China Threat: De-emphasis by Defence minister strategically untenable

Ray

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THE CHINA THREAT: DE-EMPHASIS BY INDIAN DEFENCE MINISTER STRATEGICALLY UNTENABLE

by Dr. Subhash Kapila

Introductory Observations

The "China Threat" is avidly being discussed in the global strategic community for quite some time now. This debate has been fuelled by the double digit increases in China's defence spending every year, which then generates China's rapid military modernization and upgradation of her force projection capabilities. It is a trend that is unlikely to cease for another two decades at least.

China's military modernization and upgradation of military capabilities provide China with the military muscle for more assertive and aggressive foreign policies. "Force Multiplication" to this military muscle is being provided by China's diplomatic efforts to create pressure points not only against the global superpower, namely the United States, but also emerging global key players in Asia, like Japan and India.

China in pursuit of her end-game of a revisionist power intent on challenging the status quo in the global balance of power has also been engaged in an intense drive for energy security by cornering oil supplies in Central Asia, the Gulf Region and Africa. Concomitant with this effort has been China's drive to establish a strategic nexus with countries that lie astride choke-points on the sea-lanes of oil tanker traffic.

The "China Threat" analysis by the global strategic community is based on a genuine threat assessment of China's emerging military capabilities and a predictive reading of China's national aspirations and political ambitions. The first component is based on the nuts and bolts of China's military hardware acquisitions and future plans in this direction. The second component's assessment emerges from the historical pattern of China's propensity to use military force to settle conflicts, especially post 1949 and laying claims to both historical boundaries and strategic frontiers.

Against such a backdrop, the Indian Defence Ministers assertions made on the "China Threat" during his recent tour of Japan and China (May – June 2006) are surprising as they are strategically untenable in relation to China's demonstrated strategic behaviour against India.

In strategic analysis, no credibility can be given to political rhetoric of the leaders of the two countries or citing phenomenal increase in trade volumes or high-level exchanges of political and military dignitaries or even military observers at each others armed forces exercises. Campaigns for Confidence Building Measures (CBMS) by themselves can even be "smoke screens" to cover the pursuit of long range strategic aims.

When it comes to China, India could learn a lot from the United States experience of engagement of China. After 25 years or more of the pattern of engagement spelt above and continued persistence of the United States in that direction, the "China Threat" contours are becoming that much more sharp for America.

While the United States continues its political and economic engagement of China, it does not hesitate to assert and illuminate the emerging "China Threat".

India's political leaders and some of their chosen columnists' recent utterances on a "de-emphasis" of the "China Threat" are reminiscent of the Nehruvian stances in the run-up period from 1950 to 1962. The result was a humiliating military debacle for India, not because of any military short comings of the Indian Army, but due to a myopic reading of China's intentions and a "de-emphasis" of the emerging China Threat and in the process of "de-emphasis" ignoring the constant advice of military commanders for war-preparedness against China.

This paper would therefore like to take issue with the Indian Defence Minister's assertions made during his recent tour of East Asia, that:

China is not a military threat to India ("I made it quite clear that we trust each other and, we do not, pose a mutual threat to each other")
China's military modernization has no implications for India; or words to that effect.

In the light of past history of India's imperfect national security management, no Indian political leaders and especially certainly not the Defence Minister should make any statements on "threat assessments" or "threat analysis" for political mileage. Even in this instant case, all that the Indian Defence Minister could have stressed was that India was sincere and keen to build friendly relations with China and generate mutual trust and faith.

What were the imperatives to give an uncalled for certification to China about China's strategic intentions and the implications of its military modernization.

Not only does the above send confused and ambiguous signals to India's military planners, it also sends: confused signals to those with whom India has been attempting to build strategic partnerships – the United States, Japan, Vietnam, Australia, Singapore and others. To maintain that the Indian Defence Minister's assertions pertaining to the "China Threat" are strategically untenable in relation to India, this author would like to focus attention on the following aspects:

Indian Defence Ministers' Assertions Contradictory

Threats to India's National Security: Assessment Process and Components.
"China Threat" to India: China's Demonstrated Strategic Record post- 1962.
"China Threat": Implications of China's Military Modernisation for India's security.
India's China Policy: Engagement YES, De-emphasis of "China Threat" NO.

