Afghan reality: India may talk to ISI, Taliban

[Vinod2070]

lo g, conspiracy theories crap & you people talk about Zaid hamid, I just don't understand what your problem with this 'Pakjab' when our COAS has got support from every one & president is not a Pakjab
do you think that Idiot, Bharamdad Bugti really matters or you are dreaming about breaking NWFP & Balochistan but using this 'Pakjab Factors'
& how clever of you, Roads for peace, WOW, where were you when we catered for Afghan Refugees

Perhaps you are not aware of the plans of your wannabe Bonapartes when they were doing all this. You were not catering for any refugees, your generals were dreaming of eating Afghanistan without as mush as a slurp. They were also dreaming of becoming a power in the Central Asian region while looting money with both hands from USA, Saudi, China and many others.

Don't even suggest that there were any altruistic motives in what you did in Afghanistan!

 

[ajtr]

a) I never denied it
b)whats makes you think that, in swat initially people wanted peace under Taliban but once they tasted it & saw expansionist mind set of TTP, they turned against them Operation took place & now they are happy, peace is returning
I am not going to say that things you said are practically non existent but this does not means that all Pushtuns will go Anti-Pak & fight a 'War of Liberation'




Flawed, TTP's back is broken, Don't forget that they tried to gain upper hand by unleashing carnage before initiation of Operation Rah-i-Nijat

you can suspect that this trade but unfortunately the facts are speaking differently, Questta Shura has been effectively liquidated with help of Pakistan, I repeat





hahahhha man fuuny, I like that
Indus water problem is our own, Don't know why is so much interested in it, When India itself is literally stealing water form every neighbor, you dream of creating this rift by using this Pakjab term & all that ethnic stuff will remain a wet dream
Punjab is a bigger province & it will have natural dominance, Don't know why Indians are having wet dreams after seeing this 'made up' rift between different ethic groups, I hope there were more Pakistanis here



Idenitiy that matters to me is Pakistani & moreover you can 'assume' things about me, I cannot stop you



You do Believe AL Jazeera

nice video ppl celebrating.i dont know why it took almost eight years and so many lives lost in pak that pak army acted now.may be it was the advent of civilian govt.with musharraf out of office and democratic civilian govt. in pakistan,pak army finally took action against terrorists.VTW on stealing water from indus here is a pointer from dawn news.india is not threatening jihad nuke war over water its pakistan politicians/analyst/media/writers crying hoarse from roof tops that india is stealing indus water and they r threatening nuke war over it.no doubt its always been habit of pakistan to negotiate while pointing guns to its head.but in this case they pointing nuke to there head.


The Pakistani Indus Commissioner has, on more than one occassion, accepted that India was not stealing waters and that there was a natural reduction in flows. He realizes that this natural reduction, coupled with the rights on the Western rivers given to India, which India has not exploited, will impact Pakistan. As abrogating the Treaty was next to impossible, it is calling for the 'spirit of the treaty'. If we look historically at the spirit, Pakistan exhibited the usual hate India spirit only before, during and after the Treaty. At the time of negotiating the Treaty, it first wanted to give us just 15.5 MAF of water only and later revised it to say that it wanted to take 70% of the Eastern rivers and all of the flows of the Western rivers. It wanted money for its part of the water works and India paid 62 Million Pound Sterling. It accused India of violating the Treaty when India started planning the Bhakra Nangal and delayed the project by 3 years. Ever since it has been accusing India on imaginary charges in the cases of Uri, Salal, Tulbul, Baglihar, Ranbir & Pratap canals, embankment on Ravi etc. So much for the contrast in the spirit between Pakistan and India.

 

[ajtr]

read the following blog of tariq tufail from karachi in which he proves that india is not stealing water but its the pakistani politician/jihadi/army's rehtoric and they are feeding pak public with lies


Indo-Pak Water Issues 101 – Tariq Tufail

Last week, the foreign secretaries of India and Pakistan met in New Delhi to end a “diplomatic freeze” between the two countries since the 2008 Mumbai attacks. According to Reuters’ Myra MacDonald, they did “what they were expected to do — laid out all the issues which divide the two countries and agreed to ‘keep in touch.’” However, the issue of water-sharing has been cause for contention between India and Pakistan over the years [it is also an internal issue in Pakistan among the provinces]. Below, Tariq Tufail, from Karachi, delves into the issues that stem from the 1960 Indus Water Treaty:

The Pakistan-India foreign secretary-level talks took place as scheduled. But curiously, apart from the usual rhetoric of “terrorism” from the Indian side and “Kashmir” from the Pakistani side in the run-up to the talks, water became the more prominent issue.

Though the water issue has been raised in the past, and is one of the sustaining factors behind Pakistan’s continued interest in Kashmir, the articulation of water as a core India-Pakistan dispute in such a distinct and clear manner is unprecedented. Within the space of two weeks, water was mentioned as one of the principal disputes between India and Pakistan by our Prime Minister, our foreign minister, our Chief of Army Staff (COAS) and curiously, even Hafeez Sayeed of LeT/JuD. In order to understand the issue better, it is important to first provide a background of the Indus Water Treaty (IWT).Broadly speaking, the IWT grants exclusive use of the three eastern tributaries of the Indus River – the Sutlej, Ravi and Beas Rivers - to India and the three western tributaries – Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab Rivers to Pakistan. India is entitled to use all of the 33 million acre feet (MAF) of water from the eastern tributaries, of which it currently uses 30 MAF. Of the three western tributaries, the Jhelum, Chenab and Indus itself, which carries a flow of 143 MAF, India is entitled to store 3.6 MAF and is allowed to irrigate 13,43,477 acres of land. India does not store any water as of now and irrigates 7,92,426 acres. In addition, India is entitled to build “run of the river” hydroelectric projects, which do not store water on the western tributaries. The rise in the country’s usage of the water allocated to India (which used to flow to Pakistan earlier) is stressing the water availability in Pakistan. In addition, reduced snowfall and shifting weather patterns is reducing the water inflow.

Cutting through the usual rhetoric of India “stealing” water, several possibilities have to be analyzed:

Pakistan is heightening the water issue to moderate the Indian negotiating tactic of focusing on terrorism
India is really stealing water and violating the treaty
India is not violating the “letter” of the treaty but the “spirit” of the treaty
India is neither violating the letter or the spirit of the treaty, but due to increased water requirements, Pakistan is laying the ground to re-negotiate the Indus Water Treaty
It will be fruitless to speculate on (1), so let us concentrate on (2), (3) and (4).

At this point in time, the Pakistani government has not proven that India has stolen water. The allegation of Indian water theft has not been substantiated by either telemetry readings submitted by India or by water monitoring by Pakistan and has not been raised during the meetings of water commissioners of India and Pakistan. Moreover, because water sharing between Pakistan’s provinces is a contentious issue, water monitoring in Pakistan is a murky issue. To prevent discord among the provinces, monitoring sensors installed by Siemens are frequently tampered with and some monitoring sensors are regularly lost due to theft and sabotage. Even our Indus water commissioner Jamaat Ali Shah and ex-finance minister, Dr. Mubashar Hasan agree that no provable water theft is being committed by India.

Therefore, the inescapable conclusion is that India is not violating the “letter” of the treaty, even if it may be maximizing its usage as accorded to India by the treaty. This is not enforceable in any court of law, and stirring domestic sentiment over such perceived “violations” reduces our policy options and creates disastrous consequences as the Baglihar episode showed, (for background on the Baglihar dam conflict, see this piece).

So what are the disadvantages of the massive construction spree by India?

The national security elements in Pakistan are concerned that even as India is not reducing the flow of water to Pakistan, it is rapidly acquiring the capability to do so by building dams. This is certainly an area of concern, but the IWT does not prevent India from being able to stop water flow into Pakistan at a future date. It only prevents India from stopping water flow. A positive aspect is that the IWT has stood the test of time, with no violations reported during the 1965, 1971, 1989, Kargil, Parakram and Mumbai standoffs.
Increasing India’s usage of the Indus is affecting Pakistan’s water supply and power projects. That is, the water that was allocated to India, which was previously un-utilized and subsequently flowed to Pakistan and was utilized by our farmers, is becoming increasingly scarce as India builds projects to exploit its share. Even though it causes massive problems in Pakistan, this point cannot be protested, since India is not in violation of the IWT. (For example, complaints about the Sutlej and the Ravi running dry are superfluous since India has exclusive rights to use the water of those rivers.)
So what can be done?

As pointed out beautifully by lawyer Ahmer Bilal Soofi, India cannot be compelled to give “concessions” to Pakistan as long as it complies with the letter of the IWT. Furthermore, any extraneous discussions about water sharing can be stymied by India, since water sharing according to the Indian stance is already settled by IWT. From their perspective, as long as India is not in violation of the treaty, there is nothing to discuss.

Of the remaining courses of action open to Pakistan, re-negotiation of the IWT has a very small chance of success (since both sides will try to get better terms than the current treaty even if India agrees to renegotiate). The right course of action is to massively modernize our irrigation infrastructure (it is estimated that up to 40% of water drawn from our head-works are lost due to seepage in unlined canals, theft and evaporation), stringently follow the inter-provincial water sharing accord of 1991, and gain the trust of the provinces so that new water projects such as Kalabagh can proceed without their objection while seeking unofficial concessions from India to tide over the interim 5-10 year period. However, seeking unofficial concessions might be a hard task, since it has to overcome the prevailing climate of suspicion between the two neighbors, as well as India’s own domestic interests like its own water requirements as well as the impact on public opinion and Indian farmers.

At the end of the day, the wrong course of action would be to stir public sentiment through half truths and lies and to involve non-state and Jihadi actors, which reduces the space for policy flexibility in Pakistan, and further hardens the Indian position.

 

[ajtr]

We will have to look beyond the Indus Water Treaty

At the recent foreign secretary-level talks between India and Pakistan in New Delhi, Pakistan’s foreign office team presented a paper on water issues to India prepared by Pakistan’s Indus Water Commission. Although water is not a core issue for the resumption of talks between the two nuclear neighbours, differences over the use of rivers assigned according to the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty have undercut peace-making efforts. As Pakistan and India’s populations grow, water for agriculture and electricity generation is in short supply. Pakistan’s Indus Water Commissioner Jamaat Ali Shah talks to Dawn.com about the urgent need to resolve water-sharing disputes.

Q. India says the Kishenganga project does not violate the Indus Waters Treaty. What is Pakistan’s position?

A. The Kishenganga River runs through Kashmir, and becomes the Neelum River. Water flows through Azad Jammu and Kashmir for 165 km before joining the Jhelum at Muzaffarabad. Now 70-80 kilometres of this river also run through Occupied Jammu and Kashmir. So the water re-routed by the Kishenganga power project reduces the flow of water going to Muzaffarabad. And then, Pakistan also has one project on the Jhelum River – the Neelum-Jhelum hyrdro-electric power project.

What are the adverse impacts of this one project according to the Indus Water Treaty? One, it reduces our annual energy generation. Two, the Kishenganga project also has an environmental impact because the depth of the water is reduced and this has an impact on the flora and fauna in Azad Jammu and Kashmir through which the Neelum flows. Three, there are technical problems in the design of the Kishenganga project such as the height of the gates and so on.

Q. But India contends that that it started its Kishenganga project earlier than Pakistan’s Neelum-Jhelum project. According to the Indus Water Treaty, India may construct a power plant on the rivers given to Pakistan provided it does not interfere with existing hydro-electric use by Pakistan. Is this true?

A. Yes. But the Jhelum waters were given to Pakistan. And going by the spirit of the treaty, while the waters are Pakistan’s to use, both countries can accrue benefits. When India made its plans known to Pakistan, that did not mean Pakistan did not have the intention [of constructing a plant]. In 1989, we told India that we are constructing a project there. India wanted to inspect the site. At the time, it was only a small exploration tunnel. Now the intention has been shown, with the Chinese being given the project. So we have a legal case.

Moreover, while the total quantity of water has not been changed, there are no guarantees that India will not store or divert water into the Wullar barrage. Certainly, re-routing will impact the flow-time and therefore reduce the quantum of water [to Pakistan].

Q. Where are talks between India and Pakistan on the Kishenganga project now?

A. In 1988, we came to know about Kishenganga and we asked for details. We were told that India was just conducting investigations. India is obliged by the treaty only to give detailed plans six months prior to construction.

