Fast and furious
Fast and furious
Sandeep Unnithan
March 27, 2008
It was a costly lesson in futility that the nation can do well not to forget. Soon after the attack on the Parliament on December 13, 2001, an outraged government ordered the largest mobilisation of the armed forces since the 1971 war. The army amassed on the border waiting for the order to go across.
The order never came because it had taken the army three weeks to mobilise—enough time for the United States and the rest of the world to pressure the Indian government to desist and for Pakistan to mirror Indian deployments and wave the spectre of a nuclear conflict.
Two years after Operation Parakram ended in an ignominious 10-month deployment, followed by a withdrawal, the army pulled out Cold Start, a radical new strategy to deal with such contingencies. The challenge: Could the Indian Army launch an offensive within 72 hours of being told to do so? It has spent the past four years finetuning it. Last week at Pokhran they unveiled just how well they had tuned the war machine for a jump-start.
The Thar desert reverberated with the roar of an exercise appropriately termed Brazen Chariots. Heavily armoured Mi-35 Hind helicopter gunships darted back and forth, T-90 tanks advanced, kicking up plumes of sand and Bofors howitzers moved into position.
War had broken out between Red Land and Blue Land. In the darkened underground command post of a ‘Blue Land’ division, Major General P.G. Kamat studied his key objectives: the capture of the Danwar base 40 km deep inside Red Land. Held by a brigade of enemy troops it housed a major communications hub.
Within hours of the conflict breaking out, the armoured division spearheaded by T-90 tanks was wheeling across the desert towards Danwar. Sukhoi-30 MKIs, MiG-27s and MiG-21 Bisons streaked overhead, bombing and strafing enemy fortifications with precision guided munitions and air-toground rockets. Bofors howitzers spewed devastating fire—100 guns fired on a single target in a 1 km box— and the newly-acquired Smerch rockets rained a devastating salvo of rockets 90 km away, each weighing nearly a tonne.
All lines of enemy defences were attacked simultaneously in day and night operations. In three days, aircraft and artillery had smothered targets with 450 tonne of ordnance, clearing the field for the tanks and infantry combat vehicles to move in and capture the smoking battle ground. “At the end of the destruction,” Kamat concluded wryly, “there is nothing left for us to occupy.”
This shock and awe scenario recently played out in the desert was the army’s sixth major wargame since it unveiled its new strategy in 2004. The Pakistani military attaché was not invited to the display which took place before 103 observers from 59 countries. (See graphic: A new doctrine)
Held just 30 km from the nuclear test site, the exercises were another test of the world’s only doctrine which envisages fighting a limited war under the nuclear overhang. It changes the army’s mindset from that of carrying out a defensive operation to an outrightly offensive one and refocuses the aim of a future conventional conflict from destroying the enemy’s war machine to destroying his will to fight.
The idea of swift manoeuvre operations is as old as Sun Tzu and, first implemented by the Germans during the Second World War as the Blitzkrieg, is new to the Indian Army. During the two week-long 1971 War, it had marched 4 km into Pakistani territory.
The new doctrine was born out of the failure of military mobilisation during Operation Parakram in 2002 and Pakistan exploiting a nuclearised environment to continue a proxy war. It aims to deter Pakistan from escalating its proxy war—either through assassinations of important political leaders or mass casualty attacks.
The army has two types of corps (a concentration of nearly one lakh troops) operating on a sword and shield principle. Ten holding corps are tasked with defending territory, and three are strike corps or swords—tasked with offensive operations into enemy territory.
In the army’s old doctrine, the holding formation would be first deployed on the border and would then wait for the strike corps to arrive from their bases several hundred kilometres in the hinterland. Under the new doctrine, the shields, or the holding formation, will be mobilised within 72 hours.
They will attack the enemy without waiting for the arrival of the strike corps. The attack can occur anywhere along the international boundary and at a place and time of its choosing. In the past four years, the army has tinkered with various combinations of Cold Start—manoeuvres in deserts, in the plains of Punjab, offensives launched by the strike corps and pivot corps and airland battles along with the air force.
