Discussion in 'China' started by Free Karma, Apr 24, 2015.
CIA worked with China intelligence services against Russia - Washington Times
The Dead CCCP is Good CCCP.
China has always been against the USSR and Russia.
Therefore, she would have even colluded with the Devil to bring USSR and now, Russia down.
@Zeratul echos that feeling when he/she writes
Ð¡Ð¡Ð¡Ð (Ð¡Ð¾ÑŽÐ· Ð¡Ð¾Ð²ÐµÑ‚ÑÐºÐ¸Ñ… Ð¡Ð¾Ñ†Ð¸Ð°Ð»Ð¸ÑÑ‚Ð¸Ñ‡ÐµÑÐºÐ¸Ñ… Ð ÐµÑÐ¿ÑƒÐ±Ð»Ð¸Ðº) is a Russian (Cyrillic) abbreviation for the Soviet Union or USSR.
Can you please provide your source that China is NOW working with US to bring Russia down?
Are you expecting minutes of meeting and signed memos or some kiss and tell story.
You have been the prime beneficiaries of the situation Russia is in today. And somehow SCO never seems to be going anywhere. Yanukovych was expecting to be given a nuclear umbrella by you guys. What happened? What was your response. Do you remember it?
I hope these will be helpful for you to understand the issue in its holity.
Exploiting Russian weaknesses and implanting dependence on the RFE inhabitants and pushing in more Han.
That has been the usual ploy of the Chinese posters whenever anything not too pleasant on China is written.
They want you to produce memos, documents etc, when they cannot even speak against their own regime either publicly or privately. The case of the Chinese TV chap whose private conversation with friends, make one squeal to the CPC against the TV anchor and he lost his job and, for all we know, he is in the Laogai.
China never sees itself as a direct competitor of USA like Russia, nor they oppose USA.
Chinese look for opportunities to strengthen themselves like a businessman. If we look at the recent history, Chinese supported USA on many occasions in the UN.
The timing of this leak is what interests me when looking from the side of skirmish in Ukraine.
This will make Russians very skeptical about getting closer to China.
Kinda like throwing spanner into the Chinese pivot ?...
Labor has long been abolished, you really can rumour.
Give us another Grimms Fairy Tale
Chinese have a God given restricted view and cannot see the whole scenario.
Open your eyes.
The whole idiotic idea by Rockefeller was to open china to bring down the soviet
Union. Are Russians naive after four decades?
The timing is perfect, I hope Putin gets a copy of it as well. One copy should be sent to regime of Pureistan as well so that they know who they are dealing with. I would be surprised if China is not sharing with CIA the information about location of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. USA is trying her level best to bring Pakistan under her umbrella whether they succeed or not time will tell. IMO USA might make public CIA information sharing with China about Pakistan's nuclear stockpile location as well in order to stop development of silk route.
Past enemies can become today's friends, and today's friends will become future enemies.
China needs Russia today as much as Russia needs China. Russia sits on massive natural resources which are CRITICAL in the time of war.
Anybody remember Reagan's star-wars. There have been some developments in the last few years which must have made the Chinese very uncomfortable. The Chinese also need protection from USA. The rationalists will always argue that USA will try to cut China to size soon, before China becomes strong enough to challenge USA directly.
If there is a third world war, I see China and Russia on the same side.
I see European Union split in the middle with northern Europe firmly siding with USA but Southern Europe not so.
That's called an independent foreign policy, judging every issue on its own merits rather than attaching to any power.
Even during the Soviet-China honey moon China insisted Stalin hand back control of Dalian (Port Arthur) and the Manchurian railway. China also rejected Khruschev's offer to build a joint fleet and a long-wave radio station for fear of discounting Chinese sovereignty.
Not biased by the "shared ideology" China condemned Soviet invasion of Czech Slovakia to suppress the Prague Spring.
Even when China was in the Soviet bloc USSR supported Indian aggressions against China.
It's no eye opener when we learn the so called non-aligned India and CIA were bed fellows in anti-China operations. But kudos to India for milking both superpowers to the largest extent possible.
~Tapa talks: Orange is the new black.~
Again you are at the usual Disinformation mode.
Let us see what Prague Spring was in a nutshell.
