China and India: the great game's new players

ajtr

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Laying out the Red carpet


In October 1954, Jawaharlal Nehru paid his first — and, as it turned out, also the last — visit to China after its 1949 revolution. The Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai era was at full blast, but Nehru personally had no illusions on this score, even though he was grievously to misread Chinese intentions in 1962 — and grievously did he pay for it. Briefing a goodwill delegation to China well before his visit, he had told it that India's problems with China lay "across the spine of Asia". However, he was keen on the journey to a country most of the world was excited about.

Sadly, I was too junior then to be included in the press party accompanying the PM but I read every word in every newspaper within reach on the "historic visit." Nothing could have revealed Nehru's own exceptional interest in this journey than that for precisely five days in his whole life — from October 15 to 19 of that year, when he was in China after a stopover in Vietnam — he maintained a diary. He looked upon the sojourn as a continuation of his "discovery of Asia On Nehru's arrival in Peking (as the Chinese capital was called then) nearly a million people turned out to line the 12-mile route from the airport to give him a reception that the Indian press corps accompanying him described as "breathtaking." The correspondent for the London Daily Mail reported that the Chinese had offered Nehru "a Roman triumph."

Nehru's own take on the welcome was that he discerned in it an "element of spontaneity." As he confided to the Congress parliamentary party, "I sensed such a tremendous emotional response from the Chinese people that I was amazed." His overall impression of China was that of a country "smoothly running with enormous potential power which was being translated gradually into actual strength." The country was "large not only in size but also in spirit and character", and the Chinese people, "unified, organised, disciplined, and hardworking exuded a tremendous sense of vitality."

However, greatly impressed by China though he was, he wasn't overawed. To quote his speech to the Congress parliamentary party again, "I am impressed by China. Having said that, let me also tell you that, having been to China, I am very much impressed by my own country." In today's circumstances, it surely looks highly ironic — but, at that time, Nehru also assured his party that India was "unlikely to be outstripped by China economically."

Nehru's extended conversations were with his opposite number, Zhou En-lai, who had earlier stopped over in New Delhi on his way back from the Geneva Conference on Indochina, and had received a very warm welcome. He had also invited Nehru to visit China at an early date.

Now that the record of these conversations, as that of the previous talks, is available — even if very belatedly — thanks to the publication of the Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, it is possible to perceive the pitfalls in the negotiations between the two prime ministers. Zhou was both ingratiating and cunning. Nehru, who found him to be "still very India-conscious" and "as eager as in Delhi to be as friendly as possible," was both cordial and frank. Yet he got taken in, as in Delhi in June, by Zhou's spiel that the Chinese government hadn't had time to "review" the Kuomintang-era maps. Zhou also cleverly added that none of the boundaries of China "including those with the Soviet Union and Mongolia, had been precisely demarcated."

Surprisingly, Zhou took no offence when Nehru drew attention to the "fear of China (and perhaps of India) that prevailed in the minds of the smaller nations of Asia." Nehru added that there was the problem of "overseas Chinese" and the possibility of "interference in the internal affairs of other countries through the medium of local Communist parties." Zhou claimed, whether accurately or otherwise, that he had "repeatedly advised the government of Pakistan to draw away from the United States and improve relations with India."

The high point of the visit, however, was Nehru's long meeting with Mao Tse-tung. As Nehru later recorded, it seemed to him as if he was being "ushered before a Presence," and that Mao talked to him like "an elderly uncle giving good advice." China's Chairman made the usual references to "ancient ties as well as new friendship between India and China," and underscored China's need for at least 20 years of peace for development.

What stunned Nehru was Mao's utter insensitivity about a nuclear war. Atomic weapons, Mao argued, had made "no basic change" in warfare except that more people would be killed. Nehru disagreed strongly. Atomic warfare, he said, was not a matter of a greater quantity of deaths but of a "qualitative change in killing." A third world war would be very different from earlier wars. Mao contended that even if half the population died in a nuclear war, the other half would build socialism, and imperialism would be dead for ever.

Let me end on two notes, one amusing and the other bizarre, in that order. At Nanking Nehru had to place a wreath at a memorial to reach which he had to climb 300 steps. Then 64, he practically ran up, as was his habit. Halfway, while coming down, he saw his doctor huffing and puffing on his way up.

Secondly, it is not just bizarre but also tragic that Nehru wrote the top-secret note on his visit to China on November 11, 1954, yet it never saw the light of day until the 1990s when it was published first in Nehru's Letters to Chief Ministers first and then in the Selected Works. But I read it in 1987 in Britain's Public Records Office. How did it get there? Well, Nehru had sent a copy to Winston Churchill while the latter was still Prime Minister. At the expiry of 30 years Downing Street had duly declassified it. I published a gist of it in my column. Mercifully nobody prosecuted me for violating the Official Secrets Act.

The writer is a Delhi-based political commentator
 

ajtr

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Ominous moves across the Himalayan borders

Wg Cdr N.K. Pant (Retd)

MUCH water has flowed down India's rivers ever since former defence minister George Fernandes declared that the 1998 Pokharan nuclear tests had been aimed at the Peoples Republic of China (PRC). In 2008, Pranab Mukherjee, the external affairs minister, repeated this, calling the security challenge posed by Beijing as an important priority for New Delhi. These were not off-the-cuff remarks by politicians, but a clear comprehension of the impending threat looming large on our northern mountainous borders since 1950 when the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) overran Tibet.

Tibet had racial, cultural and religious characteristics entirely different from China. It was rightfully emerging on the world stage as an independent nation, but PLA's brutal military occupation and human rights abuses altered the course of history. Subsequently, mass migration of Hans to the so-called Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) from the Chinese mainland rendered Tibetans a minority in their own homeland.

The myopic leadership in New Delhi, with exception of then deputy prime minister Sardar V. Patel, at that crucial time failed to see the writing on the wall and went ahead to recognise China's sovereignty over Tibet. This shortsighted approach to China's Tibetan invasion has cost the country dearly in terms of the defence of our Himalayan borders. After strengthening its grip on Tibet and improving road communication till the Indian borders, Beijing invented a thorny boundary dispute with New Delhi, which it is unwilling to resolve. In 1962, Communist China, that lays claim on vast areas in the Himalayas and refuses to recognise Arunachal Pradesh and Sikkim as integral parts of India, launched a humiliating military attack on India.

That China's hostile policy towards India is not going to change, is clear from a recent online poll conducted by a Chinese website, huanqiu.com, which stated 90 per cent participants believed India posed a big threat to China. About 74 per cent said China should not maintain friendly relations with India anymore, while 65 per cent thought India deploying additional troops in Arunachal was damaging bilateral ties.

Recent reported confiscation of tourism brochures by the Chinese police from the Indian pavilion at the Shanghai Expo because these showed Arunachal Pradesh as part of India is perhaps a forewarning of a military blitzkrieg across our Himalayan frontiers. New Delhi must take foolproof countermeasures to avoid a 1962 type fiasco.

Despite rapidly rising trade relations, China has, off and on, been provoking India on military and diplomatic fronts. The year before, there were media reports about increasing incursions by PLA along the borders. China has now reportedly deployed 11,000 regular troops in Gilgit-Baltistan region of Jammu and Kashmir that is under Pakistan's occupation. China is the only country that issues stapled visas to Indian citizens from J&K and Arunachal on the pretext that these territories remain disputed. Last year it raised objections when Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited Arunachal Pradesh. As quoted in the media, Singh now rightly wants the nation to be prepared in view of the new assertiveness among the Chinese, which "is difficult to tell which way it will go".

Beijing's refusal to issue visa to Lt Gen B.S. Jaswal, the Northern Command chief, for a high-level military exchange visit on grounds that he commanded troops in the disputed area of J&K has added salt to the injury, leading New Delhi to cancel defence exchanges with China. Indian officials found China's behaviour particularly provocative because in August 2009, Gen V.K. Singh, currently the Army Chief and then the Eastern Army Commander, had visited China for a similar exchange. If territorial sensitivity was the issue, then Gen Singh's visit should have been even more problematic because, as the Eastern Army Commander, he had jurisdiction over Arunachal Pradesh, which China has provocatively started calling South Tibet.

It now transpires that besides amassing troops along the 1,700-km Indo-Tibet border, China has menacingly deployed nuclear-tipped missiles aimed at the Indian mainland. Last year when India decided to bolster defences in Arunachal, Global Times, China's English language mouthpiece, in an editorial termed it "dangerous if it is based on a false anticipation that China will cave in". It also commented India's current course can only lead to rivalry between the two countries and cautioned that India "needs to consider whether or not it can afford the consequences of a potential confrontation with China". The bottom line, unambiguously, was India should not have any illusions as China would neither make any compromise in border disputes nor would sacrifice its sovereignty in exchange for friendship.

