Potential Theatres of War and Deployment strategies
Any India-Pakistan conflict will take place in four major theatres, each varying in geography and, to a lesser extent climatically. The theatres of operations are:
1) Along the Line of Control - Northern Kashmir region
2) Southern Jammu & Kashmir and Punjab sectors
3) North and Central Rajasthan
4) South Rajasthan and Gujarat
When looking at these theatres of operations, it must be borne in mind that the Line of Control in the Northern Kashmir region is not an internationally recognized border. It should also be noted that Punjab and Kashmir are politically very sensitive areas for the political establishments in both countries. It is, therefore, hardly likely that any major loss of territory in either of these two areas would be acceptable.
In the
Southern Jammu & Kashmir and Punjab sectors, stretching down into North and Central Rajasthan, there are a series of extremely formidable obstacle defences, which are called ditch-cum-bunds by the Indians, and canals by the Pakistanis. These defences, combined with the existing natural ground features make large-scale mechanized operations virtually impossible.77 These linear defences are extremely formidable, since the ditch-cum-bunds are liberally laced with diffused and well concealed concrete bunkers which have considerable defensive firepower and are difficult to locate, even with thermal imaging.78 This effectively limits operations to defensive positions with only local offensive capability.
The
Rajasthan and Gujarat regions present an entirely different scenario. In the Northern/Central Rajasthan theatre, considerable scope exists for the large scale use of mechanised formations in the desert and semi-desert sectors. It is in these sectors, the Thar desert and the Rann of Kutch, that the major armoured battles of the next India-Pakistan war are likely to be fought.79 It is, therefore, not surprising that a complete Indian Strike Corps is earmarked for use primarily in this area.
The
Thar Desert and
Rann of Kutch also present the best possible place for tactical nuclear warfare.80 The barren desert areas are ideal in that so-called collateral damage could be reduced. Moreover, any meaningful Indian gains in this area, that is beyond the major river lines, would threaten the very existence of the Pakistani state, thus prompting Pakistan to actively consider using nuclear weapons in the event of a major Indian breakthrough.
On the other hand, since the Indian Strike Corps will be operating in this area, so will be the bulk of India's formidable Corps of Air Defence Artillery. This means that any Pakistani attack against a major Indian formation would be met with heavy resistance from extremely dense and sophisticated CADA assets - not to mention fighter squadrons from the Indian Air Force. Therefore, any Pakistani attack stands a good chance of being repelled without reaching their assigned target.
India could also reduce the risk of nuclear retaliation by limiting its advance to the major river lines, or to between 60-80 km in the North/Central Rajasthan sectors.81 This would mean that the existence of Pakistan would no longer be threatened while India would still occupy chunks of territory. Pakistan would probably be less willing to cross the nuclear threshold for such a limited Indian advance.
It is unlikely that either India or Pakistan would initiate nuclear warfare in either the Punjab or Kashmir regions purely for tactical gain. Indeed, for Pakistan the use of such weapons in Kashmir would almost certainly alienate the Muslim population of the Kashmir Valley. In the case of Punjab, Pakistan's military and political elites are largely drawn from that Province and as such it is extremely unlikely that they would take a risk as large as this for limited tactical gains. From a purely military standpoint, it should also be pointed out that the ditch-cum-bund defences and their network of concrete bunkers would probably survive a nuclear attack.82 This would render a nuclear attack in this sector virtually useless.
Therefore, the only area in which nuclear weapons would be tactically useful is in Rajasthan and Gujarat - for reasons which have already been given. Yet that land , especially in Rajasthan, Thar Desert sector, is of virtually no strategic importance. Would any militarily sane nation risk revealing the full extent of its covert nuclear program unless its very existence was threatened ? The answer is clearly no. Therefore, if India limits its territorial gains in this area, Pakistan would have no reason to resort to nuclear weapons.
There is one wild card in this scenario - the Line of Control. If India were to launch a major assault along the LoC - would Pakistan use nuclear weapons ? An examination of a possible war scenario will perhaps illustrate Indian planning more clearly.War Scenario:
In 1987, the India army conducted a massive military exercise,
'Brasstacks', which outlined what was then a new tactical doctrine. No longer would the Indian army concentrate on operations in Punjab, as it had during the 1965 war, but would deploy massively powerful armoured formations in the Rajasthan sector with the aim of bisecting Pakistan at its weakest point in the Sindh Province.
This has been the model most often used and quoted by scholars in the literature available on possible war scenarios.83 Moreover, it has been further argued that thanks to Pakistan's nuclear capability, an Indian offensive in the
Sindh that met with success would be answered by a Pakistani nuclear strike. Since the defences in the
Punjab are strong, it was therefore argued that as India's military superiority was hardly overwhelming, the nuclear factor may be creating an environment where war was almost impossible.
This model is, however, obsolete and far from creating a certain conventional stalemate, has simply led to the Indian army re-thinking its tactical doctrine. No longer will the Indian army attempt to make major territorial gains, but it will concentrate on occupying a small stretch of territory, not enough to threaten Pakistan's existence, but enough to force Pakistan to commit its forces where they will be met by superior Indian firepower which will then inflict maximum attrition84. The reason for this in part lies in the risk of nuclear warfare, but the main reason lies in the fact that previous wars in 1965 and 1971 have shown that major territorial gains are unlikely in a short war.
If a major Indian offensive occurs, it will occur in Kashmir. Never before has the Indian army attempted any offensive in Kashmir, but this time, thanks to the massive influx of troops into the State, an Indian offensive along the Line of Control is very possible. It could be argued that these troops are primarily for counter-insurgency operations. However, this does not explain why the formations coming into Jammu and Kashmir are bringing their artillery with them. Any fighting will in Kashmir will centre around a clash of infantry and artillery and as such, the induction of substantial artillery assets into the region must be seen as significant.
At the outset one thing must be made clear. Neither India or Pakistan believes that anything would be decided in a war lasting less than four weeks.85 India bases its plans on a period of intense fighting lasting six to eight weeks followed by a period of major, but less intense fighting lasting up to four more weeks. War Wastage Reserves are calculated on this basis and so if a war lasts only two weeks or thereabouts, the most that can be hoped for is for heavy attrition of the enemy forces.
India has therefore moved away from the Brasstacks plan of bisecting Pakistan in the Sindh and threatening Islamabad with encirclement to a more modest objective of destroying as much of the Pakistani military as possible. Pakistan's nuclear weapons provide some deterrence against any Indian move to make deep thrusts into its territory and against any possible bisection of Pakistan, they are of no use in a war aimed solely at inflicting maximum attrition against Pakistani military forces.86
The Indian army has two Strike Corps, 2 Corps & 1 Corps, assigned to the Rajasthan and Punjab sectors respectively.87 The Strike Corps are described in an earlier section, but each is composed of one armoured division and several infantry divisions and supporting units. Each will also have an artillery division attached. There is another Strike Corps - 21 Corps which is not yet fully operational.
In the Brasstacks model, these were the two formations Pakistan was most concerned about and their continued presence in the Rajasthan and Punjab sectors will ensure that Pakistan cannot consider any major troop redeployments in either sector. Under current plans, India intends not to advance more than 60-80km in the North/Central Rajasthan sector and only up to the major river lines in South Rajasthan/Gujarat, Pakistan's existence would hardly be threatened.88
However, it must be remembered that India and Pakistan will be fighting a political war as much as a military one and any loss of territory is considered a major political embarrassment. This means that Pakistan would invariably have to attempt a counterattack against Indian forces occupying any of its territory.
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