Prague Spring began on 5 January 1968, when reformist Alexander DubÄek was elected First Secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (KSÄŒ) and he started various reforms that attempted ideals of democracy like increasing freedom of the press, freedom of speech, and freedom of movement, with economic emphasis on consumer goods and the possibility of a multiparty government. USSR was displeased.
The Prague Spring continued till 21 August 1968. On the night of 20â€“21 August 1968, Eastern Bloc armies from five Warsaw Pact countries â€“ the Soviet Union, the GDR, Bulgaria, Poland and Hungaryâ€”invaded the ÄŒSSR. GustÃ¡v HusÃ¡k, replaced DubÄek.
Albania and Romania, both Communist states, did not participate in the invasion.
Economic fallout from this move was mitigated somewhat by a strengthening of Albanian relations with the People's Republic of China, which was itself on increasingly strained terms with the Soviet Union.
Now let us see Chinaâ€™s relations with the USSR at that time.
In 1959 and 1960, USSR withdrew all economic advisers from China. Khrushchev's renunciation of the agreement to provide a sample nuclear weapon to China was a body blow to China. Mutual accusations of ideological deviation increased amongst them and the political rift between the two countries widened
Further, in 1968 and 1969, serious Sino-Soviet border clashes occurred along the Amur and Ussuri rivers.
Heard of the famous Sino-Soviet split (1960â€“1989) which was the worsening of political and ideological relations between the neighbouring states of People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) during the Cold War?
Therefore, what are you trying to ride the high horse with â€˜Not biased by the "shared ideology" China condemned Soviet invasion of Czech Slovakia to suppress the Prague Springâ€™?
When the relations between China had soured with the USSR, it is so obvious that it will criticise USSR every time it gets a chance. Is it so obvious?
After KMT was overthrown, Mao visited Moscow from December 1949 to February 1950 and the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance (1950) was signed. This included a $300 million low-interest loan and a 30-year military alliance to refurbish Maoâ€™s impoverished military. Over the years, Chinaâ€™s relations with USSR were not smooth and Mao was peeved with Stalinâ€™s obduracy.
In so far as Port Arthur is concerned, after Joseph Stalin's death in March 1953, there was a temporary revival of Sino-Soviet friendship. In 1954, the Soviets calmed Mao with an official visit by Premier Nikita Khrushchev that featured the formal hand-over of the LÃ¼shun (Port Arthur) naval base to China. The Soviets also provided technical aid in 156 industries in China's first five-year plan, and 520 million rubles in loans.
Furthermore, the USSR alarmed by the Great Leap Forward renounced aiding Chinese nuclear weapons development, and refused to side with them in the Sino-Indian War (1962), by maintaining a moderate relation with Indiaâ€”actions deemed offensive by Mao as the Chinese leader.
So, it is China which aided India to become USSRâ€™s friend. Thank you, China.
As far as CIA in India, may I add that some CIA trainees ended up commanding an army of 2,000 resistance fighters dubbed the Chushi Gangdruk, or "Four Rivers, Six Gorges". These fighters were specialized in ambushing Chinese targets from elevated bases in the mountains of Nepal
It is claimed that CIA placed a permanent ELINT device, a transceiver powered by a plutonium battery, that could detect and report data on future nuclear tests carried out by China.
It's nothing new for the world India has been an CIA pawn. Non Aligned Movement, what black humour !!
The CIA’s reconnaissance operations in India » Indian Defence Review
The CIA's reconnaissance operations in India By Claude ArpiIssue Net Edition | Date : 11 Aug , 2014
The CIA recently declassified a new series of documents on the history of the U-2 surveillance planes.
In their â€œThe Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance: The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974â€, Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach mentioned the U-2s operations in India.
On 11 November 1962, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru consented to the proposed operation and gave the United States permission to refuel the reconnaissance aircraft (U-2s) in Indian airspace.
[I quote from pages 231 to 233]
In October 1962, the Peopleâ€™s Republic of China launched a series of massive surprise attacks against Indiaâ€™s frontier forces in the western provinces of Jammu and Kashmir and in the North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA). The Chinese overran all Indian fortifications north of the Brahmaputra Valley before halting their operations.
