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Clueless on Pakistan C. Raja Mohan Posted: Fri Jan 14 2011
Stupidity, Albert Einstein once theorised, is about doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results.
The current American and Indian approaches to Pakistan, it would seem, are proof of that. The Obama administration thinks offering more incentives will induce the Pakistan army to cooperate in the pursuit of American objectives in Afghanistan. India, for its part, remains hopeful that it can persuade Pakistan, through negotiations, to end its support of cross-border terrorism.
For nearly a decade, Washington has offered carrots of all sorts to get Pakistan to dismantle the insurgent sanctuaries on its soil that have made it difficult for the United States to stabilise Afghanistan. Despite throwing nearly $20 billion at Pakistan since its invasion of Afghanistan at the end of 2001, the US finds itself in a steadily worsening situation.
Three Indian prime ministers — Inder Kumar Gujral, Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh — invested much political capital and diplomatic energy in constructing a purposeful engagement with Pakistan since the late 1990s. All three hoped that addressing Pakistan's concerns on Kashmir — the so-called core issue for Islamabad — will result in an end to violence and the full normalisation of bilateral relations. Yet, New Delhi remains trapped in a hopeless situation.
On the face of it, then, Washington and Delhi are being stupid in their expectations from Pakistan. On a closer look, however, the condition that engulfs Washington and Delhi is not stupidity but tragedy. Stupidity is about failing to see a pattern in the relationship between actions and outcomes. Tragedy is about having to do the same thing over and over again, despite "knowing" that the results will not be different.
Both Washington and Delhi are acutely aware that their current policies towards Pakistan have not worked. The problem for Washington and Delhi is that they don't have too many other options in dealing with the Pakistan army that defines the nation's policies towards the US and India. Washington, however, continues to see the Pakistan army as part of the solution.
India attempted to cut a deal with the army when Pervez Musharraf was at the peak of his power during 2004-07, but once General Ashfaq Kayani took charge in 2008, the peace process rapidly disintegrated. For India, the Pakistan army is the problem. While India knows the civilian leaders can't really deliver on its concerns, not talking to them is no good either.
In the wake of 9/11, it was Washington that set the terms for the negotiations with Rawalpindi by threatening to bomb Pakistan to stone age, if Musharraf did not cooperate with the US in Afghanistan. Now it is Kayani who sets the agenda for Washington on Afghanistan. In a six-hour visit to Islamabad and Rawalpindi on Wednesday, US Vice-President Joe Biden has reportedly sought to address all the concerns about US regional policy flagged by Kayani in recent months.
Biden's visit was about persuading Kayani to do more in draining the swamp of militancy on Pakistan's western borderlands. In return, the US media reported that the Obama administration was offering to build a long-term partnership with Pakistan.
At the end of Biden's six-hour-long stay in Pakistan, no new package of assistance was announced. That does not mean it is not under negotiation. The fact is that Kayani wants a lot more than money.
He is demanding that the US accept a special role for Pakistan in the proposed "end-state" for Afghanistan, install its proxies in power across the Durand Line, help reduce the Indian role in Afghanistan, get Delhi to make concessions on J&K, and restore a measure of parity between Delhi and Islamabad on a range of areas including nuclear and other high-technology cooperation. If Kayani is bold enough to push his luck,
it is by no means clear where Washington might draw the line.
On Pakistan's eastern frontiers, it was Delhi that suspended the talks after 26/11. Since mid-2009, India's repeated efforts at resuming the dialogue have been unsuccessful, because Kayani is setting the terms. Having reneged on Musharraf's pledge to rein in anti-India militant groups, Kayani is in no mood to give credible commitments on either bringing the perpetrators of the Mumbai attacks to justice or eliminating the safe havens for terror in Pakistan.
Kayani wants India to resume the dialogue without any conditions, and then some. When External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna invited Shah Mahmood Qureshi to visit Delhi, the Pakistani foreign minister said he was in no rush. He would rather see the results from a preparatory meeting between the two foreign secretaries, who will now meet in early February.
While many in the US and India believe that Pakistan is hurtling down an abyss and are tempted to save it from itself, Kayani seems to think he is well poised to deliver historic strategic gains for the army's regional policy. It is quite clear that neither India nor the US is in a position to unilaterally change the current strategic calculus of the Pakistan army. In an ideal world, they might have a slim chance by recasting their Pakistan policies and acting together.
Although Obama has avoided pressing India on Pakistan, many in Washington are consumed by the idea that India must find ways to please Pakistan so that Rawalpindi might do more for the US in Afghanistan. As it disabuses Washington of such ideas, India must begin to look beyond the resumption of the composite dialogue to actions that could alter the internal dynamic in Pakistan.
That would involve Delhi thinking in a disaggregated manner about Pakistan, engaging the different political forces across the border, and building a profile in Afghanistan that can survive the impending shifts in US policy. Trying different things might not necessarily end the tragedy of India's relationship with Pakistan; but it is worth finding out.
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if 3 PM of india instead of trying to set relationships with pakistan instead would had worked on setting up intelligence infrastructure in pakistan we would had better information about various terrorist organisation working against india and their activities
Stupidity, Albert Einstein once theorised, is about doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results.
