Civil war in Ukraine
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bhramos
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11.12.17. video from military personnel of UNM DNR.
"The LNR police uncovered a cache of Ukrainian DRGs buried in the cellar in Pervomaisk, MVD MVD officers discovered and seized more than 10,000 pieces of ammunition from Prymaysky's cache, as well as mines, grenade launchers and flamethrowers, the Center for Interaction with the Public (MVO) of the Ministry of Internal Affairs LNR. "In Pervomaisk the police found a large cache of weapons and ammunition, the cache was intended to replenish supplies of Ukrainian DRG (sabotage and reconnaissance groups)," the report said.
"The illegal arsenal was stored in plastic barrels buried in the ground floor of the basement and before checking the cache it was carefully checked by the police explosives of the forensic center of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the People's Republic of Finland," the police said, adding that one of the three barrels was filled with a mixture of diesel fuel and engine oil, the other two were dry.
In total, police found 14 different grenade launchers and flamethrowers in the barrels, four anti-personnel mines MON-50, one magnetic mine, 55 grenades, 31 FOG-25 rounds, seven fuses, including radio controlled, 13 fuses for hand grenades, 1, 5 kg of plastic, several signal rockets, as well as about 10 thousand rounds of various calibers, "- said in the Central Organ, adding that the entire illegal arsenal was confiscated.
At present, the LNR police establish persons involved in the organization of the cache in the front-line city.
"Judging by the nomenclature of the hiding place, it was created by Ukrainian reconnaissance groups as a long-term base for the replenishment of supplies of groups of saboteurs operating in the territory of the Republic," the department specified.
Earlier in the Central Executive Committee reported that officers of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic for nine months seized from the illegal circulation of about 190 thousand weapons and ammunition.
"The LNR police uncovered a cache of Ukrainian DRGs buried in the cellar in Pervomaisk, MVD MVD officers discovered and seized more than 10,000 pieces of ammunition from Prymaysky's cache, as well as mines, grenade launchers and flamethrowers, the Center for Interaction with the Public (MVO) of the Ministry of Internal Affairs LNR. "In Pervomaisk the police found a large cache of weapons and ammunition, the cache was intended to replenish supplies of Ukrainian DRG (sabotage and reconnaissance groups)," the report said.
"The illegal arsenal was stored in plastic barrels buried in the ground floor of the basement and before checking the cache it was carefully checked by the police explosives of the forensic center of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the People's Republic of Finland," the police said, adding that one of the three barrels was filled with a mixture of diesel fuel and engine oil, the other two were dry.
In total, police found 14 different grenade launchers and flamethrowers in the barrels, four anti-personnel mines MON-50, one magnetic mine, 55 grenades, 31 FOG-25 rounds, seven fuses, including radio controlled, 13 fuses for hand grenades, 1, 5 kg of plastic, several signal rockets, as well as about 10 thousand rounds of various calibers, "- said in the Central Organ, adding that the entire illegal arsenal was confiscated.
At present, the LNR police establish persons involved in the organization of the cache in the front-line city.
"Judging by the nomenclature of the hiding place, it was created by Ukrainian reconnaissance groups as a long-term base for the replenishment of supplies of groups of saboteurs operating in the territory of the Republic," the department specified.
Earlier in the Central Executive Committee reported that officers of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic for nine months seized from the illegal circulation of about 190 thousand weapons and ammunition.
bhramos
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11.12.17. Video from the publication "Pravda-DNR".
"MC VAL: our generation will not forgive the Ukrainians for the war in the Donbas, Valery Dragunov (MC VAL), since the age of 14, has been performing half a life of rap, which has always been a tough, aggressive style, which corresponds to most of her works:" I want to show the hidden dark nature of man. " A great influence on her work was provided by the works of Fyodor Dostoevsky, a master of Russian and world literature, which she still appreciates since her school years. This fascination left its mark on her later music.
"During the war, I described what I saw with my own eyes, what I felt when I looked at the events." The song "In My Town" was written in the autumn of 2014, influenced by events in the Donbas, when the war showed all the cruelty that many did not want to know, but I saw it with my own eyes, I do not want people to forget about this, "Valeria says.
MC VAL sees its purpose in conveying in music the memory of the time when relatives from Lugansk were deprived of what the "civilized people" can not imagine their life - the media and water, when bullets and bombs of the Ukrainian army constantly fell on the city.