In 1992 or 1993, India asked to conduct its first inspection of the site of the Neelum-Jhleum project in Azad Jammu and Kashmir. That was when there was just an underground tunnel. India told us unofficially that the tunnel was an eye-wash.

Then in 1994, we were officially informed about Kishenganga, which was to be a 330 watt storage work. Now in a storage work, there is no mention of diversion.

The commission held five meetings between 1994 and 2006 and the storage height of the dam was ultimately reduced by 40 metres. But by 2006, Kishenganga became a run-off project. Pakistan’s position was that this is a new project, the run-off was not in the 1994 project, and the 1994 project should be considered abandoned.

In June 2006, we raised objections. Between 2006 and 2008 the commission held three meetings. In 2008, Pakistan informed India that it intends to seek the opinion of a neutral expert appointed by the World Bank. India said Pakistan has no case and that there is no controversy since the Kishenganga project does not harm Pakistan’s usage. India wanted to resolve the issue at the level of the commission. So the government of Pakistan agreed to meet representatives of the government of India, but the meeting proved inconclusive.

So India and Pakistan agreed to negotiations, and in March 2009, Pakistan proposed two names of negotiators. But the Indian stance remained the same. According to the treaty, if negotiations reach a deadlock than a court of arbitration can be constituted with seven experts: two from the government of Pakistan, two from the government of India and three jointly named umpires. If these names are not jointly agreed upon, then the World Bank would help.

Pakistan’s point of view is that the direction of flow and environmental impact of the dam should be addressed by the court of arbitration, while the matter of design would be decided by the neutral expert.

Now, the Pakistan Indus Water Commission has shortlisted several names and these are with the foreign office and the law and justice ministry who have to finalise Pakistan’s two names.

Q. Will Pakistan be taking up other Indian projects with the World Bank?

A. As I said, India is planning two more power projects on the River Indus. But those of concern are the ones on the Chenab because we don’t have any storage site there. So the Chenab is more vulnerable. After constructing three, including Baglihar, India intends to construct 10 to 12 more dams on the Chenab and its tributaries.

Certainly, the treaty gives India the right, but the designs should be compliant. Already, India constructed the Wullar barrage unilaterally without informing Pakistan.

Q. It is said that the Baglihar dam issue was settled by the World Bank in India’s favour because Pakistan did not raise the objections in time. Do you agree with that?

A. Both parties had different points of view. When we approached the World Bank, India blocked us because it did not want a neutral expert. So the fact that a neutral expert was appointed was a small victory. The expert asked for documentation from us, which we provided. India believed that Pakistan was maligning them, but the fact is that the neutral expert settled three points in favour of Pakistan and one in India’s favour. And both parties bore the cost of the proceedings.

Both India and Pakistan need these waters and there is a need for candidness and transparency. Political considerations should not shadow the technical aspects. Unfortunately, the technical side is subordinate to the political side.

For example, India did not provide us updated flow data. In August 2008, India violated the treaty by not providing accurate data on the initial filling of the Baglihar dam. The treaty says the initial filling should not reduce the water flowing into Pakistan. So the initial filling of the Baglihar reduced Pakistan’s water and India should compensate for the lost water.

Q. What impact has the construction of Indian power projects had on Pakistan’s waters? We are, after all, facing shortages for agricultural use and electricity generation.

A. Apart from the Baglihar dam, neither Pakistan nor India has had problems with the Indus Water Treaty. But looking to the future, I foresee problems, especially given climate changes. India has already constructed 50-60, medium-sized projects and it plans more than a hundred. One hundred and fifty will be in the small catchment areas in Occupied Jammu and Kashmir. This is human intervention: imagine how many trees will be cut, and the resulting environmental impact? They will also impact Pakistan’s water, given the environmental degradation and increased sediment flow.

I think we will now have to look beyond the treaty for solutions. India is allowed run-off hydro-electric projects according to the treaty, but two or three is different from more than a hundred.

In 1960, Pakistan did not want to give three of its rivers to India, but it did. But clearly the World Bank had not factored in climate change and the impact of human intervention. I think the World Bank treaty is likely to be jeopardised. Already, we are facing a shortage in the western rivers, how can we then compensate for the lack of water in the eastern rivers?

Q. Do you think it is time to expand the scope of the treaty?

A. There are some issues with that. Right now, we need to protect and implement the treaty in its full spirit without re-visiting it. But both governments should initiate talks along with expert stakeholders.

Q. Would this be in India’s interest?

A. Yes, because we are neighbours. The Indus Water Treaty was not a happy marriage but we accepted it. But Pakistan should take action at the appropriate time: what happens to the state of Bahawalpur where the rivers Sutlej and Ravi are dry?

 

[ajtr]

Water issue can lead to nuclear war: Kasuri

LAHORE

PML-Q (likeminded group) Steering Committee Chairman Khursheed Mahmood Kasuri has said that water is the most important issue between Pakistan and India and if they do not take it seriously, it can lead to an atomic war.

Addressing a press conference at the PML Secretariat here on Tuesday, Kasuri expressed the concern over a meeting between Saudi Arab’s Shah Abdullah and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh which did not discuss the Kashmir issue. He said Saudi Arab, being an active member of the Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC), should have taken up the Kashmir issue. He said the Pakistan government should not beg India for holding dialogues and rather they should be held on an equality basis.

Kasuri termed the water issue a sensitive matter between India and Pakistan and the Indian government should adopt a serious strategy in this regard. He said Pakistan was having strong cultural and religious ties with Saudi government and the recent meeting between Saudi and Indian governments in which they avoided Kashmir did not reflect any change in Saudi governments’ policy. He said it was failure of the Pakistan government that it could not compel the Saudi government for taking up Kashmir issue with the Indian premier. He said the Pakistan government should have sent a special emissary to Saudi Arabia with a particular agenda but the government had not shown any seriousness.

Kasur said his government had taken up the issue of enhancing the number of Security Council members very seriously and had sent emissaries to Ghana and Ethiopia and had written letters to the UN. He said the present government was so engaged in internal crises that it was not focusing external matters.

He alleged that the incumbent government was continuing with the policies of previous government but it was not capable of following the policies of pervious government.

The former minister paid homage to 3,000 military officers who had sacrificed their lives in war on terror. He said it was unjustified that the western countries were putting pressure on Pakistan against generating nuclear electricity despite that Pakistan had not signed the NPT

 

[ajtr]

Friday Times – Latest issue

Getting ready for a ‘water war’?

Khaled Ahmed

For once Commissioner Jamaat Ali Shah is right. He sees no violation of the Treaty. And he has no jurisdiction over the new issue of scarcity of water because the Treaty doesn't deal with it

Pakistan may be getting ready to go to war with India, not over Kashmir, which it finds futile, but over the river water India is supposed to insist on stealing from it despite the Indus Water Treaty of 1960. Pakistan’s army chief has mentioned ‘water’ in his last challenging statement, followed by the Prime Minister, and there is a one-sided media war going on as the Indian side, still angry over the Mumbai attack, is poised to jump in, all guns blazing. One chief editor in Pakistan says Pakistan should nuke the Indian dams stealing Pakistani water – with him as human payload tied to a nuclear missile!

The world is waiting for this to happen. Water wars have been predicted by the UN, but statistics show that states continue to be sane over shared waters. The Economist wrote on May 1, 2008, ‘Researchers at Oregon State University say they have found that the world’s 263 trans-boundary rivers generate more co-operation than conflict. Over the past half-century, 400 treaties had been concluded over the use of rivers. Of the 37 incidents that involved violence, 30 occurred in the dry and bitterly contested region formed by Israel and its neighbours, where the upper end of the Jordan river was hotly disputed, and skirmished over, before Israel took control in the 1967 war’.

Alarmism of the Lower Riparian : The Economist ends by stating : ‘And some inter-state water treaties are very robust. The Indus river pact between India and Pakistan survived two wars and the deep crisis of 2002’. We may be about to prove the observation wrong. As we go for the next round of Indo-Pak talks – with the Indian army chief alleging cross-border infiltration in Kashmir – Pakistan’s lawyer Ahmer Bilal Soofi, writing in Dawn on February 20, 2010 focuses on the real issue : scarcity rather than theft of water, and recommends fresh talks to consider supplementing the 1960 Indus Water Treaty with a water regime during scarcity of water. The Treaty did not take into account the ecological change that would occur half a century later, depriving the subcontinent of rains and run-off from its mountain glaciers.

Today, water management is akin to conflict management. But India and Pakistan are busy conflict-creating: they started with Kashmir and have ended up with half a dozen more casus belli issues even as they talk peace. Water is the latest such issue. Before we as a lower riparian state raise the ante, let us consider some aspects of the developing confrontation. As a lower riparian, Pakistan is naturally alarmist. This is true of lower riparians anywhere in the world including lower riparian provinces in India and Pakistan. We don’t want water storage on our rivers in Kashmir; Sindh doesn’t want water storage on its rivers in Punjab. And Sindh is as alarmist and non-trusting vis-à-vis Punjab as Pakistan is vis-à-vis India.

Treaty good despite universal hatred of Treaty : In India everyone thinks signing the Indus Water Treaty was wrong. They know that not having a waters treaty is advantageous to the upper riparian if it is militarily strong. In Pakistan, even as Punjab and Sindh fight over waters, both sides denounce the 1960 Treaty. No one says how it would have benefited Pakistan if there was no treaty reserving certain rivers for Pakistan. In India those who hate the Treaty have a good reason for doing so : take all the water and make Pakistan suffer. One is astounded by the intensity of the warmongering in Pakistan over the waters, especially as one looks at the record of Pakistan’s past behaviour under the Treaty.

The Indus Treaty envisages three kinds of complications over waters. The first type is ‘questions’ which are resolved by the two sides through their water commissioners at the Indus Water Commission. The second is ‘differences’ for which the two sides approach the World Bank which appoints a neutral expert. The third type is ‘disputes’ which goes to a Court of Arbitration assembled by the World Bank for the purpose. Both sides fund the process; and the Court can also award costs. So far ‘questions’ have been many, but only one difference, over Baglihar Dam, which turned out to be not as grave as Pakistan had thought, which must have been chastening for our watchdog water commissioner, Jamaat Ali Shah. There has never been a ‘dispute’. It is on the basis of this record that the world thinks the Indus Treaty such a good bilateral arrangement. Have we learned anything from this record?

India allowed storage and some use of Western Rivers : Our bearded Water Commissioner Jamaat Ali Shah once symbolised our lower riparian alarmism, returning from his meetings in India with his dire warnings about the male fides of Indian intent. Today he is being castigated and even insulted on TV programmes because his accumulated knowledge prevents him from crossing the line on the jurisprudence of the 1960 Treaty. Discussants fall into red-faced paroxysms when he says India is not in violation even though it is in the process of building dozens of dams over our rivers – Indus, Chenab, Jhelum – and diverting water from Kishenganga.

As stated above, an upper riparian will not enter into a water treaty unless it sees advantage in it – an advantage over the lower riparian. Although Nehru is cursed in India for having signed the Indus Treaty, the truth is that he did extract from it the advantage of using some water from our three Western Rivers for consumptive use, that is, agriculture. Annexure C of the Treaty is about India diverting certain amount of water in certain months from the Western Rivers. Then, there is no bar on the building of water storage for electricity production or any other non-consumptive use on Western Rivers (Annexure E). If anyone complains in Pakistan about India building dams and taking some water out of our rivers, he speaks out of ignorance.

Water-management is conflict-management : For once Commissioner Jamaat Ali Shah is right. He sees no violation of the Treaty. And he has no jurisdiction over the new issue of scarcity of water because the Treaty doesn’t deal with it. He can only say he doesn’t believe what the Indians are saying; and he is saying that. India and Pakistan are facing a calamity they can’t quantify and that pertains to climatic change as never seen in human memory. This calamity is the ‘third party’ against which both should unite, taking along also the other states of South Asia. But this can only happen if India and Pakistan normalise their relations and become ‘sympathetic’ rather than ‘punitive’ in their view of each other. It has been observed in the context of riparian relations that water disputes can be resolved if relations are normal, that is, allowing interpenetration of interests through free bilateral trade and investment.