The current American and Indian approaches to Pakistan, it would seem, are proof of that. The Obama administration thinks offering more incentives will induce the Pakistan army to cooperate in the pursuit of American objectives in Afghanistan. India, for its part, remains hopeful that it can persuade Pakistan, through negotiations, to end its support of cross-border terrorism.
For nearly a decade, Washington has offered carrots of all sorts to get Pakistan to dismantle the insurgent sanctuaries on its soil that have made it difficult for the United States to stabilise Afghanistan. Despite throwing nearly $20 billion at Pakistan since its invasion of Afghanistan at the end of 2001, the US finds itself in a steadily worsening situation.
Three Indian prime ministers — Inder Kumar Gujral, Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh — invested much political capital and diplomatic energy in constructing a purposeful engagement with Pakistan since the late 1990s. All three hoped that addressing Pakistan's concerns on Kashmir — the so-called core issue for Islamabad — will result in an end to violence and the full normalisation of bilateral relations. Yet, New Delhi remains trapped in a hopeless situation.
On the face of it, then, Washington and Delhi are being stupid in their expectations from Pakistan. On a closer look, however, the condition that engulfs Washington and Delhi is not stupidity but tragedy. Stupidity is about failing to see a pattern in the relationship between actions and outcomes. Tragedy is about having to do the same thing over and over again, despite "knowing" that the results will not be different.
Both Washington and Delhi are acutely aware that their current policies towards Pakistan have not worked. The problem for Washington and Delhi is that they don't have too many other options in dealing with the Pakistan army that defines the nation's policies towards the US and India. Washington, however, continues to see the Pakistan army as part of the solution.
India attempted to cut a deal with the army when Pervez Musharraf was at the peak of his power during 2004-07, but once General Ashfaq Kayani took charge in 2008, the peace process rapidly disintegrated. For India, the Pakistan army is the problem. While India knows the civilian leaders can't really deliver on its concerns, not talking to them is no good either.
In the wake of 9/11, it was Washington that set the terms for the negotiations with Rawalpindi by threatening to bomb Pakistan to stone age, if Musharraf did not cooperate with the US in Afghanistan. Now it is Kayani who sets the agenda for Washington on Afghanistan. In a six-hour visit to Islamabad and Rawalpindi on Wednesday, US Vice-President Joe Biden has reportedly sought to address all the concerns about US regional policy flagged by Kayani in recent months.
Biden's visit was about persuading Kayani to do more in draining the swamp of militancy on Pakistan's western borderlands. In return, the US media reported that the Obama administration was offering to build a long-term partnership with Pakistan.
At the end of Biden's six-hour-long stay in Pakistan, no new package of assistance was announced. That does not mean it is not under negotiation. The fact is that Kayani wants a lot more than money.
He is demanding that the US accept a special role for Pakistan in the proposed "end-state" for Afghanistan, install its proxies in power across the Durand Line, help reduce the Indian role in Afghanistan, get Delhi to make concessions on J&K, and restore a measure of parity between Delhi and Islamabad on a range of areas including nuclear and other high-technology cooperation. If Kayani is bold enough to push his luck,
it is by no means clear where Washington might draw the line.
On Pakistan's eastern frontiers, it was Delhi that suspended the talks after 26/11. Since mid-2009, India's repeated efforts at resuming the dialogue have been unsuccessful, because Kayani is setting the terms. Having reneged on Musharraf's pledge to rein in anti-India militant groups, Kayani is in no mood to give credible commitments on either bringing the perpetrators of the Mumbai attacks to justice or eliminating the safe havens for terror in Pakistan.
Kayani wants India to resume the dialogue without any conditions, and then some. When External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna invited Shah Mahmood Qureshi to visit Delhi, the Pakistani foreign minister said he was in no rush. He would rather see the results from a preparatory meeting between the two foreign secretaries, who will now meet in early February.
While many in the US and India believe that Pakistan is hurtling down an abyss and are tempted to save it from itself, Kayani seems to think he is well poised to deliver historic strategic gains for the army's regional policy. It is quite clear that neither India nor the US is in a position to unilaterally change the current strategic calculus of the Pakistan army. In an ideal world, they might have a slim chance by recasting their Pakistan policies and acting together.
Although Obama has avoided pressing India on Pakistan, many in Washington are consumed by the idea that India must find ways to please Pakistan so that Rawalpindi might do more for the US in Afghanistan. As it disabuses Washington of such ideas, India must begin to look beyond the resumption of the composite dialogue to actions that could alter the internal dynamic in Pakistan.
That would involve Delhi thinking in a disaggregated manner about Pakistan, engaging the different political forces across the border, and building a profile in Afghanistan that can survive the impending shifts in US policy. Trying different things might not necessarily end the tragedy of India's relationship with Pakistan; but it is worth finding out.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
if 3 PM of india instead of trying to set relationships with pakistan instead would had worked on setting up intelligence infrastructure in pakistan we would had better information about various terrorist organisation working against india and their activities