"This was manifested in January 2014 and is connected with the events taking place on the Maidan.Then I wrote about this song that turned out to be prophetic, after just one month it turned out to be bloodshed. I felt that it would not end in Kiev, that it would come and it worried us all, to us, to the Donbas.We
were worried about this anarchy, moreover, in the song I'm directly talking about who was standing on the Maidan, for what purpose and what it could lead to. "
"You will never be our brothers," exclaims MC VAL in his next work, referring to the Ukrainians. I ask her if they cleanse their territory of radicals and oligarchs, and then turn to the Donbass with a request for peace.
"After all that has happened in recent years, our generation can no longer forgive, we have experienced too much, suffered too much to forgive them."
Since 2014, many in the West are trying to get information about the war in the Donbass. Did Valeria's musical creativity somehow destroy the information blockade of Ukraine?
"I received a lot of reports from America, Europe, especially from Poland, where people wrote that thanks to these clips they understood what was happening in the Donbass, and there were many translations of my texts into Polish and English." Donbas, we are supported by so many people in the West They say that there are enemies there, that everything against us is not the truth.It needs to learn to distinguish between what the people think and what the politicians are doing.For example: everyone knows the aggressive policy of the United States, but there are also a lot of people in this country, protesting against such a rhetorician iki ".
"MC VAL: our generation will not forgive the Ukrainians for the war in the Donbas, Valery Dragunov (MC VAL), since the age of 14, has been performing half a life of rap, which has always been a tough, aggressive style, which corresponds to most of her works:" I want to show the hidden dark nature of man. " A great influence on her work was provided by the works of Fyodor Dostoevsky, a master of Russian and world literature, which she still appreciates since her school years. This fascination left its mark on her later music.
"During the war, I described what I saw with my own eyes, what I felt when I looked at the events." The song "In My Town" was written in the autumn of 2014, influenced by events in the Donbas, when the war showed all the cruelty that many did not want to know, but I saw it with my own eyes, I do not want people to forget about this, "Valeria says.
MC VAL sees its purpose in conveying in music the memory of the time when relatives from Lugansk were deprived of what the "civilized people" can not imagine their life - the media and water, when bullets and bombs of the Ukrainian army constantly fell on the city.
"This was manifested in January 2014 and is connected with the events taking place on the Maidan.Then I wrote about this song that turned out to be prophetic, after just one month it turned out to be bloodshed. I felt that it would not end in Kiev, that it would come and it worried us all, to us, to the Donbas.We
were worried about this anarchy, moreover, in the song I'm directly talking about who was standing on the Maidan, for what purpose and what it could lead to. "
"You will never be our brothers," exclaims MC VAL in his next work, referring to the Ukrainians. I ask her if they cleanse their territory of radicals and oligarchs, and then turn to the Donbass with a request for peace.
"After all that has happened in recent years, our generation can no longer forgive, we have experienced too much, suffered too much to forgive them."
Since 2014, many in the West are trying to get information about the war in the Donbass. Did Valeria's musical creativity somehow destroy the information blockade of Ukraine?
"I received a lot of reports from America, Europe, especially from Poland, where people wrote that thanks to these clips they understood what was happening in the Donbass, and there were many translations of my texts into Polish and English." Donbas, we are supported by so many people in the West They say that there are enemies there, that everything against us is not the truth.It needs to learn to distinguish between what the people think and what the politicians are doing.For example: everyone knows the aggressive policy of the United States, but there are also a lot of people in this country, protesting against such a rhetorician iki ".
bhramos
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11.12.17. an urgent message from the militia.
"At 12:25 the whole city of Stakhanov" jumped "from a powerful rumbling, an explosive wave swept the whole district, and now it was also bang, but more quietly and far away. In Bryanka it was very loud, shaking on the ground and signaling Donetsk: Yabp-Ap-Spartak: powerful, mortars, Sands / DAP side-powerful basses, outgoing and incoming Gorlovka: Zaitsevo catches 120 mm, Gladosovo mortars. "
Video from journalists: "The dead and wounded soldiers of the Armed Forces are dotted with fields near Gorlovka, the headquarters of the ATO is evacuating with helicopters." From the war zone in the Donbass, Ukrainian military evacuated to Kharkov seriously wounded Atoll militants, the headquarters of the so-called ATO on its Facebook page , the correspondent of "Political Navigator" reports.The video shows clearly how the atolls are loaded on a stretcher into the helicopter of a seriously wounded soldier.The others enter the plane on their own.As previously reported by the Political Navigator, earlier Eduard Bazurin al of the large losses suffered by the APU in the "gray zone" as a result of attempts to break into the territory of the republic and shelling the outskirts of Gorlovka.