As a lower riparian Pakistan has no aggressive advantage, nuclear weapons or no nuclear weapons. All advantages lie in its median status and the potential it has as a trading corridor with regional states dependent on it for the movement of their goods and for the transit of their oil and gas pipelines. As stated above, 263 trans-boundary rivers in the world have caused the riparian states to cooperate rather than go to war. Many Pakistanis believe they have the advantage of leverage over America and can go on benefiting from America despite being anti-American. One has to look at Pakistan’s record with India to see how much leverage Pakistan has seen seep away as it follows its aggressive approach. Those who denounce the Indus Treaty in India want Pakistan to go on acting like this. We must remember that the Treaty can be set aside in the case of a hostile escalation; and the world will find itself siding with India if it thinks Pakistan is in the wrong.

Shahid Javed Burki’s advice for normalisation : Pakistan’s former finance minister and ex-vice president of the World Bank, Shahid Javed Burki, anticipating the Indo-Pak ministerial talks in late February 2010, wrote in Dawn (16 Feb 2010): ‘If thinking outside the box is to be encouraged, my suggestion would be that Islamabad base the dialogue on an entirely new consideration : how to bring about greater economic integration between the two countries.

‘The objective should be to develop a stake for India in the Pakistani economy and also in its stability. This would entail a number of things including unhindered flow of trade between the two countries, encouraging the private sectors on either side of the border to invest in each other’s economy, the opening up of the border that separates the two parts of Kashmir to trade and movement of people, and grant of transit rights to each other for trade with third countries. As the experience of Europe shows, economic integration among states with a history of hostility towards one another is a good way of easing tensions. Taking that approach would constitute real thinking outside the box’.

 

[ajtr]

'Not part of Pakistan'

Mangla Dam was built between 1961 and 1967 primarily to increase the amount of water that could be used for irrigation from the flow of the Jhelum and its tributaries. It was constructed pursuant to the Indus Water Treaty and with funding from the World Bank.

The core trench of Mangla Dam is 10,300 feet long and 454 feet high with a reservoir of 253 square kilometres. On its impounding in 1967, the Mangla Dam had an original gross storage capacity of 5.88 million acre feet (MAF).

The secondary function of Mangla Dam was to generate electricity from the irrigation releases through the head of the reservoir. Mangla Dam has the potential to produce 1,000MW of electricity. (What is actually produces is another matter.)

For the newly conceived state of Pakistan, the construction of Mangla Dam was in step with its ambitions to harness the country's enormous agricultural potential and to supply the increasing demand of electricity in accordance with the country's growing industry. For the people of Pakistan Mangla Dam was one of the icons, along with Tarbela on the Indus and the Kaptai of the Chittagong Hills Tracts, of the time euphemistically referred to as the "Decade of Development."

The Decade of Development (1958-68) did not come without its sacrifices.

The construction of Mangla and Kaptai each displaced over 100,000 people. The wretched fate of the people of the Chakma and Hajong tribes of the Chittagong Hill Tracts is not the topic of this column. This column is about the sacrifices made by the people of the Mirpur district of Azad Jammu and Kashmir who were forced to move from Mangla Dam's storage area. Though the government of Pakistan agreed to pay compensation to those displaced and royalties to the government of Azad Kashmir for the use of the water and electricity generated by the dam, the fact is that that people of 280 villages and the town of Dadyal gave up their homes so that Pakistan could have its "development." Such was their devotion to their fellow Muslims in Pakistan.

Because of sedimentation, Mangla Dam has lost 1.13 MAF of storage capacity and its current live capacity of 4.58 MAF implies a reduction of nearly 20 percent in the capacity of the dam. Because of this, the government of Pakistan launched the Mangla Dam Raising Project, which is a plan to raise the dam by 40 feet. This will increase the reservoir capacity by 18 percent and provide an additional 644Mwh of electricity. It also involves the displacement of over 40,000 people.

Sacrifices such as these give meaning to Pakistan's hard stance on the Kashmir issue. Sacrifices such as these give us pause for thought when our rhetoric on Kashmir begins to ring a bit hollow. Our stated position on and dedication to the Kashmir cause failed to pass muster recently when Pakistan refused the request made by the government of Azad Jammu and Kashmir for the allocation of some 614 cusecs of water for irrigation purposes.

The water situation in the country is fast forming into a proper political debate. Many have been foretelling water as the pre-eminent political issue of the future. Their auguries are coming to pass. The "El Nino" weather effect is causing water shortages and draught in the entire region. The issue of water, despite the reluctance of India, is on the agenda in the upcoming foreign secretaries-level talks. Punjab and Sindh have been at each other's throats over water supply in the Chashma-Jhelum Link Canal. (Either way, thousands will be affected and there will be corresponding crop failures.)

The Indus River System Authority (IRSA) has been unable to resolve the inter-provincial bickering and, only last week, the prime minister summoned the chief ministers of all the provinces along with leading officials of the Water and Power Development Authority and the Pakistan Indus Water Commissioner to Islamabad to find out what was going on. And, to top it all, there are almost daily items in our press where experts are lashing out at India for "stealing" our water. In some instances, senior journalists have been reported to have suggested that Pakistan take out India's dams with its nuclear arsenal.

The growing political consciousness on the water issue notwithstanding, IRSA declined the request made by the government of Azad Kashmir. The refusal was based on the grounds that, since Azad Jammu and Kashmir was not part of Pakistan, IRSA could not determine its water rights. This decision has turned relations between the governments of Pakistan and Azad Kashmir cold. Recently, before Kashmir Day (celebrated as an official holiday in our Islamic Republic) on account of the IRSA refusal, the prime minister of Azad Jammu and Kashmir informed the protocol office of the president of Pakistan that, should the president come visiting Mirpur, he would not be greeted in person.

IRSA's refusal will also have impacts on how the government of Azad Kashmir will respond to the ongoing Mangla Dam Raising Project, especially the thorny issues of displacement and compensation. The IRSA refusal also reveals the extent to which Pakistan's rhetoric towards its Kashmiri brothers and the Kashmir issue is hollow.

It is Pakistan that runs on electricity produced by Mangla. It is Pakistan's irrigation that has benefited from the storage capacity of Mangla. It is the people of Azad Jammu and Kashmir who have borne the brunt of the construction and operation of Mangla. Yet, when they ask for 614 cusecs, they are told that they are not part of Pakistan.

It would seem appropriate if the government of Pakistan and the people of Pakistan made the odd sacrifice for their Kashmiri brothers as well. We could start by better irrigation techniques that do not waste water. Efficient water use would mean we could spare the water that the government of Azad Kashmir says it needs. Alternatively, we could start by eliminating water theft. (Though, how can it be theft if the water is, at all times, passing through government-controlled canals?)

We could start by forcing our electricity consumption to be made efficient.

At present, nearly 20 percent of all electricity produced in Pakistan is wasted on account of "line losses." We could start by eliminating these wastages. If our energy usage could be made more efficient, we wouldn't need to have Mangla Dam Raising Projects and the displacement of tens of thousands.

We can start by showing our Kashmiri brothers what their sacrifices have meant for us, and what we are willing to do for them. Either that, or give up the Kashmir issue altogether. It's the very least we could do in order to be spared being called hypocrites.

 

[johnee]

a) I never denied it
b)whats makes you think that, in swat initially people wanted peace under Taliban but once they tasted it & saw expansionist mind set of TTP, they turned against them Operation took place & now they are happy, peace is returning
I am not going to say that things you said are practically non existent but this does not means that all Pushtuns will go Anti-Pak & fight a 'War of Liberation'

Emoji, I have not said that Pashtuns will fight a 'war of libration' against PA(though I wont mind if they do that. ). I have merely said that there is a widespread discontent brewing in Pashtun community against PA(for conducting various opearations where mostly the innocents were put to harm without hurting the real terrorists) and Pakjabi elites(who were indifferent to the plight of Pashtuns).

Flawed, TTP's back is broken, Don't forget that they tried to gain upper hand by unleashing carnage before initiation of Operation Rah-i-Nijat

Once the Ops stopped, the attacks by TTP are also stopped. Quid pro quo. 'You dont attack and we dont attack'.

you can suspect that this trade but unfortunately the facts are speaking differently, Questta Shura has been effectively liquidated with help of Pakistan, I repeat

Nope, facts are not speaking anything thus far. Remember the Paki officials were denying even the existance of any such shura, now few arrests and they claim that the shura is 'liquidated'. Its just a continuing hogwash by PA. Most of those who were arrested were moderates or those who were ready to negotiate(keeping PA out of loop).

hahahhha man fuuny, I like that
Indus water problem is our own, Don't know why is so much interested in it, When India itself is literally stealing water form every neighbor, you dream of creating this rift by using this Pakjab term & all that ethnic stuff will remain a wet dream
Punjab is a bigger province & it will have natural dominance, Don't know why Indians are having wet dreams after seeing this 'made up' rift between different ethic groups, I hope there were more Pakistanis here

Emoji, Pakjab enjoys resource allocation that far exceeds its proportionate size with regard to other provinces. For eg: Balochistan is a resource rich land and its population density is low. If the resource allocation were to be fair, then the Balochs would be quite rich and luxurious.

As for Indus water, emoji, your own official has said very clearly that India is not to be blamed for the shortage of water. Here's the link. Sindh is the place that is really affected by the water shortage. India still adheres to IWT inspite of shortage of water on our side yet the water does not reach the Sindh, why? Because, there is a Pakjab in the middle.

Emoji, you dont have to worry. Pakistan will not break regardless of our 'wet or dry dreams' as long as Pakjabis are smart enough not to let other ethinic tribes realise how they are being manipulated.

Idenitiy that matters to me is Pakistani & moreover you can 'assume' things about me, I cannot stop you

Thanx.

Ok, I will assume the following things about you given that you have declared yourself as a Pakistani girl:

a)you are a muslim( because most Pakistanis are muslims. Of course, there is small and diminishing minority but I dont think you belong to any such group)

b)you are a sunni(because sunnis are the majority in Pakistan. Of course, there are shias and those poor lot are targetted by all and sundry. Also, there are other sects present but they are also in minority and many of them are considered munafiqs by their fellow muslims of Pakistan. I dont think you belong to any such group)

c)you are a pakjabi(because you obviously own a computer and have a net connection. That makes you an elite in Pakistan. And mostly such luxuries are afforded by only Pakjabis in Pakistan. Of course, there are fair percentage of Sindhis in this group as well, but I dont think you belong to that group).

My future interactions with you would be based on these asssumptions.

 

[hit&run]

lol Pakistan is killing those who were already changing sides both ways. None of them killed till date was what US asked. Pakistani offences have made the situation more complicated. US will clean only its own shit not Pakistani.

Meaner India will prevail. Thanks Pakistan for making it more easier for India and complicated for USA.

 

[DaRk WaVe]

Emoji, I have not said that Pashtuns will fight a 'war of libration' against PA(though I wont mind if they do that. ). I have merely said that there is a widespread discontent brewing in Pashtun community against PA(for conducting various opearations where mostly the innocents were put to harm without hurting the real terrorists) and Pakjabi elites(who were indifferent to the plight of Pashtuns).

discontent, i just posted a video about pushtuns in Bajur you can see it, moreover if there will be collateral damage it happens every where, PA has got humans as it soldiers
I am really amused by this Pakjab theory of yours, carry on with it

Once the Ops stopped, the attacks by TTP are also stopped. Quid pro quo. 'You dont attack and we dont attack'.

before rah-i-nijat started we had worst months, , was that similar to this theory, No, They tried to pressurize the GoP not to do any Operation & spread chaos, they failed in it

Nope, facts are not speaking anything thus far. Remember the Paki officials were denying even the existance of any such shura, now few arrests and they claim that the shura is 'liquidated'. Its just a continuing hogwash by PA. Most of those who were arrested were moderates or those who were ready to negotiate(keeping PA out of loop).

you people say that we talk about good & bad taliban, now don't you think that theory applies here, the thing is we got them, may be hard to digest but we did & BTW its not few, just turn the pages & see the original leaders & the ones captured or killed, you will understand

Emoji, Pakjab enjoys resource allocation that far exceeds its proportionate size with regard to other provinces. For eg: Balochistan is a resource rich land and its population density is low. If the resource allocation were to be fair, then the Balochs would be quite rich and luxurious.

