Arjun Main Battle Tank (MBT)

[Sridhar]

Can be this one

found here

http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/row/3arjun98.pdf

and here

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/india/arjun-pics.htm

 

[ppgj]

it is obvious and understandable the minister Sri. Rao Inderjit Singh, cannot equivocally say to the parliament army's sabotage bids in trials. however, worth noting -

Even as Army chief General Deepak Kapoor left for the Arjun-manufacturing heavy vehicles factory at Avadi on Thursday, minister of state for defence production Rao Inderjit Singh said the "possibility of sabotage" of the recent winter trials of the tanks "should be examined".

The minister said though the German engines in the tanks had been used for over 15 years, "it should be examined how they broke down during the winter trials."

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/...-in-Arjun-tank-trials/articleshow/2980896.cms

 

[ppgj]

one more of army's tantrums...

Armed forces prefer Russian armour

Ajai Shukla / New Delhi April 19, 2008

The battle lines have been drawn. At stake is the future of one of India's most prestigious defence products: the Arjun Main Battle Tank (MBT).

In its 29th report, which was tabled in Parliament earlier this week, Parliament's Standing Committee on Defence writes that it is "startled" to be told that the tank had performed poorly in winter trials, and that it was miles away from meeting the army's requirements.

Business Standard has come to know from three different members of the Standing Committee on Defence that it is more than "startled" — it is frankly disbelieving of the army's deposition.

In its last annual report for 2007-08, the committee was told by the ministry that the Arjun tank was “a product unique in its class", an improved system over the T-72, Rs 6-8 crore cheaper than its contemporary system in the West, far superior (in firing accuracy) to the other two tanks (T-72 and T-90), driven for over 60,000 km and fired more than 8,000 rounds and “there was no problem."

After the army representative slammed the Arjun, the Standing Committee chairman, Balasaheb Vikhe Patil, as well as the defence secretary and several other members agreed that the committee would formulate a clear policy on India's tank of the future.

Underlying this decision is the belief amongst most members of the Standing Committee that the army is biased against the Arjun tank and is in favour of continuing to use the Russian T-72 and T-90 tanks. There were clear factual inaccuracies in the army's deposition before the Standing Committee. The most glaring of them is the army's suggestion that it is carrying out trials on the Arjun's performance.

In fact, the army has already accepted the Arjun for introduction into service, based upon its driving and firing performance over the years. After firing trials in summer 2006, the trial report (written by the army) said: "The accuracy and consistency of the Arjun has been proved beyond doubt."

The ongoing trials in Pokhran that the army is citing are Accelerated Usage cum Reliability Trials (AUCRT). In these, two Arjun tanks were run almost non-stop for 3,000 kilometres, not to judge performance, but to evaluate the tank's requirement of spare parts, fuel and lubricants during its entire service life.

In fact, it is the Arjun's developer, the Central Vehicle R&D Laboratory (CVRDE), Avadi, that has long demanded comparative trials, where the performance of five Arjuns would be gauged against five Russian T-90s and T-72s. The army has consistently sidestepped that invitation.

The army has also testified incorrectly to the Standing Committee about four engine failures during the recent AUCRT. In fact, sources closely associated with the trials say, the problems were with four gearboxes manufactured by German company Renk AG. A world leader in transmission systems, Renk representatives are already in Pokhran and Avadi, analysing and resolving the problem.

The army does not mention, but problems were also experienced with four hydro-pneumatic suspension units (HSUs) which leaked after the Arjuns had run 2,000 kilometres.

But the Arjun's makers say 2,000 kilometres is the service life of the suspension; normally they would have been replaced before the point at which they leaked.

Officers closely associated with the Arjun, as well as several members of the Standing Committee on Defence, contrast the army's approach to the Arjun with the navy's acceptance of indigenous projects.

They say the navy has achieved striking success in building its own warships, by associating itself with the project right from the design stage; warships are accepted into service and many hiccups overcome during their service lives. In contrast, the army is resisting accepting the Arjun until every last hiccup is resolved by the DRDO.

An application to interview the army's Director General of Mechanised Forces (DGMF) was approved by the MoD eight months ago. However, the DGMF has not granted an interview so far because of "scheduling problems."

http://www.business-standard.com/india/storypage.php?autono=320574

 

[Vinod2070]

Unbelievable! The army wants to kill the indigenous industry and capability so that it can continue getting the kickbacks!

 

[nitesh]

http://frontierindia.net/passion-of-the-arjun-tank[/quote]

For those who don’t know, I have titled the headline based on “The Passion of the Christ,” which is a religious film produced in 2004. It is based on the New Testament accounts of the arrest, trial, torture, crucifixion, and resurrection of Jesus Christ, events commonly known as The Passion. Before some hackles are raised, I am not trying to compare the Arjun Tank with the bible story.

One more point, I would like to emphasize that, I am not against the Russian T-90 Tank. This is for my friends who have repeatedly pointed out to “the fact” that I am anti T-90. Most of the times, I have put up the other side of the fence, whenever there has been attempt to malign the Arjun Tank. Many a times, I have been informed that Frontier India Strategic and Defence” has the most comprehensive collection of data, facts and stories. While I always took it as an compliment, some indicated that it proves I am anti T-90. I absolutely have no arguments for them.

For starters, whoever is working overtime on the anti-Arjun Tank campaign has been responsible for demonization of T-90 in Indian service. There are some points to be considered. The anti Arjun Tank camp is normally Indians. If there are Russians behind it, then I would say, these Russians are doing their job and doing the best for their country. Russia has great generals who make these tanks and great statesmen who would like India to posses these toys for its defence. On the other side, we have Indian generals. They could or could not be thinking about their own country. Let me give them a benefit of doubt and say that, they indeed want the best for their country. But, having said that, even with their best of intention for the country, we have a very “vision” challenged generals when compared to the Russian, American, Israeli generals who make their own stuff and fight.