Should India not revisit its policy on the Tibetan issue in view of China's continued aggressive intransigence? Sometimes in the middle ages, China may have had "suzerainty" over Tibet, but the territory has always functioned as a free nation till Mao's army annexed it in 1950. In fact, the region, in cultural, trade and religious spheres, was much closer to India than to China. Some imperial dynasties ruling Chinese mainland in the distant past had association with Tibet that can be loosely compared to the British monarch's connections with some Commonwealth countries like Canada and Australia. However, present-day Britain never laid territorial claims on these sovereign nations that had once been its colonies. New Delhi, besides bolstering defences on the Indo-Tibet border, must strive to create a strong international opinion for creating a genuinely autonomous Shangri-La where indigenous Tibetans can preserve their vanishing cultural and religious identity.
 

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That China's hostile policy towards India is not going to change, is clear from a recent online poll conducted by a Chinese website, huanqiu.com, which stated 90 per cent participants believed India posed a big threat to China. About 74 per cent said China should not maintain friendly relations with India anymore, while 65 per cent thought India deploying additional troops in Arunachal was damaging bilateral ties.
Exactly how reliable is this "poll"?

Most likely it is just a bunch of CCP goons. Time Magazine reported that 47% of Chinese had an "unfavorable" view of India, thought I'm not sure how reliable that is either. China's population is very large and it is difficult to get a true representation of their views, especially under the constant vigilance of the CCP.
 

ajtr

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India's China Syndrome


The first major test of the Indian armed forces came in 1962 when India was involved in a border conflict with China. In 1914, an Englishman, Sir Arthur Haney McMahon tried to define the border between India and Tibet (China) on the highest watershed principle. The effort was only partially successful, as the central Chinese government of that time did not ratify the agreement. In the late 1950s, the border dispute between India and China (who had incorporated Tibet) started simmering. Some border posts were set up by the Chinese; India considered it as incursions in Indian territory.

Around October 1962, Jawaharlal Nehru gave a public statement that he had asked the armed forces to get the offensive posts vacated. In the event, it appears that China took the initiative. Before the Indians could act, the Chinese attacked over the Eastern border. Skirmishes also occurred in the Western (Ladakh) region, where the Indian troops gave an extremely good account of themselves.
But in the East, the Indian army, for some inexplicable reason, failed to offer any credible resistance. There were unconfirmed reports of battalions and even perhaps a brigade, giving up their positions (hard facts are difficult to come by). The Chinese forces advanced with extra-ordinary ease. It was not the defeat, but the manner of defeat which was most humiliating. Matters were made worst by the Chinese declaring a unilateral ceasefire on 21 November 1962; the Chinese withdrew to their original positions.

The Indian nation was staggered beyond belief; no one had imagined that such a situation could develop. The great visionary Nehru himself was forced to declare that they had been living in a dream world of their own making. Nehru could not survive the shock, suffered a stroke and died in 1964.

After the great debacle, the market was awash with books mostly written by (defeated) generals and Intelligence top brass, whose failures in the first instance had resulted in the disastrous situation. Their first (in fact only) priority was to blame everyone else, except themselves. There was a liberal use of words like 'if' and 'but'. Over the centuries, Indian (read Hindu) commanders never learnt the basic lesson that 'victory' speaks for itself and does not have to rely on 'ifs' and 'buts'.

Every type and manner of imaginary and untenable excuses were trotted out for the defeat and the humiliation, e.g.:

— Lack of Intelligence

— Lack of acclimatization

— Shortage of equipment; proper (winter) clothing and boots were stressed

—Inadequacy of all types and manner of resources

The (trusting) Indian public was led to believe that the troops could not fight due to inadequacy of equipment; till date (2009), most Indians believe that that was the case. That it was not so is proven by the fact that the Indian troops fought well on the Western front, where the winter was much more severe.

At this stage, it would be relevant to record some views of Napoleon Bonaparte, the great French general. Napoleon was made a major-general at the age of 26, and given command of some 40,000 French troops, one of the most ill-equipped army of those days. Napoleon was asked to conquer Northern Italy, which France had been trying to occupy unsuccessfully, for a century or so. There were some two hundred thousand Italian and Austrian troops in Northern Italy at that time. Napoleon addressed his troops with words somewhat on the following lines — 'I know you have neither food nor clothing, nor boots; but, we are going to win in any case'. (These are not his exact words, but only convey the sense.) Napoleon went on to conquer Northern Italy with that army. The moral of the story is that generals may fight many times with adequate equipment; but sometimes they may have to do that with inadequate equipment. That is the nature of war, which must be won under all circumstances.

The actual reasons for the 1962 debacle were:

Failure of higher direction and control at Army HQs and Ministry of Defense
Almost total failure of generalship at the field level
Failure of the troops to do what they are trained and expected to do, i.e. 'stand up and fight'.
The writer is aware that he would be criticized and pilloried for writing the last factor above, which would be projected as a reflection on our gallant soldiers and an effort to break their morale. The writer, however, believes that there must come a time in the history of nations when they must stand up and face 'cold and hard' facts, howsoever unpleasant these may be; that requires courage. The remedial actions can start only after such an acceptance of reality.

Understandably, following the debacle, there was turmoil in India; some generals, including the Chief of the Army Staff, were eased out. The Minister of Defense was asked to go. But care was taken not to touch any bureaucrat at the Ministry of Defense. An inquiry was undertaken; but its report was kept under wraps. Soon everything was forgotten and things fell into the earlier easy groove.

The 1962 fiasco was a failure of fundamental and basic nature. It should have called in question everything connected with the armed forces. There was a requirement for a change in the very mindset of the armed forces and its controlling establishment. Wholesale changes of management structure, procedures and training patterns were called for. That is easier said than done; so, we are where we always were, i.e. nowhere. It would be a monumental error to think that we learnt any lesson from the 1962 debacle.

India's China Syndrome
Caveat: India and China are neighbors, both aspiring to become global powers. The two can go on their aspirational route without having to step on each other's toes. Nothing that is stated below may be taken to infer that the conflict between the two is unavoidable, or likely.

Presently, India suffers from the China syndrome. In TV debates on China, one sees a galaxy of retired diplomats and generals, and other busy-bodies; they are undoubtedly a set of most prescient men of India. What happens in TV studios is series of tired monologues symptomatic of a nation without any iron in its soul. The primary emphasis is to project China as some sort of a super military power. All sort of dooms-day scenarios are painted for India. That is just a manifestation of the Indian (read Hindu) 'defeatist mindset', in this case linked to the 1962 defeat.

The root of the 1962 debacle lay in the failure of the Indian army to put up a fight against the Chinese in the Eastern sector. As that was too shameful to be publicly admitted, a propaganda war was unleashed to project China as a vastly superior military machine, against which we could not have succeeded, even if we had tried. Attributes were assigned to the Chinese army, which it did not posses. The following types of deceptively disguised statements were let out:

Chinese came in wave after wave — what could we possibly do?
Chinese had vastly superior armaments.
Their Generals out-foxed ours.
We were shivering with cold.
The media, always hungry for news, picked up the theme and started playing it around, with a degree of vehemence. At the same time, (defeated) generals came out with a series of books, plugging the same line, i.e. projecting the Chinese army as a 'super human' one. The Government refused to give the authentic version. Even after about half a century, the official Henderson Brooks Inquiry report is under wraps.

The bitter truth is that the above types of statements were substantially untrue; in fact, most were patently false. There is no evidence to support the oft-repeated theory that the Chinese came in waves. It is highly unlikely that the Chinese had an overwhelming numerical superiority. For all we know, overall numbers might have been even in our favor; at least should have been. We were fighting in our own backyard.

However, the general public had no option but to believe the make-believe stories told to them by the media and the books penned by the generals. The result was that over time, the concept of the (perceived) superiority of the Chinese army got lodged in our subconscious. It was in keeping with that mindset that Admiral Sureesh Mehta, serving Chief of the Naval Staff, and Chairman of the 'Chiefs of Staff Committee' made a statement on 10 August 2009. He went on to publicly proclaim that India was no match for China and the gap was so wide that it was unbridgeable. What an admirable self-goal to be achieved by the Admiral?