There are elites who enjoy resources every where, they don't exist in Pakistan alone, as for Baluchistan, its our problem & Bramdad has got no significance, He can rant on & for the people of Balochistan things are being done & will be done

As for Indus water, emoji, your own official has said very clearly that India is not to be blamed for the shortage of water. Here's the link. Sindh is the place that is really affected by the water shortage. India still adheres to IWT inspite of shortage of water on our side yet the water does not reach the Sindh, why? Because, there is a Pakjab in the middle.

Though i don't have much knowledge about this water issue, but let me tell you the outstanding problem of NFC Award that existed between our provinces was solve in a way that no one from any province objected to it(there goes your Pakjab) & i am sure we can apply the same to our other problems, no need for you to worry about our internal problems, you really can't cash on them

Ok, I will assume the following things about you given that you have declared yourself as a Pakistani girl:

a)you are a muslim( because most Pakistanis are muslims. Of course, there is small and diminishing minority but I dont think you belong to any such group)

b)you are a sunni(because sunnis are the majority in Pakistan. Of course, there are shias and those poor lot are targetted by all and sundry. Also, there are other sects present but they are also in minority and many of them are considered munafiqs by their fellow muslims of Pakistan. I dont think you belong to any such group)

c)you are a pakjabi(because you obviously own a computer and have a net connection. That makes you an elite in Pakistan. And mostly such luxuries are afforded by only Pakjabis in Pakistan. Of course, there are fair percentage of Sindhis in this group as well, but I dont think you belong to that group).

My future interactions with you would be based on these asssumptions.

hahahhahha man funny, that was the best one, so now you think that internet connection is a kind of 'rare facility', happens, i can understand your frustration

http://propakistani.pk/2009/01/24/internet-users-in-pakistan-hit-175-million-mark/

http://propakistani.pk/2009/02/07/broadband-users-to-hit-5-mln-mark-in-3-years/

& I am proud to say I am no 'elite', I am a girl who's working her way through thick & thin along with her mom & will continue to do so & will be there when ever her country calls for her

but still you can assume no problem, i know some what its hurting you but sorry about that

 

[Pintu]

A request to all , please try to remain in between the topic of discussion, no need to get into assumption of identity of a member , hence all this type of posts will be moderated, kindly continue with the discussion.

 

[johnee]

discontent, i just posted a video about pushtuns in Bajur you can see it, moreover if there will be collateral damage it happens every where, PA has got humans as it soldiers
I am really amused by this Pakjab theory of yours, carry on with it

I have seen the video posted by you, thanx for posting it. Now please see the following videos, they offer a different version:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RuHtSgXMcqg

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xwmLdL8o6fM&feature=related

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JV3kgVcB87k&feature=related

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u8JKxvFTEXM&feature=related

The above videos show the integrity of Ops launched by PA and how the innocent civilian Pashtuns were targetted delibrately. This is the reason for discontentment against PA.

As for TTP, they saw the launching of these Ops(however ineffective or farcical in nature) as a betrayal and vowed vengeance against PA. Thus, they went after PA's assets. Since TTP stronghold is Peshawar, most of the attacks on PA's assets were in and around Peshawar where obviously some Pashtuns died as a collateral damage.

Now you see, PA delibrately targetted Pashtuns to give a feeling to the world that they are doing Ops against the Talibs, the Talibs saw these Ops as betrayal of PA at the behest of US and attacked PA and its assets.


Lastly, I am really amused that Pakjab theory is amusing to you. BTW, the term Pakjab may be new to you, but the theory is not new(neither is it mine). Infact, this Pakjab theory led to the breaking of your nation in 1971. West Pakistan(bengalis) had greater population in terms of ethinicity than other provinces of Pakistan(including Pakjab). Thus, if democratic process was implemented to elect a leader, the bengalis would have dominated the Pakistan. Obviously, Pakjabis would not let that happen and launched a genocide on Bengalis through PA. This led to a large scale humanity crisis and India was forced to intervene and the rest is history.
Similarly, today PA is attempting a genocide against Balochs. Similarly, in the name of different Ops, Pashtuns' lives are ravaged PA leading to a large scale humanity crisis. Similarly, Sindhis are parched because water share is all used up by Pakjab. Thus, Pakistan's history replete with such examples.

before rah-i-nijat started we had worst months, , was that similar to this theory, No, They tried to pressurize the GoP not to do any Operation & spread chaos, they failed in it

It was PA that was desperate to avoid any conflict with TTP even stooping low to make a deal with TTP. But eventually, they were armtwisted by US to act. They conducted a few dog and pony shows. They, perhaps, hoped that 'friendly' TTP would understand. TTP did not understand, moreover, interpretted it as deep betrayal('You too brutus!!). And what followed was TTP's anger against PA. Once PA shifted focus away from TTP, TTP stopped attacking PA. Quid pro quo.

you people say that we talk about good & bad taliban, now don't you think that theory applies here, the thing is we got them, may be hard to digest but we did & BTW its not few, just turn the pages & see the original leaders & the ones captured or killed, you will understand

Ha ha...Good twist. Did anyone talked about good taliban or bad taliban? One only talked about those who were pro-PA and those who were ready to 'betray' PA by negotiating and thereby keeping PA out of loop.

There are elites who enjoy resources every where, they don't exist in Pakistan alone, as for Baluchistan, its our problem & Bramdad has got no significance, He can rant on & for the people of Balochistan things are being done & will be done

Sure.

Though i don't have much knowledge about this water issue, but let me tell you the outstanding problem of NFC Award that existed between our provinces was solve in a way that no one from any province objected to it(there goes your Pakjab) & i am sure we can apply the same to our other problems, no need for you to worry about our internal problems, you really can't cash on them

Well, there is no cash in Pakistan, so we cant cash on anything anyway.
The fact stands that the Pakjab enjoys resources, funds and power disproportionally by usurping the fair share of other provinces. Of course, its your internal issue, I was merely pointing it out.

hahahhahha man funny, that was the best one, so now you think that internet connection is a kind of 'rare facility', happens, i can understand your frustration

http://propakistani.pk/2009/01/24/internet-users-in-pakistan-hit-175-million-mark/

http://propakistani.pk/2009/02/07/broadband-users-to-hit-5-mln-mark-in-3-years/

& I am proud to say I am no 'elite', I am a girl who's working her way through thick & thin along with her mom & will continue to do so & will be there when ever her country calls for her

Thanx for the links and appreciate your patriotic fervour. I am sure you feel you are not an elite and perhaps feel that your position fairly normal. But you should look at the general level of Pakistani population. How many girls in Pakistan are educated? How many of them work? How many of them can afford a computer? How many of them own a internet? Think, and you will know whether you are an elite or not.

I am sure that a baloch girl or a pashtun girl, most probably, would not have these facilites.

but still you can assume no problem, i know some what its hurting you but sorry about that

I didnt understand why you feel I am 'hurt'(or 'frustrated'). Emoji, I assure you that you have not 'hurt' me or 'frustrated' me. Infact, I am happy to chat with you.

 

[ajtr]

Afghanistan - What India should expect and what it should do

Afghanistan has been at the cross roads of great empires and thus a scene for frequent/brutal conflict but never under the control of any outside power for long. In the last 30 years Afghanistan has seen the effects of a Communist takeover promising liberation from feudalism and assuring equality, a religious bigoted group establishing itself spearheaded by US led Islamic zeal, followed by the US attempts to give the hapless country liberty and equality. Today we once again see the return of the Taliban and the US eager to negotiate with the same ideology and the same people they wanted to overthrow in 2001. There are many who say that this is actually a display of ethnic nationalism under the guise of a religious movement.
Situation in Afghanistan is a very complex one with a number of actors - internal and external, conflicting interests and capabilities. It is not likely to change in the next few years.
• This includes the various ethnic nationalities of Afghanistan.
• The warlords and their vested interests in the production and smuggling of narcotics, and arms. • Corruption alone is a US $ 2 billion industry. A weak government in Kabul without any viable succession option visible.
• Its inability to exercise any control outside Kabul is well known. Has weak army and law enforcement machineries; their growth is hindered by factors of corruption and local ethnic interests. Attempts to establish an ANA and ANP have been slow and arduous.
• Most importantly, there is more than one group operating inside Afghanistan and many from Pakistani soil.

There are any number of external players and their own interests. The US and its allies want to make US free of any terrorism emanating from Afghanistan which is a threat to them and their allies. To do this they rely on Pakistan whose interests are different from the American interests and whose co-operation is less than forthcoming. Having made Pakistan totally indispensible to their cause they US has allowed Pakistan to play the spoiler. Pakistan, obsessed with India, has assumed that the control of Kabul slipping into the hands of the Taliban and that the Taliban being under their control would leave them in an advantageous position vis-a-vis India. The Pak establishment has endeavoured, successfully so far, to keep India out of any international arrangement aimed at solving the Afghan tangle.
That being so, a solution to the problem is equally difficult.

There are several kinds of insurgencies afloat in Afghanistan since 2002.
The Quetta Shura in south and east Afghanistan . Sirajuddin Haqqani in Pakhtia, Pakhtika, Jalalabad . Salafis of Hayatullah in Kunnar and Nooristan. Hizb- e-Islami of Hikmetyar but have now mostly been fighting under the banner of Taliban. The Pakistani Taliban, their own sub groups according to region and clan, and their various associates from the LeT , JeM, SSP, LJ. And then, there is the Al Qaeda.
For the present Pakistan may exult. It presumes that the inevitable and hopefully substantial departure of the US/NATO would leave it with the much sought after strategic depth.

It is difficult to predict if and when the US will change its decades old policy of pardoning Pakistan all its transgressions. What we need to take into account is that one of these days the US will carry out its much vaunted but ridiculously inadequate much delayed surge, declare mission accomplished and thin out. Its long-term policies are dictated by election year compulsions. Once the coalition forces begin to pull out a few things will inevitably happen as other interests try to fill the empty spaces. It is a retreat by another name. It is different from the Vietnam quagmire because the Vietnamese did not come after the Americans for vengeance. The Afghans will. Istanbul and London are the markers for the retreat. Although US may put whatever spin it may want to.

Pakistan will naturally assume that its moment has come again and it could now acquire its much dreamt strategic depth, throw the Indians out and be the overlord in Afghanistan.

• The Iranians are unlikely to remain idle spectators as a Sunni Wahabbi neighbour is going to be unsettling factor for them.
• Saudi Arabia on the other hand would want a Wahhabi regime in Afghanistan that would check the Iranians and hopefully also keep the anti-Saudi extremists in Afghanistan.
• The Chinese have already begun to move in with their commercial and resource interests into Afghanistan as they would see an opportunity to move closer to the Persian Gulf, given their steady relations with the Iranians. The Chinese would see themselves moving into empty spaces up to the Persian Gulf vacated by a retreating American empire without having fired a bullet and lost a man. They also need to keep the Islamist extremists away from sensitive areas like Xinjiang so their presence in Afghanistan and image might be an insurance against the marauding extremists.
• The Central Asian Republics and Russia have their concerns about the dangers of Talibanised ideology spreading into their countries. Russia is realigning; so is Japan..
• Finally, the absence of a strong centralised authority will only create more confusion in a country that has been run on drug money and foreign doles.
• Pakistan’s exultation may be temporary. Unable to control its own territory it is unlikely to be able to run Afghanistan in the way it may want to. It does not have the resources to do so and the US, hopefully, may not sub lease Afghanistan to Pakistan this time. The other very real danger is that the Pushtuns on both sides of the Durand Line, joined together in a common fight for decades, may well ask if they fought all these years only to end up being minorities in both countries. The departure of the Coalition Forces will only add to the instability of the region and India needs to prepare itself for this eventuality.

It is an accepted fact of history that the Taliban were the creation of Pakistan. But what is not known today is the degree of control Pakistan exercises on the Taliban.