"At 12:25 the whole city of Stakhanov" jumped "from a powerful rumbling, an explosive wave swept the whole district, and now it was also bang, but more quietly and far away. In Bryanka it was very loud, shaking on the ground and signaling Donetsk: Yabp-Ap-Spartak: powerful, mortars, Sands / DAP side-powerful basses, outgoing and incoming Gorlovka: Zaitsevo catches 120 mm, Gladosovo mortars. "
Video from journalists: "The dead and wounded soldiers of the Armed Forces are dotted with fields near Gorlovka, the headquarters of the ATO is evacuating with helicopters." From the war zone in the Donbass, Ukrainian military evacuated to Kharkov seriously wounded Atoll militants, the headquarters of the so-called ATO on its Facebook page , the correspondent of "Political Navigator" reports.The video shows clearly how the atolls are loaded on a stretcher into the helicopter of a seriously wounded soldier.The others enter the plane on their own.As previously reported by the Political Navigator, earlier Eduard Bazurin al of the large losses suffered by the APU in the "gray zone" as a result of attempts to break into the territory of the republic and shelling the outskirts of Gorlovka.
bhramos
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The sharpest problems of the armed forces of Ukraine
Ukrainian news agency "Defense Pronunciations Courier " published an interesting interview with the Deputy Commander of the Land Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) on logistics Major General Yuri Tolokniy under the heading "The most acute problems of the APU are not directly connected with the ATU zone" .
In an interview, Major-General Y. Toloknyi reports on a number of characteristic problems in the current APU:
- the acute shortage of funds for the construction of facilities for the deployment of troops, newly formed or withdrawn from the ATO zone by rotation, joints and units are deployed in tent camps;
- a shortage of funds to ensure the survivability and security of arsenals and ammunition storage sites - 5-10% of the required;
"The situation with ammunition is very serious, there are a number of deficit calibers today, including rifle, and artillery and missile ammunition." Limits on the consumption of artillery ammunition have been introduced. In a year or two, a maximum of three, a shortage of ammunition will be critical;
- the option of upgrading T-64BM tanks "Bulat" was "unsuccessful in real combat." "T-64BM Bulat tanks were inefficient due to their heavy weight and weak engine, they were transferred to the reserve, and replaced by linear T-64 tanks."
Since 2014, in matters related to the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the attention of the vast majority of experts and the media has been focused on the war zone in the east of the country, related problems and challenges. However, a significant part of the most acute problems of the army lies outside the ATU zone, and is concentrated in areas not directly related to military operations. Moreover, the revival of the APU, which began four years ago, has turned into a whole series of new difficulties. The person who worked in army logistics since its inception in the Supreme Armed Forces in the modern form - the deputy chief - told about the difficulties connected with the equipment of the permanent deployment of troops, the situation with bases and arsenals, as well as the growing problems in the ammunition industry, the information agency "Defense Industry Bulletin" logistics management of the Southern Operational Command,
- What are the main needs of troops in the war zone?
- When entering the winter, it is, first of all, fuel for engines. It is necessary to switch to normal winter fuel. There have already been a number of scandals about this. Also it is timely deliveries of coal and firewood. The completeness of the winter form - which has been changed for five years already several times, and its quality still leaves much to be desired, although in comparison with the first samples there is progress.
But the key problematic issues in the supply of troops now, paradoxically, are not related to the ATU zone. The war zone is under the scrutiny of both military and political leadership, so that the most pressing issues are resolved there. The stabilization of the front line also helps us. The units that are rotated are located in the same places, and gradually they have established the necessary conditions for life and service there.
But when it comes to other regions ... In my opinion, now the most acute problem is the camps, where troops are assigned to restore combat effectiveness. These camps are tent camps, and after a year and a half of operation these tents are no longer suitable for living. The second, related question is the points of a permanent dislocation. We have today created a number of new military formations, but for them it is necessary to create new points of permanent deployment - stationary headquarters, houses for officers, dormitories or barracks of improved type with laundries, bathrooms, etc. Otherwise, it turns out that parts of the field conditions on the front are output to exactly the same conditions in the rear, which does not allow to restore combat capability.
All this means is catastrophically small. For example, there is a decision of the Minister of Defense to create a military town on the "Wide Lan" test range before the end of 2017. Originally planned for two brigades, then cut to one. There is still a tent city, although for a long time there should have been built prefabricated barracks. Construction is proceeding, but slowly, and the final deadlines for the delivery of the facility are still unclear. In any case, this year it will not be built.
- What needs to be done to solve these issues?
