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Admiral John Arbuthnot Fisher, British Admiral and First Sea Lord who rapidly built up the Royal Navy before the Great War, wrote nearly a century ago, "It is astounding to me, perfectly astounding, how the very best amongst us fail to realize the vast impending revolution in Naval warfare and Naval strategy that the submarine will accomplish."
Nearly a century later, the most enthusiastic proponents of his words are located in our part of the world. Reports of Chinese submarines venturing into the Indian Ocean seem to indicate they are getting uncomfortably close. So what? Surely if the Chinese have nuclear submarines, the Indian Ocean is obviously one of the Oceans where they can logically be expected to operate. Many among us would like to deny this, believing that the Chinese are still stuck with technology issues that preclude such a possibility. While we in India are still struggling to put our first "indigenous " nuclear submarine to sea, we would like to extend our own inabilities and inefficiencies to the Chinese - therefore they cannot deploy. Much like the US admiral who dismissed submarines in the late 19th century, 'The Holland boats are interesting novelties which appeal to the non-professional mind, which is apt to invest them with remarkable properties they do not posses"
In addition to the SSBNs the Chinese have a robust SSN and conventional submarine building programme. Their 091, 093 and 095 SSN programmes have turned out about eight submarines in the past four decades. This is sufficient to master the adopted technology and fix glitches in the design (possibly with external assistance). The very fact that the Chinese have built greater number of submarines and operated them means their technical expertise and operating experience is substantially greater than ours. Add to this the Chinese capability of deploying 1000 km range tube launched cruise missiles and other shorter range missiles and torpedoes.
A Chinese SSN operating in the Bay of Bengal or the Arabian Sea can pose a substantial threat to our Navy.
The ability of the Vikramaditya Carrier Battle Group to establish and sustain sea control even in our own backyard will be seriously challenged. Anybody with elementary knowledge of naval tactics can figure out the clear and present danger that a SSN with missile and torpedoes present. In addition the SSNs can mark our SSBNs which may have to transit to the South China Sea, compromising our assured second strike capability. There are at least three broad areas we would need to rapidly build up:
a)Submarines
We need to have adequate force levels of SSNs and SSBNs if credible minimum deterrence under the averred policy of 'No First Use' (NFU) is to have any credibility at all. In order to be able to deploy SSNs and SSBNs we need to develop the ability to design and construct these submarines in India. We wasted whatever little experience we had had in submarine construction by in-advisedly and prematurely shutting down the HDW programme after commissioning INS Shankul in 1994. While we were building these submarines in Mazagoan Docks, even before commissioning the first submarine, we inducted the 877 EKMs.-as if predetermined to stop submarine construction in India. We started our learning process all over again with the Scorpene programme in 2005, and the manner in which it is progressing, we seem to be slow learners. Instead of consolidating our skills and developing the industrial base required to sustain submarine building we seen to be intent upon diversifying the submarine production lines. The sad truth is that our conventional submarine production capability, which could have provided substantial support to indigenous SSN and SSBN building, is nonexistent. If we have to deter the Chinese we need to be able to deploy at least 6 -8 SSNs and a number of SSBNs depending on their weapons capability.
b) Surveillance and Reconnaissance
The main stay of airborne ASW surveillance was based on the IL38s and the TU142s obtained from the Russians. It took the Navy many years to convince the government of the need to move away from Russian technology especially with regard to ASW and C4I issues. The induction of the P8Is may bring in a qualitative jump in our air ASW capability. While surveillance efficiency may have improved, the problem that the exploitable vastness of the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea still pose great challenges in the initial detection of submarines. Initial detection is always the vital first step in ASW.
c) Strategic ASW
In order to be able to improve the probability of detection of submarines we need to have sustained surveillance efforts both in the spatial and temporal domains. The only cost effective method is the deployment of sea bed arrays to augment air borne ASW. Though NPOL have worked on this programme it has so not reached the deployable stage. So is the case with the indigenous long range sonobuoy and Nagin towed array systems.
We are nowhere close to mastering crucial technology areas of submarine design and construction and the development of strategic ASW systems. We are still struggling to send the Arihant to sea. The indigenous conventional submarine building programme is in a limbo- with the delays in the Scorpene programme and the Hamletitude in decision making on the Project 75i. There are no visible signs of an SSN construction programme.
In the world of strategic deterrence , credibility is established only by capability and reinforced by posture and resolve. If we do not have capability there can be no deterrence. If we do not have the capability to challenge or riposte we will become so fearsome of the enemy capability that we will have no bargaining chips to negotiate. We will become self deterred by our incapacity. A Nuclear submarine poses a considerable threat. A few of them can cut off our lines of communication to our island territories and place at risk critical targets which lie within 800 kms of the coast.
The immediate need is to create capability to give credence to our policy. It was envisioned that the submarine building capability would be achieved through the "consortium approach by a web of public-private partnership." This web of capability building has so far remained knotted in the confused web of decision making. The MoDs priority in trying to keep PSU and defence shipyards afloat appears to be at cross purposes with the requirement TOestablish, consolidate and imbibe submarine design and construction capability.