The Indian Government appealed to the United States for military aid. In the negotiations that followed, it became apparent that Indian claims concerning the extent of the Chinese incursions could not be reliably evaluated. US Ambassador John Kenneth Galbraith, therefore, suggested to the Indian Government that US aerial reconnaissance of the disputed areas would provide both governments with a more accurate picture of the Communist Chinese incursions.
On 11 November 1962, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru consented to the proposed operation and gave the United States permission to refuel the reconnaissance aircraft (U-2s) in Indian airspace.
In late November, Detachment G  to Ta Khli,  to carry out the overflights of the Sino-Indian border area. Since the U-2s were not authorized to overfly Burma, they had to reach the target area via the Bay of Bengal and eastern India and, therefore, required midair refueling.
Because of severe winter weather conditions, the first flight did not take place until 5 December. Poor weather and air turbulence hampered the mission, and only 40 percent of the target area could be photographed. A second mission on 10 December was more successful, but the U-2 experienced rough engine performance because of icing of the fuel lines.
Photography from these missions was used in January and again in March 1963 to brief Prime Minister Nehru, who then informed the Indian Parliament about Communist Chinese troop movements along the border
Detachment G U-2s made four more overflights of the Sino-Indian border areas in January 1963, which led to a PRC protest to India. Photography from these missions was used in January and again in March 1963 to brief Prime Minister Nehru, who then informed the Indian Parliament about Communist Chinese troop movements along the border. Although Nehru did not reveal the source of his intelligence, a UPI wire story surmised that the information had been obtained by U-2s.
The United States had provided photographic coverage of the border area to India for two reasons. First of all, US policymakers wanted a clear picture of the area under dispute. In addition, the intelligence community wanted to establish a precedent for overflights from India, which could lead to obtaining a permanent staging base in India for electronic reconnaissance missions against the Soviet ABM [Anti-Ballistic Missile] site at Saryshagan and photographic missions against those portions of western China that were out of range of Detachment H.
In April 1963, Ambassador Galbraith and the Chief of Station at New Delhi made the first official request to India for a base. The following month, President Kennedy agreed to DCI [Director Central Intelligence] McConeâ€™s suggestion to raise the question of a U-2 base in India when he met with Indiaâ€™s President Savepalli Radhakrishnan on 3 June. This meeting resulted in an Indian offer of an abandoned World War II base at Charbatia, south of Calcutta [near Cuttack in Odisha].
The Charbatia base was in poor condition and needed considerable renovation before it could be used for U-2 operations. Work on the base by the Indians took much longer than expected, so Detachment G continued to use Ta Khli when it staged four sorties over Tibet from 29 September to 10 November 1963. In addition to the coverage of the Sino-Indian border during this series of flights, the U-2s also photographed all of Thailand to produce a photomap of the border regions as a quid pro quo for the Thai Government. During one of these photomapping missions, a U-2 pilot conducted the longest mission ever recorded in this aircraft- 11 hours and 45 minutes.
At the end of this flight on 10 November 1963, the pilot was in such poor physical condition that project managers prohibited the scheduling of future missions longer than 10 hours.
The first mission out of Charbatia did not take place until 24 May 1964. Three days later Prime Minister Nehru died, and further operations were postponed.
Charbatia was still not ready in early 1964, so on 31 March 1964 Detachment G staged another mission from Ta Khli. The first mission out of Charbatia did not take place until 24 May 1964. Three days later Prime Minister Nehru died, and further operations were postponed.
The pilots and aircraft left Charbatia, but other equipment remained in place to save staging costs. In December 1964, when Sino-Indian tensions increased along the border, Detachment G returned to Charbatia and conducted three highly successful missions, satisfying all of COMORâ€™s requirements for the Sino-Indian border region. By this time, however, Ta Khli had become the main base for Detachment Gâ€™s Asian operations, and Charbatia served merely as a forward staging base. Charbatia was closed out in July 1967.
 Elsewhere, the U-2 report says that Detachment C could not have stayed in Nevada much longer. In June 1957, the entire facility had to be evacuated because the Atomic Energy Commission was about to conduct a series of nuclear tests whose fallout was expected to contaminate the Groom Lake facility. All remaining CIA personnel, materiel, and aircraft were transferred to Edwards Air Force Base in California, and became known as Detachment G.