Now, there is nothing new or novel about our investing our adversaries and tormentors, with super human attributes. We have been doing that from the days of the Ghaznis and Ghauris, Baburs and Abdalis. The sad and bitter truth is that we were always defeated in our conflicts with invading armies. Our response was to project those upstarts as masters of 'vastly superior military machines', against which we could not have succeeded. We had the following types of thought processes, even if we might not have made formal statements to that effect:

Oh, Ghazni was a great Sultan; he was even a greater general; we stood no chance against him.
Prithviraj had let Ghauri go after capturing him (as per our version). Ghauri did not reciprocate that act of kindness. How mean of him!
Abdali was ruthless, and always winning. What could we have done?
Clive was a civilian clerk. He had no business to turn himself into a great general, and start defeating Indian generals.
The refrain of our argument throughout history has been somewhat on the following lines:

'Defeat was really not our fault; they (our tormentors) were just too powerful.'

Bharat is suffering from a besieged psyche and psychology of victimhood. We are happy to project ourselves as victims. Let us explain by an example. In July–August 2009, the Indian Prime Minister issued a joint statement with his Pakistani counterpart. The statement contained a line that the Pakistan Prime Minister said that they had some threat perception in Balochistan, a border province of theirs. There was no reference, not even a remote one, that that threat was from India.


But all hell broke loose in India. The main Opposition Party, the BJP, walked out of Parliament, and went to complain to the President. Their contention was that Pakistan was trying to imply that that threat could be from the Indian Intelligence Agency R&AW, and that any such suggestion was preposterous. India can never do such a thing; we are a paragon of morality, and satya (truth). In any case, we are ahmisic (non-violent), and worshippers of shanti (peace). So, how can anybody dare imply to the contrary? We are the quiescent type; we cannot be active. We have never been the doers; only things have been done to us. We can only be victims; we are not used to any other role. That was the pith of their protestation and argument.

With that type of mindset, we are projecting China as a sort of super power. No doubt, China is a formidable military machine; but, so are we. Bharat is a humongous country, and is no push over. Being an ex Air Force man, the author would like to record his opinion that our three major weapon systems in Mirages, Mig 29, and Su 31 are the most formidable. In fact, awesome may be a more appropriate word, keeping in view our capability for mid-air refueling. These are amongst the best weapon systems in the world; and so are the men manning these machines. It is possible (but not necessary) that we need some additional numbers. The numbers will get looked after in due course; that aspect need not be over emphasized. The author also ventures to say that the Indian army is also generally well equipped; their T 90 tanks are among the best in the world, and so are the Bofor guns. Upgradation of weapon systems is a continuous process; we do not have to emphasize that in an out-of-the-way fashion, and project that as our weakness.

Let us have a look around. China has some 15 countries around its periphery. With the exception of Russia, all those countries are small; in fact, some are tiny. If those countries were to go by the Indian example, they would have no reason even to exist. Their faces would be forever bereft of a smile; but, we know that that is not the case. Those countries are living with honor and dignity. We have the example of the tiny Vietnam standing up to the formidable Chinese army.

Nothing stated above should be taken to mean that we ignore or sleep over external threats to our security. Rather, those threats should be the main focus of our national attention, which presently, these are not. But for that, we do not have to beat our chest in public over our perceived weaknesses, especially at the official (including highest Defence) levels. India is a big country, it must learn to think and act big. The Indian Armed Forces are capable of taking on any world class military machine, provided we can get our mental act together; some 90% of our problems is in our mind.1 It may be relevant to quote an Urdu couplet here:

Khud hi ko ker buland itna Raise yourself to a level,
Ki her taqdir se pehle Above all others;
Khuda bande se khud puchhe So, God himself will ask
Bta teri raza kya hai Tell me, what do you wish to be?
Note:
1. Of course, problems of the mind are almost impossible to tackle.
 

ajtr

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The Chinese are coming!




By Lt Gen JFR Jacob

The Dragon has emerged from its lair with a vengeance.

A senior Indian army officer was denied an official Chinese visa on the grounds that he was commanding in Jammu and Kashmir, a disputed territory according to the Chinese.

The Chinese occupy considerable amount of territory in Ladakh, which they captured in 1962. They are now slowly making inroads into the Indus Valley and other areas. In 1963, Pakistan had illegally ceded some 5,000 square km (2000 sq miles) in the area of the Karakoram to China.

Pakistan is now reported to have handed over control of the major part of the northern territories to China. Media reports indicate that there are some 10,000 Chinese soldiers based in Gilgit on the pretext of protecting the widening work on the Karakoram Highway and the construction of a railway line to link east Tibet with the Pakistani port of Gwadar in the Gulf of Oman.

The Russians in the 19th and 20th centuries dreamt of a getting warm water port on the Arabian Sea. The Chinese seem well on the way to fulfilling this Russian dream.

In a Further Move to Encircle India by Sea, the Chinese are Establishing Naval and Air Bases on Myanmar's Ramree Island in the Bay of Bengal. (Incidentally, I took part in the amphibious assault on Ramree Island during World War II). These Bases on Ramree Island will help the Chinese in their Endeavors to Control the Upper Bay of Bengal and Pose a Threat to Kolkata, Vishakapatnam and the Andamans.

The presence of Chinese troops in Gilgit is a matter of great concern. During the Kargil conflict, the five battalions of the intruding paramilitary Northern Rifles were maintained from Gilgit and thence from Skardu. There is a good road from Gilgit to Skardu. In pre-Partition days, road communications to Gilgit were along the Kargil-Skardu-Gilgit route. This section can easily be restored in a short period of time.

The reported presence of Chinese troops in Gilgit poses a serious threat to Indian road communications to Ladakh running through Kargil.

Another matter of concern is the increased Chinese interest in the Indus Valley. The easiest approach to Leh is along this valley. The Chinese have not only shown interest in the Indus Valley but also the Karakoram Pass between India and China.

Any Chinese move through the Karakoram Pass will threaten our troops in Siachen and our base at Thoise. In the contingency of any future conflict with the Chinese, new areas of conflict in Ladakh will open up. I served in Ladakh for two years immediately after the Chinese invasion of 1962, and it also fell under my purview subsequently as Chief of Staff and Army Commander covering the northeast. During this period there were many incursions and incidents.

Keeping these factors in mind, there is an urgent requirement for another division and supporting armour to be raised for the defence of Ladakh and two more for the north east.


In the northeast, the Chinese may, after negotiations, reduce their claims from the whole of Arunachal to the Tawang tract and Walong.

Major Bob Kathing and his Assam Rifles platoon only moved to take control of Tawang in the spring of 1951. The Chinese had placed a pillar in Walong in the 1870s. They have built up the road, rail and air infrastructure in Tibet. It is assessed that the Chinese can now induct some 30 divisions there in a matter of weeks.

We are committed to ensure the defence of Bhutan. We need at least two divisions plus for the defence of Bhutan. In West Bhutan, the Chinese have moved upto the Torsa Nulla. From there it is not far to Siliguri via Jaldakha. This remains the most serious potential threat to the Siliguri corridor.

The Chinese have developed the infrastructure in Tibet to enable them to mount operations all along the border. We are still in the process of upgrading our infrastructure in the north east. It will take many more years before the infrastructure in the north east is upgraded to what is required. Thus we need to raise two more divisions and an armoured brigade for the north east.

There is an urgent requirement for more artillery, firepower and mobility. More helicopters are also needed to ensure mobility.Mobility is a key factor in military operations. Mobility is necessary to obtain flexibility as also the ability to react in fluid operations. In order to ensure the means to react, we need reserves. These reserves have yet to be created.

The Air Force needs to deploy more squadrons in that region, since, unlike 1962, the Air Force will play a decisive role in any future operations.


The Chinese are also said to be re-establishing their earlier links with the Naga insurgents.


In 1974/75, I was in charge of operations that intercepted two Naga gangs going to China to collect weapons and money. The Nagas were then compelled to sign the Shillong Accord, and Chinese support for the Naga insurgents was put on the backburner. Twelve years of peace followed. But now, the Chinese, in collusion with the Pakistani ISI, are said to be in the process of re-activating their support of the Naga insurgents as part of an overall scheme to destabilize the north east.

The increasing military collaboration between China and Pakistan is of growing concern, but we seem woefully unprepared for this contingency.

The government urgently needs to expedite the induction of land, air and naval weapons systems and to build up the required reserves of ammunition and spares. In any future conflict, logistics will be of paramount importance.


During the 1971 war, it took me some six months to build up the infrastructure for the operations in East Pakistan. The requirements now are far, far greater. Modern weapons systems take a long time to induct and absorb. The induction of new weapons systems and build up of logistical backing should be initiated on an emergency footing.

At the moment, we seem to have insufficient resources to meet this contingency.

We are critically short of modern weapons systems and weaponry. No new 155mm guns have been inducted for some two decades.