- First of all, you need a clear understanding of how many such camps we need, and clearly identify their locations. And then start creating a full-fledged, long-term housing and infrastructure there. In my opinion, two things prevent this. First, of course, lack of finance. And secondly, in my opinion, often doing something in the ATU zone is loud, "piarno", it sounds. And the arrangement of remote areas from the region does not give such image, "rating" results. In addition, the creation of a military town is a long and painstaking, costly process that does not give instant information returns. The construction of barracks, dormitories, houses for officers ... It is much easier for the purpose of "PR", for example, to create a tank company, or buy a few dozen cars, and gain political points on it.
- How can the situation with ammunition be rectified? In particular, with ensuring the safety of their storage.
- In 2005, the program of survivability of bases, warehouses and arsenals was adopted. The first question is - in each warehouse, the volume of ammunition for which it is designed should be stored. We must clearly know how much and what we need: a military, operational, strategic reserve. Before the war, all ammunition depots were overloaded - with the reduction of combat units, the conversion of divisions into brigades, etc. their ammunition was moved to warehouses. Since then, the war and the pre-war active, albeit very stupid, disposal of ammunition have somewhat improved the situation, but only partially. Second - the warehouse should have a special purpose. That is, if the warehouse is intended for the storage of high-risk ammunition - primarily jet - the storage should at least be dumped. And ideally, ammunition should be located in special underground arched vaults. Now it is necessary to abandon all efforts to eliminate open storage areas. They are the most vulnerable to sabotage, and create an increased danger in case of negligence or natural and man-made disasters. In 2008, a fire at the 61st arsenal in Lozovaya began precisely because an open flame - nearby burned leaves - was thrown by the wind into openly stored boxes with mines, which are stored with bunches of gunpowder. It was they who caught fire. Fortunately, this arsenal did not have jet munitions, and the storage facilities were dumped, so the fragmentation of the fragments amounted to a maximum of 1.5 km, which limited the scale of damage and damage. The same reasons led to the disaster in Balakley. Therefore, it is necessary to bring the storage of ammunition in line with the current regulations. They are the most vulnerable to sabotage, and create an increased danger in case of negligence or natural and man-made disasters. In 2008, a fire at the 61st arsenal in Lozovaya began precisely because an open flame - nearby burned leaves - was thrown by the wind into openly stored boxes with mines, which are stored with bunches of gunpowder. It was they who caught fire. Fortunately, this arsenal did not have jet munitions, and the storage facilities were dumped, so the fragmentation of the fragments amounted to a maximum of 1.5 km, which limited the scale of damage and damage. The same reasons led to the disaster in Balakley. Therefore, it is necessary to bring the storage of ammunition in line with the current regulations. They are the most vulnerable to sabotage, and create an increased danger in case of negligence or natural and man-made disasters. In 2008, a fire at the 61st arsenal in Lozovaya began precisely because an open flame - nearby burned leaves - was thrown by the wind into openly stored boxes with mines, which are stored with bunches of gunpowder. It was they who caught fire. Fortunately, this arsenal did not have jet munitions, and the storage facilities were dumped, so the fragmentation of the fragments amounted to a maximum of 1.5 km, which limited the scale of damage and damage. The same reasons led to the disaster in Balakley. Therefore, it is necessary to bring the storage of ammunition in line with the current regulations. In 2008, a fire at the 61st arsenal in Lozovaya began precisely because an open flame - nearby burned leaves - was thrown by the wind into openly stored boxes with mines, which are stored with bunches of gunpowder. It was they who caught fire. Fortunately, this arsenal did not have jet munitions, and the storage facilities were dumped, so the fragmentation of the fragments amounted to a maximum of 1.5 km, which limited the scale of damage and damage. The same reasons led to the disaster in Balakley. Therefore, it is necessary to bring the storage of ammunition in line with the current regulations. In 2008, a fire at the 61st arsenal in Lozovaya began precisely because an open flame - nearby burned leaves - was thrown by the wind into openly stored boxes with mines, which are stored with bunches of gunpowder. It was they who caught fire. Fortunately, this arsenal did not have jet munitions, and the storage facilities were dumped, so the fragmentation of the fragments amounted to a maximum of 1.5 km, which limited the scale of damage and damage. The same reasons led to the disaster in Balakley. Therefore, it is necessary to bring the storage of ammunition in line with the current regulations. so the fragmentation of the fragments amounted to a maximum of 1.5 km, which limited the scale of damage and damage. The same reasons led to the disaster in Balakley. Therefore, it is necessary to bring the storage of ammunition in line with the current regulations. so the fragmentation of the fragments amounted to a maximum of 1.5 km, which limited the scale of damage and damage. The same reasons led to the disaster in Balakley. Therefore, it is necessary to bring the storage of ammunition in line with the current regulations.