I have seen the arguments that DRDO has not made tanks up to their standards hence they import. At the same time, we have seen the development histories of tanks in the world. Majority of the tanks have been adopted by their armies when these tanks were not up to their mark. subsequently, they have evolved their tanks to a state that, Indian generals drool at them. Infact, Our generals wanted an Israeli company to evaluate and tell if Arjun Tank was good or bad. Then they wanted DRDO to improve the tank as per the recommendation of the Israeli company. Is army incapable of making a qualitative requirement for itself and the evaluate it themselves?

The habit of changing the qualitative requirements to suit imports was the brain child of General Gopal Gurunath Bewoor. While he was the Deputy Chief of Army Staff (1967 – 1973), he earned a dubious distinction of changing a qualitative requirement, which led to purchase and license production of SS11B1 and the death of the Indian Anti Tank Missile program. Who can argue that General Gopal Gurunath Bewoor was not a good Army Chief? Was there any foreign lobby involved?

I must admit that Indian Army has an history of using Indian equipment. Most of them were shoddy quality from the Indian public sector units and defence production units (DPSU). DRDO was in infancy then. So was Indian Navy. I am not trying to pitch Indian Army vs Indian Navy. Let me give you another example. The Indian Air force, wanted a replacement for the MiG-21’s. The light combat aircraft, though has not achieved the newly formed “air staff requirement,” the IAF is willing to take a specified number of LCA’s. Why? Because they think that LCA, even in its current form is better than the MiG-21’s in service. Indian Army had a similar chance back in 1980’s when they scuttled the induction of Arjun Tank, in favour of T-72 tanks. Look at Akash Missiles induction into IAF and recent orders.

Armed Forces Chiefs can make or break history. IAF chief’s have been not very dynamic in this respect. I am not implying that they were not competent in other departments. It took former Air Chief Marshal Fali Homi Major to push the much needed change in Indian Air Force mentality. In the Indian Army, General Shankar Roychowdhury was the only general who made a difference. Rest of the Army chiefs were not in his grade in this respect. There is an argument that Indian Army is the user and not an R&D or production unit. An argument which is flawed.

The mismanagement and frequent attacks on the Arjun Tank project by the Army has attracted worldwide attention. The Arjun Tank project detractors were largely responsible for the popularity of the project. I would like to give you an example. When the media is invited to any of the armed forces events, they expect media not to ask ugly questions, eat refreshments and then print their press releases. But media seeks sensation. Press releases don’t sell. Now look who is bad mouthing Arjun Tank project? It is the anonymous Army officers and some retired army officers. They succeed in feeding sensational news about constant failures of the project. Then media somersaulted. When it was pointed out to media that there was a likely sabotage of Arjun Tank trials, they realised that it was a bigger sensation than the regular failure news. It was a matter of DRDO establishing its Public Interface Directorate that the anti Arjun Tank camp faltered. Under strict media and political glare, Arjun Tank showed up its mettle. Nay sayers could not manipulate the results. Also, I hope Indian Army personnel should read a bit on internet. I had already written what Indian Army would cook up during the AUCRT trials. It came as no surprise when Indian Army reported in parliament that Arjun Tanks failed.

Hypothetically, If Russians are very concerned about the image of T-90, then they should be sacking their Indian agents (bothe official and unofficial ones). T-90 tank purchase was a knee jerk reaction to T-80 sale by Ukraine to the pesky neighbor. The Arjun Tank detractors probably bunked their class during studies. Probably that can explain their lack of knowledge of the phrase ” people living in glass houses don’t throw stones at others.” The T-90 tanks came with their set of inefficiencies which were greater than the Arjun tanks advertised deficiencies. There is another aspect to T-90 purchase. Indian Army gives the linage argument. T-90 is logical successor to T-72, an argument which Russian army does not buy. Russians want Black Eagle, a fifth generation tank. Now, if you read carefully the press reports after the acquisition of T-72, these tanks were always under performing. Retired Tankers have said so. They like Chieftains and Centurion better. The T-72 tank was an interim main battle tank in 1979. Since the tanks were worse at the other side of the border, it was okay. Subsequently it was DRDO which improved the T-72 and it was called combat improved Ajeya. When Pakistan acquired T-80 tanks, Russia gave a proposal to improve T-72. Since the DRDO came up with Tank-Ex upgrade, Indian Army did not want an T-72 upgrade. (you can read Indian Armies reaction here.) So Indian Army pushed for T-90. It was not the issue that enemy Pakistan bought T-80’s, the issue was the enemy DRDO came up with Tank-Ex upgrade.

I would like to add one point here. A lot has been said about Indian Army’s problems with DRDO. Less has been said about DRDO’s problem with Indian Army. It is not just the ego the Indian Army officers have inherited from British. They have also acquired the traits of colonial British when dealing with other Indians. I am sure, I have generalised it. But, how far is it away from the truth? Some time back a DRDO’s project manager wanted to demonstrate an equipment to Indian Army. His main concern was not the demonstration, but, where will he and his team mates stay. The place was an remote place, far away from civilization. “You see, they (Indian Army) have quarters there, but not for us” he explained defensively. After some discussion on Indian Army attitude, he again defended Indian Army by saying that “Customers are never satisfied.” DRDO has been bending back to accommodate the Army’s daunting requests, which later on goes on to boomerang on DRDO. I hope, one can understand how strained is the relationship. Its equally strained both ways.

Then there is another argument that Arjun Tank was not available when Army needed it. Sometime back, I was chatting up with two retired senior army officers. This point came up. One of the officers observed dryly that “or is it the Army did not induct Arjun Tank.” Actually, this example can be seen the sequence of events after 1996, when Arjun Tank displayed that it was fit for induction as per the last of Army qualitative requirements.

Army has not been entirely out of loop of developing the tank. There are two names of Indian Army personnel whom I wish to mention or my article will not be complete. One is Lt.Gen Ajai Singh who is the governor of Assam state in India. He was responsible for rejuvenation of the Arjun Tank project. The other one is Retired major general H.M Singh. He has been with the Arjun Tank project in excess of 20 years. A die hard Arjun Tank backer. The 43rd armored regiment have been involved in the development and testing of the Arjun Tanks. They have seen various versions of this tank. They say that every cloud has silver lining.

