A Question about Kargil Hills

[Ray]

Sir,

In all due honesty, that was my categorical assertion. Someone like me, who has never been to Drass will never know. I rely on satellite imagery and sifting through reports, of what I consider are credible authors. Still, the fact that no one on the ground has actually come up with something detailing why the Point is not as of the strategic significance expounded in, as what you call a 'cause célèbre', or why it can not be retaken, warrants a questioning. I could understand if the confusion served a purpose, but I simply cannot see what. Other than angering a crowd, incensed at the fact that their martyrs' blood has been spilled in vain, at least with respect to that peak.

What I may write may not appeal to you.

When I joined the Army, I knew of the dangers and more so when I went to the Infantry!

Martyrdom is the badge of all our tribe. I am not incensed with martyrdom in battle. Veer bhogya vasudhara. Where I am incensed is martyrdom in CI, where there is no war. And the country is not concerned of the sacrifice of those who died and instead the Human Rights go berserk with false complaints. And everyone lies supine!

Actually, all areas from where the enemy can interdict are important ground of tactical importance. 5353 is one of them. Was it with India or was it not? That is the question. When the operations started it was not with India.

The areas occupied by Pakistan were all unheld.

Why was 5353 not captured? The question could be equally applicable for many more posts held by the Pakistanis. If possible we should have gone in and cleared all posts right upto the Gultari - Dalunang road. The issue that was preventing the same was that it would mean crossing the LC and did we have the troops required to capture all the posts? Each post would require a 11:1 troops differential! And each post would take a whole lot of time and the ceasefire came in between!

Read the 1965 ops of the Kargil Sector where we were nearly threatening Olthingthang!

 

[Ray]

Let my posts not deter anyone in asking questions.

It is your right to know what happened and why things that should have happened did not happen.

It is also true that for a common man, understanding the basics of warfare at the grassroot level is not possible or expected, as for an Army man, while he may know the broad aspects of naval warfare, it would not be feasible for him to know the intricacies of commanding a Naval ship in combat, even though we have the commonality of being trained for war.

Therefore, as I would ask even a Naval subaltern the basics of combat manoeuvres of a ship and not feel shy or embarrassed, one should not feel shy or embarrassed to question and learn about all the issues that happened or did not happen in war, except the operational secret issues.

To be frank, it is only the assaulting troops who know what exactly happened or did not happen. Even those in the Kargil War not in direct assault are in the know from hearsay!

Bash on Regardless!

 

[Ray]

The Guns of Kargil
Behind the infantry's heroism lay the artillery's prowess
Brigadier Lakhwinder Singh, Lucky for short, makes no apologies for his tactics. The commander of the artillery brigade of India's 8 Mountain Division admits what he did was akin to using a sledgehammer to shell a peanut. After all when has a powerful gun like Bofors, capable of hurling over 40 kg of deadly explosive to a distance of over 30 km, ever been used like a sharpshooter to knock down well-entrenched enemy soldiers sitting on top of peaks? Or which recent battle has seen over 100 artillery guns both big and small lined up and fired simultaneously to pulverise the enemy in a small target area into submission?

This was the untold story. While the infantry came in for much praise, it was the artillery that worked hard to soften up the enemy. In a war the ends usually justify the means. Singh unabashedly admits that he took a page out of history to use what even his Corp Commander Krishan Pal describes as " one of the most innovative artillery tactics to win a war". He remembers reading how famous warriors like Babar and Ranjit Singh employed rows of master gunners to fire cannonballs directly at the enemy. His logic: if such simple tubes could be utilised in controlled direct firing then why not sophisticated gun systems? So he first tried out the technique during the battle for Tololing. A battery of six guns were lined up and told to make direct hits at targets on top of the peak where Pakistani intruders were holed up. It made the final assault by the infantry much easier-casualties were lower too-to give India its first major victory in the Kargil war.

Yet it was on a neighbouring peak called Point 5140 where Singh's brigade demonstrated how an ancient war tactic still held good. Singh ordered all available guns, including Bofors, 105 mm field guns and 120 mm mortars, to line up. In all they numbered over 100. He then told his gunners to fire them continuously at the positions held by Pakistanis on the heights. Singh even had rockets launched against them. So effective was the firepower that the infantry was able to regain the positions without a single casualty.