China's SSN deployment threatens India's second-strike capability
Nearly a century later, the most enthusiastic proponents of his words are located in our part of the world. Reports of Chinese submarines venturing into the Indian Ocean seem to indicate they are getting uncomfortably close. So what? Surely if the Chinese have nuclear submarines, the Indian Ocean is obviously one of the Oceans where they can logically be expected to operate. Many among us would like to deny this, believing that the Chinese are still stuck with technology issues that preclude such a possibility. While we in India are still struggling to put our first "indigenous " nuclear submarine to sea, we would like to extend our own inabilities and inefficiencies to the Chinese - therefore they cannot deploy. Much like the US admiral who dismissed submarines in the late 19th century, 'The Holland boats are interesting novelties which appeal to the non-professional mind, which is apt to invest them with remarkable properties they do not posses"
In addition to the SSBNs the Chinese have a robust SSN and conventional submarine building programme. Their 091, 093 and 095 SSN programmes have turned out about eight submarines in the past four decades. This is sufficient to master the adopted technology and fix glitches in the design (possibly with external assistance). The very fact that the Chinese have built greater number of submarines and operated them means their technical expertise and operating experience is substantially greater than ours. Add to this the Chinese capability of deploying 1000 km range tube launched cruise missiles and other shorter range missiles and torpedoes.
A Chinese SSN operating in the Bay of Bengal or the Arabian Sea can pose a substantial threat to our Navy.
The ability of the Vikramaditya Carrier Battle Group to establish and sustain sea control even in our own backyard will be seriously challenged. Anybody with elementary knowledge of naval tactics can figure out the clear and present danger that a SSN with missile and torpedoes present. In addition the SSNs can mark our SSBNs which may have to transit to the South China Sea, compromising our assured second strike capability. There are at least three broad areas we would need to rapidly build up:
a)Submarines
We need to have adequate force levels of SSNs and SSBNs if credible minimum deterrence under the averred policy of 'No First Use' (NFU) is to have any credibility at all. In order to be able to deploy SSNs and SSBNs we need to develop the ability to design and construct these submarines in India. We wasted whatever little experience we had had in submarine construction by in-advisedly and prematurely shutting down the HDW programme after commissioning INS Shankul in 1994. While we were building these submarines in Mazagoan Docks, even before commissioning the first submarine, we inducted the 877 EKMs.-as if predetermined to stop submarine construction in India. We started our learning process all over again with the Scorpene programme in 2005, and the manner in which it is progressing, we seem to be slow learners. Instead of consolidating our skills and developing the industrial base required to sustain submarine building we seen to be intent upon diversifying the submarine production lines. The sad truth is that our conventional submarine production capability, which could have provided substantial support to indigenous SSN and SSBN building, is nonexistent. If we have to deter the Chinese we need to be able to deploy at least 6 -8 SSNs and a number of SSBNs depending on their weapons capability.
b) Surveillance and Reconnaissance
The main stay of airborne ASW surveillance was based on the IL38s and the TU142s obtained from the Russians. It took the Navy many years to convince the government of the need to move away from Russian technology especially with regard to ASW and C4I issues. The induction of the P8Is may bring in a qualitative jump in our air ASW capability. While surveillance efficiency may have improved, the problem that the exploitable vastness of the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea still pose great challenges in the initial detection of submarines. Initial detection is always the vital first step in ASW.
c) Strategic ASW
In order to be able to improve the probability of detection of submarines we need to have sustained surveillance efforts both in the spatial and temporal domains. The only cost effective method is the deployment of sea bed arrays to augment air borne ASW. Though NPOL have worked on this programme it has so not reached the deployable stage. So is the case with the indigenous long range sonobuoy and Nagin towed array systems.
We are nowhere close to mastering crucial technology areas of submarine design and construction and the development of strategic ASW systems. We are still struggling to send the Arihant to sea. The indigenous conventional submarine building programme is in a limbo- with the delays in the Scorpene programme and the Hamletitude in decision making on the Project 75i. There are no visible signs of an SSN construction programme.
In the world of strategic deterrence , credibility is established only by capability and reinforced by posture and resolve. If we do not have capability there can be no deterrence. If we do not have the capability to challenge or riposte we will become so fearsome of the enemy capability that we will have no bargaining chips to negotiate. We will become self deterred by our incapacity. A Nuclear submarine poses a considerable threat. A few of them can cut off our lines of communication to our island territories and place at risk critical targets which lie within 800 kms of the coast.
The immediate need is to create capability to give credence to our policy. It was envisioned that the submarine building capability would be achieved through the "consortium approach by a web of public-private partnership." This web of capability building has so far remained knotted in the confused web of decision making. The MoDs priority in trying to keep PSU and defence shipyards afloat appears to be at cross purposes with the requirement TOestablish, consolidate and imbibe submarine design and construction capability.
China's SSN deployment threatens India's second-strike capability