During the limited Kargil conflict, we ran out of 155mm ammunition for the Bofors field guns.
Fortunately for us, the Israelis flew out the required ammunition

New aircraft for our Air Force are yet to be inducted. The navy is short of vital weapons systems. These shortages need to be addressed at the earliest.

There is no Soviet Union with its Treaty of Friendship to help us now [in 1971, the Soviets moved 40 divisions to the Xinjiang and seven to the Manchurian borders to deter the Chinese]. We have to rely on our own resources. We must show that we have the will and wherewithal to meet the emerging contingencies.


It is High Time the Government Reappraises the Emerging Situation and puts in place the Measures Required to Meet the Developments, Before it is Too Late.
 

ajtr

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Actions count, not words

Apropos China, India is repeating Nehru's blunder of angry rhetoric sans total military preparedness, says N.V.Subramanian

15 October 2010: A state is taken seriously when it talks less and acts more. At one time or the other, all the great powers have been taken seriously on this account. It is indeed this quality, of acting rather than indulging in rhetoric, that has or did make them great powers. India, unfortunately, does not fall in this category, not at least in the decades after Indira Gandhi.
For example, it is not without significance that today, both the foreign minister, S.M.Krishna, and the army chief, General V.K.Singh, have made critical comments about China. Krishna has said that China ought to respect India's core concerns about Jammu and Kashmir. The foreign minister ruled out resuming defence exchanges with China until it accepted Indian concerns about J and K and Arunachal Pradesh.
On the other hand, General Singh called China an irritant alongwith Pakistan. He said he did not expect a conventional war with China but hinted at the possibility of skirmishes. "Even though we have a stable border with China," he remarked, "we cannot take chances." Krishna meanwhile added that China's new "assertiveness" would figure in the Manmohan Singh-Barack Obama talks next month in Delhi.
It is obvious that the Chinese have not changed their stance either in respect of stapled visas for Kashmiris or Lieutenant-General B.S.Jaswal's cancelled trip to China since the two issues hit the headlines months and weeks ago. Krishna says that the Chinese must return to their previous "neutral" stand on J and K, which is a trifle difficult to comprehend considering that China possesses vast parts of the state either captured in the 1962 war or ceded by Pakistan. But even to take Krishna's peroration at face value, it is clear that the Chinese "neutrality" he expects on Kashmir is not coming.
Why that is so has been explained in earlier commentaries in this magazine, and they have to do with China's energy-security concerns, the US decline, and the coming American withdrawal from Afghanistan. But more to the point, the refusal of China to return to its so-called earlier "neutrality" on J and K suggests that India has failed at persuading/ pressuring it. Rather than accept that failure, investigate why, and make amends, what we get is more talk. Nehru's rhetoric without military backing left India shocked and shamed in 1962. Are we headed towards another terrible repetition of history?
This writer would like to hope it is not so, but his confidence level is thin. Taking into account a host of factors, it is hard not to reach the conclusion that India is not adequately prepared to face China. While the army chief may entirely be right to exclude the possibility of a conventional war with China, that is his thinking about China's thinking, which may be equally wrong or right. India has to be prepared to win any manner of Chinese attack, and this writer is not sure that this is currently possible.
Leaving aside the military dimensions of all this, it should be apparent to any independent analyst that if China was convinced of India's intent and capability to meet and overcome its challenge, then it would have been by now building peace bridges with this country. That China certainly is not doing. Rather, its belligerence is daily growing, and India is combating it with rhetoric. This stinks of 1962.
This writer purposely is skipping military details, but it is irresponsible to raise the rhetorical heat against China unless India fully is prepared for the hostile consequences on land and at sea. If this rhetoric is aimed at the US president's November visit, it cannot get more reckless. Because Obama will not play India's game against China and do only that which suits American interests, and those dictate a careful balancing act vis-a-vis the Middle Kingdom.
This writer's chief worry is that Obama will show limited understanding of India's problems with China forcing Delhi to tone down the anti-Chinese rhetoric once he returns home. That will worsen relations with China, because China correctly will evaluate India as having little political will squarely to confront it. Where the dynamics of that will lead to is anybody's guess.
The aim of this piece is not to demoralize and dishearten India but to remind of the seriousness with which great powers like China have to be dealt with. India's present behaviour smacks of immaturity which cannot continue once it enters the United Nations Security Council even as a non-permanent member.
Everything that India says must carefully be weighed and backed with the capacity for action. Only when this condition is satisfied will its words carry the force of threat. Currently, as said before, this condition does not appear to be satisfied. This is grave, and it should immediately and intimately engage the government.
N.V.Subramanian is Editor, www.NewsInsight.net, and writes internationally on strategic affairs. He has authored two novels, University of Love (Writers Workshop, Calcutta) and Courtesan of Storms (Har-Anand, Delhi). Email: [email protected]
 

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India and China's great game in full swing




India stepped up its diplomatic and military moves to counter China in 2010 as the "China Threat Theory" gained ground in Indian leading circles.

Defense Minister A. K. Antony told army commanders on September 13 that "China's increasing assertiveness" is a "serious threat." Prime Minister Manmohan Singh recently urged the armed forces to strengthen India's border with a "sense of urgency".

Lack of contact between armed forces

Indian officials are alarmed by the modernization of China's armed forces. In addition to the Defense Minister's warnings of Chinese "aggression", India's defense chiefs of staff recently qualified China as a "long-term threat" comparable to Pakistan.

But the fear of China reflects a lack of understanding of the PLA's strategic intentions. One of the reasons is that contact between the armed forces of the two countries remains limited.

At present, the military attaché of the Indian Embassy in Beijing is the only way for India to keep in contact with the Chinese military. The Indian political system accords little decision-making power to the Defense Ministry and communication between the two militaries is limited to specific issues like military exercises and avoiding border conflict.

India's east-facing diplomacy

India is stepping up its diplomatic act in East Asia in an effort to counterbalance China's strategic power. The "Look East" Policy initiated by former Indian Prime Minister Narasimha Rao has evolved into a more solid military partnership with its Asian partners.

In the past three months, Indian military officials have visited Vietnam, Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand and Singapore. In July, Indian Army Chief V. K. Singh visited Vietnam, the first visit by an Indian military leader for nearly 10 years. In mid-October, Defense Minister A. K. Antony visited Vietnam to attend an ASEAN meeting. Over the past 10 years, India has helped Vietnam strengthen its sea and air military capabilities supposedly in order to prevent China from fully "controlling the South China Sea."

In September, Antony became the first Indian Defense Minister to visit South Korea. Compared to the, perhaps understandable, India-Vietnam defense cooperation, the developing India-South Korea partnership seems more explicitly aimed at counterbalancing China.

India is also actively strengthening defense cooperation with Japan. On September 28, Air Force Chief P. V. Naik participated in the first military dialogue between India and Japan. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh is scheduled to visit Japan in late October.

An Indian fleet will shortly complete a one-month trip in the Pacific Ocean, during which it will have visited Australia, Indonesia, Singapore and Vietnam.

India's military and political leaders see their counterbalancing measures and support for China's neighbors as a long-term strategy.

India boosting its military power

In the next 10 years, India plans to spend US$35 billion on naval equipment. One Indian navy official defined India's economic and strategic interests as stretching from the edge of the Persian Gulf to the Indian Ocean. With the Chinese military modernizing its missile and sea-based capabilities, India is building its own strategic stocks rapidly. "India's defense spending is pegged at less than 2 percent of the country's gross domestic product. This is grossly inadequate for the huge threats and challenges that confront India. The People's Liberation Army of China is modernizing rapidly and will soon become a first-rate 21st century force. This situation is not conducive to strategic stability," said Gurmeet Kanwal, retired Army brigadier and director of the Centre for Land Warfare Studies.

In recent years, India's military purchases from Russia have focused on fighter aircraft and helicopters. Moscow has always been the number one supplier of military aircraft to New Delhi. Indian Air Force Chief P. V. Naik has confirmed that India has bought 80 Mi-17 helicopters, to be delivered later this year, and that the purchase of another 59 is under way. These 139 helicopters will cost US$700 million.

The Indian Defense Ministry has confirmed an additional order of 42 Su-30MKI fighter jets, bringing India's fleet of Su-30 aircraft up to 272, and costing US$13.6 billion. The Indian Air Force plans to upgrade its Mig-29 fighter group and IL-76 transport planes. Starting in 2012, India plans to spend US$2.5 billion upgrading its Su-30 fleet. On October 6, India announced plans to buy 300 fifth-generation stealth fighters jointly developed with Russia, in a contract worth around US$30 billion.