With the infantry getting more confident of the artillery's prowess it was even willing to cut down the safety margins and take some daring risks. Normally the soldiers stay at least 350 m away from a spot towards which the shells are directed. But with the guns proving so accurate they would call for shelling even when they ventured to within 50 m of the targeted enemy positions.

It was night when the brigade targeted Tiger Hill and the entire sky lit up like Diwali as they resorted to non-stop firing for several hours. The pounding saw the Pakistani soldiers running for cover though many of them were killed by the deadly fusillade. Intercepts of conversations had one of them saying: "Hell has fallen on us." The continuous firing made the infantry's task of capturing the hill much easier. Major-General Mohinder Puri, general officer commanding of the 8 Division, acknowledges that "it was the preponderance of the artillery fire that helped us score many victories".

The brigade has one regret though. It just could not silence the big guns of the Pakistanis. The result: splinters caused almost 80 per cent of the Indian casualties. Without a sophisticated weapon-locating radar, which Pakistan had, the Indian Army had to depend on the conventional method of observers perched at vantage points and directing the fire. But they were unable to cause telling damage. There were other problems too. Because of the rarefied air and strong wind currents in the upper atmosphere, the accuracy of the Bofors gun, especially over longer distances of 20 km or more, caused problems. Singh dismisses them as minor hitches. There was such a demand for the Bofors gun that while in the beginning there were barely 25, by the end of the war the number had swelled to 100. Not bad for a gun whose name had become infamous for other reasons.

Artillery in Kargil

 

[Rage]

What I may write may not appeal to you.

When I joined the Army, I knew of the dangers and more so when I went to the Infantry!

Martyrdom is the badge of all our tribe. I am not incensed with martyrdom in battle. Veer bhogya vasudhara. Where I am incensed is martyrdom in CI, where there is no war. And the country is not concerned of the sacrifice of those who died and instead the Human Rights go berserk with false complaints.

Actually, all areas from where the enemy can interdict are important ground of tactical importance. 5353 is one of them. Was it with India or was it not? That is the question. When the operations started it was not with India.

The areas occupied by Pakistan were all unheld.

Why was 5353 not captured? The question could be equally applicable for many more posts held by the Pakistanis. If possible we should have gone in and cleared all posts right upto the Gultari - Dalunang road. The issue that was preventing the same was that it would mean crossing the LC and did we have the troops required to capture all the posts? Each post would require a 1:11 troops differential! And each post would take a whole lot of time and the ceasefire came in between!

Read the 1965 ops of the Kargil Sector where we were nearly threatening Olthingthang!

I understand that, Sir. Veer bhogya vasudhara, since I am actively considering active service myself. My argument is from a political perspective: It makes no sense to have a people irate and journalists churning out articles, on what they legitimately believe to be inaction on such a sensitive and core issue. If the peak cannot be taken, have an Army historian or a bureaucrat in concert with Army strategists, come out with why.

It is also secondarily from a strategic perspective: yes, Arty does not work optmially in a rarified atmosphere. But that argument works everywhere. As for shelling, they not not hit the road itself. Targeting a slope or a ridge or a gradient beside the road, will trigger a landslide enough to block it for hours.

The four posts the author talks about are: Point 5240, Point 5165 and the the two posts at Pathar and Point 4590.

Aul should have never agreed to the August pact, and having violated it, should have done it with full force in order to recover Point 5353. Having said that, having had the peak being lost should have caused the Union Home Ministry some chagrin, and should have led to concerted action to recover the peak even then. Now that the peak is linked with Pakistani rear head quarters at Gultari, any military pounce will lead to the resumption of full-blown hostilities.

 

[Ray]

Rage,

It is difficult to explain in a post.

Was 5353 the sole focus of the Army?

There are many who question why did we not cross the LC.

Or why did not IAF not go across the LC and play havoc.

Are you aware of what was available in the Indian inventory?

Or what was the serviceability state of the war machinery?

Bofors were not integral to 8 Mtn.

Therefore, there were void elsewhere.

Would the war be confined to the Kargil Area? Could it not escalate as a full fledged war?

What would be the international reaction?