Indian Defence Ministers Assertions Contradictory

Indian Defence Minister's assertions on China relating to strategic threat and implications for India's security of Chinese military modernization contradict his assertions made in June 2005, only a year back in Washington.

The Indian Defence Minister, certainly had China and Pakistan in mind as security threats, when he made the following points in an address at the Carnegie think-tank in Washington on June 27, 2005:

Indian lives in a dangerous neighbourhood
India faces the full spectrum of threats
Since Independence India has faced aggression and threats
India faced with an unfavourable nuclear and missile environment
India faces Proxy War on a daily basis.
India located in the center of an arc of fundamentalist activisim, terrorism and political instability.

More pointedly, the Indian Defence Minister asserted that: "The above underlines convergence of our security concerns with those of the international community, and with United States in particular" and that "India finds itself at the front line."

Surely, the Indian Defence Minister would have been conscious then that in United States security perceptions, China was a threat and that its rapid military modernization had the ultimate aim of challenging the global power balance. So, if there was a convergence of security interests with the United States in particular, this convergence necessarily rests on the "China Threat" and that it was being seconded by India.

Further the Annual Defence Report 2005-2006 of the Indian Government, makes the following points on China:

"China's military modernization with the sustained double digit growth in its defence budget for over a decade as also the development of infrastructure in the India- China border areas continues to be monitored."
"China's defence exchanges and nuclear and missile co-operation between China and Pakistan continued to elicit concern."

If China was not a threat or a potential military threat to India, then why should India monitor China's military activities or express concern on China's assistance to Pakistan in nuclear weapons and missiles.

Contradictory assertions and unwarranted camouflage of India's national security threats, merit a short discourse on "Threat Assessments" and "Threat Analysis", which follows:

Threats to India's National Security: Assessment Process and Components

The assessment process and components that need to be taken into consideration are spelt out in detail in this authors' book: "India's Defence Policies and Strategic Thought: A Comparative Analysis." Possibly, this is the only book published in India which devotes an exclusive and exhaustive chapter on "Threat Assessment" and "Threat Analysis": with a case study of India's shortcomings in India's pre – 1962 threat assessments.

For the purposes of this paper the salient points that need to be repeated from the above are:

"Threat Assessments" have to be a joint and integrated exercise between India's military commanders and India's political leadership.
The "Threat Assessment" has two vital components:

1. The Military Component

2. The Political Component

The "Military Component" assessment is a hard-headed net assessment of the threat faced from an adversary/ political adversary based on military capabilities, force structures, force deployments, reserves, infrastructure, indigenous defence production and strategic forces assets both quantitatively and qualitatively.
The "Political Component" is the most critical and challenging component of the "Threat Assessment". It is to be provided in clear and precise terms by the highest "political leadership" of the country. It pertains to "reading of the intentions" of the nation's adversary.

India's "threat assessments" in the past have gone tragically wrong, whether it was Pakistan or China, because of a "faulty political component" provided by India's political leadership to India's military commanders. India's political leadership has been found wanting in the accurate readings of the "intentions" of India's adversaries.

The "intentions reading" of India's adversaries by India's political leadership cannot be determined by idealistic foreign policy goals, personal political preferences of India's political leaders or pressures of coalition partners.

The "intentions reading" by the political leadership has to be based on a comprehensive review of the adversary's demonstrated strategic behaviour at the global and regional level, its strategic alliances/ partnerships and its record of propensity to use force in conflictual situations. It also has to read the adversary's pattern of behaviour and strategic responses to rising power centres which may rival it.

With such vital strategic issues involved, India's political leaders have to exercise extreme reticence and restraint on "threat assessments" utterances. India's Defence Minister does not seem to have exercised reticence when he asserted that there was no "China Threat" to India.

The demonstrated record of China's strategic moves and political postures against India post – 1962 amply denote that China is a threat to India's national security interests. This stands corroborated by the vivid illustration below:

"China Threat" to India: China's Demonstrated Strategic Record Post – 1962

The year 1962 marked a water-shed in China-India relations. India was rudely woken up strategically from the idealistic stupor that an unsuspecting Nehruvian era leadership had induced in India as a result of the political de-emphasis of the emerging "China Threat" to India.