Either way it is feared that there will be a destabilising effect on PK. One would doubt if the Pushtun/Taliban will rest after assuming power in AF. A victorious Taliban in Kabul is less likely to accept the Durand Line. Please do not pooh pooh this, ridicule it, ignore it as an IN dream; do please look at it as a PK nightmare.
Rahimullah Yusufzai in a recent article in the News (Feb 2, 2010) made this very astute observation when he said that the “Return of the Afghan Taliban to power whether by force or some peace process, would definitely raise the spirits of the Pakistani Taliban and likeminded jihadis and thus lead to fallout on the situation in Pakistan.” He added that “There is bound to be fallout on Pakistan when the world's most powerful armies are involved in the longest war in the US and NATO history in neighbouring Afghanistan. And the fallout is to be expected because the US and NATO consider Afghanistan and Pakistan's tribal areas as theatres of the same war and have thus deliberately named their strategy to deal with the challenge as Af-Pak.”

If the Taliban succeed in Afghanistan then one can expect a repeat of what happened in India after the retreat of the Soviets from Afghanistan. There will be far too many unemployable jihadis in Pakistan and besides the jihadis would want to continue their jihad having defeated another superpower.

The status of the ANA and ANP

The dilemma is that losing is not an option for the US; stalemate is strategic defeat for a superpower; troop augmentation to the extent required is unacceptable, and even a surge of 40000 is difficult. The much talked of Afghan army is still a ghost army. Ann Jones in her report in the Nation (Sep 21, 2009) had described the Afghan Army as a figment of Washington’s imagination. It does not exist in the numbers claimed, it is poorly trained, many of the recruits/trainees are repeats who come back with new names for the money, the food and the equipment they can take away and sell. It is a frightening thought to have a man trained with rubber guns for three weeks, then given the real gun and sent off to fight battles for his country.

This became apparent when the Helmand campaign began last July and the ANA could muster only 600 men, far short of the 90000 that are supposed to be enlisted. The hope that Afghanistan will suddenly have an efficient 134000 strong army in two years is very much a false hope. What should worry Washington is that there have been reports of demoralisation and self-doubts among some sections of the US forces. The state of the Afghan police is even worse with 60% suspected to be on drugs. Ill equipped and ill trained, they are easy pickings for the Taliban. No wonder Pakistan will continue to hedge its bets with the Taliban, targeting only those that they see threatening them. They are aware also that NATO countries may not be able last out in Afghanistan much beyond 2010.

There are many Afghans who do not see the Taliban as necessarily bigoted or evil; they see the possibility of a more rational Taliban regime once the US has left.

Striking deals with the Taliban

It is presumed that some kind of a deal will be attempted in the months ahead. Mullah Omar will accept to negotiate only after the US /NATO leave. If the US objective is to get rid of foreign militants then the Taliban may be more willing to talk. But the trust deficit is huge.

The Afghan/Pushtun/Taliban fear is that the surge and augmentation of ANA/ANP would eventually mean more targets, more damage more explosions - more deaths and destruction. This would be a part of the surge.

All indications are that the US/NATO will commence withdrawal/disengagement around mid-2011. It is necessary for us to think of the post-US situation. The West had made it their business 8 years ago to get rid of Al Qaeda and Taliban from Afghanistan to make America and its friends safe. Today, they rationalize and prepare for a dignified exit by saying that AQ is not really in AF while the Taliban are a reality, so the world must deal with this reality.

There is talk of good/moderate Taliban and the hardcore/bad Taliban. These are essentially rationalisations to set the new discourse. Moderate Taliban or those who will be weaned away from the main Taliban may not have the authority to deliver what they promise. It is doubtful, if Taliban would strike a deal with the US under pressure from the Pakistanis on terms that are more favourable to the Taliban than to Mullah Omar. Attempts to divide the Taliban have essentially failed. In India we should stop post-event rationalisations on behalf of the Americans.

Pakistan’s options
One sees a new mood in Islamabad post Istanbul and London. A new mood of assertiveness, self confidence and aggression is visible in Kayani’s statements and Qureshi’s choreographed obduracy prior to the talks and collective theatrics afterwards. Pakistan will up its demands with Washington in the months ahead. For India it will do likewise. The cue this time will be water. Pakistan will buy additional insurance for itself in Afghanistan while keeping its options in India open and up the ante in Kashmir. This will be to provoke an Indian reaction and get out of having to take sterner action against the Taliban in Balochistan and Afghanistan.

• One can expect the following in the next few months from Pakistan:
• Intefada type protests in Kashmir
• Provocations to keep Indian Army engaged yet seek their withdrawal
• Terrorism in the rest of India.
• One can expect continued terrorist attacks in Afghanistan against Indians and Indian assets to frighten away India from Afghanistan since persuasion through the US has not succeeded.
• Water will be the issue that will be used to unite the people against India as the temperature in Kashmir is raised.
• Consolidate in Afghanistan by making itself a party to any negotiations that the Americans may have with the Taliban, so that Pakistan remains in control
• Insulate and preserve India-specific terrorist organisations for use from time to time.
• Talk to India patronisingly as a favour to the US

What should India do

• Indian primary interest is to prevent Pakistan from using Afghanistan as a base for terrorist activity in India.
• The other interest is to seek access to Central Asia through Afghanistan and Iran, since Pakistan will not oblige.
• It would be self defeating to withdraw from Afghanistan at this juncture after the attack in Kabul because this is what the Pakistanis want India to do. India must therefore continue with its present policy of providing infrastructure and financial assistance to the Karzai government something which has earned India tremendous goodwill in that country.
• It is hoped that by staying on and continuing this assistance under greater safety guarantees from the Afghan government could help strengthen Karzai’s hands.
• India needs to develop contacts/strengthen them as the case maybe with all sections in Afghanistan, with different power centres and ethnic groups, including the Pushtun and the Taliban too.
• Russia, China, the Central Asian Republics and Iran are all extremely wary of the spread of Wahhabi Islam and its destabilising consequences for their region and their own countries. These are the other interested regional powers with whom India must seek common ground to address common problems.

 

[ajtr]

im not happy coz u left bengalis.

 

[DaRk WaVe]

I have seen the video posted by you, thanx for posting it. Now please see the following videos, they offer a different version:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RuHtSgXMcqg

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xwmLdL8o6fM&feature=related

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JV3kgVcB87k&feature=related

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u8JKxvFTEXM&feature=related

The above videos show the integrity of Ops launched by PA and how the innocent civilian Pashtuns were targetted delibrately. This is the reason for discontentment against PA.

As for TTP, they saw the launching of these Ops(however ineffective or farcical in nature) as a betrayal and vowed vengeance against PA. Thus, they went after PA's assets. Since TTP stronghold is Peshawar, most of the attacks on PA's assets were in and around Peshawar where obviously some Pashtuns died as a collateral damage.

Now you see, PA delibrately targetted Pashtuns to give a feeling to the world that they are doing Ops against the Talibs, the Talibs saw these Ops as betrayal of PA at the behest of US and attacked PA and its assets.

every one has a different version, firstly you said that Peshawar is a strong hold, all right, its the biggest city of NWFP & also a city surrounded by volatile regions & the biggest city near the Disturbed areas

the security at borders of Provinces & at entry & exit points of Big cities is extremely tight, Most of time they don't get through e.g. Two suicide bomber were intercepted on Motorway which lead to Lahore, Some Uzbeks caught in Sindh etc
so Peshawar becomes a target of Choice

& moreover if you will see the the recent carnge on Peshawar more than 90% of the attacks were carreid out on Civilians, which in no way is 'collateral damage' neither these attacks targeted security apparatus e.g the Meena Bazzar Attack, which is totally a civilian area, This proves that they were out for blood & it didn't mattered for them who's blood it was

At least 101 killed, 150 injured; fire destroys several buildings; many trapped in debris: Peshawar bomb targets women, children

PESHAWAR, Oct 28: At least 101 people, mostly women and children, were killed and over 150 injured when a huge car bomb ripped through a crowded market here on Wednesday.

The blast triggered a huge fire which engulfed a number of buildings near the Meena Bazaar. A plume of dust and smoke billowed from narrow lanes of the market situated in the old part of the city.

A senior intelligence official blamed terrorists based in Darra Adamkhel for the attack. “We intercepted a call last week in which militants were talking about a ‘heart-rending’ attack in Peshawar,” he said.

A representative of the shopkeepers’ association said threats had been received in recent days with militants demanding that women be forbidden from going to the market.

The blast took place in two narrow lanes between Meena Bazaar and Kochi Bazaar frequented by women. A cotton warehouse in the market caught fire which spread to several buildings on the Cheri Koban road. A number of shops along the narrow road, vehicles and carts were gutted.

Most of the bodies were charred beyond recognition and till late night only 25 of them had been identified.

Hospital sources said the death toll could rise because scores of badly burnt and injured people were in a critical condition.

http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect...ris-peshawar-bomb-targets-women,-children-909

Moreover the peace in Swat is only favouring the PA, because it was PA who did it & peace is returning, No Pushtun IDP (whom i met) were against PA's Opeartion in Swat..

Swat people happy with anti-Taliban banners

Tuesday, November 17, 2009
Delawar Jan

PESHAWAR: The display of anti-Taliban banners by unknown persons in various areas of Kabal(don't confuse it with Kabul) was the topic of discussion in Swat on Monday and majority of people hailed the move as a sign of an end to the Taliban era.

Kabal residents said on Sunday that they saw anti-Taliban banners calling leader of the Swat militants Maulana Fazlullah a “shameless” person. “Where is the shameless Fazlullah?” was the slogan inscribed on one of the banners. One can infer from the writing on the banner that those having displayed the banners were criticising the Taliban leader for going underground.

Other slogans included, “Taliban’s friend is the nation’s foe,” and “The Taliban movement is virtually the movement of oppressors.”

“Taliban network has been dismantled and their leaders killed or arrested. The supply of money and arms and ammunition to the militants has been stopped and now they are hiding,” PPP-Sherpao Swat President Sher Shah Khan said when asked to comment on the display of anti-Taliban banners.

People said the display of banners had proved the militants had been eliminated from the valley, an impression that would prove a shot in the arm for the government to win the confidence of the Swat people.

At one stage, the distrust between the people and security forces had alienated the people of Swat.

“The militants have been routed and order restored in Swat, and today people feel secure,” said the former nazim of Koza Bandai Union Council Sher Khan. The display of banners in their strongholds left no doubt that Taliban had now become history, he said.

Who has displayed these banners? People in Swat believed the military might have done that. However, Sher Khan said the people would also take such measures to prove that Taliban had no place in the valley.

Restoring peace and arresting and killing some of the top Taliban commanders in a massive military operation launched in May this year, the security forces are yet to track down the most wanted Fazlullah.

Some of his key lieutenants have also managed to remain at large even after six and a half months of the offensive, aimed at driving the militants out of Swat and capturing the top leadership.

The federal ministers and government authorities have stated several times that the Taliban chief in Swat had lost his one or both legs during the operation, but this claim could not be confirmed from independent sources.

“Previously, Taliban were throwing away bodies of people but today their corpses are being plunked,” a resident of Mingora said on condition of anonymity.

A member of Global Peace Council, Ibarahim Dewlai, brother of slain Taliban leader Ali Bakht, said the display of banners was the final nail in Taliban’s coffin.

The residents said it would help remove fear of Taliban from the hearts of people and bury the myth about their power. “In an area where Taliban would behead people for uttering a word of dissent, the display of banners is people’s victory,” Muhammad Yar of Kanju remarked. He said people were now doing their routine work without any fear.

The militants have been unable to launch any attack during the last 75 days, a tremendous success in an area from where several incidents of violence were reported daily.

http://www.thenews.com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=208982

Life returns to Pakistan's Swat Valley​

I had the rare opportunity to tour the conflict-affected areas by helicopter, where access has been restricted due to security concerns. Flying at treetop level provides an eerie sense of omniscience, looking onto rooftops and into courtyards. The contours of the land, the underlying patterns of villages and roads become clear, especially in the rugged mountains of Swat where the roads snake over passes and along ridges, houses hug the mountainside alongside terraced ridges.

Displaced families are returning to their homes in Pakistan's Swat Valley, months after fleeing a Taliban onslaught. Photo: Reuters/Faisal Mahmood, courtesy of Reuters AlertNet - Homepage

As we flew yesterday, we passed over a long line of trucks, rickshaws, cars and buses filled with the displaced residents of Swat returning home. The "all clear" has been sounded for all of Buner and most of Swat, the two districts of Pakistan where conflict had pushed out most of the residents in a terrifying exodus — most of them left with minimal possessions, and many of whom walked for several days until they reached either transport or shelter. The elderly and infirmed were often left at home, unable to withstand the journey and taking their chances as the Pakistan military sought to crush the Taliban insurgency once and for all.

