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This document is rather instructive.
https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&...xRhWgJ&sig=AHIEtbSs88Dp5ZCByxFot46s-5REJCJDFw
I think, Agnostic Muslim, Afghanistan's relationship with Pakistan over the Durand Line and Pashtunistan provides a useful insight into Pakistan's own relationship with India vis-Ã -vis Kashmir. Ever since Pakistan's inception, Afghanistan's relationship with Pakistan has centered around one critical issue: Pashtunistan, just as Pakistan's relationship with India has centered around Kashmir. Afghanistan's contention, as it stands, is that the Durand Line was (and is) invalid as it was drawn under duress. Soon after partition, Pakistan found that it was necessary to invade Balochistan and seize it, Balochistan having formerly never been a part of British India and having rejected annexure to the newly created state of Pakistan on the grounds of common Muslimhood, in order to disguise the fact that where the Durand Line Agreement ought to have been a Tripartite agreement between independent Baluchistan, Afghanistan and British India, it was in fact only a bi-partisan agreement between British India and Afghanistan that illegitimately excluded Baluchistan despite encompassing its boundaries; and to maintain in its eyes, and the world's, the validity under int'l legal norms of the Durand Line agreement. Legally, Afghanistan's claim to the validity of Pakistan's ownership over Pashtunistan is limited, since uti possidetis juris (succession of binding multilateral agreements between colonial powers to independent states) does apply. Though Afghanistan's demand for the invalidity of the Durand line and for the Pashtuns' right to be able to secede and choose their own state, were framed as a support for Pashtunistan's independence, as in the case of Kashmir, these demands were in fact irredentist, since an independent Pashtunistan would probably not likely exist, being a fragile and defenseless state, and would inevitably cede to Afghanistan. Just as in the case of many Indian politicians, most of Afghan's leaders too thought the new state of Pakistan wouldn't survive, and so, have essentially staked their claim to an area under Pakistan's current sovereignty should the state of Pakistan break up.
Again, the claim is compounded by being based on a prophecy, that necessitates self-fulfillment: Afghanistan's strategic interests are served by the pursuit of territory under Pakistan's current ownership vis-a-vis it's landlockedness and access to the sea, just as Pakistan's strategic interests over geostrategic leverage and water resources are served by the pursuit of Kashmir. So, to pursue that strategic interest in legitimate form, a prophecy must be fulfilled: that the state that occupies it will inevitably break-up due to it's barbaric and demonic rule and will cease to hold control over the minds and hearts of the people with whom this state is thought to identify; and this is achieved by the painting of a picture of permanent turmoil in which it sits. Hence, to pursue that claim, less than a decade after independence, Afghanistan sent regular troops, as well as Afghan tribesmen, who crossed the border into Pakistan 30 miles northeast of Chaman (see the similiarity? ), where they got repelled by Pakistani troops after six days of fighting. For it's part, Afghanistan said it had no involvement in the attack, which it claimed comprised exclusively of Pashtun tribesmen agitating for an "independent" (sic.) Pashtuni-stan. Six decades later, given Afghanistan's penchant to become a world harbour zone for terrorists and it's continuous use of irregular forces dressed as tribesmen, those claims seem less than credible.
See what the world is seeing?
Tit-for-tat. As someone said once, Karma is indeed a bitch.
https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&...xRhWgJ&sig=AHIEtbSs88Dp5ZCByxFot46s-5REJCJDFw
I think, Agnostic Muslim, Afghanistan's relationship with Pakistan over the Durand Line and Pashtunistan provides a useful insight into Pakistan's own relationship with India vis-Ã -vis Kashmir. Ever since Pakistan's inception, Afghanistan's relationship with Pakistan has centered around one critical issue: Pashtunistan, just as Pakistan's relationship with India has centered around Kashmir. Afghanistan's contention, as it stands, is that the Durand Line was (and is) invalid as it was drawn under duress. Soon after partition, Pakistan found that it was necessary to invade Balochistan and seize it, Balochistan having formerly never been a part of British India and having rejected annexure to the newly created state of Pakistan on the grounds of common Muslimhood, in order to disguise the fact that where the Durand Line Agreement ought to have been a Tripartite agreement between independent Baluchistan, Afghanistan and British India, it was in fact only a bi-partisan agreement between British India and Afghanistan that illegitimately excluded Baluchistan despite encompassing its boundaries; and to maintain in its eyes, and the world's, the validity under int'l legal norms of the Durand Line agreement. Legally, Afghanistan's claim to the validity of Pakistan's ownership over Pashtunistan is limited, since uti possidetis juris (succession of binding multilateral agreements between colonial powers to independent states) does apply. Though Afghanistan's demand for the invalidity of the Durand line and for the Pashtuns' right to be able to secede and choose their own state, were framed as a support for Pashtunistan's independence, as in the case of Kashmir, these demands were in fact irredentist, since an independent Pashtunistan would probably not likely exist, being a fragile and defenseless state, and would inevitably cede to Afghanistan. Just as in the case of many Indian politicians, most of Afghan's leaders too thought the new state of Pakistan wouldn't survive, and so, have essentially staked their claim to an area under Pakistan's current sovereignty should the state of Pakistan break up.
Again, the claim is compounded by being based on a prophecy, that necessitates self-fulfillment: Afghanistan's strategic interests are served by the pursuit of territory under Pakistan's current ownership vis-a-vis it's landlockedness and access to the sea, just as Pakistan's strategic interests over geostrategic leverage and water resources are served by the pursuit of Kashmir. So, to pursue that strategic interest in legitimate form, a prophecy must be fulfilled: that the state that occupies it will inevitably break-up due to it's barbaric and demonic rule and will cease to hold control over the minds and hearts of the people with whom this state is thought to identify; and this is achieved by the painting of a picture of permanent turmoil in which it sits. Hence, to pursue that claim, less than a decade after independence, Afghanistan sent regular troops, as well as Afghan tribesmen, who crossed the border into Pakistan 30 miles northeast of Chaman (see the similiarity? ), where they got repelled by Pakistani troops after six days of fighting. For it's part, Afghanistan said it had no involvement in the attack, which it claimed comprised exclusively of Pashtun tribesmen agitating for an "independent" (sic.) Pashtuni-stan. Six decades later, given Afghanistan's penchant to become a world harbour zone for terrorists and it's continuous use of irregular forces dressed as tribesmen, those claims seem less than credible.
See what the world is seeing?
Tit-for-tat. As someone said once, Karma is indeed a bitch.
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