What iF Parvez was equally mad to use nukes as he was mad to launch a war that defied military logic in that he had not thought of the logistics support of those who had infiltrated and occupied.

There are so many issues that impinged on the decision making at the highest political and military level.

Now, was 5353 that important to trigger off a full fledged war and maybe being subjected to a nuclear strike? Parvez it must be remembered is a weird man!

I would not know the higher thinking that went into doing what was done!

 

[Ray]

5353 is not linked to Gultari.


What is taking 5353 by 'full force'?

The 8 Mtn Div was recycling troops for attacks.

Fresh troops would come from elsewhere, where there would be a void and a would become a soft area with all the negative ramifications, if the war escalated into a full fledged war. Same was the case with the Bofors which came from elsewhere.

Fresh troops would come from the plains and so they would have to be acclimatised and that would be a waste of precious time!

 

[Ray]

It is also secondarily from a strategic perspective: yes, Arty does not work optmially in a rarified atmosphere. But that argument works everywhere. As for shelling, they do not need to hit the road itself. Targeting a slope or a gradient beside the road, will trigger a landslide enough to block it for hours.

No, arty is quite accurate in the plains and so it is not a case of the argument working everywhere.

One does not have to occupy 5353 to fire guns on the slope. From the Pakistan Marpola, I am sure they could see the hills where to hit if not by direct observation of the road.

To fire artillery one could also use 'predicted shoot' if one was to hit the hills. And anyway, it would require a whole lot of ammunition to cause a landslide. I am not too sure if a landslide is possible because if it were then with every post being shelled, there should have been landslide. Maybe the sound could start an avalanche.

 

[Ray]

It is 0301h where I am.

So Goodnight!

 

[sandeepdg]

The Guns of Kargil
Behind the infantry's heroism lay the artillery's prowess
Brigadier Lakhwinder Singh, Lucky for short, makes no apologies for his tactics. The commander of the artillery brigade of India's 8 Mountain Division admits what he did was akin to using a sledgehammer to shell a peanut. After all when has a powerful gun like Bofors, capable of hurling over 40 kg of deadly explosive to a distance of over 30 km, ever been used like a sharpshooter to knock down well-entrenched enemy soldiers sitting on top of peaks? Or which recent battle has seen over 100 artillery guns both big and small lined up and fired simultaneously to pulverise the enemy in a small target area into submission?

This was the untold story. While the infantry came in for much praise, it was the artillery that worked hard to soften up the enemy. In a war the ends usually justify the means. Singh unabashedly admits that he took a page out of history to use what even his Corp Commander Krishan Pal describes as " one of the most innovative artillery tactics to win a war". He remembers reading how famous warriors like Babar and Ranjit Singh employed rows of master gunners to fire cannonballs directly at the enemy. His logic: if such simple tubes could be utilised in controlled direct firing then why not sophisticated gun systems? So he first tried out the technique during the battle for Tololing. A battery of six guns were lined up and told to make direct hits at targets on top of the peak where Pakistani intruders were holed up. It made the final assault by the infantry much easier-casualties were lower too-to give India its first major victory in the Kargil war.

Yet it was on a neighbouring peak called Point 5140 where Singh's brigade demonstrated how an ancient war tactic still held good. Singh ordered all available guns, including Bofors, 105 mm field guns and 120 mm mortars, to line up. In all they numbered over 100. He then told his gunners to fire them continuously at the positions held by Pakistanis on the heights. Singh even had rockets launched against them. So effective was the firepower that the infantry was able to regain the positions without a single casualty.

With the infantry getting more confident of the artillery's prowess it was even willing to cut down the safety margins and take some daring risks. Normally the soldiers stay at least 350 m away from a spot towards which the shells are directed. But with the guns proving so accurate they would call for shelling even when they ventured to within 50 m of the targeted enemy positions.

It was night when the brigade targeted Tiger Hill and the entire sky lit up like Diwali as they resorted to non-stop firing for several hours. The pounding saw the Pakistani soldiers running for cover though many of them were killed by the deadly fusillade. Intercepts of conversations had one of them saying: "Hell has fallen on us." The continuous firing made the infantry's task of capturing the hill much easier. Major-General Mohinder Puri, general officer commanding of the 8 Division, acknowledges that "it was the preponderance of the artillery fire that helped us score many victories".