 Takhli Royal Thai Air Force Base is today a Royal Thai Air Force facility, located in Central Thailand, approximately 144 miles northwest of Bangkok
What is surprising in this story is that the beginning of the collaboration between the CIA and the Indian Government for reconnaissance of the Himalayan borders, is given as November 11, 1962.
It is the day Nehru is supposed to have allowed the U-2s to â€˜refuelâ€™ during their reconnaissance flights.
To understand the context, it is necessary to look at The Foreign Relations of the United States (1961â€“1963 Volume XIX, South Asia), which publishes several telegrams from the Department of State to the US Embassy in India.
One of these cables is sent from Washington on November 20, 1962 (at 12:50 a.m. U.S. time) by the US Secretary of State Dean Rusk to the US Ambassador in India, John Kenneth Galbraith.
â€œâ€¦.As we read this message it amounts to a request for an active and practically speaking unlimited military partnership between the United States and India to take on Chinese invasion Indiaâ€¦â€
Marked â€˜Eyes Only for Ambassador from Secretaryâ€™, the cable says of Nehruâ€™s request for assistance: â€œWe have just forwarded to you second letter from Nehru today anticipated in your [cable] 1889. As we read this message it amounts to a request for an active and practically speaking unlimited military partnership between the United States and India to take on Chinese invasion India. This involves for us the most far-reaching political and strategic issues and we are not at all [emphasis mine] convinced that Indians are prepared to face the situation in the same terms. I recall that more than once in past two years I have expressed to various Indian representatives my concern that their policy would lead to a situation where they would call upon us for assistance when it is too late rather than give their and free world policy any opportunity for preventive effectiveness.â€
This new development relates to the two panicky letterssent by the Indian Prime Minister on November 19, 1962, which were brought to the Indian publicâ€™s notice by the veteran journalist Inder Malhotra a few years ago.
Another telegram (also classified â€˜Eyes Only for the Ambassadorâ€™) from Dean Rusk was sent the same day at 22:31 p.m. US time; it tells the US Ambassador: â€œUnless you think it inappropriate, please deliver the following message to Prime Minister Nehru as soon as feasible.â€
The letter to Jawaharlal Nehru reads thus:
Dear Mr. Prime Minister:
I was on the point of responding to your two urgent letters when we received news of the Chinese statements on a cease-fire. I, of course, wish your assessment of whether it makes any change in your situation. I had planned to write you that we are ready to be as responsive as possible to your needs, in association with the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth. We remain prepared to do so.
We had already organized a small group of top U.S. officials [headed by Ambassador Averell Harriman, it included Paul Nitze, Carl Kaysen, Roger Hilsman, and General Paul D. Adams], who would arrive in New Delhi Friday [November 22], to help Ambassador Galbraith in concerting with your government how we can best help. It seems useful to go ahead with this effort as planned and we will do so unless you think it inadvisable.
The problem was that Washington (and Delhi as well) had little information about the Chinese intentions and even less on the dispositions of the PLA in Tibet.
It is signed Dean Rusk, who told his Ambassador: â€œYou might suggest to Nehru that even under changed circumstances the team would be useful as a tangible gesture of US support.â€
In the earlier quoted telegram, the State Department had informed the US Ambassador: â€œLatest message from PriMin [Nehru] in effect proposes not only a military alliance between India and the United States but complete commitment by us to a fighting war. We recognized this might be immediate reaction of a Government in a desperate position but it is a proposal which cannot be reconciled with any further pretense of non-alignment. If this is what Nehru has in mind, he should be entirely clear about it before we even consider our own decision.â€
The problem was that Washington (and Delhi as well) had little information about the Chinese intentions and even less on the dispositions of the PLA in Tibet. It was most urgent for both Washington and Delhi to get proper and reliable information; this probably justified the use of the U-2 surveillance planes.
This lack of information was admitted by Rusk when he cabled Galbraith on November 19 (at 11:06 p.m.): â€œWe acutely feel lack of information regarding GOI [Government of India] plans and capacity to meet this new situation. Accordingly, we are sending a small high-level team to arrive New Delhi approximately Friday [November 22] to assess whole situation along with Indian plans and capability for meeting it and return with action recommendations as soon as possible. They may wish to visit scene of action on frontier. Team will include high ranking military officers both Army and Air with appropriate representation from State and CIA. Arranging best coordination we can with UK directly, but not waiting on them.â€
This was what Ambassador Averell Harriman was sent to Delhi for: to ascertain Nehruâ€™s long term intentions and Indiaâ€™s real needs.