Some sections feel that Arjun Tank will not get a fair trial by the army. Some say that Army does not has the competency to evaluate Arjun Tank. There is an anecdote. While Arjun Tank was on trial, the engine compressor broke down. The engine was replaced in less than 30 minutes and the tank was up and running. The engine can be repaired and put on to the next tank. Where as if the same thing happens to the T-90, its grounded till the repairs are effected. It may take in excess of 3 hours. So, finally when the report reached the Army HQ, it stated:

Arjun Tank: engine broken. Complete replacement
T-90: engine broken, repaired.

Then there is another anecdote. The Advanced Light helicopters built by HAL in Army service were running huge repair bills inspite of army being specifically told that ALH does not need as many services as a Chetak helicopter.

There is a view that the army had issued GSQR to see that Arjun Tank does not fructify ever. DRDO pulled a fast one on them by importing all it cannot make in time and put together the tank. If army orders it, it will indigenise it as much possible. So, Arjun detractors ended up blaming that it has imported content. They forgot that T-90 was not even an Indian design.

In India, there is no professional independent agency that can interface between the R&D, production and the user. The US has it. The Russians have the military backing their R&D centers. So do others.

Like rest of the apprehensive Indians, even I am eagerly looking forward Arjun Tank vs T-90 comparative trial results. Is the anti Arjun Tank lobby is running and avoiding these trials for the obvious reason?

 

[Chota]

The above article has also got seperate articles as follows


History of Arjun Tank Development

Arjun Tank

Indian Army finds no major defects with Arjun Tank during Ex Ashvamegh

Arjun Tank for accelerated user trials

Arjun Tank to be put through summer trials


AUCRT trials of Arjun Tank from December 2007

Awaiting Indian Army’s preparedness report card with Arjun Tank

Indian Army’s claims over Arjun Tank was expected

Arjun Mk2 – The Futuristic MBT

Indian Army looses battle against Arjun Tank, but, will there be Arjun Mark-2?

DRDO’s Arjun Tank scores bull’s eye on Indian Army egos

43rd Armour Regiment and ex-officer’s satisfied with Arjun Tank

Steps taken to ensure Arjun Tank delivery

Indian MoD outlines roadmap for MBT Arjun, Mark II in pipeline

Five hundred Arjun Tank orders needed for project break even

T-90 S is a Dud, it can’t fire far enough

The Kanchan Armor

Arjun Tanks Future

Indian Army gets its first armoured regiment of MBT Arjun

Revised DPP 2008 to induce indigenisation, bring about Transparency says Indian Defence Minister

Indigenous NBC sensor for Arjun MBT

Indigenous defence research – looking through DRDO prism

Blind men of Hindustan Army

T-90S torsion bar problems persist

 

[Sridhar]

Arjun's time has come

History is made On 25th May 2009, 16 brand new Arjun Tanks were formally handed over to the Indian Army by the Defence Research & Development Organisation, or DRDO, thus completing the first Arjun Tank regiment.
This was a historic moment and a milestone on the way to self reliance. The Arjun is a state-of-the-art weapon system. Incredible mobility, awesome fire power, great power to weight ratio, enhanced armour protection, Laser Warning System, GPS, missile firing capability and other and almost everything that places of modern western MBTs.
The ride of the Arjun from drawing board to the field formations was not so smooth. The DRDO worked hard and met the technical challenges through indigenous developments (60%), imports and collaborations (total 40%). Its greatest achievements were the development of 120mm Rifled gun, Kanchan Armour, Gunner's Main Sight, Battle Management System and hydro-pneumatic suspension system. The Kanchan Armour, developed by Defence Matallurgical Research Laboratory, Hyderabad, is comparable to British 'Chobham' system, which is one of the best in the world.
Apart from the Kanchan Armour, the Arjun is also fitted with Laser Warning system and 9 Smoke grenade launchers for protection. DRDO developed the Hydro-pneumatic suspension for the tank that uses compressed Nitrogen as a springing agent with Hydraulic shock absorbers to dumb resonance. This suspension system ensures a smooth ride for the users and plays a key role when tank fires while running at a speed of 40Km.
The Russian T-series tanks have a Torsion bar suspension, but after looking at the performance of the hydro-pneumatic suspension developed by the DRDO, they are thinking of using that in their next generation tank. The 120mm Rifled gun of the tank can fire missiles, FSAPDS (Fin Stabilised Armour Piercing Discarding Sabot), HE (High-Explosive), HEAT (High-Explosive Anti tank) and HESH (High-Explosive Squash Head) ammunition with precision at a rate of 6-8 rounds per minute.
Again this gun has changed the trend of Smoothbore guns being used in the T-series tanks. Accuracy of the Rifled gun is better than Smoothbore guns. Arjun's main gun has successfully fired the Israeli LAHAT missile, which has a range of 8 KM with high penetration capability of 800mm. A special 120mm anti aircraft/helicopter round is under development and will use proximity fuse mechanism. The tank can carry 39 rounds in special blast-proof canisters to enhance crew protection. The tank is also armed with a 12.7 mm anti air machine gun and a 7.62 mm coaxial machine gun.