Now that a significant part of the ammunition has been disposed of or consumed during the war, a redistribution plan must be drawn up. Some arsenals are emptied, others remain overloaded. It is necessary to install object signaling in storage - fire, and motion sensors - and perimeter, with security cameras. It is necessary to equip the perimeter - to cut trees, if the object is located in the forest, to plow the land around so that there is no dry grass. You also need to ensure reliable protection of the perimeter. After the outbreak of the war, because of the shortage of combat units, the over-the-shelf soldiers from the companies' mouths and platoons of the protection of bases and arsenals were sent for completing, and the protection of objects is often carried out by the VOKhR. What is VOHR? Pensioners with carbines SCS in bullet-proof vests of the Soviet model. Dogs needed for protection in the Army were available only in one warehouse. How reliable is this protection? Bases and arsenals should be guarded by special units, trained, and equipped with everything necessary.
Also, in the immediate units and subunits there must be quick reaction armies, which, thanks to the established connection, can be quickly deployed to the arsenal in the event of an attack, and provide defense according to a pre-established plan. Now, when the main combat units at the front, at points of permanent deployment there is nothing like this. The interaction with the SBU and the police should also be adjusted. All employees of bases and arsenals should be checked by these structures.
- Is the process of these changes going on, and if so - how fast?
- The process is going, but wavy. After another disaster, the funds are quickly allocated, but then their volume is reduced, and financing is reduced to a minimum. Then everything repeats itself again. If you look at financing by years, then it's easy to see the dependence on PE on different bases and arsenals. In "quiet" years I had to hear from high-ranking military officials the opinion that the encumbrance is "burying money into the ground". Today, the funds are partially allocated for signaling - about 10-15% of the need. According to the reconstruction of allocated finance, in fact, only to replace the floors. A huge problem with tare - boxes in fact become worthless with time. A little stands out for the purchase of small means of automation, the processing of wooden rafters with fireproof impregnation, reloading fire extinguishers ... For the construction of new facilities, money is not actually allocated. Thus, we have about 5-10% of the required tactical tasks to ensure survivability. For strategic purposes - the construction of new storage facilities - funds are not allocated at all.
- How would you evaluate the project of building a new cartridge factory?
- This is a crying necessity. The situation with ammunition is very serious. Today there are a number of scarce calibers. We are talking about rifle, and artillery and missile munitions.
In fact, there is nothing to replenish ammunition, and it is constantly shrinking. In Ukraine, only small batches are produced. By the nature of the service, I did not deal directly with this issue, but there are some considerations. For example, purchases abroad, which some see as a way out, will not help solve this problem - firstly, there are not many states that can meet our need for Soviet-style ammunition - and our weapons remain predominantly Soviet. The ammunition of the NATO standard is not like us. Secondly, ammunition is a lethal weapon. Everyone knows the attitude of our Western partners to the supply of lethal weapons to Ukraine. Knowing our politicians, if large volumes of ammunition were shipped from abroad, it would be accompanied by loud PR actions, so the absence of such noise indicates that,
The main thing is to organize this production competently, to arrange the production of calibres in which we need. On small arms, at least close the range of calibers from 5.45 to 14.5 mm. As for the artillery ... Only in the last year the control over the consumption of artillery ammunition has become tougher. Returns are freebies and so on. In the first years of the war the expenditure of shells was completely uncontrolled, and colossal.
- When, in your opinion, is the current state of affairs of a shortage of ammunition critical? Provided that the creation of a new production does not move from the dead end.
"I think a year or two." A maximum of three.
- What key problems would you single out in other types of troops, except the Land Forces?
- In the Navy, the housing issue is very acute. In the Air Force, as far as I know, the difficult situation with spare parts and the degree of deterioration of the park. They endlessly extend the resource of technology, but you know - it's one thing to extend the resource, say, a tank, and quite another - an airplane. The consequences of failure are completely different. Therefore, a significant part of the fleet of vehicles in the air does not rise into the air. Also during the years of independence, the airfield network was destroyed.
"You mentioned the tanks." What is the situation with armored vehicles now?
- In general, the reserve of equipment is still great, but all this equipment is obsolete, and the potential for modernization is almost exhausted. Some variants of modernization are unsuccessful in real combat. For example, the T-64BM Bulat tanks were inefficient due to their heavy weight and weak engine, they were transferred to the reserve, and replaced by linear T-64 tanks. Thus, it is necessary to create new samples. But there are other problems here. BM Oplot, for example, in the Armed Forces is available in a single copy - in the Kharkov Institute of Tank Forces. So the question is in the possibilities of the state for procurement, and industry - for the serial production of new machines.