In response to what it sees as a Chinese missile threat, India is trying to buy a missile defense system. Defense News disclosed on September 6 that according to US's China Military Report, the PLA plans to station "Dongfeng-21" medium-range ballistic missiles on the Tibetan Plateau, prompting India submitted its biggest ever order of US$3 billion to the international military market. America's "Patriot -3", Israel's "Iron Dome" and "David's sling" are the preferred options for the India Defense Ministry.

The current geopolitical reality in Asia is that: under the overarching umbrella of American power, China, Japan and India are growing more rapidly than ever before. At present, Sino-Japanese and Sino-US relations remain tense, while the game between India and China is in full swing.
 

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the biggest unhappyniess for India is that CHina never looks on India as its rival while India insist that China be India's rival.
 

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the biggest unhappyniess for India is that CHina never looks on India as its rival while India insist that China be India's rival.
NightWatch

For the Night of 22 October 2010

US-China-India: President Obama will visit India between 6 and 9 November. The forthcoming trip has generated significant unease in China about US strategy in Asia.

Since Thursday, a half dozen or more Chinese newspapers and strategists have complained about the US relationship with India. A National Defense University official wrote, "India's goals of becoming a global power cannot be realized by just following the US. This writer accused the US of "building a strategic fence" with Japan and South Korea as the backbone and a carapace of India, Vietnam and other nations having territorial disputes with China.

This official wrote, "India's politicians should be aware that as the two weaker sides of a triangular relationship, it is very important for India and China to maintain stability to prevent the US from profiting from their disputes"¦.The US fence around China is weak but could become an iron wall if China makes strategic mistakes."

Earlier, a Chinese air force colonel wrote about a crescent ring encircling China from Japan to Afghanistan. A professor at Beijing University's School of International Studies said, "If you look around Asia and see what the US is doing, it is not surprising and difficult to understand America's needs in South Asia."

A Fudan University analyst wrote in the China Daily that India and China are made for each other but must guard against western elements. "Some Indian media raised a hue and cry over so-called 'border invasion' by China last year and the recent suspension of bilateral military exchanges,'' said the commentary."Some Western countries and media are trying to use this to drive a wedge between the two neighbors."

Comment: These two ancient cultures have had no significant interaction until modern times. But for colonial era land disputes, they are not natural enemies. However, their aspirations for world power stature have converted them into at least strategic competitors, sometime rivals and potential enemies.

China's rise to great power stature impedes India's dominance in South Asia. China has developed proxies or allies on every Indian border, which undercuts the credibility of its complaints about encirclement
. China has spurred India to look to its strategic space in South Asia and to increase security cooperation with East Asia powers with which it has never had significant interaction "¦ before the rise of China.

It is curious that Chinese international affairs commentators evince so much insecurity, for a country that considers itself the equal in many areas of the United States and has become so aggressive in asserting its right to be the leader of Asia.
:happy_2:
 

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the biggest unhappyniess for India is that CHina never looks on India as its rival while India insist that China be India's rival.
China not seeing india as its rival. :emot15: They why hell CCP Army is moving the Flankers to the india border.

Oh.. so sorry that china cant be india's rival, you people have lot to deal in the east border :emot180:
I wont disturb your wet dreams. Enjoy buddy.
 

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1962 Redux?


All wars commence in the mind, and escalate with words. "Zhang Nan" or "Southern Tibet", the designation bestowed by the People's Republic of China on India's state of Arunachal Pradesh bordering Tibet, is one such example. China now claims Arunachal Pradesh as its historic territory comprising the three southern districts of the Tawang Tract unilaterally acquired by the then British Empire after the Treaty of Simla in 1913. New demands, which were first articulated around 2005, initially concerned Tawang as a traditional tributary region of Lhasa, being the birthplace of the Sixth Dalai Lama (Tsangyang Gyatso, enthroned 1697, probably murdered 1706 by Mongol guards who were escorting him to Beijing under arrest). Subsequently, a day prior to the visit of China's President Hu Jintao to India in 2006, Sun Yuxi, the then Chinese ambassador to India, stridently reiterated in public China's claims to the entire state of Arunachal Pradesh in a deliberately provocative gesture designed to put New Delhi on notice of Beijing's intention to dominate the agenda of interaction according to its own priorities. In a longer-term perspective, these needlessly provocative claims could escalate to a flash point with the potential to provoke a major confrontation between the two countries, and create an existential crisis for the entire region, a contingency for which India has to prepare itself adequately.
Indian reaction has been characteristically muted, constantly choosing to soft pedal and play down the issue — a unilateral gesture of restraint regardless of the degree of blatant provocation, which exasperated many in this country. It is seen as making a virtue out of necessity, because India has neglected to build up the requisite capabilities to adopt stronger alternatives. This is surely an unenviable position for a country seeking to promote itself as a major power for a permanent seat on the Security Council.
The present Sino-Indian equation is almost irresistibly reminiscent of the run-up to the Sino-Indian border war of 1962, and provides a fascinating playback of China's postures at that time with its disconcertingly similar sequence of claims along the McMahon Line in North East Frontier Agency (Nefa), as well as along the Uttar Pradesh-Tibet border and in Ladakh, as relics of historic injustices perpetrated in earlier days by British imperialists. A naive and militarily ill-prepared India, with an exaggerated self image of its own international relevance as a leader of the Non-Aligned Movement, had sought to dissuade a determined China with platitudinous Nehruvian philosophies of anti-colonial solidarity, all of which were contemptuously disposed of by "a whiff of grapeshot" on the desolate slopes of the Namkha Chu and Rezang La. India's collapse and comprehensive downsizing in short order in 1962 was primarily because it lacked military capability vis-a-vis China, a fatal flaw which has a disconcerting tendency of repeating itself when lessons of earlier debacles wear off from the country, as they seem to be doing now. "1962 redux" is slowly grinding into gear again, with end results unforeseeable, except that an enhanced replay at some stage (2020?) can never be totally discounted. India must not repeat its follies of the past because this time around it has been adequately forewarned.
In starkly contrasting national attitudes, the People's Republic of China has never swerved from its "sacred duty" to recover and reunify what it perceives as its lost territories, notably Tibet and Taiwan. China's other such claims pertain to areas along the Sino-Soviet and Sino-Indian borders, besides smaller island entities in the South and East China Seas, to which has now been added the complete territory of India's Arunachal Pradesh under its new Chinese appellation.
India has to evaluate the threat potential of the situation dispassionately but realistically, having reference to China's demonstrated determination to set its own history in order. Tibet was successfully concluded in 1950 when the People's Liberation Army marched into the country against a feeble and disjointed resistance, and re-established China's authority. Taiwan has been an infructuous effort so far only because of the massive support and protection of the United States, which has guaranteed the independence of that country with the presence of its Seventh Fleet.
If similar Chinese pressures develop regarding Arunachal Pradesh, and cannot be resolved through diplomacy and mediation (again as in 1962), India will be left with starkly limited options — either capitulation to China, or military defence of its territory.
In the latter contingency, even a speculative overview would suggest that for India a full fledged Sino-India war would likely be a "two-and-a-half front", with Pakistan and China combining in tandem, and an additional internal half front against affiliated terrorist networks already emplaced and functional within the country. For India it would be a combination of 1962, together with all of India's wars against Pakistan (1947-65, '71 and '99), upgraded to future dimensions and extending over land, aerial, maritime space and cyberspace domains. Nuclear exchange at some stage, strategic, tactical or both, would remain a distinct possibility, admittedly a worst case, but one which cannot be ignored. The magnitude of losses in terms of human, material and economic costs to all participants can only be speculated upon at present.
China is obviously very much ahead of India in military capabilities, a comparative differential which will be further skewed with Pakistan's resources coming into play. India has to develop its own matching capabilities in short order, especially the ability to reach out and inflict severe punitive damage to the heartlands of its adversaries, howsoever distant. There would be national, regional and international repercussions that would severely affect the direct participants as also close bystanders like Nepal, Bangladesh and Bhutan, if not countries further afield as well.
Any future Sino-Indian conflict is a doomsday scenario, straight out of Dr Strangelove, a zero-sum calculus that must not be allowed to occur. China must restrain itself regarding its alleged claims to India's Arunachal Pradesh. History has moved on — attempts to reverse it are futile.
Gen. Shankar Roychowdhury is a former Chief of Army Staff and a former Member of Parliament
 

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China Plays to Win the 21st Century's Great Game

By M.D. Nalapat

Among the reasons why NATO is losing ground to the People's Republic of China (PRC) in the global geopolitical race is the belief in the permanence of tradition and precedent in world affairs. It is hard to understand that such beliefs still have adherents when it is clear that today paradigm shifts are accelerating and even core conditions are altered beyond recognition within a decade. The PRC is itself an example of such a trend, having morphed several times since its founding in 1949. To understand present day realities in that country and adjust policy, analysts and scholars sometimes need to remove from their memory concepts and information that were valid during earlier stages of the PRC's evolution.