Bells and whistles
DRDO and Elbit, Israel have co-developed the state-of-the-art Battle Management System for Arjun that enables it to be on network with other tanks of the formation. This system gives it local network centric ability and each Arjun tank will have latest battlefield situation. In short, each Arjun will know who is targeting who. Designed and developed by Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL), the Gunner's Main Sight consists of a day-sight, thermal sight, a laser range finder and a stabilized head common to all the three channels. The common sighting head mirror is stabilized in elevation and azimuth. The thermal imager provides night vision facility to the gunner and the commander to observe and engage target in total darkness and in the presence of smoke, dust, haze and light camouflage. A laser range finder is integrated with the Gunner's Main Sight to range the targets accurately and has a reported range of 10 Km.
Developing a tank engine was a difficult task for a country where neither public nor private industry had developed any kind of internal combustion engine. So a decision was taken to import a limited number engines from M/S MTU, Germany while DRDO worked towards developing an indigenous engine for the tank. This step was taken to ensure the project meets its assigned deadlines. Initially MTU supplied 700hp engines and then 1100 hp engines for the prototypes, and is also working towards developing 1400hp engine as per Combat Vehicle Research and Development Establishment's (CVRDE) requirement. Finally, the 39,700cc V10 MTU engine was integrated with the tank in 1989, giving it a very high power-to-weight ratio of 24:1 HP/ton. The tank can attain a speed of 40Km/hr in just 9 seconds and maximum speed of 70Km/hr in 15 seconds. Maximum cross country speed of the tank is 40 Km/hr. Total weight of the engine is 5.2 tonne and can be replaced in the field in just 45 minutes.
The first 124 tanks will use a Digital Fire Control System provided by Sagem. The integrated digital fire control system installed in the Arjun consists of a laser rangefinder, ballistic computer, thermal imaging night sight, meteorological sensor, stabilised panoramic sight for the tank commander, stand-by (articulated) sighting telescope, GPS and an electronic gate to achieve higher first round hit probability.


The Stats
Let's look at the capabilities of the Arjun and the T-90 tank that Indian Army has chosen as its Main Battle Tank.
From this comparision, it is clear that the Arjun is second to none. So why does the Indian Army not want more than 124 Arjun tanks?
The official Army statements have always shown expressed annoyance over the delay in the development of the tank, its weight, width and performance. Yet, though the T-90 tanks of the Indian Army face the same performance issues in the Thar desert, repeated orders have been placed for it.
From a user prospective, the main issue is the delay in the development of the tank. The DRDO took almost 25 years to develop the tank and any technology will get obsolete in 25 years. So if DRDO presented a tank in 1996 that has been developed on the basis of General Staff Qualitative Requirement (GSQR) given in 1972, then the tank should not be called a modern tank.
But DRDO has a logical explanation for the delay.
In 1972, when India decided to develop a world class tank of its own, the Indian Army issued its first General Staff Qualitative Requirement (GSQR) and DRDO started working to develop a world class tank. But Army also wanted the tank to be light, less than 50 Ton. Combat Vehicle Research and Development Establishment (CVRDE) undertook the design and development of the tank based on the GSQR. An initial amount of Rs. 15.5 crore was sanctioned by the Government in 1974 and the Project Development Certification (PDC) of the project was 10 years from the date of sanction.

Inside story

CVRDE started working on the tank that was to be equipped with 110/115 mm main gun. In late 70s, just before the main gun, suspension and transmission equipment developed by the DRDO were about to undergo trials, the Indian Army changed the requirement and came up with second GSQR in 1982, which wanted an increase in weight and width of the tank, and the 110/115 mm main gun to be replaced with a 120 mm gun, and improved Sighting and Fire Control system.
So the CVRDE had to re-design the main gun again. A few prototypes were produced based on the revised GSQR, and were undergoing limited technical trials. But in 1985, the Army changed the GSQR again seeking a better 120 mm gun, Fin Stabilized Armour Piercing Discarding Sabot (FSAPDS), Semi Combustible Cartridge cases and high energy propellant, Integrated Fire Control System based on sight stabilized system with periscopic gunner sight, Thermal Imaging system for night fighting capability, enhanced armour protection, Nuclear Biological and Chemical (NBC) warfare protection system, Medium Fording capability, auxiliary power unit (APU), Laser Warning System (LWS) and Global Positioning System (GPS).
This was the third GSQR issued for the same product.
The CVRDE had to re-design the structure of the hull to incorporate the changes. By 1989, a 1400 hp MTU engine was integrated into the newly designed tank and 12 prototypes were produced for evaluation purposes. These prototypes covered a total distance of 20,000 Km to evaluate the mobility of the tank and fired 540 FSAPDS and 560 HESH rounds to check the weapon system.
In 1993, 6 Pre-Production tanks were formally inducted into Indian Army and were thoroughly tested by the field formations. In May 1994, the tank was reviewed by the COAS and certain modifications were suggested. In 1996, 9 more PPS tanks were inducted in the Army. The last PPS tank had additional features like APU, NBC, medium fording etc. All the PPS tanks covered a total of 70,000 Km of distance and fired 7,000 rounds. The Army cleared the overall design and selected the 15th PPS tank as the reference tank for production, and placed an indent initially for 15 limited series production in November 1997 and cumulatively 124 in March 2000.
The first batch of production tanks was handed over to the army on 7th August, 2004. This gap of 7 years (1997-2004) is questionable and could have been avoided by DRDO, CVRDE and Heavy Vehicle Factory (HVF), which was supposed to manufacture the tank after the transfer of technology from CVRDE. But the main reason of delay in the development of the tank was GSQR that was changed every time the tank was going for trials. Officially army has never been happy with the tank though personnel of the 43rd Armoured regiment, who have been testing the Arjun tank for years are very happy with the performance of the tank. They have no complains. On April 8th, 2005, a roundtable conference was held in New Delhi by SAPRA India where former Deputy Chief of Army Staff, Lt. Gen. Niranjan S. Malik praised the tank.

