Can China’s
anti-ship ballistic missile really hit an American aircraft carrier zigzagging at 30 knots in the Taiwan Strait? That remains unclear as there is no record of China successfully testing its growing suite of “carrier killer” missiles on a moving target at sea.
This uncertainty leaves the door open to the possibility that Beijing’s ASBM hype is merely a Sun Tzu ruse to prod America into spending countless billions on new weapons to defend against a chimera.
In reality, there are four basic ways to neutralize China’s ASBM threat, and these “four corners” of an American ASBM defense are not mutually exclusive.
Strategy #1: Interceptor Missiles
The US and its allies have been rapidly moving ahead in the development of interceptor missiles. Some poster children for the interceptor missile response are growing up in the
“Standard Missile” series being fathered by Raytheon.
For example, the SM-3 is geared towards “mid-course defense” – hitting an ASBM early in its trajectory at longer distances and higher altitudes and possibly even in space. In contrast, the
SM-6 Dual specializes more in “terminal defense” should an ASBM break through the SM-3 perimeter – and it is equally potent against incoming cruise missiles.
Strategy #2: Outranging China’s Carrier Killer
In a
seminal report published by the Center for a New American Security in October of 2015, Dr. Jerry Hendrix documented the deadly decline in the range of American aircraft carrier strike groups since the end of World War II. The problem here is not with the carriers themselves but rather with their air wings, which now feature shorter-range fighters.
To see the
historical problem framed by Hendrix, consider that the average unrefueled combat range of an American carrier has shrunk from over 1,200 nautical miles in 1958 and over 900 nautical miles in 1986 to less than 500 nautical miles today. In contrast, the range of China’s DF21-D antiship ballistic missile is between 800 and 1,000 nautical miles.
The obvious strategy here to save aircraft carriers as a viable fighting platform is to focus once again on range. To Hendrix, one way to work this problem is to develop “a new long-range, deep strike asset in line with the
A-3 Skywarrior and A-6 Intruder of the past that could take off from a carrier, fly more than 1,500 nm, penetrate a dense anti-air network of sensors and missiles, deliver multiple weapons on target, and then return to the carrier.”
In Hendrix’s vision, the most logical means to do this is through “an unmanned platform” along the lines of the
X-47B that was cancelled in 2006. The plane
remains on life support as a test vehicle that has successfully completed carrier landings, but it is literally “waiting in the wings.”
Strategy #3: Destroy China ASBMs On Their Launch Pads
This option immediately brings to mind the contentious
AirSea Battle vs. Offshore Control debate that has raged for years over whether it is prudent to strike the Chinese mainland should China launch an attack on American carriers or forward bases. Suffice it to say that any strike on the Chinese mainland would invite possible strikes on the American homeland, possibly nuclear strikes.
Strategy #4: Force Restructuring
The most common form of the
force restructuring argument goes like this: “If China’s ASBMs can sink our carriers, we should rely more on submarines.”
http://www.realcleardefense.com/art...issiles_vs_americas_four_corners_defense.html