Most importantly, traveling with Pakistan country director Steve Claborne, we were able to make a quick aerial assessment of the damage that awaited the returnees. Thousands of people have returned over the last two weeks. Once again, I was struck by the extraordinary resilience of people.

We touched down in Mingora, Swat's largest city, and toured the already-bustling marketplace, perhaps already 30 percent back in business. Open-front shops were selling produce, household goods, flowers and — most interestingly — radios, cassettes and videos, which were banned under the Taliban rule of the last several months. Women were on the streets, after having been forced inside under the Taliban. Laundry flapped in nearly half the houses and children tumbled out to wave at us.

Damage is centered on buildings near the roadside, on the 230 schools destroyed by the Taliban and in the buildings that housed the insurgents. There is rubble; there is damage, but the determination of the people to return from the ferocious heat and hopelessness of the camps is clear. Mercy Corps will focus our return programs on helping people quickly recover and get back to school and work.

Life returns to Pakistan's Swat Valley | Mercy Corps

then recent Take over of Bajur, I have shown you the AL Jazeera Video about it, It is enough source to prove my point, If there would ahve been discontent the Tribal Militas would not have supported PA in its offensive, They want peace & death of militants & that is happening

Lastly, I am really amused that Pakjab theory is amusing to you. BTW, the term Pakjab may be new to you, but the theory is not new(neither is it mine). Infact, this Pakjab theory led to the breaking of your nation in 1971. West Pakistan(bengalis) had greater population in terms of ethinicity than other provinces of Pakistan(including Pakjab). Thus, if democratic process was implemented to elect a leader, the bengalis would have dominated the Pakistan. Obviously, Pakjabis would not let that happen and launched a genocide on Bengalis through PA. This led to a large scale humanity crisis and India was forced to intervene and the rest is history.
Similarly, today PA is attempting a genocide against Balochs. Similarly, in the name of different Ops, Pashtuns' lives are ravaged PA leading to a large scale humanity crisis. Similarly, Sindhis are parched because water share is all used up by Pakjab. Thus, Pakistan's history replete with such examples.

I absolutely agree that East Pakistan was the biggest mistake we did, our leaders were extremely short sighted, 'Operation Search Light' being an example how stupid Generals can get & we literally presented East Pakistan to India in a plate & you grabbed it, but don't use this word 'had to interfere', you supported a Full Time insurgency there
as i mentioned before about the NFC Award, which is actually about distribution of resources among provinces, has been finalized with no province angry at it, you this Pakjab theory goes go down the drain

NFC award

The hammering out of a consensus among the centre and the provinces on the seventh National Finance Commission award is a major achievement and a positive event for those who believe that the future of a vibrant Pakistan lies in a democratic federation.

The seventh NFC has established a number of milestones. For the division of resources among the provinces, the federation has moved away from the unsatisfactory single criterion of population to a multi-criteria award that includes poverty/backwardness, revenue collection and generation, and inverse population density. Moreover, the centre and the provinces have shown a spirit of fair play when addressing Balochistan and the NWFP. Balochistan has been guaranteed a minimum award, with the centre pledging to make up for any shortfall, while in a nod towards the NWFP’s extraordinary burden in the war against militancy, the province has been promised a special one per cent of the undivided federal pool.

The centre too has shown flexibility. The old framework in which subventions, grants and other special awards by the centre took 10 per cent out of the total revenue pool has been dropped and the revenue collection charges pocketed by the centre have been slashed to one per cent. All of this increases transparency and takes some of the sting out of the charge that the centre is short-changing the provinces. Of course, the NFC has not addressed all complaints, and challenges remain in the years ahead. Foremost among the challenges are the revenue and expenditure projections. Finance Minister Shaukat Tarin has said that the tax-to-GDP ratio will be increased to 13.9 per cent over the next five years — it currently hovers around 10 per cent — and that federal expenses will be reduced to 12 per cent of GDP at the end of that period, as compared to the present 14.6 per cent. But hiking tax collection/revenue and slashing expenditure is easier said than done — indeed, every government promises the same but few have been able to deliver.

Nevertheless, while cautioning that the seventh NFC is not a panacea, we are indeed grateful that it appears to be a step in the right direction. In some quarters, such has been the dismay over the current phase in the transition to democracy that people could be forgiven for thinking that perhaps democracy can never work in Pakistan. But the consensus on the seventh NFC award is a sign that, political differences aside, not only do the provinces and the centre want to make democracy work, they in fact can do so when given the time and space to make difficult decisions.

I am not saying that there are NO problems, but don't you exaggerate things, the Elites even exist in ur country as well, which is performing very well economically, but still Farmers are committing suicides & poverty is still there, ever though of that?

but in the end you know I know & you also know that 'comparison of poverty & elites' won't take you & me any where, They are there, the only Thing that matters is how me 'minimize the damage', as for Blaochistan, There is no 'genocide going on', Action will be taken against those who will challenge writ of Gov & 'collateral damage' will happen, Just like it happens every where

‘Aghaze Huqooq-i-Balochistan’ package

ISLAMABAD: All out efforts will be made to bring Balochistan on a par with developed areas of the country, Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani said on Monday.

Talking to a delegation from Balochistan which included Governor Nawab Zulfiqar Magsi and Chief Minister Nawab Mohammad Aslam Raisani, he said the government believed in developing consensus on all vital national issues and to this end was working on the Balochistan package, which would address the province’s political, social and economic problems. Federal ministers Makhdoom Amin Fahim, Raja Pervaiz Ashraf, Babar Awan and Syed Khurshid Shah and Senators Raza Rabbani and Mir Lashkari Raeesani, who is also chief of the PPP in Balochistan, also attended the meeting.

The meeting unanimously approved the package’s name: ‘Aghaze Huqooq-i-Balochistan’.
Senator Rabbani, head of the parliamentary committee on Balochistan, gave a briefing on the recommendations incorporated to the package.

He said that the package contained three parts – constitutional, administrative and economic.

The constitutional part, he said, would be looked after by the constitutional reforms committee while administrative and economic side would be taken care of by the prime minister.

It was decided that input of Balochistan lawmakers would be incorporated in the final draft to make the package effective and successful.
The prime minister said that the federal government attached a priority to socio-economic development of Balochistan because it was vital for the country’s progress
It was PA that was desperate to avoid any conflict with TTP even stooping low to make a deal with TTP. But eventually, they were armtwisted by US to act. They conducted a few dog and pony shows. They, perhaps, hoped that 'friendly' TTP would understand. TTP did not understand, moreover, interpretted it as deep betrayal('You too brutus!!). And what followed was TTP's anger against PA. Once PA shifted focus away from TTP, TTP stopped attacking PA. Quid pro quo.

as for water i won't poke my nose into it, for now, as i am really not 'into' this issue

Ha ha...Good twist. Did anyone talked about good taliban or bad taliban? One only talked about those who were pro-PA and those who were ready to 'betray' PA by negotiating and thereby keeping PA out of loop.

From when did we started having 'Moderate Taliban', ain't that similar to Good & bad taliban, No negotiations took place between any High level Taliban Official & ISAF, you think Taliban will negotiate while they know 30,000 more troops are coming to their very own Helmand, you can't talk to them, its like 'kill or be killed' when are you dealing them, You can't keep PA out on loop in Afgh & you know it
but Afgh problem can be certainly solved without India

Thanx for the links and appreciate your patriotic fervour. I am sure you feel you are not an elite and perhaps feel that your position fairly normal. But you should look at the general level of Pakistani population. How many girls in Pakistan are educated? How many of them work? How many of them can afford a computer? How many of them own a internet? Think, and you will know whether you are an elite or not.

I am sure that a baloch girl or a pashtun girl, most probably, would not have these facilites.

their number are increasing will continue to increase so, we don't have a Swat valley on every corner of Pak(which is on the way to peace)

just because you think that girls don't have computer & access to facilities dosen't make any difference, Just look around on Social sites you will see Pakistani Girls literally swarming, its another case that 1 out of 1,00,000 girls is interested in 'forums', but you can still assume me 'elite', doesn't matter, but remember what Pintu said

I didnt understand why you feel I am 'hurt'(or 'frustrated'). Emoji, I assure you that you have not 'hurt' me or 'frustrated' me. Infact, I am happy to chat with you.

ok, but stop using this 'ji', I know it is used for 'respect' but it certainly is 'odd'

 

[ajtr]

Live video feed from predator drones trageting taliban in pakistan.

[video]<object id="flashObj" width="486" height="412" classid="clsid27CDB6E-AE6D-11cf-96B8-444553540000" codebase="http://download.macromedia.com/pub/shockwave/cabs/flash/swflash.cab#version=9,0,47,0"><param name="movie" value="http://c.brightcove.com/services/viewer/federated_f9/3924348001?isVid=1&publisherID=1274168784" /><param name="bgcolor" value="#FFFFFF" /><param name="flashVars" value="videoId=34442050001&playerID=3924348001&domain=embed&" /><param name="base" value="http://admin.brightcove.com" /><param name="seamlesstabbing" value="false" /><param name="allowFullScreen" value="true" /><param name="swLiveConnect" value="true" /><param name="allowScriptAccess" value="always" /><embed src="http://c.brightcove.com/services/viewer/federated_f9/3924348001?isVid=1&publisherID=1274168784" bgcolor="#FFFFFF" flashVars="videoId=34442050001&playerID=3924348001&domain=embed&" base="http://admin.brightcove.com" name="flashObj" width="486" height="412" seamlesstabbing="false" type="application/x-shockwave-flash" allowFullScreen="true" swLiveConnect="true" allowScriptAccess="always" pluginspage="http://www.macromedia.com/shockwave/download/index.cgi?P1_Prod_Version=ShockwaveFlash"></embed></object>[/video]

 

[ajtr]

Here are the series of editorials of Ajai Shukla in business standard from july 2008 on india role and options in Afghanistan.

Ajai Shukla: Planning for doomsday

Ajai Shukla / New Delhi July 15, 2008, 0:50 IST
It's called "mission creep" … the creeping expansion of objectives, and the resources that are deployed towards a strategic aim. After a bloody week in Afghanistan — not just for India, but for Afghan civilians and US forces as well — New Delhi is confronting an urgent question: should India send in more forces, even the military, to secure our interests in that volatile country?



Accelerating that re-evaluation has been media commentary calling for increased military presence. A respected national daily editorially observed, "After the Kabul bombing, India must come to terms with an important question that it has avoided debating so far. New Delhi cannot continue to expand its economic and diplomatic activity in Afghanistan, while avoiding a commensurate increase in its military presence there. For too long, New Delhi has deferred to Pakistani and American sensitivities about raising India's strategic profile in Afghanistan."

This dilemma was at the heart of Foreign Secretary Shiv Shankar Menon's Sunday visit to Kabul, ostensibly to rally morale in the embassy. Fortunately there was no discernible sign of mission creep. Menon assured President Hamid Karzai that India will stand fast in Afghanistan, but the primary responsibility for safeguarding the 4,000 Indian doctors, engineers, scientists, executives and labourers there remains with Kabul.

The concept of "Indian security for Indian workers" is an attractive one for a country proud of its military, but must be evaluated cautiously, with a clear understanding that Afghanistan is transitioning from insurgency to civil war. Troops are sent into a deteriorating situation only if their presence can transform impending defeat into a realistic chance of victory. The situation in Afghanistan may have moved beyond that point.

India's engagement with that country, therefore, must be characterised by the deployment of "soft power", not the military. The palpable Afghan affection for India flows more from its engagement with Mumbai than with New Delhi. Indian films, music, dance, food, and the peaceful generosity of Indians have transformed our country in Afghan minds into an idyll that far exceeds the reality. This perception has been reinforced by clever aid diplomacy; India has sunk three quarters of a billion dollars in Afghanistan's medical facilities, educational institutions, public transport, irrigation schemes, even that country's parliament building.

To now throw troops into what will inevitably become a bloody struggle for power risks smudging India's benevolent image. Even with the mandate to do no more than safeguard Indian workers and assets in Afghanistan, an enhanced Indian security presence will find its role expanding as the environment becomes more hostile. The very presence of an Indian force will be a magnet for renewed attacks.