Off track
According to Gen. Malik, co-ordination among the user (Indian Army), development agencies (DRDO, CVRDE, HVF) and the contractors (MRF, Kirloskars etc.) is the major issue. Smooth co-ordination and bulk orders can iron out the minor issues. To resolve the co-ordination issue between different parties, a committee can be set up that must periodically review the development of the projects undertaken by DRDO, users need & concerns of different vendors.
If DRDO fails to meet the set deadline of any two consecutive developments phases of any project then a penalty should be charged & the user should be asked to procure the weapon from open market so the defence preparedness is not affected. In the past, the DRDO had promised to deliver many mission critical equipments that the forces wanted to procure from open market, but failed to deliver. We need to have some procedure in place to avoid such situation. The performance issue of the Arjun tank raised by the army can be sorted out while producing the tanks in batches just like Israelis did when they started producing their Merkava MBT. Ariel Sharon was the DG, Combat Vehicles at that time. He asked the Army to accept the tank as Mark I and instructed the development agencies to start working on Mark II, a better version of the Mark I. This is exactly what the IAF did when they procured Su-30 from Russia. Sukhois joined the IAF in batches and each batch was an improved version of the previous batch. Finally all the Sukhoi's were upgraded to Su-30 MKI version.
We are at a point where we can remove our dependency on Russia for military supplies. The Army should procure the Arjun in batches of 500. Manufacturing 500 tanks will at least take 5-6 years and this time duration will be sufficient for the DRDO to come up with a Mark II version. Once the Mark II is in production, HVF can upgrade all the Mark I tanks to Mark II configuration. The DRDO can co-develop cutting-edge technologies with Israel, Russia or France for the Mark II version instead of developing them from scratch. This will reduce the development time and fulfil the user's needs right on time. In the past, South Africa had shown keen interest in the Arjun and wanted to work together. South Africa wanted appr. 200 tanks. But somehow it did not work.
The DRDO learnt its lesson and co-developed the Battle Management System for the tank with Elbit, Israel and is currently developing Laser Warning Control System (LWCS) with the same company. DRDO is also working on co-developing Mobile Camouflage Systems (MCS) with Barracuda Camouflage Ltd, Gurgaon, India, part of Saab Barracuda, AB, Sweden. This system will be custom designed for the Arjun to decrease the high temperature in the interior of the tank. This will help the crew and keep the sensitive equipment working during peak summer in the Thar desert. It will also reduce thermal signature of the tank and increase its survivability. The Indian Army is impressed with the system and thinking of using it in its fleet of T-90 and T-72 tanks.
We must seize this opportunity to become self reliant. We cannot keep on importing tanks from Russia when we have the potential to build them in-house. There is no point spending 25-30 years in developing technologies & not allowing the final product to prove its mettle.



http://sify.com/news/Arjun-s-time-has-come-imagegallery-Others-kcejIxhcfac.html

 

[ppgj]

@nitesh, is the author of the article you posted P. Chacko Joseph? this man has followed Arjun like nobody with such passion. he commands my salute.

@chota, you should have copied the links and posted. can you edit it please? one can have important links at one place. thanks.

 

[black eagle]

A DIFFERENT POINT OF VIEW

T-90S Bhisma vs Arjun
Posted by vkthakur on Sunday, February 07, 2010 (EST)

February 07, 2010, (Splash News) - The Indian Army plans to pit a few of its Arjun MBTs against T-90S Bhisma tanks in a mock battle in the Rajasthan desert in March - April to help it determine if its should place additional orders for Arjuns.

The Indian Army, which has reservations about the DRDO developed Arjuns and prefers to equip its armor regiments with the T-90 Bhisma, is coming under intense pressure to place additional orders for Arjuns, over and above the 124 tanks that it has so far ordered.

The DRDO, as a civilian organization, has easy access to the press and has lined up journalists to crusade on its behalf in the name of indigenization and self sufficiency. DRDO bosses also have easy access to the Defense Minister.

Army generals don't have easy access to the Defense Minister and risk a court martial by going to the press directly.

Ironically, the Defense Minister controls both the army and DRDO. When it comes to arms procurement from the DRDO, he represents the vendor as well as the client. It is hard to be objective under the circumstances.

Very often our armed forces get lumped with weapon systems that they don't want.

You may or may not have noticed a concerted press campaign to show the Army in poor light for its reluctance to place additional Arjun orders.
Ten T-90S Bhisma tanks on Rajpath. Photo Credit: PIB

During past trials the Arjun proved to be a very unreliable weapon system. Besides other things it was plagued by frequent engine failures.

The DRDO contends that the engine failures took place because the army deliberately sabotaged the engines! To the best of my knowledge, no investigation was ever carried out into the allegation, let alone the DRDO's charge proved.

Journalists campaigning in favor of the Arjun are high lighting DRDO's sabotage charge without mentioning that the accusation had no basis. This is shoddy journalism.

The journos are also high lighting tank characteristics such as weight, gun-caliber and power to weight ratio in insinuating that "corrupt generals" are opting for the inferior Bhisma over the more potent Arjun.

I have very little knowledge about tanks but I have a lot of respect for the Indian Army. The occasional aberrations in the conduct of Army Generals are just that, occasional aberrations. They have not shaken my faith in the Indian Army as an institution and should not shake the faith of any other Indian.

The Indian Army, is one of the finest institutions of the country, and thank god for it.

Having been a war fighter, albeit a fighter pilot, I know we all crave for the best fighting systems because our lives depend on it. I do not believe a general can ever be so corrupt as to put the life of his officers and men at risk.

There are far too many checks and balances within the Army for lobby to lump it with second grade weapon systems when a better option is available.

If the Army prefers the Bhisma over Arjun I think the matter should end there. Since it hasn't, I took it upon myself to highlight the real issues in choosing between two tanks, as I understand them.

It's not the weight of the tank, its engine horsepower, power to weight ratio, gun caliber, etc. that are as important as:

1. The reliability of a tank's mobility system.
2. Reliability of a tank's aiming and firing system.
3. Mobility of the tank. Its ability to clear obstacles, go through water and over sand.
4. Stand off range from which a tank can first engage the enemy.
5. Rapidity with which it can engage the enemy while on the move. How many times can it fire within a given time frame and with what accuracy?
6. Effectiveness of its armor protection. Manufacturers claims aren't helpful. Armor effectiveness is best established with actual trials.
7. Active protection against anti-tank missiles.

I have my take on where the two tanks stand based on my past interaction with armor corp officers. However, it is time to look at the issue afresh and the trials are being held precisely for that purpose. I understand both Arjun and Bhisma have undergone changes in the recent past.

What I would like to see is the better tank inducted into the Indian Army. The last DRDO chief made a public statement that Indian Armed Forces should accept 10% substandard armament to encourage DRDO. I consider the statement outrageous.

