakistan and China are vigorously working together on the $46 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which culminates in Gwadar. China would not want such a huge investment going to waste. Thus there is every possibility that Beijing and Islamabad join hands to obstruct the political and economic maze of Afghanistan, so as to obstruct India’s dreams of reaching Central Asia. Pakistan could also see an India-Iran covert partnership to cause dysfunction in Gwadar, but Tehran would likely refrain as it is trying to pacify relations with its neighbors and the international community in the wake of 2015 agreement. Any entanglement with Pakistan would also endanger the eastern border of Iran.

5. Partnerships and Rivalries: There is no economic competition between Pakistan and China. Chinese investment in Pakistan is also aimed at boosting trade with the rest of Asia, and Pakistan won’t become a hurdle in China’s quest to reach the Middle East and Persian Gulf . That’s because Pakistan is currently on the receiving end of a huge Chinese investment, which will revamp Pakistan’s feeble economic structure. The infrastructural development at Gwadar at the CPEC in general will help Pakistan to enhance trade with both China and the Middle East, but this doesn’t necessarily mean it would interrupt the flow of Chinese trade and goods to the same destination. However, the Iran-India dynamic is different. After the July 2015 agreement, Tehran is trying its level best to come into the mainstream international arena by accelerating trade in order to put its jammed economic wheel back on track. Iran will not allow India’s Central Asian dream to come true at the cost of Iranian interests.

Whether Gwadar or Chabahar, the developments of both ports can assist millions of people. Gwadar may well hold a slight edge because of its importance and utility, but it can produce best results only when there are no major regional threats. The same goes for Chabahar. Economic cooperation and integration is what’s needed in South Asia and even beyond. That, however, demands enhanced cooperation among all involved parties and the dissolution of all outstanding strategic and political misunderstandings.

Muhammad Daim Fazil is Lecturer of International Relations and Political Science at University of Gujrat, Sialkot Campus, Pakistan. He tweets @DaimFazil.