A Chinese joke called ADIZ

[Tolaha]

Are you suggesting that Taiwan is controlled by Mainland China?

Aren't we all talking about incursions into ADIZ made by US, Japan and Korea here? That's what I thought!

 

[cir]

in the joker of a zone in the eyes of jokers，all civilian aircraft，including those from Japan，must and will now submit its flight plan。

Check the latest news from Japan。

A pack of jokers indeed。

 

[no smoking]

Aren't we all talking about incursions into ADIZ made by US, Japan and Korea here? That's what I thought!

Since someone just doubt if Chinese has the gut to take any defensive measurement in their ADIZ, I think the witness from the taiwanese could prove he is wrong.

 

[happy]

in the joker of a zone in the eyes of jokers，all civilian aircraft，including those from Japan，must and will now submit its flight plan。

Check the latest news from Japan。

A pack of jokers indeed。

Is this what you are talking about >>>

UPDATE 2-Asian nations urge peace in sea disputes, unlikely to blame China

Dec 13 (Reuters) - Asian nations must ensure that territorial disputes do not erupt into conflict, leaders said on Friday, with Japan and the Philippines reaffirming their commitment to freedom of flight as concerns grow over China's new air defence zone.

Beijing's growing military strength has sparked concern in Asia and tension has spiked in the last month after China announced the air defence zone including islands in the East China Sea also claimed by Japan.

The air defence identification zone has triggered protests from the United States and its close allies, Japan and South Korea

China is also locked in territorial rows with other Asian nations, including the Philippines, over wide swathes of the South China Sea and has said it might set up a similar zone there.

"We reiterated our commitment to uphold the rule of law, promote the peaceful settlement of disputes, and to assure freedom of flight in international air space," Philippine President Benigno Aquino told reporters in Tokyo after meeting Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe.

Aquino stopped short of mentioning China in the media appearance with Abe, who has made stronger ties with the 10 members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) a priority, visiting all of them during his first year in office.

The charm offensive, which has been underlined by hefty Japanese aid over the years and rising private investment, culminates in a three-day Tokyo gathering that began on Friday and is billed officially as celebrating 40 years of diplomatic ties.

The final statement from the summit, due to be released on Saturday, is likely to state its support for freedom of the air and the seas - but stop short of mentioning China.

Chinese state media kept up the invective against Japan's complaints over the air space zone on Friday, with the official Xinhua news agency saying Abe was going to "stage again its China-is-to-blame game" at the ASEAN summit.

"It is believed that anyone with only half a brain knows that it is Japan who intentionally set the region on fire in the first place," Xinhua said in an English-language commentary.

Xinhua also announced the launch of a guided missile frigate, the Sanya, which it described as a new generation of battleship "especially adept for use in long-distance vigilance and aerial defence combat".

Abe has yet to meet the leaders of South Korea or China, and Tokyo's ties with its giant neighbour have been fraught since Japan bought three uninhabited islands in the East China Sea at the centre of a territorial dispute - a situation that other leaders at the meeting said should be rectified.

"In particular, it must be said that good relations between Japan and China are critical to the future of our region," said Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in a speech.

"Indonesia is deeply concerned at the prospect of the disputes erupting into open conflicts, which will have adverse impacts on all countries in the region."

UPDATE 2-Asian nations urge peace in sea disputes, unlikely to blame China | Reuters

No wonder

 

[happy]

Japan to adopt new defence guidelines amid territory row with China

TOKYO Pacifist Japan will adopt new defence guidelines next week paving the way for its military to respond more quickly and forcefully to perceived threats from China and North Korea, officials said on Thursday.

The government of conservative Prime Minister Shinzo Abe will approve rules intended to help air, land and sea forces work together more effectively in the face of danger, an official from Abe's Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) said.

The move comes amid the continuing row between China and Japan over the sovereignty of a small island chain in the East China Sea, a dispute that has escalated over the last year to include military hardware from both sides.

Lawmakers from the ruling bloc on Wednesday endorsed the plan, which would create what it called a "Dynamic Joint Defence Force", the official said.

"For the first time, we will be able to obtain mobility, or the capability to deploy swiftly in an integrated manner," Defence Minister Itsunori Onodera said on Thursday.

"When we deploy troops to remote islands... we need to respond with ground, marine and air defence forces," Onodera said in a speech at a private think tank in Tokyo.

"Or if we faced a North Korean missile, Japan would first attempt to shoot it down from the sea, then from the ground.

"While the Air Defence Force has huge radar sites, it is the Ground Self Defence Force who protect these important facilities," he said, adding the country's military had to be alert to a possible "intrusion from the sea".