Each decade since 1949 has seen changes in the form and spread of economic progress and societal evolution in China. The first was the consolidation of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) power over the country. The next (1959-1969) was the establishment of Mao Zedong's personal dictatorship over the Party. The third (1969-1979) was reflected in the leadership's efforts at fashioning a strategy for ensuring China's global success - even through an alliance with the United States. The fourth period (1979-1989) saw a reversal of the economic stagnation of the previous three decades. If the fifth period (1989-1999) was exemplified by experimentation with western culture and possible alliances, the sixth (1999-present) saw the growth of a Han nationalism that had as its core objective the restoration of China's historically long-held status as the most developed nation in the world. This sixth period witnessed both the deepening of self-reliance in technology as well as a geopolitical push to wrest primacy from the United States first in Asia and Africa, then in South America and finally in Europe.

Afghanistan, Once Again the Setting for the Great Game

As the PRC has emerged as a serious challenger to American global pre-eminence, it is not surprising that one of the arenas of confrontation is Afghanistan. If this rivalry has not engendered much attention then the reason lies in the fact that the PRC usually goes about the fulfillment of its objectives in as "silent" a way as possible. This is in stark contrast to the United States, which usually advertises its engagements and confrontations in some part to increase the perception of U.S. global primacy.

Those who suffer from the handicap of remembering Kipling believe that the present Afghan situation resembles his "Great Game" that was played out between the British and Russian empires. Current events in Afghanistan are indeed following a well-worn path, but one that resembles less the 19th Century than it does the 20th, specifically the 1980s.

In this age of accelerating change (including in societal mindsets), history seldom gets repeated beyond a 20-year cycle, which in the first half of the current century will shrink further to about ten years. What is taking place in Afghanistan is indeed a repeat of the history that took place when the United States and Saudi Arabia used the Pakistani army to wage an unconventional war against the Soviet Union. Today, the PRC seeks to use that very same military force - the only one to have jihad as its official motto - to carry out the humiliation of what some would term an exhausted super power, the United States.

The new Great Game is being scripted almost entirely by a single PRC entity, the People's Liberation Army (PLA), which has today become a near autonomous player within the PRC governance structure. This represents a considerable change from the past. Both Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping kept the PLA on a tight leash, the former making it an accomplice of his depredations on those elements in the CCP core that he regarded as enemies, and the latter succeeded in pushing the PRC out of sight.

Once Jiang Zemin took control of the Chinese Communist Party in the 1990s, however, he began to indulge the PLA, a process that has yet to be checked by his successor. Part of the reason could be that Jiang's own actions established appear to have established a precedent whereby the CCP General Secretary extends his period in formal authority and policy relevance past the mandated retirement age by continuing on as Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC). Jiang served 20 months as CMC Chairman after handing over the party baton to Hu Jintao in 2002.

PLA Taking Foreign Policy Lead

Given his Asia-oriented geopolitical vision and desire to ensure that the CCP respond to grassroots sentiment rather than rely on the coercive powers of the state security apparatus, Hu is also likely to seek to continue as CMC chief even after stepping down as CCP chief in 2012. Because of this, he, like Jiang Zemin before him, has adopted as conciliatory a line towards the PLA and, in the process, has allowed it to fashion policy in several crucial areas, including toward India, Pakistan and Afghanistan. Of great consequence, the policies adopted by the CCP toward each of these countries reflect the perceptions and narrow needs of the PLA rather than that of the broader state or nation.

Over the past 15 years, strong control of the CCP has eroded, one consequence being that displays of muscle have taken place that have gone counter to Deng Xiaoping's philosophy of "speaking softly" even while carrying a big stick. Examples include the display of military temper across the Taiwan Strait in the 1990s, the present standoff with India over the status of Kashmir and tensions with Southeast Asian countries about the extent of their claim on territorial waters in the China Seas.

In the formulation of strategic and foreign policy, the PLA has become an autonomous player within the CCP pantheon and no longer appears to be limited by the State Council. Because of this situation, General Secretary Hu Jintao's vision of a close alliance between the PRC and India has broken down as well as the policy that India and Pakistan would be treated in parallel, rather than pursuing a policy favoring one over the other.

PLA Quashes India Relations in Favor of Pakistan

The PLA, however, has its own priorities and views the Pakistani army as its closest ally in Asia after the militaries of North Korea and Myanmar. Hence, it has ensured that China's policy toward India be reduced in a manner similar to that adopted by Nixon and Kissinger toward Taiwan in the early 1970s.

While U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates publicly fantasizes about the loyalty and reliability of the Pakistani army, the reality is that, since the 2001 Afghanistan War and the 2003 occupation of Iraq, more and more members of Pakistan's officer corps have turned hostile to the United States, a sentiment not hidden at regimental dinner tables. The reason why such a shift in opinion is significant can be found in the fact that since the period of Zia ul-Haq's command, those succeeding him as Pakistani Chief of Army Staff are dependent on the support of the key Corps Commanders to retain authority over the overall military.

In Turn, Pakistani Military Favors China over U.S.

The assumption held in many Western capitals, that if the top echelon of the Pakistani military are favorably disposed toward NATO the rest will follow, is flawed on two counts. First, the top echelon in the Pakistani army wishes NATO forces to withdraw from Afghanistan and favor the return of Taliban rule there. Second, the majority of Pakistan's generals are opposed to the fulfillment of NATO's goals in their neighboring country and, moreover, prefer China to the United States as Pakistan's closest ally.

Of the top 20 generals in Pakistan, only two prefer the United States to China, while six are loyal to the China and the rest neutral. As a group, the Corps Commanders view Beijing as a far more natural partner for them to have than Washington and, consequently, respond to signals from there rather than from the Pentagon. Even if Pakistani Chief of the Army Staff General P.A. Kayani had wanted to advance the NATO agenda in Afghanistan (as improbable as that is) he would be unable to do so given the need to have the Corps Commanders on his side in the perpetual effort to ensure the primacy of the Pakistani military over the civilian establishment.

Although the Indian strategic community regards the world's most populous democracy as being the target of the PLA's expansion of its capabilities within the Indian Ocean Rim, the reality is that India plays a subsidiary role in the calculus of the Chinese military. The PLA sees U.S. armed forces as its rival and responds to India only to the extent that it perceives Delhi to be a fellow traveler of the United States.

Pakistani Military Inaction Furthers China's Interests

It is hardly a secret that the PLA would like the U.S. military to withdraw from Asia and what better way of hurrying this along than by ensuring that NATO is defeated in Afghanistan, the way the USSR military was? Given this, what better means of achieving this objective than the Pakistani army which has perfected the science of professing compliance with U.S. requests while doing very little to carry them out in practice. Indeed, Pakistani military elements often prosecute U.S. requests to the opposite intended effect thereby sabotaging U.S. objectives and interests. Such actions, of course, are nearly exclusively carried out by "retired" or "on leave" personnel preserving the Pakistani military leadership's plausible deniability for their subordinates actions. Both the Pakistani army as well as their PLA ally believe that a American victory in Afghanistan would entrench U.S. forces in that country while a defeat would send them packing leaving that country as low-hanging fruit for Islamabad and Beijing to dominate.

Small wonder, therefore, that the many "operations against the Taliban" that are being conducted by the Pakistani army seem to be having zero success in checking the progress of the Taliban and its tribal allies. This lack of success is startling because, unlike in 1994-1995, today the Taliban is feared and loathed by the overwhelming majority of Pashtuns. That the PLA is even willing to make a foe of India by riling Delhi over Kashmir, including the denial of visas to Indian army commanders who were invited to visit China by the PLA and stationing thousands of uniformed personnel in the Pakistan-controlled part of Kashmir ostensibly to "build roads."

The prize of this 21st century version of the Great Game is nothing less than China's replacement of the United States as the pre-eminent military power in Asia the way the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan in 1988 signaled the eclipse of Moscow by Washington throughout the globe.
 

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Indian Ocean becomes battleground for India and China

BY: csmonitor.com

Let's play connect the dots. After the US midterm elections, President Obama will visit India, Indonesia, South Korea, and Japan. Trace a line between the nations, noting how it loops down through the Indian Ocean and back up through the South China Sea and East China Sea, forming a semicircle around China.

The route underscores the importance of these nations and bodies of water as the United States seeks to check the growing assertiveness of China, says Robert Kaplan, author of newly published "Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power."