Washington however warned: â€œThere are strong reasons why the United States should not appear to be the point of the spear in assisting India in this situation. The most impelling of these is that our role might force Moscow to support Peiping [Beijing]. We shall be considering here whether there is anything we can constructively say to Moscow about Chinaâ€™s reckless and provocative action because there is some reason to believe that Moscow is also very much worried about the dangerous possibility. I would emphasize, however, India must mobilize its own diplomatic and political resources, seek the broadest base of support throughout the world and, more particularly, enlist the active interest and participation of the Commonwealth.â€
The end results of these discussions were plans for a major three-phase military aid package encompassing material support, help with domestic defense production, and possible assistance with air defenses.
Already on November 19 (in the cable quoted earlier), Rusk had defined the possible help Washington could immediately provide to Delhi: â€œWe are prepared to dispatch twelve or more C-130â€²s at once to assist in any necessary movement of forces and equipment to Assam area or to Ladakh. This would be US operation with planes, crews support. Request your urgent advice whether Indians prepared to use this transport immediately. Also earliest estimates men and tonnage involved. Special airlift team being dispatched at once. This provides another opportunity for you to remind Indians about importance of moving troops from Pakistan border. Urgency of situation underlines anomaly of Indian reluctance in this respect.â€
Part of the Harrimanâ€™s mission was also to make peace between India and Pakistan.
Washington was keen to rope in the British in the operation.
As mentioned by The US Secretary of State in the same cable: â€œThis as far as we can see to go on basis of facts now available here. However, supply actions urgently needed and assessed as valid need not be delayed despite lack of clear picture Indian capabilities. View possibility India now ready use tactical air, one airlift requirement may be bombs request of UK. London should raise this and ascertain availability and British air shipment capabilities.â€
This is for the overt assistance; we have another source of the events, which mentions the covert support (minus the U-2â€™s reconnaissance flights).
Kenneth Conboy and James Morrison in their â€˜The CIAâ€™S Secret in Tibetâ€™ (University Press of Kansas, 2002) recounts:
On 21 November, Harrimanâ€™s entourage departed Andrews Air Force Base in Maryland. Although the Chinese declared a unilateral cease-fire while the group was en route, the situation was still tense when it reached New Delhi the following day. Without pause, Ambassador Galbraith ushered Harriman into the first of four meetings with Nehru. The end results of these discussions were plans for a major three-phase military aid package encompassing material support, help with domestic defense production, and possible assistance with air defenses.
Convoy and Morrison, who are more interested by the covert aspect of the US-India collaboration (particularly the US support to the Tibetan guerilla), continue:
Both the CIA and the Intelligence Bureau were quick to seize the opportunity.
As a covert aside to Harrimanâ€™s talks, the CIA representatives on the delegation held their own sessions with Indian intelligence czar [Intelligence Bureau Director B.N.] Mullik. This was a first, as Galbraith had previously taken great pains to downscale the agencyâ€™s activities inside India to all but benign reporting functions. As recently as 5 November, he had objected to projected CIA plans due to the risk of exposure. But in a 13 November letter to Kennedy, the ambassador had a qualified change of heart, noting that [Defence Minister V.K. Krishna] Menonâ€™s departure was a turning point to begin working with the Indians on â€˜sensitive mattersâ€™.
Both the CIA and the Intelligence Bureau were quick to seize the opportunity. â€œI went into a huddle with Mullik and Des [FitzGerald, head of CIAâ€™s Far East Division],â€ recalls Critchfield [James Critchfield of the CIAâ€™s the Near East Division], â€œand we started coming up with all these schemes against the Chinese.â€
Most of their ideas centered around use of the Tibetans. â€œThe Indians were interested in the Tibet program because of its intelligence collection value,â€ said [Indiaâ€™s] station chief David Blee, who sat in on some of the meetings. â€œMullik was particularly interested in paramilitary operations.â€ There was good reason for this: following Menonâ€™s resignation, and [Dalai Lama's elder brother] Gyalo Thondupâ€™s stated preference, the Intelligence Bureau had been placed in charge of the 5,000 Tibetan guerrillas forming under Brigadier [Sujan Singh] Uban [first Inspector General of the Tibetan Special Frontier Force].