Shifting threatsUnder operating assumptions in place during the Cold War era, Japan's military, which is constitutionally-bound to being a "self-defence force", was largely static, with the majority of resources in the north and east to guard against a Russian invasion, long thought to be the greatest risk the country faced.

But the shifting security dynamics, in particular the rise of China as a military force to be reckoned with, means Japan's soldiers, sailors and airmen need to be located further south and to be able to deploy to the country's many far-flung islands.

Abe's cabinet is also set to approve Tokyo's first National Security Strategy on Tuesday, which was agreed in the ruling party meeting Wednesday, the LDP official said.

The document is the foundation on which Japan's defence policy will be built, guiding the organisation and deployment of troops, as well as the equipment at their disposal.

In an indication of how deeply felt the island dispute with China is, the NSS says Beijing's recent declaration of an Air Defence Identification Zone in the East China Sea "is (an attempt) at changing the current situation by force, and is irreconcilable with the international order". It also stipulates North Korea's nuclear and missile development is a threat to Japan.

Oman Tribune - the edge of knowledge

 

[Tolaha]

Since someone just doubt if Chinese has the gut to take any defensive measurement in their ADIZ, I think the witness from the taiwanese could prove he is wrong.

Bravo @no smoking... Bravo CCP... Bravo PLA! Now that I have known that even Taiwan violated the Chinese ADIZ but this time, the Chinese air force bravely followed these foreign fighters, it has been proven that all those who doubted the words of the CCP and its followers, are proven wrong. And it includes yours truly. Please accept my humble apologies. From the bottom of my heart. You had me, finally!

 

[Ray]

ADIZ though not recognised by any international law, maybe essential for countries that fear sneak attacks by adversarial countries.

To that extent, China is justified.

However, where China is a departure is that China has extended their ADIZ over territories that are under Japanese control, and also claimed by China.

The other departure is that China demands that all flying objects obtained permission from China even if they are not heading for China, but traversing through the claimed ADIZ.

In other countries, only those flying objects that aim to enter the country's actual airspace is to inform the nation.

But then China is a departure in itself from most international norms and niceties.

Imagine Mongolia demanding that all flying objects take Mongolia's permission when they enter Inner Mongolia, which is occupied by China but actually is a part of Mongolia!

Will China comply?

 

[badguy2000]

ADIZ though not recognised by any international law, maybe essential for countries that fear sneak attacks by adversarial countries.

To that extent, China is justified.

However, where China is a departure is that China has extended their ADIZ over territories that are under Japanese control, and also claimed by China.

The other departure is that China demands that all flying objects obtained permission from China even if they are not heading for China, but traversing through the claimed ADIZ.

In other countries, only those flying objects that aim to enter the country's actual airspace is to inform the nation.

But then China is a departure in itself from most international norms and niceties.

Imagine Mongolia demanding that all flying objects take Mongolia's permission when they enter Inner Mongolia, which is occupied by China but actually is a part of Mongolia!

Will China comply?

1. Islands in East China sea are claimed by CHina and Japan,so it is disputed islands.
however,inner mongolia is not claimed officially by Mongolia ,and is not disputed area...

2.ADIZ is set up over sea,instead of over land.

By

 

[Ray]

1. Islands in East China sea are claimed by CHina and Japan,so it is disputed islands.
however,inner mongolia is not claimed officially by Mongolia ,and is not disputed area...

2.ADIZ is set up over sea,instead of over land.

By

You must understand that disputes can be created without any background or with background.

The Chinese claim is a itself disputed and does not hold a candle.

The 'Eleven dotted lines' of ROC became 'Nine dotted lines' of Communist China and the whole SCS was claimed by China!

As far as the "jurisprudence evidence" is concerned, the vast majority of international legal experts have concluded that China's claim to historic title over the South China Sea, implying full sovereign authority and consent for other states to transit, is invalid and illegal. The historical evidence, if anything, is even less persuasive. There are several contradictions in China's use of history to justify its claims to islands and reefs in the South China Sea, not least of which is its polemical assertion of parallels with imperialist expansion by the United States and European powers in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Justifying China's attempts to expand its maritime frontiers by claiming islands and reefs far from its shores, Jia Qingguo, professor at Beijing University's School of International Studies, argues that China is merely following the example set by the West. "The United States has Guam in Asia which is very far away from the U.S. and the French have islands in the South Pacific, so it is nothing new," Jia told AFP recently.