When once again a "Political de-emphasis" of the "China Threat" is underway, India needs to be reminded of China's demonstrated strategic record against India post – 1962 and in place even today.

China's Grand Strategy incorporates an important ingredient that India has to be kept strategically within South Asian confines and impeded from becoming a regional power or a key global power.
To that end, India needs to be kept strategically de-stabilised by creating 'regional de-stabilisers' in South Asia.
China's strategic nexus with Pakistan (India's arch rival in South Asia) and building up her nuclear weapons and strategic missiles arsenal.
China has signed Mutual Defence Cooperation Agreements with both Pakistan and Bangladesh.
Recent turbulence in Nepal is aimed at bringing about a Maoist regime, with adverse effects for India's security.
China's steps to establish naval bases in Gwadur (Pakistan), Chittagong (Bangladesh) and Akyab & Haingyii (Myanmar) and also for overtures for a base at the Southern tip of Sri Lanka.

Strategically analysed, none of the developments initiated by China can be construed as "India-friendly". They are decidedly anti-Indian in conception and implementation and can be said to be essential ingredients of a "China Threat" to India.

China has even on date not desisted from sizeable arms supplies to Pakistan whose military buildup is India-specific. Recent agreements include:

Four frigates for Pakistan Navy with options on additional four
150 F-17 attack aircraft for Pakistan Air Force
10 J10 fighter aircraft for Pakistan Air force

In terms of China's anti-Indian policy stances and attitudinal indicators, the following need to be cited:

China's hysterical reactions to India's nuclear weapons tests of 1998.
China's veiled criticisms of the US-India strategic partnership.
China's criticism of US-India civil nuclear energy deal
Chinas opposition to Nuclear Suppliers Group making an exception for India on the above deal
China's strong opposition to India's candidature for Permanent Member status of United Nations Security Council.

In all of the above Chinese policy formulations and initiatives run the following under-currents:

China's disregard for India's strategic sensitivities
Reflect China's concerns of considering India as a potential threat. In fact, in PLA strategic studies circles, India has been constantly cited as a threat to China.
China's resentment over India's enlargement of her strategic relationships
China's reservations on emergence of India as a regional power and a key global player.

When does all of the above manifest itself? It manifests itself when two countries are involved in an adversary relationship.

In light of the above the Indian Defence Minister's assertions that there is no "China Threat" to India, is a strategically untenable assertion.

"China Threat": Implications of China's Military Modernisation for India's Security

The "China Threat" has been a real and potent threat to India ever since the military occupation of Tibet in 1950. China exhibited that potency in 1962 along the entire Indian border with Tibet, in 1966/67 in military clashes in Sikkim; and in 1987 in Arunachal Pradesh in confrontation over the Sumdorong incident. Its military occupation of Tibet and massive Chinese military and missiles deployments on this plateau emboldened it to issue coercive military ultimations to India in support of Pakistan at the height of the 1965 and 1971 India-Pakistan Wars.

China today has a sizeable military infrastructure in Tibet supporting over-sized Chinese military deployments and so also India-specific targeted ballistic missiles of long range. So far China's military deployments in Tibet, ranged against India were militarily inhibited in terms of full combat potential due to inadequate modernization of military hardware and limited logistics infrastructure.

The recent military modernization of China's armed forces in Tibet, coupled with the functional railway line linking Lhasa with mainland China, increased traffic capacity of highways and oil pipelines, creates the following military implications for India:

China's military deployments in Tibet, ranged against India, can be doubled at short notice, if required.
Military modernization of China's armed forces raises the combat potential of China's force deployments against India.
China's railway line and other military support logistics infrastructure in Tibet, acts as a "force multiplier" to China's combat potential against India
Unlike the 1962 War, in any future conflict, China can be expected to employ and generate sizeable air operations against India because of improved airfields and logistics support.
Railway line to Lhasa will also facilitate deployment of rail mobile missile – launchers and missiles.

The above military implications for India of China's improved combat potential that it can generate from Tibet against India, cannot be dismissively ignored as can be made out from the Indian Defence Minister's statement.