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Akim
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Indeed, there is a problem of shortage of ammunition, but it is partially solved. Cartridges 5.45x39 and 7.62x54 import from Bulgaria. In that month, the state tests of the projectile to 2A36 began. For other types of 152-mm howitzers, shells are huge. There is a shortage of missiles for MLRS, but it is not acute.
The sharpest problems of the armed forces of Ukraine
Ukrainian news agency "Defense Pronunciations Courier " published an interesting interview with the Deputy Commander of the Land Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) on logistics Major General Yuri Tolokniy under the heading "The most acute problems of the APU are not directly connected with the ATU zone" .
In an interview, Major-General Y. Toloknyi reports on a number of characteristic problems in the current APU:
- the acute shortage of funds for the construction of facilities for the deployment of troops, newly formed or withdrawn from the ATO zone by rotation, joints and units are deployed in tent camps;
- a shortage of funds to ensure the survivability and security of arsenals and ammunition storage sites - 5-10% of the required;
"The situation with ammunition is very serious, there are a number of deficit calibers today, including rifle, and artillery and missile ammunition." Limits on the consumption of artillery ammunition have been introduced. In a year or two, a maximum of three, a shortage of ammunition will be critical;
- the option of upgrading T-64BM tanks "Bulat" was "unsuccessful in real combat." "T-64BM Bulat tanks were inefficient due to their heavy weight and weak engine, they were transferred to the reserve, and replaced by linear T-64 tanks."
Since 2014, in matters related to the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the attention of the vast majority of experts and the media has been focused on the war zone in the east of the country, related problems and challenges. However, a significant part of the most acute problems of the army lies outside the ATU zone, and is concentrated in areas not directly related to military operations. Moreover, the revival of the APU, which began four years ago, has turned into a whole series of new difficulties. The person who worked in army logistics since its inception in the Supreme Armed Forces in the modern form - the deputy chief - told about the difficulties connected with the equipment of the permanent deployment of troops, the situation with bases and arsenals, as well as the growing problems in the ammunition industry, the information agency "Defense Industry Bulletin" logistics management of the Southern Operational Command,
- What are the main needs of troops in the war zone?
- When entering the winter, it is, first of all, fuel for engines. It is necessary to switch to normal winter fuel. There have already been a number of scandals about this. Also it is timely deliveries of coal and firewood. The completeness of the winter form - which has been changed for five years already several times, and its quality still leaves much to be desired, although in comparison with the first samples there is progress.
But the key problematic issues in the supply of troops now, paradoxically, are not related to the ATU zone. The war zone is under the scrutiny of both military and political leadership, so that the most pressing issues are resolved there. The stabilization of the front line also helps us. The units that are rotated are located in the same places, and gradually they have established the necessary conditions for life and service there.
But when it comes to other regions ... In my opinion, now the most acute problem is the camps, where troops are assigned to restore combat effectiveness. These camps are tent camps, and after a year and a half of operation these tents are no longer suitable for living. The second, related question is the points of a permanent dislocation. We have today created a number of new military formations, but for them it is necessary to create new points of permanent deployment - stationary headquarters, houses for officers, dormitories or barracks of improved type with laundries, bathrooms, etc. Otherwise, it turns out that parts of the field conditions on the front are output to exactly the same conditions in the rear, which does not allow to restore combat capability.
All this means is catastrophically small. For example, there is a decision of the Minister of Defense to create a military town on the "Wide Lan" test range before the end of 2017. Originally planned for two brigades, then cut to one. There is still a tent city, although for a long time there should have been built prefabricated barracks. Construction is proceeding, but slowly, and the final deadlines for the delivery of the facility are still unclear. In any case, this year it will not be built.
- What needs to be done to solve these issues?
- First of all, you need a clear understanding of how many such camps we need, and clearly identify their locations. And then start creating a full-fledged, long-term housing and infrastructure there. In my opinion, two things prevent this. First, of course, lack of finance. And secondly, in my opinion, often doing something in the ATU zone is loud, "piarno", it sounds. And the arrangement of remote areas from the region does not give such image, "rating" results. In addition, the creation of a military town is a long and painstaking, costly process that does not give instant information returns. The construction of barracks, dormitories, houses for officers ... It is much easier for the purpose of "PR", for example, to create a tank company, or buy a few dozen cars, and gain political points on it.
- How can the situation with ammunition be rectified? In particular, with ensuring the safety of their storage.