"It's not a war I'm predicting, but what I am alluding toward is a very complex, Metternichian arrangement of power from the Horn of Africa all the way up through the Sea of Japan," Mr. Kaplan told a small crowd Monday at the Harvard Book Store in Cambridge. "We don't have to interfere everywhere, we just have to move closer to our democratic allies in the region so they can do more of the heavy lifting."

Opinion: Will US naval power sink?

China's ongoing dispute in the East China Sea over islands claimed by Japan is the most recent example of Beijing's growing assertiveness on water. South Korea and Indonesia – the other stopovers for Mr. Obama next month – are also wary of China's wide-reaching maritime claims. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, for her part, seems to be filling in the gap between these countries with her upcoming visits to Cambodia, Vietnam, Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, Australia, and New Zealand.

Rise of India and China

A correspondent for the Atlantic and member of the Defense Policy Board federal advisory committee, Kaplan says he is convinced that the West should focus on the role that emerging superpowers China and India will play as they battle for dominance in the Indian Ocean, an area rich in resources and vital to shipping.

"In this post-Iraq, post-Afghanistan world "¦ we're seeing the rise of India and China," he says. "Think of China trying to move south toward the Indian Ocean and India moving west and east. Where they intersect will be lines of rivalry through the 21st century."

China now has fighter jets stationed in Tibet that can reach Indian airspace. The Indian Navy now has a presence in the South China Sea. And in the Indian Ocean, both powers are racing to establish their presence.

China is building major port projects in Pakistan, Bangladesh, Burma (Myanmar), and Sri Lanka, while also providing significant military and economic aid to those countries. Chinese warships paid their first visit in August to Burma, the Monitor's Ben Arnoldy recently reported, warning that the Indian Ocean could become a more serious flashpoint for India and China's overlapping ambitions.

"China wants a presence. India is unnerved by all of this," says Kaplan.

China takes to the seas

The United States, too, will need to play this game of "soft power" in the region. "We've gotten used to this Burger King, cold war-style base," Kaplan told a smiling audience. Into the future, the US military is likely to offer aid for nations to maintain military bases in exchange for access. "In other words, more of a subtle relationship."

Like the United States, which beefed up its navy and increased its maritime activities after consolidating its land borders, so too is China expanding on the oceans now that it has nearly completed drawing its land border from Tibet to Taiwan.

"China is able to build a great navy precisely because its land borders are secure," says Kaplan. By contrast, he says India is still attempting to control its borders with Pakistan (at Kashmir), Nepal, and Bangladesh, which sucks resources away from its navy.

No longer America's playground

This highlights how India is still far behind China. China paves more miles of road per year than India already has. Its economy and military are both much larger than India's. Even the recent Commonwealth Games in Delhi, fraught with delays and troubles, served to highlight China's display of might in pulling off the 2008 Beijing Olympics.

Regardless of when or if India catches up to China, this much is now clear for the Washington, says Kaplan: "The Indian Ocean and Pacific are no longer American lakes."




http://idrw.org/?p=1039
 

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One can calculate what would be the cost of having a flotilla in the Indian Ocean for the Chinese.

One could also calculate the cost of China ever reaching the number of ships that the US has.

The answer would be crystal clear!
 

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Subsequently, a day prior to the visit of China's President Hu Jintao to India in 2006, Sun Yuxi, the then Chinese ambassador to India, stridently reiterated in public China's claims to the entire state of Arunachal Pradesh in a deliberately provocative gesture designed to put New Delhi on notice of Beijing's intention to dominate the agenda of interaction according to its own priorities.
Then the GOI should have told China, "Who is Hu?"

And Pranab Mukherjee should have said, "China".

In Bengali, it mean 'don't want'!

To be frank, China is quite immaterial for us to be bothered about. Economically and militarily we can hold our own.

China cannot put India on notice.

The GOI must stop pus*sy footing and it is time to seek strategic alliances on equal footing to send a message to China, no more dadagiri.

Even though Chinese good are dirt cheap and can help Indian economy, pride is more important than cheap Chinese goods and most of them don't work or pack up after a few years!

It is time for India to send warships around to countries in SE Asia, Australia and Japan and show its flag!

It is time to play the Chinese strategic game of 'Go'!

What is Go?

Here it is:
Go or weiqi

The object of the game is to control (surround) a larger portion of the board than the opponent.
 
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President Obama is not the darling of the US media or the US South filled with rednecks and evangelists for obvious reasons. Therefore, it is not usual if the US media does not show its gung ho patriotism as it does for Southern cowboy clones and rednecks who surface as their Presidents.

Notwithstanding Obama's attitude of wanting to tone down US gung ho psyche and appearing moderate, he seems to be going overboard and losing friends faster than gaining anything worthwhile! This mismatch is what is gnawing at the US ego of being the last word in everything happening in the world!

Obama or otherwise, the US strategic interests remain the same, be it the Republicans in power of the Democrats or white Presidents or Black President. It is just that the rhetoric is different. Hence, China remains a focal point of foreign and defence perspective.

Emasculating by encircling China is the US policy and with China's power projection in the neighbourhood turning ugly and negative and worrisome to those affected, it is the ideal time to play 'US, the Saviour' and to be frank, US is the only country that can put China in its place, much to the comfort of those who are threatened by China's aggressive power projection and hegemonic aspirations. The scenario is ideal to strike while the iron is hot and to miss this opportunity would be to the US' peril! Therefore, it is correct of Obama to visit all the peripheral states around China, assure them and if possible, strike strategic deals!

Let no one be smug that the US wants India to be a superpower or such semantics. Yes, they will massage the ego, but they are also aware that a unfettered India can be difficult (given her independent attitude and not always toeing the line) if not dangerous. Thus, they have adopted a very fine balance by aligning with Pakistan and yet making cooing noise to placate India!!

The Indian Ocean is a vital international sea route. The US will not abdicate its supremacy in this area. They were contesting USSR here in the Cold War days and even got a lease of Diego Gracia from the British and ensured that the locals are removed from the island into oblivion elsewhere! This should indicate the strategic value of Diego to the US where they violated human rights in a gross and inhuman manner!

China may have airbases in Tibet and pose a threat. However, what must be remembered, is that Tibet is high altitude and so the payload carried by Chinese aircraft will be substantially low compared to the Indians.
The contention that the Indian Navy has a presence in the South China Seas is an overestimation. It might be mentioned that whether a few Chinese ships visit Myanmar or a few IN ships visit Singapore, it does not mean that these Navies have acquired the strength for power projection. These are merely cosmetic and a placebo, at best!

For China to be able to build a navy that is capable of power projection, it will take a huge sum of money as also there has to be adequate number of ship building capabilities to keep pace to desires. Does China have the money and infrastructure?

The Indian Ocean will continue to remain the US's Lake for sometime to come.

Kaplan is merely stoking fears so that the US Navy can get the defence budget that it wants and to ensure that the cuts that are being contemplated are not too drastic!

Robert Kaplan, a prolific and influential writer for The Atlantic Monthly, joined the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) as a Senior Fellow in March 2008, after serving as the Class of 1960 Distinguished Visiting Professor in National Security at the United States Naval Academy.


CNAS is the only organization of its kind led by veterans of the current wars.

Therefore, there is good reasons to ensure that the Armed Forces strength and high profile remains paramount, even if it means tweaking the international strategic environment within plausible parameters!
 
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SHASH2K2

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Visa row between India, China ahead of Singh-Jiabao meet


A visa row has reportedly surfaced between India and China on the eve of a meeting in Hanoi, Vietnam, between Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh and his Chinese counterpart Wen Jiabao. The meeting is scheduled to take place later in the week. India and China have been engaged in a war of words over
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* Kashmiris bend visa norms to enter china
* China sticks to stapled visas for J&K

the staple visa issue relating to residents from the state of Jammu and Kashmir.

China has again reiterated that its policy on issuing stapled visas for residents of Kashmir remains consistent and unchanged.

Chinese foreign office spokesman Ma Zhaoxu said on Tuesday: "As for the Indian Kashmir visa, our policy is consistent and has stayed unchanged."

He was replying to questions on whether the issue would come up for discussions at the meeting between Singh and Jiabao.

Reacting strongly to the Chinese position, sources said: "India's position has been well articulated, it has been conveyed to China that Jammu and Kashmir is an integral part of India. There should be a uniform practice to issue visas irrespective of domicile and ethnicity".

Meanwhile, there are concerns in India over China's growing assertiveness and a hardened stand on Jammu and Kashmir. India has suspended high-level defence cooperation with China over the visa row.

It may be recalled that Beijing had refused to issue a regular visa to Lt General BS Jaswal, the General Officer Commanding in Chief of the Indian Army's Northern command, on grounds that he was overseeing operations in Kashmir, which Beijing, like Pakistan, views as a territory under dispute.