“By readying itself in time for any military operation, the army is giving the political leadership more options,” says Gurmeet Kanwal, director, Centre for Land Warfare Studies. The decision to go to war will still be a political one and Cold Start is only one of the many options the army brings to the table, even if it is unsure of it being accepted.
“Today, the army is ready to launch an offensive virtually from the line of march, but is the political and security decision-making apparatus coping with advancements on the ground?” asks a senior army official. The National Security Council, meant to study all the options and advise the prime minister on options in a crisis, has not met in five years.
As the saying goes, no plan survives contact with the enemy and Cold Start may be no exception. The primary concern is whether a conventional war, however limited, is possible in a nuclearised environment. “There is always space for conventional war below the nuclear threshold (the point above which the adversary will launch nuclear weapons),” says Lt-General Noble Thamburaj, general officer commanding, Southern Command.
The development of the doctrine seems to have contradictory effects. “On the one hand, it seems to increase the range of options available to the political establishment by allowing gradations in the use of force between none and a massive Parakram-like mobilisation in response to provocations from Pakistan. On the other hand, if the new doctrine were fully operationalised, it makes the resort to force more likely. Depending on the nature of the provocation or future crisis, the existence of Cold Start as an option could increase public pressure on the government to use force in response to a specific incident,” says Walter C. Ladwig from the Oxford University and an author on a paper on the doctrine.
Different strokes
Old strategy
Mobilise, build-up, hit. Offensive power instruments like air force, army and the navy operate sequentially.
It took 12-22 days to mobilise formations for offensive operations.
Pivot or holding corps would get into position and wait for strike corps to arrive. Logistics pause.
Different zones of enemy defences addressed sequentially.
Cold Start
Hit, mobilise, hit harder. All offensive power instruments—air force, army and navy—attack tactical and strategic targets simultaneously.
Operations start within 24 hours.
Pivot corps already in position, launch operations without waiting for arrival of strike corps. Day and night operations with no logistics pause.
All enemy zones are attacked simultaneously.
Analysts also point out to its inherent weakness. Pakistan’s strike formations are closer to the international border and can be mobilised in just 24 hours.
Over the past decade, it has put in new counter strategies including creating a corps reserve for each of its four holding corps.
Moreover, an operation launched by a holding formation, without waiting for the strike corps, could actually weaken the line leading to a counter attack from the other side.
The innovative mobilisation strategy may take years to fully realise because the army is not yet adequately mechanised—a prerequisite for mobile warfare. “You cannot fight mobile, high-speed wars if you have an unmechanised army. The formations that are to initiate Cold Start are all infantry with a bit of armour and some armoured brigades. The strike formations are strike only in name as only about 40 per cent of the three strike corps are mechanised (troops in armoured personnel carriers),” says defence analyst Ravi Rikhye.
The Indian Army has inducted impressive firepower like the Smerch, radars, satellites and unmanned aerial vehicles that ensure continuous coverage of enemy territory. “Technology has enabled us to reduce our attacking ratios from 9:1 (nine troops for every enemy soldier) to 2.5:1,” says Thamburaj.
Yet, the speed of technology induction may not be keeping pace with the fast-paced doctrine. The army has a long equipment wishlist and is wrestling with a grave shortage of helicopters to speedily insert troops behind enemy lines, an essential aspect of fast-paced operations.
It needs to airlift a brigade (3,000) troops, which requires at least 100 helicopters but the MI-17s operated by the IAF can only ferry half a battalion or 400 troops. Equipment shortage also plagues the creation of three new Independent Battle Groups under each strike corps.
However, the mere existence of such a doctrine could contribute to deterrence. “Pakistan would not necessarily be able to count on slow mobilisation times or outside intervention from the United States to prevent a retaliation to a given provocation in the future,” says Ladwig.
“Cold Start is a bit like the stock market. If you have the capacity to take risks, you will make good gains, but if you’re unwilling to take them, you can choose the low-risk option of putting your money in a fixed deposit with steady returns,” says former vice chief Lt-General Vijay Oberoi. A conundrum which the decision makers must take into account.