The brigade has one regret though. It just could not silence the big guns of the Pakistanis. The result: splinters caused almost 80 per cent of the Indian casualties. Without a sophisticated weapon-locating radar, which Pakistan had, the Indian Army had to depend on the conventional method of observers perched at vantage points and directing the fire. But they were unable to cause telling damage. There were other problems too. Because of the rarefied air and strong wind currents in the upper atmosphere, the accuracy of the Bofors gun, especially over longer distances of 20 km or more, caused problems. Singh dismisses them as minor hitches. There was such a demand for the Bofors gun that while in the beginning there were barely 25, by the end of the war the number had swelled to 100. Not bad for a gun whose name had become infamous for other reasons.

Artillery in Kargil

That's an awesome piece of information on the artillery's role, sir !! I have always held the artillery in great respect, its a known fact that on an open battlefield with both sides facing each other, anywhere, artillery support is always required for the infantry to achieve its objectives. This goes on to show, the importance of a good artillery in an army. Also, it depicts the fact, that the IA is handicapped only by the lack of resources, otherwise, given the raw military talent and discipline, I consider it the best standing army on the face of this planet !!

 

[Yusuf]

The Guns of Kargil
Behind the infantry's heroism lay the artillery's prowess
Artillery in Kargil

and with a dozen years gone, arty is as neglected as ever before.

 

[sandeepdg]

I think in a landscape like Kargil and LOC, among the options to take out enemy artillery positions that are based at a higher altitude, according to me is, a cruise missile attack guided by satellite navigation as they are very accurate. Also, the sensor fuzed weapon, CBU-105 can be used in these scenarios, I suppose since the USAF deploys these on on aircrafts travelling at heights upto 6100 m above ground or 20k feet. Another incredible machine will be something similar to the AC-130 Spectre gunship, nothing in the world can escape its eye and its awesome fire power, and finally the most daring technique will a raid by spec ops teams behind the enemy lines to take out the guns manually. But the later three methods will involve crossing the LOC, where as cruise missiles can be launched from well within our borders.

 

[Rage]

Ray,

What I meant was- that given an outbreak of hostilities, we will have to retake the position anyway - because we cannot allow such a strategic height with incontrovertible access to the highway and Marpo La, a key pass on the LoC which India dominates, to be held by the enemy.

Border roads have always been a concern for us, and the different warring between the states, and between the states and the centre, means that these are rarely completed in time. So, while an alternative highway(s) might be prudent, we cannot rely on its circumspect completion alone. Which is why we have to negotiate its release during peacetime. Besides, as a military man you will know that it is always best to keep as many logistics routes as possible open, because they will only expedite the process not hamper it. That is my position, on this.

5353 is most certainly linked to Gultari. At least, as far as we know from the most recent information:

http://www.navhindtimes.in/opinion/unfinished-issues-kargil-war


It will not take many shells to dislodge a ridge, and if Point 5353 is connected to Gultari as we say they are, that should not be a problem. The mountains in the Ladakh-district region are of sedimentary rock anyway, and are in the process of disintegration due to weathering. A few arty shells and down will come baby, cradle and all.

No, arty is quite accurate in the plains and so it is not a case of the argument working everywhere.

That argument was with respect to Kargil- i.e. that mountainous area.

I don't know about the available manpower or artillery at the time. But if we did not have enough to retake such a strategic position, it is another thing to discuss.

Besides, my small knowledge of military history tells me that Gen. Mehta ordered his troops to abandon Point 4590 and Point 5165 for a time to actually attempt to capture Point 5353. Besides, it is prudent to remember that India occupied the peak in 1993, successfully cutting off Pakistan's logistics & supplies routes.The Army's emphasis even during the war, was on measures to capture Point 5353 and the associated tri-junction, because they knew how strategically valuable it was, despite statements subsequently by Maj-Gen. J.J. Singh that the pass had an overview of barely 0.5 km of the national highway, a blatant lie since anyone who'se been there can clearly see the peak for over 8-10 km. of national highway. Why then, did J.J. Singh subsequently declare that the LoC follows an ''imaginary line'', a claim which directly violates the Army's oft-repeated assertions during the Kargil conflict that the LoC was clearly and unequivocally demarcated on 17 maps duly signed by India and Pakistan? Why did George Fernandes subsequently assert that 5353 was not even "on the Indian side of the border"? A claim which is fantastically false. We've had this discussed to death:

Explanation demanded for MoD mix-up on pt 5353 status


I don't know how credible this report is, but the intelligence failures were legendary. It appears to be from the Hindu, so I give it the credence it deserves:

http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/article1867.ece?service=mobile


I doubt Musharraf would have escalated the war in other places. Logistically, the Pak military is not capable of waging war against India on multiple fronts in a sustained manner. They would lose, and would have lost in an even worse manner than they already did.

Musharraf making the war nuclear was out of the question, he is and was, and does remain a U.S. puppet. And the U.S does not tolerate "allies" dropping nuclear bombs on other countries, not least one it wants to court for future "reference".

Now, whether Pakistan trumpets the occupation to avoid the "ignominy" of their defeat or not, we should not let it take away from the fact that the peak is a strategic position. We should, and must, initiate measures to retake that peak during peacetime.

 

[Ray]

Ray,

What I meant was- that given an outbreak of hostilities, we will have to retake the position anyway - because we cannot allow such a strategic height with incontrovertible access to the highway and Marpo La, a key pass on the LoC which India dominates, to be held by the enemy.

Marpo La is with the enemy and one side is with us.

It leads to the Gultari - Dalunang road.

5353 is to the East of Pakistan Marpo La.

I have not understood what is the tactical connotation.

I have not understood the strategic implications.

Maybe, it is because my understanding is based on the military meaning of the word.

Ground of tactical importance means an area of ground which, if captured by the enemy, could seriously affect a unit or sub-unit's ability to fulfil its mission.

Strategy means the art and science of distributing and applying military power to attain national objectives in peace and war.

Border roads have always been a concern for us, and the different warring between the states, and between the states and the centre, means that these are rarely completed in time. So, while an alternative highway(s) might be prudent, we cannot rely on its circumspect completion alone. Which is why we have to negotiate its release during peacetime. Besides, as a military man you will know that it is always best to keep as many logistics routes as possible open, because they will only expedite the process not hamper it. That is my position, on this.

My understanding of the GREF (Border Roads) is that it is an excellent organisation and the civil labour is the worst looked after in the world. They slog throughout the year, come snow, rain, hell or high waters. It is because of them that the roads maintained by them are excellent compared to the rest of India and come mudslide or snow or avalanches, they work tirelessly and open up the roads in the shortest period of time. Many a pilgrim to the religious places in the hills thank them for rescuing them from the hardships caused by road blocks due to natural calamities.

As far as the alternate route to NH1D, it must be understood that constructing a road in the mountains is not such an easy task. The survey takes a long time since not only the mountain structure should be firm enough but also to detect the weak areas where abutments and reinforcements have to be made. Nets have to be constructed where there are chances of falling boulders. Water seepage and its rate is also to be catered for. Then there is the issue of incline. It is a total different kettle of fish to build a road in the mountains when compared to the plains. I am not from the Engrs and so I could not tell you in better terms the difference of building roads in the mountains and that on the plains.

The construction was on when I was there. I am not sure about its status as of now.

5353 is most certainly linked to Gultari. At least, as far as we know from the most recent information:

http://www.navhindtimes.in/opinion/unfinished-issues-kargil-war

It make little difference if 5353 is connected to the Gultari - Dalunang Road.

Unless it is connected to Dras, the story ends at 5353.

In fact, if 5353 is connected to the Gultari _ Dalunang Road, it is good for India. It will be an initial objective in the next war since Pakistan would have made the road for us and all we will have to do is connect our road to 5353 and we have a full operation road at our disposal! But I am sure, they would have posts in depth so that to take it, one would have to fight each successive post to reach the roadhead.

It will not take many shells to dislodge a ridge, and if Point 5353 is connected to Gultari as we say they are, that should not be a problem. The mountains in the Ladakh-district region are of sedimentary rock anyway, and are in the process of disintegration due to weathering. A few arty shells and down will come baby, cradle and all.