India has also protested against the presence of Chinese companies involved in infrastructure projects in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.

On Monday, Indian Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao said New Delhi wants to see the peaceful rise of China and engage with it in a peaceful manner.

Last week, External Affairs Minister SM Krishna said China "should be sensitive to India's core concerns".

Dr Singh and Premier Wen Jiabao will be meeting in Hanoi on October 29 on the sidelines of the Fifth East Asia Summit.

Special Representatives of both countries - Shiv Shankar Menon and Dai Bingguo -are also expected to meet soon.
 

ajtr

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China's Rise, India's Challenge
Sino-Indian Relations

27 October 2010


Indo-Sino naval rivalry grows, Above: Chinese destroyer "Harbin"
The dramatic rise of two Asian giants set against the backdrop of a troubled diplomatic history has propelled India and China into a trajectory that will likely prove difficult to navigate in the coming years.
By Harsh V Pant for ISN Insights
With the world riveted by Chinese aggression against Japan and Southeast Asian states in recent months, one country was not surprised: India. After all, New Delhi has been grappling with the challenge of China's rapid rise for some time. Bilateral ties between China and India nosedived so dramatically last year that Indian strategists were even predicting 'the year of the Chinese attack on India'; it was suggested that China would attack India by 2012 primarily to divert attention from its growing domestic troubles. This suggestion received widespread coverage in the Indian media, which was more interested in sensationalizing the issue than interrogating the claims.
Meanwhile, the official Chinese media picked up the story and gave it another spin. It argued that while a Chinese attack on India is highly unlikely, a conflict between the two neighbors could occur in one scenario: an aggressive Indian policy toward China about their border dispute, forcing China to take military action. The Chinese media went on to speculate that the 'China will attack India' line might just be a pretext for India to deploy more troops to the border areas.
A growing unease
This curious exchange reflects an uneasiness that exists between the two Asian giants as they continue their ascent in the global inter-state hierarchy. Even as they sign loftily worded documents year after year, the distrust between the two is actually growing at an alarming rate. True, economic cooperation and bilateral political, as well as socio-cultural exchanges are at an all time high; China is India's largest trading partner. Yet this cooperation has done little to assuage each country's concerns about the other's intentions. The two sides are locked in a classic security dilemma, where any action taken by one is immediately interpreted by the other as a threat to its interests.
At the global level, the rhetoric is all about cooperation, and indeed the two sides have worked together on climate change, global trade negotiations and demanding a restructuring of global financial institutions in view of the global economy's shifting center of gravity. At the bilateral level, however, mounting tensions reached an impasse last year, when China took its territorial dispute with India all the way to the Asian Development Bank. There China blocked India's application for a loan that included money for development projects in the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, which China continues to claim as part of its own territory. Also, the suggestion by the Chinese to the US Pacific fleet commander last year that the Indian Ocean should be recognized as a Chinese sphere of influence has raised hackles in New Delhi. China's lack of support for the US-India civilian nuclear energy cooperation pact, which it tried to block at the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), and its pro-Pakistan position on anti-India terrorist groups operating on Pakistani soil, including the orchestrators of the November 2008 Mumbai attacks, have further strained ties.
Sino-Indian frictions are growing, and the potential for conflict remains high. Alarm is rising in India because of frequent and strident Chinese claims about the Line of Actual Control in Arunachal Pradesh and Sikkim, where Indians have complained of a dramatic rise in Chinese intrusions into Indian territory over the last few years, most along the border in Arunachal Pradesh, which China refers to as "Southern Tibet". China has recently upped the ante on the border issue. It has been regularly protesting against the Indian prime minister's visit to Arunachal Pradesh, asserting its claims over the territory. What has caught most observers of Sino-Indian ties by surprise, however, is the vehemence with which Beijing has contested recent Indian administrative and political actions in the state, even denying visas to Indian citizens of Arunachal Pradesh.
The recent rounds of boundary negotiations have been a disappointing failure, with a growing perception in India that China is less willing to adhere to earlier political understandings about how to address the boundary dispute. Even the rhetoric has degenerated to such an extent that a Chinese analyst connected to China's Ministry of National Defense claimed in an article last year that China could "dismember the so-called 'Indian Union' with one little move" into as many as 30 states.
Pakistan, of course, has always been a crucial foreign policy asset for China, but with India's rise and US-India rapprochement, its role in China's grand strategy is bound to grow even further. Not surprisingly, recent revelations about China's shift away from a three-decades' old cautious approach on Jammu and Kashmir, its increasing military presence in Pakistan, planned infrastructure linking Xinjiang and Gwadar, issuing stapled visas to residents of Jammu and Kashmir and supplying nuclear reactors to Pakistan, all confirm a new intensity behind China's old strategy of using Pakistan to secure its interests in the region.
India's formidable challenge
While it has not yet achieved the economic and political profile that China enjoys regionally and globally, India is increasingly bracketed with China as a rising or emerging power - or even a global superpower. Indian elites who have been obsessed with Pakistan for more than 60 years suddenly have found a new object of fascination. India's main security concern now is not the increasingly decrepit state of Pakistan but an ever more assertive China, a shift that is widely viewed inside India as one that can facilitate better strategic planning.
India's defeat at Chinese hands in 1962 shaped the Indian elite's perceptions of China, and they are unlikely to alter them anytime soon. China is thus viewed by India as a growing, aggressive nationalistic power whose ambitions are likely to reshape the contours of the regional and global balance of power with deleterious consequences for Indian interests. Indian policymakers, however, continue to believe that Beijing is not a short-term threat to India but needs to be watched over the long-term. However, Indian defense officials are increasingly warning in rather blunt terms about the disparity between the two Asian powers. The Indian naval chief has warned that India neither has "the capability nor the intention to match China force for force" in military terms, while the former Indian air chief has suggested that China posed more of a threat to India than Pakistan.
China's recent hardening toward India could well be a function of its own internal vulnerabilities, but that is hardly a consolation to Indian policymakers who have to respond to an Indian public that increasingly wants the country to assert itself in the region and beyond. India is rather belatedly gearing up to respond with its own diplomatic and military overtures, setting the stage for a Sino-Indian strategic rivalry. Both India and China have a vested interest in stabilizing their relationship by seeking out issues on which their interests converge, but pursuing mutually desirable interests does not inevitably produce satisfactory solutions to strategic problems. A troubled history coupled with the structural uncertainties engendered by their simultaneous rise is propelling the two Asian giants into a trajectory that they might find rather difficult to navigate in the coming years. Sino-Indian ties have entered turbulent times, and they are likely to remain there for the foreseeable future.
 

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Beijing debates why India looking eastwards

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's tour of Japan, Malaysia and Vietnam has set the Chinese debating whether India intends to counter China with new eastern allies. "Japan and India have placed high expectations upon each other in combining strengths to counterbalance China," wrote a People's Daily online columnist on Wednesday, under a headline asking if 'India's look east policy means look to encircle China?' Commentaries on the People's Daily website, the Communist Party mouthpiece, are considered an indicator of the official line.The latest piece, ahead of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's meeting with Premier Wen Jiabao in Hanoi, implied that India must consider Chinese concerns while forging new ties in the region. "The savvy Indian leadership will never rashly board the ship of Japan without giving a glance at China's expression," it said, emphasising that China, not Japan, is India's largest trade partner."Any attempt by New Delhi to build strategic links to East Asian nations will be decried by Beijing," said research fellow Dean Cheng at the Heritage Foundation in Washington. "The point is not so much whether India (or any nation) is trying to encircle Beijing, but whether Beijing believes that's the case. This article typifies thinking in some quarters that this is precisely what's going on."


A Chinese analyst in Shanghai cautioned against 'over-interpreting' India's look east policy. "On the surface, India's look east policy is not strategic. It's to tap the opportunity to strengthen the nation's competitiveness and build India," Shen Dingli, executive dean of the Institute of International Relations at Fudan University, said.
"Look east does not mean fight east," said Shen. "Look east mostly means engage east."
The Chinese foreign ministry has emphasised friendly relations with India and avoided reacting to Singh's talks with his Japanese counterpart Naoto Kan in Tokyo, where both leaders discussed the rise of China. The People's Daily commentary is the first detailed view from the state media on Singh's Tokyo stopover, at a time of Sino-Japanese tensions over political disputes.The commentary suggested that India skip the 'out-of-tune' policy, 'no matter what a strong temptation it is at the idea of benefiting from China and Japan playing off each other or killing the rival by another's hand'.



http://www.hindustantimes.com/Beijing-debates-why-India-looking-eastwards/Article1-618696.aspx
 

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