The reason why the better tanks needs to equip the Indian Army is because Pakistan's T-80UD tanks are at par with the Bhisma. Indeed, Pakistan's acquisition of the tanks from Ukraine triggered a knee jerk purchase of Bhismas by the Indian Army from Russia. So if Arjun is picked despite being 10% substandard, the nation should remember to turn to god, not the Indian Army the next time Pakistan acts belligerent.

Epilogue

I wrote this blog post after trying to get my point across on the blog of a journo who has lately been bashing the army and blatantly championing the cause of inducting more Arjuns.

Guess what? My comment pointing out the lack of balance in the journos post wasn't published. It was then that I noticed that all the comments on the journos blog are appreciative of his stand. Some moderation and so much for journalistic ethics.

http://kuku.sawf.org/Articles/62617.aspx

 

[ppgj]

mr. vijainder thakur is the biggest DRDO hater. he is against LCA also. so one can't expect better than this from him.

The DRDO, as a civilian organization, has easy access to the press and has lined up journalists to crusade on its behalf in the name of indigenization and self sufficiency. DRDO bosses also have easy access to the Defense Minister.

how come we keep hearing from the DGMF mr. bharadwaj more than DRDO on Arjun?? inspite of what this person wants us to beleive!!

I have very little knowledge about tanks but I have a lot of respect for the Indian Army.

yet he summarises and lambasts Arjun!!! the same person thought Arjun runs on 1000hp engine!!! it is still there on BROADSWORD. even ajai corrects him check out the site.

It's not the weight of the tank, its engine horsepower, power to weight ratio, gun caliber, etc. that are as important as:

1. The reliability of a tank's mobility system.
2. Reliability of a tank's aiming and firing system.
3. Mobility of the tank. Its ability to clear obstacles, go through water and over sand.
4. Stand off range from which a tank can first engage the enemy.
5. Rapidity with which it can engage the enemy while on the move. How many times can it fire within a given time frame and with what accuracy?
6. Effectiveness of its armor protection. Manufacturers claims aren't helpful. Armor effectiveness is best established with actual trials.
7. Active protection against anti-tank missiles.

all these points have proven T-90 is inferior to Arjun.

So if Arjun is picked despite being 10% substandard, the nation should remember to turn to god, not the Indian Army the next time Pakistan acts belligerent.

it is the other way round. i hope god saves our T-90's.

 

[p2prada]

And since the great WW-II many tanks of all weights and size have had same problem, some surfaces require very low ground pressure, like a swamp.

Without the proposed tenders for T-90 upgrade its not superior than the Arjun.

First of all Boeing worked with Lockheed martin on YF-22 and F-22.
Northrop Grumman was the one opposing with YF-23 with their experience on B-2 bomber, and their reserach advanced the technology they had developed in RCS management, Avionics and Materials, this will be used for the USAF next generation bomber project, the research done is very much alive.

Integrate a new missile or shell on the T-90 and Russians are back in business, its the era of computerised FCS, and the maker still keeps the source.
A tender requires permission from the ministry of finance and under the new DPP intimation to the parliament, so i guess if there is a tender we would know about it.
The APS will be common for all MBTs and ICVs.
The active part in APS shows a approach to distruct a ATGM in flight.

You asked about where a top of the line ERA for arjun will come from in the next 5 years, i answered with possible locations.

OK

http://www.drdo.org/explosive.html

India and Russia have a IPR agreement in place, we can not go outside the contract boundaries and modify a russian product without permission. If there is no ToT and Russia refuses to allow modification we need to keep importing the armour tiles.

Not when the heavy MBTs costs are going down with aggreements in place for domestic manufacturing (which might fall through if the order is stuck at 124), In T-90 most of the tank is imported and assembled here in India, and yet it might end up being cheaper manufactured in Russia than India (ala Su-30).

FCS on arjun is indigenous computerised one, and its next generation all electric type fire and drive control are already in final stages of development for the ICV project abhay .

Look at the projected figures of economic and industrial performance for 2030.

If i had it i wont give it, dont trust such figures, these are confidential and often heavily under quoted or over quoted by people in the know (they risk loosing their jobs or are trying to market the product).

That is just strange, our opponent is a regular army with tanks and heavy ATGMs (for which no ERA works as both shaped charges are massive), and the shells are fired thousands of times before induction.
That doctrine you stated, in both pre and post cold start time concentrates on occupying lands and cutting off major population centres, nowhere does the army intend to control a city, as that bogs them down rids them of the advantage to maneuver in a maneuver warfare and risks there supply lines.
Please read about the previous battles and have a look at the map
US army in Iraq and Russian army in Chechnya faced a enemy in urban scenario where the tanks supporting infantry was suppressed while the anti tank team fired from a preferred vector and distance like the top of roop which gave a top attack profile, or the basement of a building which gave access to the bottom parts of the tank (vulnerable in all profiles front or side), in open field tank battle the situation is very different and frontal armour protection against Kinetic rounds is very important.

Will T-90 work, yes it will excel with all the possible upgrades, Arjun will also achieve the same results with more protection.

A battle to cut supply routes and occupying territory for post war negotiations is very different from a occupation of a city where the opposing force is able to fight with the death with a thousand cuts mentality.

These two situations could not be any more different.

Many people falsely claim that T-series tank have ineffective armour and ERA based on Russian experience in chechnya, which is incorrect as the tanks were in a urban setting where the terrorists were able to attack from a distance and angle of their choosing, perhaps a tactical mistake, but in no way a reflection of the tanks ability.

Any major tender if accepted or paid for will be in the know.

The only mentioned time line for FMBT is 2030 and its not been mentioned that many times (nothing is for certain).

He also said in the same briefing


And he stated the timeline as around 2030 for induction.
If the army requirements for the Arjun MBT are met they will have to buy more, MoD is the boss, even after saying that they will not place any more orders, there will still be trials for more.
Throughout your post your position is that media is somehow against T-90 which is incorret, its mostly col. Ajai Shukla right now, and before 2005 he openly criticised the Tank.
And eveyone knows that the Army doesnot want more than the 124 arjun MBTs, its not in doubt, the discussion is why should they take more, no one here or in the media can have any bearing on the final decision, this is just a discussion on what if and why should they, like the many carried out in online forums about what if we had kept on pushing forward in 1971 or why should some candidate win the indian idol etc. etc.