Instead, Indian planners should be considering that, perhaps three years along, US and NATO forces may pull out of Afghanistan. Hamid Karzai would be history, and Afghanistan itself divided into different zones of control. In that Afghanistan, India's physical presence may well be reduced to zero. The ITBP will have pulled out; development projects will have shut down; elements hostile to India may well control large parts of the country; the embassy and India's consulates may close shop. This is what happened in 1996; today, only American and European support — fickle, and already wavering — prevents a return to that time.

The US and NATO militaries are already losing the battle as they realise too late that the battlefield is not confined to Afghan soil. After the killing of nine US soldiers on Sunday in a Taliban assault on a US post near the Pakistan border, General David McKiernan, the top NATO commander, fumed that militants based in Pakistan had staged attacks in Afghanistan "almost every day I have been here."

Unlike Russia, which faced the same situation in the 1980s — an insurgency operating from Pakistan's North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Baluchistan — the US and NATO are making strenuous efforts to shut off Taliban support across the Durand Line. On Saturday, the US Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, paid an unscheduled visit to Pakistan. He demanded to meet army chief, General Pervez Kiyani, and told him, apparently in the baldest possible terms, that if the Pakistan army was not going to crack down in the NWFP tribal areas, then US and NATO forces in Afghanistan would operate across the border into Pakistan.

But despite those threats, and the occasional cross-border foray, western forces in Afghanistan can hardly influence events in Pakistan's tribal areas. Only the Pakistan army can do that, but remains unwilling to do so. General Kiyani drew Admiral Mullen's attention to the 800 Pakistani soldiers who have already been killed in counter-militancy operations in the NWFP, suggesting that Pakistan had already done enough. (India has lost close to 7,000 soldiers in J&K.) The army brass in Pakistan — which will eventually have the final word on this — has not yet come round to accepting that the military has little choice but to transform the NWFP from a sanctuary into a battlefield.

Without that realisation in Rawalpindi, a couple of years more of rising casualties in Afghanistan could well trigger a US and NATO pullout. India's actions today must create influence and goodwill that will sustain itself even without a physical presence. New Delhi must play its own hand in The Great Game in Afghanistan, building bridges with every community and spreading developmental aid across different regions. The Afghan government must be urged to provide the security needed for these projects to continue as long as possible. And if India is forced to pull out in another interregnum of turmoil, we will continue to reap the benefits of a low-key, aid-driven policy.

ajaishukla.blogspot.com

Ajai Shukla: The Indian ant in the Afghan flood

All of India's projects will cease to matter in 2013, when New Delhi will have to pull down the shutters and exit from Kabul
Ajai Shukla / New Delhi October 6, 2009, 0:23 IST
India needs to remember that even the most industrious ants are swept away in a flood! Even as New Delhi logs success after success in development projects in Afghanistan, the storm clouds of the Taliban are gathering across that country.


In the latest example of how AfPak is going the Taliban way, eight American soldiers were killed on Saturday when the Taliban stormed a US outpost near the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. The attackers’ rifles and rocket launchers were pitted against American mortars, guns and air strikes, but numerical superiority made up for that, with jehadis pouring across from hideouts in Pakistan. The locals supported the Taliban because an American air strike had killed over a dozen villagers just the week before.

Today, the spectre of 1992 looms over Afghanistan, when Soviet-style communism collapsed and the civil war began, leading to the victory of the Taliban in 1996. It would not be rash to predict that US forces will pull out from Afghanistan by end-2011, a year before the next US elections. Two years after that, in 2013, the Taliban could well control Kabul.

But India’s Afghanistan policy appears paralysed, an aid policy substituting for a realistic political strategy. All of India’s development projects—those roads, electrical transmission lines, irrigation projects, schools and democratic institutions—will cease to matter around 2013, when, like in 1996, New Delhi will have to pull down the shutters and exit from Kabul ahead of the Taliban troopers. After that, as it did from 1996 to 2001, India will live on in Afghan hearts, while Pakistan-sponsored fundamentalists live in Afghan government buildings.

“What can we do?” shrug senior Indian officials. “If we have to pull out, we’ll pull out,” they say.

This time, though, India could remain out of Afghanistan indefinitely. There is no Ahmed Shah Masood to keep the Taliban at bay, even if in just a sliver of Afghanistan. And the chances of another 9/11—which swept India back into Kabul, piggybacking on American power—can be safely discounted.

One way of preventing this disaster is by working with the US to split the Taliban and win over fighters who are not ideologically committed. Instead of silently acquiescing to the blunt US and NATO strategy of defeating the Taliban militarily, India must point the way towards a more nuanced strategy: understanding the Taliban, identifying each of its components, stepping up military pressure on the irreconciliable ideologues and then winning or buying over the opportunists.

The prospect of “Talking to the Taliban” evokes strong reactions, mostly: “You can’t talk to those jehadis! Just crush them underfoot.”

That line of talk comes from those who don’t understand the nature of warfare in Afghanistan and its shifting system of alliances. After three decades of warfare and turbulence, Afghans see no glory in dying in battle. Fighters expect their leaders to switch allegiance in time to avoid unnecessary casualties and to remain on the winning side. Building a winning image is half the battle won, because then half the opposition will cross over.

A handful of committed ones will never change sides. That is why, the strategy of talking to the Taliban excludes dialogue with Mullah Omar and the Quetta Shura. They are beyond the pale and New Delhi must ensure that Washington understands that. Islamabad’s recent offer to initiate talks with Mullah Omar merely invents a role for Pakistan. Instead, the Taliban Emir must feel the heat of US arms, even sitting in Quetta.

But most fighters wearing Taliban turbans today consist of ideologically uncommitted village militias, who believe the Taliban are headed for a win. Most began their fighting careers in the 1980s as US-funded mujahideen to fight the Soviet occupation; in the 1990s, when the communists sank and the Pakistan-aided Taliban were resurgent, they switched sides and grew their beards. After the Taliban were routed in 2001, the beards went off again. Scores of militias waited to see whether Hamid Karzai was worth joining—apparently he wasn’t, because shaving went out of fashion and the Taliban ranks swelled again.

Karzai, already discredited, is now an untouchable after rigging the recent general elections. His lack of legitimacy has also put paid to America’s exit option, which involved training Afghan soldiers and policemen, and handing over the country to a popular Afghan leader. New Delhi must point out to the US that a victory in Afghanistan, in the short time available, can only come by winning over large sections of the Taliban. Indiscriminate battlefield confrontation must make way for a carrot and stick policy, where Taliban commanders are lured by a share of local power (even at the cost of Karzai’s officials) as well as dollops of money to ease their transition.

ajaishukla.blogspot.com

Ajai Shukla: Managing India's image in Af-Pak

Ajai Shukla / New Delhi March 09, 2010, 0:18 IST

The February 26 gunning down of Indian workers in Kabul, followed by the stoppage of work by Indian doctors at the Indira Gandhi Institute of Child Health, is a tragic step towards what this column has long predicted: that, as the Taliban inexorably extend its influence, India will thin out in Afghanistan; and pull out entirely when a Taliban takeover appears imminent (Planning for doomsday, July 15, 2008; and The Indian ant in the Afghan flood, October 6, 2009).

Assessing whether it was already time to scale down was part of the mandate of National Security Advisor Shiv Shankar Menon during his weekend visit to Kabul. Despite Menon’s brave words about not cowing before terror, New Delhi understands that its public has little appetite for receiving body bags from Kabul.(this is very true of indian public.people here will remember the public outcry during 199 indian airlines hijack to kandhar,when media and indian were very ready to give up the india itself.) Unable to send in troops to protect its aid workers, India’s options are narrowing.

What will remain after India’s inevitable departure from Afghanistan is an enormous fund of goodwill generated by our billion-dollar aid-driven engagement since 2001. Projecting soft power rather than hard has been a wise and far-thinking strategy. Pakistan’s geographical proximity to Afghanistan; its cultural and religious affinity; and its self-destructive wielding of the instruments of radicalisation, all mean that Islamabad can out-kill anyone in Afghanistan. Most Afghans, including the Pashtuns, distrust and resent Pakistan; but the power to kill and coerce looms larger in the short term than the power to feed, teach and enrich.

But from a longer-term perspective, India will retain enormous influence within Afghanistan, a dormant clout that will survive the power fluctuations that characterise that country. When the environment changes, that influence will flower again.

Inexplicably, the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), the creator of India’s far-sighted and pragmatic Afghanistan strategy, sheds this sophistication while dealing with our more immediate problem, Pakistan. The Indian public is entitled to fulminate about Pakistan’s self-destructive support to cross-border militancy and terrorism. But Indian policy-makers, while reflecting public anger, must also have a cooler plan. Instead, while correctly visualising Afghanistan as a patchwork of competing constituencies, the MEA addresses Pakistan as a wall-to-wall bad guy. New Delhi talks to Islamabad, but India remains disengaged from the real Pakistan.

So, which Pakistani constituency should India address? The United States, with its penchant for immediate fixes, has invariably chosen to talk to the Pakistan Army. But there is a structural reason why India cannot follow this path: the most fundamental institutional interest of “the khakis”, as Pakistan’s liberal fringe calls the army, has traditionally lain in holding up India as an adversary. The India bogey guarantees status, funding, housing and the freedom to run the country.

Today, India is especially vital as the spectre that will extricate the Pakistan Army from messy counter-insurgency operations in its tribal areas. So crucial is the Indian bogeyman that Kashmir is now getting a back-up for keeping the animosity bubbling. India’s perfidy in water-sharing is being dragged centre stage, most recently by Lashkar-e-Toiba chieftain Hafiz Saeed, that old and trusted servant of the General Headquarters in Rawalpindi. Without a trace of irony, he calls it “water terrorism”.

If the khakis are ruled out as interlocutors, what about the candle-lighters: Pakistan’s liberal fringe, an ineffectual menage of rights activists, academics, authors, poets and members of the English media. Pleasant individuals for the most part, they have served Pakistan well by masking a deeply regressive society with a patina of western-style modernity. But they have notably failed in bringing change to Pakistan and, because so few are listening to them, are granted their little space in society.

That leaves the Pakistan proletariat, small-town residents and rural peasants, most of whom are inimical to India because of the educational, social and political environment that they live in. Their religious environment is even more worrisome, with an increasingly radical clergy preaching the message of global jehad. At first look, this might appear a wasted cause for India; but deeper thought indicates that this is the audience to be addressed.

Admittedly, shaping opinion amongst the Pakistani masses will not yield results in the immediate and directly political way that shaping opinion in India does. In that under-developed democracy, security policy is only weakly linked with public perception. But, just as in Afghanistan, where India has nurtured roots that will survive a brushfire, a carefully targeted perception campaign can temper rural Pakistan’s reflexive anti-Indianism. The most potent weapon in this endeavour is information.

I remember listening, on radio monitoring networks in J&K, to conversations amongst radicalised and indoctrinated jehadis who had just infiltrated across the Line of Control. They had been told in Pakistan that every mosque in J&K had been burnt and that the Indian Army carried off any woman they fancied; all this is uncontested truth in the villages of Pakistani Punjab. It is a reality that India needs to challenge with information.

Such a campaign cannot be mounted by the MEA, which focuses excessively on scoring diplomatic points with Pakistan. Nor can it be an intelligence-led operation, which will quickly lose credibility. What is needed is a multi-disciplinary effort that carefully nuances the message and obtains the means of delivery, perhaps a special organisation under the Ministry of Culture. India needs to think carefully about spreading its message within Pakistan.

ajaishukla.blogspot.com

** comments in red are mine.

 

[ajtr]

An Indian In Kabul

One of the first questions I am asked by Afghans is: Am I a Hindustani or a Pakistani? And when I respond, the smile and welcome I get overwhelms me... Friday, 26 Feb was the first time I felt unsafe here, exposed because of my nationality...
I woke up on Friday morning around 6.40 to a loud noise, thinking we were having another earthquake. That illusion dissolved within seconds when I heard the second blast and then gunfire. Within minutes, after a call from a colleague, the four of us living in our staff compound got together. We could see the smoke from the blast and hear continuous firing for more than two hours after that. Details of what was happening kept coming in along with rumours. The one thing we were sure of in the initial hour was that it was an attack in the area of Shar-e-Naw -- the city centre. All through the day, I was in touch with friends at the Indian embassy and others, and every call added another horror. It was too close to home this time around.
I am a development professional who has been living in Afghanistan now for nearly two years. This is not the first time I have lost friends or colleagues to an attack of this nature, nor would it be the last. The first big explosion was a few months after I came here -- the attack on the Indian Embassy in July 2008. Still new to the country, my initial thought was that it was a car back- firing, till I saw colleagues moving away from glass windows. That was my induction to life in Afghanistan. The second one was when one of my first friends here, a Canadian AID worker, was killed on her way back to Kabul from visiting a community education project. Three other colleagues died with her.