An in-depth analysis of the "historical evidence" underlying China's claims shows that history is, in fact, not on China's side. If anything, Beijing's claim to the Spratlys on the basis of history runs aground on the fact that the region's past empires did not exercise sovereignty. In pre-modern Asia, empires were characterized by undefined, unprotected, and often changing frontiers. The notion of suzerainty prevailed. Unlike a nation-state, the frontiers of Chinese empires were neither carefully drawn nor policed but were more like circles or zones, tapering off from the center of civilization to the undefined periphery of alien barbarians. More importantly, in its territorial disputes with neighboring India, Burma, and Vietnam, Beijing always took the position that its land boundaries were never defined, demarcated, and delimited. But now, when it comes to islands, shoals, and reefs in the South China Sea, Beijing claims otherwise. In other words, China's claim that its land boundaries were historically never defined and delimited stands in sharp contrast with the stance that China's maritime boundaries were always clearly defined and delimited. Herein lies a basic contradiction (ji ben mao dun) in the Chinese stand on land and maritime boundaries which is untenable. Actually, it is the mid-twentieth-century attempts to convert the undefined frontiers of ancient civilizations and kingdoms enjoying suzerainty into clearly defined, delimited, and demarcated boundaries of modern nation-states exercising sovereignty that lie at the center of China's territorial and maritime disputes with neighboring countries. Put simply, sovereignty is a post-imperial notion ascribed to nation-states, not ancient empires.

The notion of sovereignty is not a Chinese or Asian notion but a European one that originated with the signing of the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. It was primarily a land-based concept and did not apply to nation-states in Asia and Africa until the mid-twentieth century. The Westphalian state system based on the concept of legal equality or state sovereignty over clearly defined external boundaries distinguished itself not only from the old feudal system in Europe, but also from other forms of hegemony and suzerainty that existed at that time in Asia—in Persia, China and India. Before the Treaty of Westphalia, kingdoms and empires in Europe and elsewhere could not claim or exercise sovereignty.

History, as is well known, is written by the victors, not the vanquished. China's present borders largely reflect the frontiers established during the spectacular episode of eighteenth-century Qing (Manchu) expansionism, which over time hardened into fixed national boundaries (except outer Mongolia, largely because of the Soviet Union) following the imposition of the Westphalian nation-state system over Asia in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Official Chinese history today often distorts this complex history, however, claiming that Mongols, Tibetans, Manchus, and Hans were all Chinese, when in fact the Great Wall was built by the Chinese dynasties to keep out the troublesome northern Mongol and Manchu tribes that repeatedly overran Han China; the Great Wall actually represented the Han Chinese empire's outer security perimeter. While most historians see the onslaught of the Mongol hordes led by Genghis Khan in the early 1200s as an apocalyptic event that threatened the very survival of ancient civilizations in China, India, Persia and other nations, the Chinese have consciously promoted the myth that he was actually "Chinese," and therefore all areas that the Mongols (the Yuan dynasty) had once occupied or conquered (such as Tibet and much of Central and Inner Asia) belong to China by retrospectively superimposing the sixteenth century European notion of sovereignty over the twelfth century Asia. China's claims on Taiwan and in the South China Sea are also based on the grounds that both were parts of the Manchu empire. (Actually, in the Manchu or Qing dynasty maps, it is Hainan Island, not the Paracel and Spratly Islands, that is depicted as China's southernmost border.) In this version of history, any territory conquered by "Chinese" in the past remains immutably so, no matter when the conquest may have occurred.

Such writing and rewriting of history from a nationalistic perspective to promote national unity and regime legitimacy has been accorded the highest priority by China's rulers, both Nationalists and Communists. The Chinese Communist Party leadership consciously conducts itself as the heir to China's imperial legacy, often employing the symbolism and rhetoric of empire. From primary-school textbooks to television historical dramas, the state-controlled information system has force-fed generations of Chinese a diet of imperial China's grandeur. As the Australian Sinologist Geremie Barmé points out, "For decades Chinese education and propaganda have emphasized the role of history in the fate of the Chinese nation-state"‰."‰."‰."‰While Marxism-Leninism and Mao Thought have been abandoned in all but name, the role of history in China's future remains steadfast." So much so that history has been refined as an instrument of statecraft (also known as "cartographic aggression") by state-controlled research institutions, media, and education bodies.