This discussion has gone for a bit too long and neither you nor I are satisfied with the other's reasons. So, we can simply wait for the trials. Perhaps the Arjun will be inducted in limited numbers. Perhaps not.

Honestly, I don't care for which tank is superior. All I believe is that the Indian army cannot afford the logistics footprint or the maintenance of the Arjun compared to the T-90 at war time and peace time and this has been my primary bone of contention against the Arjun. In the end I don't want the IA going to war with museum pieces. If DRDO can provide the Arjun with the same or lesser life cycle costs than the T-90 then I am all for the Arjun even though there is an extra cost for changing infrastructure.

General Question: Has DRDO released the cost of maintaining the Arjun?

 

[bengalraider]

This discussion has gone for a bit too long and neither you nor I are satisfied with the other's reasons. So, we can simply wait for the trials. Perhaps the Arjun will be inducted in limited numbers. Perhaps not.

Honestly, I don't care for which tank is superior. All I believe is that the Indian army cannot afford the logistics footprint or the maintenance of the Arjun compared to the T-90 at war time and peace time and this has been my primary bone of contention against the Arjun. In the end I don't want the IA going to war with museum pieces. If DRDO can provide the Arjun with the same or lesser life cycle costs than the T-90 then I am all for the Arjun even though there is an extra cost for changing infrastructure.

General Question: Has DRDO released the cost of maintaining the Arjun?

I agree with your assessment that we should wait for the trials however i disagree that if it wants to the IA cannot provide the logistics for the Arjun, The IA has made two complete logistical leaps since independence once during the 80's when we increased the no. of armored regiments from 40 to 60 in six years (a massive boost for armor and for logistics as well)this was done when the economic boom still hadn't boomed and the earlier revolution when we moved form the British and american armor that we had to a armored force built around the soviet T-series; if we want to we can make the logistics happen, the question is do we want to?

 

[nitesh]

This discussion has gone for a bit too long and neither you nor I are satisfied with the other's reasons. So, we can simply wait for the trials. Perhaps the Arjun will be inducted in limited numbers. Perhaps not.

Honestly, I don't care for which tank is superior. All I believe is that the Indian army cannot afford the logistics footprint or the maintenance of the Arjun compared to the T-90 at war time and peace time and this has been my primary bone of contention against the Arjun. In the end I don't want the IA going to war with museum pieces. If DRDO can provide the Arjun with the same or lesser life cycle costs than the T-90 then I am all for the Arjun even though there is an extra cost for changing infrastructure.

General Question: Has DRDO released the cost of maintaining the Arjun?

In this whole discussion some question still go un answered like why the GSQR issued which resulted in this tank? Does the GSQR issuer inept to see what it wants? The case for support to domestic industries. Why can't be a START given to domestic industries.

 

[ppgj]

In this whole discussion some question still go un answered like why the GSQR issued which resulted in this tank? Does the GSQR issuer inept to see what it wants?

nitesh, if you look at the whole saga of Arjun it is clear - periodic GSQR'S were issued to delay, scuttle and finally kill the Arjun while using the same delays to augment additional T-90 numbers and upgrades there on.

The case for support to domestic industries. Why can't be a START given to domestic industries.

the army has never been interested to that aspect. since MOD has a final say, they should just shut the scuttlers in the army and introduce the tank. it has been proven in summer, winter and AUCR trials. how many times does it have to prove itself?? it is a joke being played by a section of the army on all indians. the joke needs to be put to rest.

 

[nitesh]

PPQJ I am also in agreement with you when the tank has already proven in ACURT which is basically checking the IA's preparedness to handle the tank then what this fuss is all about

 

[p2prada]

In this whole discussion some question still go un answered like why the GSQR issued which resulted in this tank? Does the GSQR issuer inept to see what it wants? The case for support to domestic industries. Why can't be a START given to domestic industries.

I have already answered your questions over and over again in multiple posts.

 

[p2prada]

I agree with your assessment that we should wait for the trials however i disagree that if it wants to the IA cannot provide the logistics for the Arjun, The IA has made two complete logistical leaps since independence once during the 80's when we increased the no. of armored regiments from 40 to 60 in six years (a massive boost for armor and for logistics as well)this was done when the economic boom still hadn't boomed and the earlier revolution when we moved form the British and american armor that we had to a armored force built around the soviet T-series; if we want to we can make the logistics happen, the question is do we want to?

The right question today is do we need to? The fact is during the 80s, the T-72s replaced all those older less capable tanks like T-55s and Centurions. Today the Arjun is going to replace only a similar capability tank which will only increase lifecycle costs and additional costs for change in infrastructure. So, why rush things when a Arjun Mk2 can be made? DRDO has also expressively suggested that the Arjun Mk2 will be developed. Things like indigenous will come someday. But, rushing it on untested platforms unless there is a massive capability boost is not recommended by any military. The T-72/T-90 is a time tested platform, no General will pin hopes on a new tank without extensive user trials. Even the T-72 went through massive testing before and after induction.

Also, having 2 different platforms will increase logistics all over again. The fact is having 1600 Arjun HMBTs is simply not feasible for most armies in the world, including India.

 

[nitesh]

I have already answered your questions over and over again in multiple posts.

Nope p2 unfortunately I don't think you have answered it, It's simple GSQR gets issued work begins product comes (with delay as there was no experience of building) now the GSQR issuer comes with different tantrums to throw the project out of gear with aruments of fuel consumption, similar technology already exist, weight problem and what not totally ignoring the vital point of supporting the home grown product

 

[Ray]

Basically, a tank’s major components that enhance power and strength are few.

The critical systems are the Fire Control system, Ammunition, a laser rangefinder, ballistic computer, thermal imaging night sight, stabilized panoramic sight for the tank commander, and a secondary telescopic sight.

Designing parameters indicates that the LRF (integral to the gunner’s sight) should have a range of more than 10 km and a thermal imager, which can with a range of more than 5.5 km, should recognize a target at 4 km and identify targets at 2.5-3.5 km.