Over the years, one has grown accustomed to the fact that insecurity is a constant part of life. One doesn't even think about it, until another attack/kidnapping happens. Then you find out the details, try and understand where we can tighten security, what one needs to avoid or be careful about and move on to business as usual. It's the only way you can survive working here.

But this Friday was different. I knew many of those killed. I have memories of going to Noor Guest house to visit the doctors when I had been ill, and having heard Nawab, the tabla player, at cultural events numerous times. These were people and places that are like my back yard. My favourite sheer yak (local ice cream) shop is the one next to where the Noor Guest house once stood. It has been vaporised now. I know the children who beg on these streets. I know some of them by name -- they are part of the fabric of my life here. This was an area which has numerous guest houses where friends and colleagues are put up when they are visiting. This time around, I have still not been able to put this behind me and move ahead.

It is the first time I have felt unsafe here, exposed because of my nationality and the fact that I am a Kharaji (foreigner). Till now I have basked in the love and affection the people of this country have showered on me. The way they have opened their hearts and homes to me has always made me feel at home. But I no longer feel that I could blend into the crowd at Mandayee or Laysee Mariam (the local markets), having been told enough number of times that I can pass off for an Afghan woman, till I open my mouth. Now every time I am on the streets and my head- scarf slips, I feel exposed.

One of the first questions I am asked by Afghans is: Am I a Hindustani or a Pakistani? And when I respond, the smile and welcome I get overwhelms me. Indians are loved in this country. Is that all an illusion? I used till now to believe that I am not as much of an outsider as other expats here. I have never been as conscious of my nationality as I am here, both in a positive and negative way; it had never been something that I allow to define me exclusively.

The slightest sound now startles me into thinking: Is this another attack? I do feel unsafe now, however much my friends and colleagues have tried to comfort me and tell me otherwise, it's a sad state of being. I don't live in a fortress with armed guards, and I don't wish to either. That isn't why I am here: to hide behind armed guards, only move between office and home. I am here to get to know this country and its people, to contribute in any small way I can to its development. Large gatherings of Indians is a security risk we are being told, that one needs to avoid guest houses and other places where there is a large Indian population.

I organised a prayer meeting a few days ago in memory of all those who lost their lives in Friday's attack: Afghan, Indian, Italian and French. All of Friday there were calls from Afghan friends and colleagues reaching out. They live with this insecurity every day of their lives. They live with the fact that today might be the last day of their lives. Every single one of them has lost loved ones in the last 30 years of war; I hope I have imbibed some of their strength and resilience while I have lived in their country.

I do not want this fear to remain and change me, I want to continue living and working here with my friends. But I do live with the reality that if 'they' are out to get you, they will. This is the phrase most often used by the Indian and Expat community here. It could just also be a matter of being at the wrong place at the wrong time which, I reflect, is true of any other part of the world as well.

The tragedy is that my memories of Afghanistan are built around such incidents -- those are the time- lines we use here: The day of the Serna attack was the Bollywood party, the day of the German embassy bombing was when our Health Grant came through. These are the incidents you use to remember when things happened. When will this change? In my lifetime? When will my Afghan friends who have had to leave their country be able to come back?

I am of course here by my own choice. My Afghan friends and colleagues don't have that choice. They can't escape the violence. The children on the streets don't have that choice.

 

[ajtr]

Gen Kayani’s moves suggest that he sees the final lap, argues Nitin Pai

US President Barack Obama gave his AfPak speech at West Point on December 1, 2009 where he announced his intention “to begin the transfer of our forces out of Afghanistan in July of 2011.” Pakistani Army chief Gen Ashfaq Parvez Kayani signalled his policy by the end that month when a suicide bomber attacked a CIA facility at Khost in Afghanistan

Mr Obama’s speech might have triggered the Pakistani military-jihadi complex into implementing its endgame strategy. Pakistani actions over the last three months suggest that it is both attempting to hasten the US exit from Afghanistan and neutralising the other regional actors — Iran and India — which might oppose a pro-Pakistan post-US arrangement in Kabul. From the attack on the CIA at Khost; to the capture of Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar in Karachi; to the terrorist attack at German Bakery in Pune; to the raid on Kabul City Centre; to the rendition of Abdolmalek Rigi to Iran; and most recently, the attack on Indian officials at Kabul, Gen Kayani & Co have executed their moves masterfully.

Mullah Baradar was not only a ‘moderate’ among the Quetta Shura Taliban, but also actually negotiating with the United States and the Karzai Government, against the wishes of the ISI. ‘Capturing’ him not only allowed Pakistan to undermine the US-Afghan political initiative but also allowed Gen Kayani to be seen as arresting a ‘high-ranking Taliban leader’. This was a brilliant move — Washington had to praise Pakistan even after receiving a kick below the belt. It was, nevertheless, a significant setback for independent US political efforts in Afghanistan. It meant that the US relies a little more on Pakistan to act as the, well, interlocutor with the Taliban.

Abdolmalek Rigi, the leader of a Iranian-Baloch-Sunni terrorist organisation called Jundallah, was almost certainly a CIA asset. The Iranian Government has accused him of both being a US agent and of having links with Al Qaeda. Both these charges are perhaps true — contradictory as they might seem. The ISI allowed him to operate from Pakistani territory, for the CIA, against Iran for several years. But after India, Iran and Russia — whose interests were ignored at the London Conference on the future of Afghanistan — started coming together, the ISI played the CIA out and handed him over to Iran. The US can’t complain too loudly, after all, like Mullah Baradar, hasn’t Pakistan just acted against a terrorist with links to Al Qaeda?

(There was the little issue of how to hand Rigi over without setting a precedent that New Delhi might exploit-so an elaborate drama became necessary.)

With Iran it was mollification. With India it is aggression. The attack on Indian officials in Kabul is intended to scare India out of Afghanistan. Even as the Pakistani military-jihadi complex seeks to hasten US military withdrawal, it is working towards installing its proxies into the corridors of power in Kabul. It will allow President Hamid Karzai to remain in office just long enough to provide a political cover for the US — but before long, a pro-Pakistan regime will take his place.

Is Gen Kayani overplaying his hand? Maybe. But bringing the situation to a head before 2011 works to Pakistan’s advantage.

Will the US watch silently as the Pakistani military-jihadi complex destroys its assets and — brazenly, if cleverly — frustrates its designs? Will the vaunted COIN campaign work fast enough? Will the US intensify its covert war inside Pakistan to counter Gen Kayani’s moves? Let’s see.

 

[DaRk WaVe]

Stranded in Afghanistan​

National security adviser Shiv Shankar Menon went to Afghanistan a week after the terror attack on a small hotel housing mainly Indians, ostensibly to beef up security arrangements. While this was clearly one of the main tasks of his visit, it will not be speculation to add that a prime concern here is to re-gain India’s faltering grip in Kabul. More so after its diplomacy received a severe setback at the London Conference on Afghanistan where India was unable to garner support for its position in the region.

So while security is a pressing concern, India has become a target for the Taliban as well as various anti-India outfits operating in and out of Afghanistan. In the absence of a clear-cut strategy and vision, India finds itself isolated, with Turkey seizing the initiative to bring Islamabad and Kabul together on a ‘talk to Taliban’ policy. Pakistan, which has been spearheading a campaign to make India pull out of Afghanistan, has succeeded to a point where while New Delhi’s efforts at reconstruction are recognised by the West, its strategic considerations find no supporters. As the London Conference amply demonstrated the US and its NATO allies have decided to go along with the good and bad Taliban policy of Pakistan, drawing a distinction between the hardliners and moderates so as to begin talks with the latter.

On terrorism too Pakistan has been able to convince the world that it is as much a victim as India, and that it needs all the help it can get to protect its people from the extremists. It is of course true that terror has struck Pakistan hard and fast, but it is also true that Pakistan still seeks to protect those groups that it has used for terrorism within Jammu and Kashmir, and other parts of India. But given the fact that it has been able to convince the US under Barack Obama that it has dealt with, and is dealing with terrorism, it is now back in the good books of the western world and is not just recognised but also applauded as a worthy ally in the war against terrorism. The US knows, as does Pakistan, that the Obama exit policy cannot be possible without Islamabad’s help and support and is prepared to let the fires of Kashmir simmer, in return for dousing flames in Afghanistan.

One of the prime individuals behind Pakistan’s success in bringing the world around to what had appeared to be, and for India still is, a completely untenable stand is Pakistan Army Chief General Ashfaq Kayani. This quiet general who refuses to meet even the Pakistani media for interviews, keeps away from the spotlight, does not belong to the elite, has managed more than his predecessor did with his aggressive rhetoric. He has managed to convince Washington that the Pakistan Army can still perform through the successful operations in Swat and parts of Waziristan. Those who were sceptical of his prowess in Islamabad’s elite circles now admit that Kayani is a ‘professional’. He has also managed to win over some civilian support by convincing them that the army is not interested in political control.

As a result Pakistan has been able to reclaim its ‘strategic’ assets in Afghanistan and is presently brokering a dialogue with the Taliban, with full support of Afghan President Hamd Karzai who was earlier totally opposed to the idea. Menon, thus, has to rebuild fences with Karzai and ensure that Pakistan’s writ does not run in Afghanistan to a point where Indian interests in the region are jeopardised. This task was very achievable at one stage, but given India’s overconfidence and inability to think ahead, the advantage was lost last year.

It is true that India has made it clear that it will not close down consulates just because of absurd allegations by Pakistan, and will continue to remain engaged with the people of Afghanistan. But terror attacks are cutting into this resolve, in that pilots are now reluctant to fly Indian Airlines into Kabul, and doctors as well as others engaged in the process of reconstruction do not want to be part of the process. Security cannot be ensured as India is clearly being targeted, and the fact that the Americans are not particularly supportive was evident in Richard Holbrooke’s first remarks insisting that he did not think India was the target of the terrorists. He retracted subsequently, but the political significance of his first response was not lost in Kabul, Islamabad or New Delhi. The Americans have worked out their exit policy, and are moving frenetically forward. Pakistan is the ally, as is Karzai now, but India remains out on the fringes and is not essential to US strategy in the region except as a country that needs to be managed from time to time.

Instead of mindlessly succumbing to US pressure and US strategy for the region, New Delhi needs to urgently define its own interests and work out a related strategy. Talks with Pakistan, although very necessary, cannot be successful or pay India necessary dividends if these are not factored into a long-term policy for the region. Otherwise, as the recent foreign secretary level talks showed the exercise will be not just meaningless but even damaging to the peace process. Dialogue, thus, has to be factored into a strategic policy and not become the policy itself. It has started seeming for quite some time now that the government has outsourced thinking and policy making to the US, and quite happily accepts the finished product and starts implementing it without further thought.

Security for Indians in Afghanistan can only be possible if the terrorists know that any such action will draw the same response from the US and Afghan forces as if Americans or others were killed. And this can only be if India is able to get on to the same page as the rest. By now Prime Minister Manmohan Singh should have realised that India’s strength does not, and never can come from becoming a subordinate to the US. It comes from having a voice in the neighbourhood — West Asia, South Asia, China and Russia. Unfortunately the UPA government by following the policies initiated by the NDA, has ensured a certain marginalisation of India in the entire region. The reluctance to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation despite the enthusiasm of then Russian President Putin, the refusal to speak for the Palestinians, the inability to articulate a policy dear to West Asian hearts, the vote against Iran at the IAEA at a politically crucial time, the confused policy for Sri Lanka and Nepal… the list is long but suffice it to say that market economics can never be a substitute for sound diplomacy. After all if New Delhi does not speak for anyone, no one will stand up for it either. And this is now evident right at India’s door.

Stranded in Afghanistan