China uses folklore, myths, and legends, as well as history, to bolster greater territorial and maritime claims and create new realities on the land and water. Chinese textbooks preach the notion of the Middle Kingdom as being the oldest and most advanced civilization that was at the very center of the universe, surrounded by lesser, partially Sinicized states in East and Southeast Asia that must constantly bow and pay their respects. China's version of history often deliberately blurs the distinction between what was no more than hegemonic influence, tributary relationships, suzerainty, and actual control. Subscribing to the notion that those who have mastered the past control their present and chart their own futures, Beijing has always placed a very high value on "the history card" (often a revisionist interpretation of history) in its diplomatic efforts to achieve foreign policy objectives, especially to extract territorial and diplomatic concessions from other countries. Almost every contiguous state has, at one time or another, felt the force of Chinese arms—Mongolia, Tibet, Burma, Korea, Russia, India, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Taiwan—and been a subject of China's revisionist history. As Martin Jacques notes in When China Rules the World, "Imperial Sinocentrism shapes and underpins modern Chinese nationalism." If unchecked, imperial hubris or nostalgia for a return to the past can have unpredictable consequences for regional peace and stability.

If the idea of national sovereignty goes back to seventeenth-century Europe and the system that originated with the Treaty of Westphalia, the idea of maritime sovereignty is largely a mid-twentieth-century American concoction that China and others have seized upon to extend their maritime frontiers. As Jacques notes, "The idea of maritime sovereignty is a relatively recent invention, dating from 1945 when the United States declared that it intended to exercise sovereignty over its territorial waters." In fact, the UN's Law of the Sea agreement represented the most prominent international effort to apply the land-based notion of sovereignty to the maritime domain worldwide—although, importantly, it rejects the idea of justification by historical right. Thus although Beijing claims around eighty percent of the South China Sea as its "historic waters" (and is now seeking to elevate this claim to a "core interest" akin with its claims on Taiwan and Tibet), China has, historically speaking, about as much right to claim the South China Sea as Mexico has to claim the Gulf of Mexico for its exclusive use, or Iran the Persian Gulf, or India the Indian Ocean. In other words, none at all. From a legal standpoint, "the prolific usage of the nomenclature 'South China Sea' does not confer historic Chinese sovereignty." Countries that have used history to claim sovereignty over islands have had the consent of others and a mutually agreeable interpretation of history—both elements missing in the SCS.

Ancient empires either won control over territories through aggression, annexation, or assimilation or lost them to rivals who possessed superior firepower or statecraft. Territorial expansion and contraction was the norm, determined by the strength or weakness of a kingdom or empire. The very idea of "sacred lands" is ahistorical because control of territory was based on who grabbed or stole what last from whom. The frontiers of the Qin, Han, Tang, Song, and Ming dynasties waxed and waned throughout history. A strong and powerful imperial China, much like czarist Russia, was expansionist in Inner Asia and Indochina as opportunity arose and strength allowed. The gradual expansion over the centuries under the non-Chinese Mongol and Manchu dynasties extended imperial China's control over Tibet and parts of Central Asia (now Xinjiang), Taiwan, and Southeast Asia. Modern China is, in fact, an "empire-state" masquerading as a nation-state.

Even if one were to accept Beijing's "historical claims" argument for a moment, the problem is that the Chinese empire was not the only empire in pre-modern Asia and the world. There were other empires and kingdoms too. Many countries can make equally valid "historical claims" to lands that are currently not a part of their territory but under Chinese control (e.g., the Gando region in China's Jilin province that belongs to Korea). Before the twentieth century, there were no sovereign nation-states in Asia with clear, legally defined boundaries of jurisdiction and control. If China's claims are justified on the basis of history, then so are the historical claims of Vietnamese and Filipinos based on their histories. Students of Asian history know, for instance, that Malay peoples related to today's Filipinos have a better claim to Taiwan than Beijing does. Taiwan was originally settled by people of Malay-Polynesian descent—ancestors of the present-day aborigine groups—who populated the low-lying coastal plains. Noted Asia-watcher Philip Bowring argues that "[t]he fact that China has a long record of written history does not invalidate other nations' histories as illustrated by artifacts, language, lineage and genetic affinities, the evidence of trade and travel."

Unless one subscribes to the notion of Chinese exceptionalism, imperial China's "historical claims" are as valid as those of other kingdoms and empires in Southeast and South Asia. The problem with history is where and when to draw the line, why, and more importantly, whose version of history is accurate. China laying claim to the Mongol and Manchu empires' colonial possessions would be equivalent to India laying claim to Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Burma, Malaysia (Srivijaya), Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka on the grounds that they were all parts of either the Ashoka, Maurya, Chola, or the Moghul and the British Indian empires. From the tenth through the thirteenth centuries, several of the Pallava and Chola kings in southern India assembled large navies and armies to overthrow neighboring kingdoms and to undertake punitive attacks on the states in the Bay of Bengal region. They also took to the sea to conquer parts of what are now Sri Lanka, Malaysia and Indonesia. In his study of India's strategic culture, George Tanham observed: "In what was really a battle over the trade between China and India and Europe, the Cholas were quite successful in both naval and land engagements and briefly ruled portions of Southeast Asia."