China's military force deployments in Tibet, its military modernization and the upgradation of military support logistics infrastructure is aimed against India. It is not aimed at Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan or Myanmar. Nor are the Chinese military postures in Tibet of any military use in its confrontation with the United States.

The military modernization of any adversary and especially one that is in a revisionist mode cannot be de-emphasised solely on a pious reading of sanctimonious peace rhetoric.

India with its notoriously slow defence - acquisitions record, lack of political consciousness and active responses to "threats in the making" needs extra vigilance to China's military developments and modernization.

India's China Policy: Engagement YES, De-Emphasis of China Threat NO

India and Indian political leadership and policy planners have a propensity to go overboard at the first mention of the words "peace", "dialogue" and CBMs. Presumably, this happens because even a slightest of such openings releases India's political leaders and policy planners from taking hard strategic decisions and also enables them to mask to the strategically gullible Indian public their own masterly strategic inactivity.

India has paid heavily in the past for her soft approaches to its national security management. After 60 years of independence, the Indian Republic, in the pursuit of her aspirational goals, needs to learn to call a spade, a spade.

It is nobody's case that China should continue to figure as a eternal military adversary and a threat to India's national security interests. But the onus for a de-emphasis of the "China Threat" to India lies on China. The onus certainly does not lie on India or the Indian Defence Minister.

The "China Threat" to India emerged from China's hostile stances and Chinese policy formulations, and not as a result of India's actions. To begin with China to induce trust in India, should discard her monochromatic South Asia strategic policy, namely the strategic de-stabilisation of India via proxy use of Pakistan and Bangladesh. The evidence of change has to be practical, concrete and transparently discernible.

Till that takes place, India's China policy should essentially dwell on the following guidelines:

Engagement in the political, economic and cultural fields
The "China Threat" to India should not be de-emphasised or under-played by India's political leadership. Reticence in this regard would be well-advised and judgments reserved till China gives evidence of change.
India's military planners should not be lulled into complacency by the political rhetoric de-emphasising the "China Threat". The "China Threat" to India is real and so also the "China- Pakistan Strategic Nexus".

In brief, the United States model in dealing with China is a useful guide, namely "Engagement YES, De-emphasis of "China Threat" NO".

Concluding Observations

"Criminal culpability should dwell on the shoulders of the political leadership which is oblivious to developing threats to national security or worse still who attempt to under-emphasise or de-emphasise threats to the country's security for reasons of political consideration or idealist/ pacifist beliefs." This comment stands made in this author's book on the question of vigilance in threat recognition written three years ago.

The Indian Defence Minister's public assertions de-emphasising the "China Threat" while on a visit to the strategically sensitive East Asia region were uncalled for, unwarranted and not strategically untenable. It leaves in its wake serious strategic implications for India's national security interests as follows:

De-emphasis of the "China Threat" at the Defence Ministers level, seriously impacts on India's defence preparedness and defence planning priorities.
By first asserting this in Japan, the Indian Defence Minister sent confusing signals to Japanese policy establishment, which lately has been responding to forge a strategic partnership with India.
United States – India evolving strategic partnership gets impacted as it sends confounding messages to Washington in terms of India's strategic directions.
China seems elated by obtaining a "Certificate of Purity" from the Indian Defence Minister in terms of her strategic intentions.

The Indian Defence Minister by giving a "Certificate of Purity" to China on her strategic intentions, now owes an explanation to the Indian people on the following counts:

Has the present Indian Government reposed "implicit trust" in China's rhetorical intentions?
Have the Indian intelligence machinery and the Indian military come to similar readings on China's intentions and they too now de-emphasise the "China Threat"?
Does the Indian Government have any other special inputs to substantiate the Defence Minister's assertions?

"China Threat" in pure military terms may manifest in the long term perspective, but the "China Threat" to India in strategic terms is "live" and "existent" as manifested by its strategic encirclement of India, its military nexus with Pakistan and Bangladesh, and its political opposition to every Indian initiative to secure its rightful place in the international order. It is engaged in balance of power politics against India in South Asia and contiguous regions. This is a manifestation that China distrusts India's strategic intentions and India has to take notice of it.

History seems to be repeating itself again in terms of a dismissive reading, de-recognition and de-emphasis of the "China Threat" by India's political leadership from the same political dispensation that brought the humiliating debacle of 1962.