- In 2005, the program of survivability of bases, warehouses and arsenals was adopted. The first question is - in each warehouse, the volume of ammunition for which it is designed should be stored. We must clearly know how much and what we need: a military, operational, strategic reserve. Before the war, all ammunition depots were overloaded - with the reduction of combat units, the conversion of divisions into brigades, etc. their ammunition was moved to warehouses. Since then, the war and the pre-war active, albeit very stupid, disposal of ammunition have somewhat improved the situation, but only partially. Second - the warehouse should have a special purpose. That is, if the warehouse is intended for the storage of high-risk ammunition - primarily jet - the storage should at least be dumped. And ideally, ammunition should be located in special underground arched vaults. Now it is necessary to abandon all efforts to eliminate open storage areas. They are the most vulnerable to sabotage, and create an increased danger in case of negligence or natural and man-made disasters. In 2008, a fire at the 61st arsenal in Lozovaya began precisely because an open flame - nearby burned leaves - was thrown by the wind into openly stored boxes with mines, which are stored with bunches of gunpowder. It was they who caught fire. Fortunately, this arsenal did not have jet munitions, and the storage facilities were dumped, so the fragmentation of the fragments amounted to a maximum of 1.5 km, which limited the scale of damage and damage. The same reasons led to the disaster in Balakley. Therefore, it is necessary to bring the storage of ammunition in line with the current regulations. They are the most vulnerable to sabotage, and create an increased danger in case of negligence or natural and man-made disasters. In 2008, a fire at the 61st arsenal in Lozovaya began precisely because an open flame - nearby burned leaves - was thrown by the wind into openly stored boxes with mines, which are stored with bunches of gunpowder. It was they who caught fire. Fortunately, this arsenal did not have jet munitions, and the storage facilities were dumped, so the fragmentation of the fragments amounted to a maximum of 1.5 km, which limited the scale of damage and damage. The same reasons led to the disaster in Balakley. Therefore, it is necessary to bring the storage of ammunition in line with the current regulations. They are the most vulnerable to sabotage, and create an increased danger in case of negligence or natural and man-made disasters. In 2008, a fire at the 61st arsenal in Lozovaya began precisely because an open flame - nearby burned leaves - was thrown by the wind into openly stored boxes with mines, which are stored with bunches of gunpowder. It was they who caught fire. Fortunately, this arsenal did not have jet munitions, and the storage facilities were dumped, so the fragmentation of the fragments amounted to a maximum of 1.5 km, which limited the scale of damage and damage. The same reasons led to the disaster in Balakley. Therefore, it is necessary to bring the storage of ammunition in line with the current regulations. In 2008, a fire at the 61st arsenal in Lozovaya began precisely because an open flame - nearby burned leaves - was thrown by the wind into openly stored boxes with mines, which are stored with bunches of gunpowder. It was they who caught fire. Fortunately, this arsenal did not have jet munitions, and the storage facilities were dumped, so the fragmentation of the fragments amounted to a maximum of 1.5 km, which limited the scale of damage and damage. The same reasons led to the disaster in Balakley. Therefore, it is necessary to bring the storage of ammunition in line with the current regulations. In 2008, a fire at the 61st arsenal in Lozovaya began precisely because an open flame - nearby burned leaves - was thrown by the wind into openly stored boxes with mines, which are stored with bunches of gunpowder. It was they who caught fire. Fortunately, this arsenal did not have jet munitions, and the storage facilities were dumped, so the fragmentation of the fragments amounted to a maximum of 1.5 km, which limited the scale of damage and damage. The same reasons led to the disaster in Balakley. Therefore, it is necessary to bring the storage of ammunition in line with the current regulations. so the fragmentation of the fragments amounted to a maximum of 1.5 km, which limited the scale of damage and damage. The same reasons led to the disaster in Balakley. Therefore, it is necessary to bring the storage of ammunition in line with the current regulations. so the fragmentation of the fragments amounted to a maximum of 1.5 km, which limited the scale of damage and damage. The same reasons led to the disaster in Balakley. Therefore, it is necessary to bring the storage of ammunition in line with the current regulations.
Now that a significant part of the ammunition has been disposed of or consumed during the war, a redistribution plan must be drawn up. Some arsenals are emptied, others remain overloaded. It is necessary to install object signaling in storage - fire, and motion sensors - and perimeter, with security cameras. It is necessary to equip the perimeter - to cut trees, if the object is located in the forest, to plow the land around so that there is no dry grass. You also need to ensure reliable protection of the perimeter. After the outbreak of the war, because of the shortage of combat units, the over-the-shelf soldiers from the companies' mouths and platoons of the protection of bases and arsenals were sent for completing, and the protection of objects is often carried out by the VOKhR. What is VOHR? Pensioners with carbines SCS in bullet-proof vests of the Soviet model. Dogs needed for protection in the Army were available only in one warehouse. How reliable is this protection? Bases and arsenals should be guarded by special units, trained, and equipped with everything necessary.