Convoy and Morrison analyse: â€œMullik was cautious as well. Although he was well connected to the Nehru family and had the prime ministerâ€™s full approval to talk with the CIA, he knew that the Indian populace was fickle, and until recently, anti-Americanism had been a popular mantra. It was perhaps only a matter of time before the barometer would swing back and make open Indo-U.S. cooperation political suicide.â€
â€¦V.K. Krishna Menon, the arrogant Defence Minister and stumbling block for a closer collaboration between India and the US, had resigned on November 8.
According to the American authors: â€œBy the end of the Harriman mission, the CIA and Intelligence Bureau had arrived at a rough division of labor. The Indians, with CIA support from the Near East Division, would work together in developing Ubanâ€™s 5,000-strong tactical guerrilla force. The CIAâ€™s Far East Division, meantime, would unilaterally create a strategic long-range resistance movement inside Tibet. The Mustang contingent would also remain under the CIAâ€™s unilateral control.â€
But this is another story.
To come back to the U-2 operation in India, it is doubtful that a full-fledged use of the U-2s was permitted on November 11, though V.K. Krishna Menon, the arrogant Defence Minister and stumbling block for a closer collaboration between India and the US, had resigned on November 8.
It is also true that the CIA History of the U-2s mentions only the â€˜permission for refuelingâ€™ given on November 11.
It is however certain, that the main thrust of the covert operations over the Himalayas was decided during Harrimanâ€™s Mission to India, when the CIAâ€™s senior officials accompanying Kennedyâ€™s envoy met with their
Indian counterpart, particularly B.N. Mullik.
Though not mentioned in the CIAâ€™s history, it would be interesting to probe the role of Biju Patnaik, the Oriya politician, who was instrumental in offering Charbatia as a base the U-2sâ€™ operations in the Himalayas and Tibet.
Early 1961, Patnaik became president of the Odishaâ€™s State Congress. Under his leadership, the Congress Party won 82 of 140 seats in the Assembly election and on 23 June 1961, he became the State Chief Minister (he remained in the post until 2 October 1963 when he resigned from the post under the Kamaraj Plan to revitalise the Congress party). Patnaik was then 45-year old.
He played an important, though not recognized as yet, in the covert operations against China.
Courtesy: Claude Arpi
With hindsight I'd say both Sino-CCCP split and Sino-India face-off in 1960's were blessings in disguise for China.
The Sino-Indian Conflict
China shall always act in Chinese interest, being self-esteemed as one of multi-polars- not pursuing to be an enemy of either Russia (erstwhile CCCP) or America, but standing as an equal.
That is what it says most piously every time, but connives in 'self interest' covering the same with mellifluous cooing to disarm and distract.
Remember 'Peaceful Rising'?
Having 'risen peacefully' by disarming sweet talk, it actually armed itself to the teeth and even stealing technology through deceit and agents in the Han diaspora.
It resulted in Aggressive claiming of the SCS and confronting the US also.
Conveniently you are forgetting the Sino Soviet dispute where relations were soured immensely.
Hence, to believe the USSR will come out in favour of China is wishful thinking.
Russia aided India to balance China which it was finding distasteful. even though it was a fraternal brother.
And like good Communists like China, they infiltrated the Indian system with its 'well wishers'.
Read Mitrokhin Archive.
India is no one's pawn.
China was detested and so it outsourced the disgust to the US who had better tools and who digested China to its gills.
Set a thief to catch a thief.
1962 and post 1962 was botched up by that dreamer Nehru, who elevated Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai as his mantra and defanged the military as he was afraid that India would go Pakistan's way.
Time will only tell.
The geostrategic equation is changing fast.
China is losing friends and buying enemies.
Carry out more atrocities on the Muslims of Xinjiang and oil will get scarce for China.
Well, based on your criteria, India is also trying to bring Russia since India is exploiting Russia's weakness of lacking cash to force Russia give up her core military technologies.
Separate names with a comma.