(The author is an International Relations and Strategic Affairs analyst. He is the Consultant, Strategic Affairs with South Asia Analysis Group. Email:[email protected])

THE CHINA THREAT: DE-EMPHASIS BY INDIAN DEFENCE MINISTER STRATEGICALLY UNTENABLE
Brig Subash Kapila was my instructor in the DSSC.

China keeps escalating her defence budget annually and claims that it is for peaceful rise and if India buys armament for legitimate defence needs it sends shivers around China and its media goes ballistics!

Under no circumstances China is a nation that believes in peaceful coexistence. She is perpetually furthering her hegemonic dreams and continuously keeps the borders around her 'active' trotting historical imaginations to 'justify' her aims. Totally poppycoc.k is her claims as is being repeatedly proved. Starting with the occupation of Tibet and starting wars as with India and Vietnam, she is pursuing an armed confrontationist approach in the South China Seas, Unfortunately for China, in the SCS, the US has ensured that China slinks back into her shell!

There is no doubt that India should be wary of China and her propensity to befool with pious platitudes and homilies. The US has tried to befriend China and even assisted her in her quest for military and technological prowess. It has boomeranged as the US now realises. China is a double faced chameleon and of that there is no doubt. India should never forget how that silly 'Bandug Spirit' and Panchsheel proved to be India's Waterloo in 1962.

We cannot take another chance. Once bitten, twice shy is a very good adage that one should always remember.

Notwithstanding the Defence Minister's assertions, China continues to be a threat and China's unending militarisation is indeed fraught with danger for India as also for the Asia Pacific Rim nations.

The Indian Govt should quit being Nehru and embrace the world with love to finally be let down. India should be wake up to the reality and take measures to ensure that China does not entrap us once again with false piety and fraudulent mish mash of peace and such insincere claptrap!
 

smanekshaw

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The way we are going, we probably won't even be a match for Phillipines.
Look at the way the rupee depreciated by 20% in 4 months. That pushes up the cost of the Rafael deal by the same amount.

When this shit called DRDO can't even make ammunition for a tank, why are we even competing with China. If they choose to attack, we are screwed.
Let's face facts, we are in deep shit.
 

Ray

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Is China a threat or is it not is the question.
 

arya

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Is China a threat or is it not is the question.
what will you do if you are going in bus and a strong man try to fight with you

either you will fight or you will wait for right time , its better we should wait or right time , we have to increase our numbers and fact is that presnt govt cant do that .

we need a leader like modi to protect our proud .

fight only for win not for loss
 

Ray

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I was actually fishing for a more detailed analysis from those who observe the strategic issues on the forum.
 

satish007

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If they choose to attack, we are screwed.
Let's face facts, we are in deep shit.
China never attack countries have nuke. never will bomb a country in deep shit that will splash these shit to sky and cover all over the world
 
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amoy

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Still not getting over that that silly 'Bandung Spirit' and Panchsheel, and India's Waterloo in 1962?

Good, there's always Nehru Indians can always blame for all the woes. Economically many posters have vomit enough over Nehruvian Socialism. And now Nehru is brought up again for "defence" and "China threat"?? But, hey wait, Nehru was dead probably 40+ years ago. He's not gonna be held accountable for many things that happened since then.

Every cloud has a silver lining. China threat gives justifications to India for more military budget
China today has a sizeable military infrastructure in Tibet supporting over-sized Chinese military deployments and so also India-specific targeted ballistic missiles of long range. So far China's military deployments in Tibet, ranged against India were militarily inhibited in terms of full combat potential due to inadequate modernization of military hardware and limited logistics infrastructure.
But don't blame Nehru again, for not having an economy of the same size as China, even though in 1962 India was far better off in many ways.
 

Ray

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Yes Bandung is always important to remember.

How can anyone forget the treachery?

EVen then, much pious platitue emanated from China.

India thought China was friend.

And then.................................backstab.

Have you forgotten how China reacts when Japanese leaders go and give their homage at the Shinto shrine?

All because the Japanese conquered a large part of China and gave China a hard time?

Look within before you spout the same old Chinese mealy mouthed pious platiude and plebeian homilies!
 
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