The Fire control system must have the ability to fire on the move and must have a probability of more than 98% First Shot hit ratio. Instead of developing a FCS from scratch, the DRDO being futile and time taking effort, they developed an existing FCS system from Elbit Israel. It has better range and identification features than T-90 (a T-90 has an identification range of 1.2-1.5 km, while an Arjun FCS has 2.5 km range).

The Arjun MBT power pack was a major problem. It was the German 1400 HP MTU 838 Ka 501Diesel engine, while even Leopard 2 uses a newer version, MTU mb 873 multi-fuel, 1500 hp engine. The engine did not meet the rigorous Indian environment successfully. It is obvious that the engine suits Indian arid conditions and is able to perform under extreme environmental conditions. The new engine should have an increased cruising range from 120 miles to 250 miles. The reason is simple since it is not a linear battle matrix. The CT, CG and CC have to encompass the battlefield as per the tactical milieu. This is really important and was indicated that it should be on the top of the agenda of DRDO. This, it is believed has been addressed.

The Armour of the Arjun, though was capable for taking on Pakistani MBTs, it is believed was not quite scratch. The armour and the silhouette of a battle tank should be capable of withstanding not only the direct fire of APFSDS, HEAT, HESH & various RPG rounds, but also the ATGMs , armed helicopters, ground attack aircraft, and cruise missiles.

An MBT with a low thermal signature and angular structure makes it harder for the enemy’s radars to detect it timely and eliminate it. This was another area of ‘interest’. In the future scenario, it is not just the threat from Pakistani Al Khalids and T-80Us, but also from M1A2, Leopard 2 etc. ERA and depleted uranium armour should also be developed for Arjun. It is learnt that ERA has been developed and deployed.

Active Area Defence System is an area that is critical to an MBT. It allows it to keep its relevance in the modern battlefield. Arjun has a new AADS from Elbit, Israel. ATGMs have been so successful that MBTs too are carrying them now; Arjun has successfully mounted a LAHAT ATGM, again from Israel with an option of also including Russian Shtora ATGM. Better AADS, communications and air defence gives tank, a chance to fire back at the nagging choppers above.

Indian Army has operated Russian equipment, and has neglected crew protection levels. This was due to buying Soviet Tanks off the shelf, which later cannot be redesigned to enhance crew protection arrangements.

In Arjun, the crew is protected from ammunition by the armour so in case of ammunition being hit doesn’t causes crew to meet death in a burning hell. It gives them precious time to escape and live to fight another day with a brand new tank.

Electronics on Arjun comprises of a 32-bit computer, integrated with a GPS and Battlefield Management System, FCS-TIF, and AADS. It has been developed by BEL, and the communications suite is from Marconi Communications and radar equipments from Thales SA. All these raise foreign components to about 70%, and so does the cost to about $ 4 million. When compared to others, like Pakistan, Al Khalid is nothing but Type 90 of China; they are just producing it in assembly line like we are doing with T-90S. T-80Us were bought off the shelf. European and US MBTs cost either same or more than an Arjun, but here we should look with an economist’s perspective. They have been in production for more than two decades and the present versions are based on the experience of those years. Therefore their cost has stabilized more or less, and has weathered the effect of inflation. Once Arjun enters production, and more upgrades come along with gained experience from the army and DRDO, its unit cost will stabilize or even reduce. A computer costs same as it used to 5 years ago, but now is faster, more powerful, and effective. Same phenomenon will happen with Arjun MBT in a lesser degree, unless we do not stop with constructive criticism, army is allowed to dictate changes and enhancements and more components are indigenously designed and produced.

Future plan, steadily localize the foreign components, starting from licensed production to reverse engineering (yes, Chinese are smart when they do this.), and ultimately develop own capability to design, build and implement our own major MBT components. Invest heavily in the Avadi Ordnance Factory so to increase it production capacity, better labor production management, and quality control. Above all, lay down export stipulations, for ex. For every two MBT army buys, one must be exported, this will put pressure on DRDO to make it products from second rate to the globally competitive. The end gainer will be the Indian Armed Forces.

Arjun has bloated dimensions, six cm more than officially laid stipulations. This means Arjun will be bulging 3 cms more on both sides of an Indian flat rail car. It might need broader rail cars and tank trailers. The bigger rail cars and trailers can carry T-72s and T-90s also. This is required because we are developing an MBT on the line of NATO strategy and not the Russian lineage. To achieve a paradigm shift, the complete chain of allied equipments for MBT has to be changed, and this change will not be exclusive catering to the armoured equipments of either the Russian or the western family, but to both. It will streamline the supporting elements of the armoured corps and reduce the problem of too many types of equipment of many origins. It creates huge material management problems in the event of a war. For the time being we can be inspired from milkmen who attach their milk cans on the windows Indian rail compartment windows, those cans sure do extend beyond 3 cms on each side. Be practical, where possible improvise.

In the end, after 7-8 years Indian Armored Corps should have more than 1000 Arjun Mk1 and Mk2 (preferably, 70% indigenous), 500 T-90S, and more than 2000 T-72 upgraded to the T-90 and Arjun standards. The Arjun MBT program and T-90 serial production will have numerous offshoots for the T-72 up gradation. I sincerely hope, we Indians cast cynicism aside and start thinking strategically. Just because Arjun has flaws and employs somewhat obsolete technology when compared to western tanks, it must not be terminated. An aspiring regional power must make its own big battle platforms like tanks, artillery guns, APCs etc. Merkava MBT of Israel had four versions, Mk 4 being the latest, and it still is not 100% indigenous, it has General Dynamic’s engine. No MBT with an exception of perhaps M1A2 can be said to be a fully homemade tank. Battle winning tanks are not made with egos; they are a clever mix of innovation and inspiration.

(comments are also based on inputs)

Therefore, the original is not the same as what is being fielded.

 

[Ray]

Brig Richard Simpkins, a very renowned armour tactical and think tank in his book Rae to the Swift, has stated that it is 30 - 50 cycle in which tactics, equipment etc changes.