Also, in the immediate units and subunits there must be quick reaction armies, which, thanks to the established connection, can be quickly deployed to the arsenal in the event of an attack, and provide defense according to a pre-established plan. Now, when the main combat units at the front, at points of permanent deployment there is nothing like this. The interaction with the SBU and the police should also be adjusted. All employees of bases and arsenals should be checked by these structures.
- Is the process of these changes going on, and if so - how fast?
- The process is going, but wavy. After another disaster, the funds are quickly allocated, but then their volume is reduced, and financing is reduced to a minimum. Then everything repeats itself again. If you look at financing by years, then it's easy to see the dependence on PE on different bases and arsenals. In "quiet" years I had to hear from high-ranking military officials the opinion that the encumbrance is "burying money into the ground". Today, the funds are partially allocated for signaling - about 10-15% of the need. According to the reconstruction of allocated finance, in fact, only to replace the floors. A huge problem with tare - boxes in fact become worthless with time. A little stands out for the purchase of small means of automation, the processing of wooden rafters with fireproof impregnation, reloading fire extinguishers ... For the construction of new facilities, money is not actually allocated. Thus, we have about 5-10% of the required tactical tasks to ensure survivability. For strategic purposes - the construction of new storage facilities - funds are not allocated at all.
- How would you evaluate the project of building a new cartridge factory?
- This is a crying necessity. The situation with ammunition is very serious. Today there are a number of scarce calibers. We are talking about rifle, and artillery and missile munitions.
In fact, there is nothing to replenish ammunition, and it is constantly shrinking. In Ukraine, only small batches are produced. By the nature of the service, I did not deal directly with this issue, but there are some considerations. For example, purchases abroad, which some see as a way out, will not help solve this problem - firstly, there are not many states that can meet our need for Soviet-style ammunition - and our weapons remain predominantly Soviet. The ammunition of the NATO standard is not like us. Secondly, ammunition is a lethal weapon. Everyone knows the attitude of our Western partners to the supply of lethal weapons to Ukraine. Knowing our politicians, if large volumes of ammunition were shipped from abroad, it would be accompanied by loud PR actions, so the absence of such noise indicates that,
The main thing is to organize this production competently, to arrange the production of calibres in which we need. On small arms, at least close the range of calibers from 5.45 to 14.5 mm. As for the artillery ... Only in the last year the control over the consumption of artillery ammunition has become tougher. Returns are freebies and so on. In the first years of the war the expenditure of shells was completely uncontrolled, and colossal.
- When, in your opinion, is the current state of affairs of a shortage of ammunition critical? Provided that the creation of a new production does not move from the dead end.
"I think a year or two." A maximum of three.
- What key problems would you single out in other types of troops, except the Land Forces?
- In the Navy, the housing issue is very acute. In the Air Force, as far as I know, the difficult situation with spare parts and the degree of deterioration of the park. They endlessly extend the resource of technology, but you know - it's one thing to extend the resource, say, a tank, and quite another - an airplane. The consequences of failure are completely different. Therefore, a significant part of the fleet of vehicles in the air does not rise into the air. Also during the years of independence, the airfield network was destroyed.
"You mentioned the tanks." What is the situation with armored vehicles now?
- In general, the reserve of equipment is still great, but all this equipment is obsolete, and the potential for modernization is almost exhausted. Some variants of modernization are unsuccessful in real combat. For example, the T-64BM Bulat tanks were inefficient due to their heavy weight and weak engine, they were transferred to the reserve, and replaced by linear T-64 tanks. Thus, it is necessary to create new samples. But there are other problems here. BM Oplot, for example, in the Armed Forces is available in a single copy - in the Kharkov Institute of Tank Forces. So the question is in the possibilities of the state for procurement, and industry - for the serial production of new machines.
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Akim
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Test round for 2A36/2S5, VOG-17M and 60-mm mine
60-mm mortar in ATO of used by Special Forces
bhramos
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1448th Central Artillery Base of Armaments (military unit A-4559, Orzhev ) bmpvsu.ru
Interesting information on reserves of equipment in APU
Interesting information on reserves of equipment in APU
bhramos
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bhramos
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how good are these?
as India also upgraded ZSU-23-4 Shilka with Ukrainian engine........
bhramos
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Akim
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It just passes the test. Created for the motives of Polish modernization ZSU-23-4MP Biała. However, the Poles have a digital opto-electronic channel, here is a new digital radar. Its parameters are similar to the old radar of the RPK-2, however, it catches targets with a smaller radar cross-section.
ZSU-23-4MP Biała
ukrainian radar
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