That is not what real life experience is. There have been artillery exchanges and all was well. There would not have been field firing ranges either if what you state was correct.

When so much of artillery was pounding away in the Kargil operations, such a phenomenon did not occur.

Therefore, that theory may require a re-look.

That argument was with respect to Kargil- i.e. that mountainous area.

I don't know about the available manpower or artillery at the time. But if we did not have enough to retake such a strategic position, it is another thing to discuss.

Besides, my small knowledge of military history tells me that Gen. Mehta ordered his troops to abandon Point 4590 and Point 5165 for a time to actually attempt to capture Point 5353. Besides, it is prudent to remember that India occupied the peak in 1993, successfully cutting off Pakistan's logistics & supplies routes.The Army's emphasis even during the war, was on measures to capture Point 5353 and the associated tri-junction, because they knew how strategically valuable it was, despite statements subsequently by Maj-Gen. J.J. Singh that the pass had an overview of barely 0.5 km of the national highway, a blatant lie since anyone who'se been there can clearly see the peak for over 8-10 km. of national highway. Why then, did J.J. Singh subsequently declare that the LoC follows an ''imaginary line'', a claim which directly violates the Army's oft-repeated assertions during the Kargil conflict that the LoC was clearly and unequivocally demarcated on 17 maps duly signed by India and Pakistan? Why did George Fernandes subsequently assert that 5353 was not even "on the Indian side of the border"? A claim which is fantastically false. We've had this discussed to death:

Explanation demanded for MoD mix-up on pt 5353 status

Who is Gen Mehta?

I don't know how credible this report is, but the intelligence failures were legendary. It appears to be from the Hindu, so I give it the credence it deserves:

http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/article1867.ece?service=mobile

I have not read your link.

Int failure was there.

I doubt Musharraf would have escalated the war in other places. Logistically, the Pak military is not capable of waging war against India on multiple fronts in a sustained manner. They would lose, and would have lost in an even worse manner than they already did.

Musharraf making the war nuclear was out of the question, he is and was, and does remain a U.S. puppet. And the U.S does not tolerate "allies" dropping nuclear bombs on other countries, not least one it wants to court for future "reference".

Now, whether Pakistan trumpets the occupation to avoid the "ignominy" of their defeat or not, we should not let it take away from the fact that the peak is a strategic position. We should, and must, initiate measures to retake that peak during peacetime.

I would not be able to comment on what Musharraf would have done. I can only conjecture as to what he could have done, given his megalomania, desire to prove that a Mohajir was a better Pakistani than the real Pakistani and also to make amends for failures as a Bde Cdr in Siachen.

 

[Kunal Biswas]

Gen. Mehta ordered his troops to abandon Point 4590 and Point 5165 for a time to actually attempt to capture Point 5353. Besides, it is prudent to remember that India occupied the peak in 1993, successfully cutting off Pakistan's logistics & supplies routes.The Army's emphasis even during the war, was on measures to capture Point 5353 and the associated tri-junction, because they knew how strategically valuable it was, despite statements subsequently by Maj-Gen. J.J. Singh that the pass had an overview of barely 0.5 km of the national highway, a blatant lie since anyone who'se been there can clearly see the peak for over 8-10 km. of national highway. Why then, did J.J. Singh subsequently declare that the LoC follows an ''imaginary line'', a claim which directly violates the Army's oft-repeated assertions during the Kargil conflict that the LoC was clearly and unequivocally demarcated on 17 maps duly signed by India and Pakistan? Why did George Fernandes subsequently assert that 5353 was not even "on the Indian side of the border"? A claim which is fantastically false.

7.50/9.24

1. IAF bombing was restricted beyond LOC.. ( Enemy ARTY position are other side of LOC )

2. NO roads for huge transportation, sky was was not right for helos at low altitude because of Pakistani surface to air missiles..

3. No time to planed an major assault that far without proper air-cover and arty cover..




Idea of the terrain..

I doubt Musharraf would have escalated the war in other places. Logistically, the Pak military is not capable of waging war against India on multiple fronts in a sustained manner. They would lose, and would have lost in an even worse manner than they already did.

During Kargil Indian arty was mobilizing its self from every part of the country where as Pakistani have enough no of arty to cover his forces and beyond..
Still today we are in same situation..