China's claims in the South China Sea are also a major shift from its longstanding geopolitical orientation to continental power. In claiming a strong maritime tradition, China makes much of the early-fifteenth-century expeditions of Zheng He to the Indian Ocean and Africa. But, as Bowring points out, "Chinese were actually latecomers to navigation beyond coastal waters. For centuries, the masters of the oceans were the Malayo-Polynesian peoples who colonized much of the world, from Taiwan to New Zealand and Hawaii to the south and east, and to Madagascar in the west. Bronze vessels were being traded with Palawan, just south of Scarborough, at the time of Confucius. When Chinese Buddhist pilgrims like Faxian went to Sri Lanka [southern India] in the fifth century, they went in ships owned and operated by Malay peoples. Ships from what is now the Philippines traded with Funan, a state in what is now southern Vietnam, a thousand years before the Yuan dynasty."

And finally, China's so-called "historic claims" to the South China Sea are actually not "centuries old." They only go back to 1947, when Chiang Kai-shek's nationalist government drew the so-called "eleven-dash line" on Chinese maps of the South China Sea, enclosing the Spratly Islands and other chains that the ruling Kuomintang party declared were now under Chinese sovereignty. Chiang himself, saying he saw German fascism as a model for China, was fascinated by the Nazi concept of an expanded Lebensraum ("living space") for the Chinese nation. He did not have the opportunity to be expansionist himself because the Japanese put him on the defensive, but cartographers of the nationalist regime drew the U-shape of eleven dashes in an attempt to enlarge China's "living space" in the South China Sea soon after Japan's defeat in World War II. Apparently, the Republic of China (ROC) nationalist government was also incensed over the World War II-era Japanese maps that showed the entire South China Sea as a Japanese lake. The Chinese government first operationally sailed into the South China Sea in 1947 with the voyage of the ROC ships Zhongjian, Zhongye, Taiping and Yongxing. They did not begin surveys there until many years later. Following the victory of the Chinese Communist Party in the civil war in 1949, the People's Republic of China adopted this cartographic coup, revising Chiang's notion into a "nine-dash line" after erasing two dashes in the Gulf of Tonkin in 1953 showing places his government had never been to. As late as 2005, the PLA Navy's published map of Scarborough Shoal was just an exact datum-for-datum copy of the U.S. Navy's map (with thanks to Barney Moreland for providing the author with this information).

Since the end of the Second World War, China has been redrawing its maps, redefining borders, manufacturing historical evidence, using force to create new territorial realities, renaming islands, and seeking to impose its version of history on the waters of the region. The passage of domestic legislation in 1992, "Law on the Territorial Waters and Their Contiguous Areas," which claimed four-fifths of the South China Sea, was followed by armed skirmishes with the Philippine and Vietnamese navies throughout the 1990s. More recently, the dispatch of large numbers of Chinese fishing boats and maritime surveillance vessels to the disputed waters in what is tantamount to a "people's war on the high seas" has further heightened tensions. To quote Sujit Dutta, "China's unmitigated irredentism [is] based on the"‰."‰."‰."‰theory that the periphery must be occupied in order to secure the core. [This] is an essentially imperial notion that was internalized by the Chinese nationalists—both Kuomintang and Communist. The [current] regime's attempts to reach its imagined geographical frontiers often with little historical basis have had and continue to have highly destabilizing strategic consequences."

Apparently, one reason Southeast Asians find it difficult to accept Chinese territorial claims is that it would amount to acceptance of the notion of Han racial superiority over other Asian races and empires. Says Jay Batongbacal of the University of the Philippines law school: "Intuitively, acceptance of the nine-dash line is a corresponding denial of the very identity and history of the ancestors of the Vietnamese, Filipinos, and Malays; it is practically a modern revival of China's denigration of non-Chinese as 'barbarians' not entitled to equal respect and dignity as peoples."

To sum up, empires and kingdoms never exercised sovereignty. The "history question" is very complex and defies an easy explanation. If historical claims had any validity then Mongolia could claim all of Asia simply because it once conquered the lands of the continent. There is absolutely no historical basis to support either of the dash-line claims, especially considering that the territories of Chinese empires were never as carefully delimited as nation-states, but rather existed as zones of influence tapering away from a civilized center to the periphery of alien barbarians. This is the position contemporary China took starting in the 1960s, while negotiating its land boundaries with several of its neighboring countries. But this is not the position it takes today in the cartographic, diplomatic, and low-intensity military skirmishes to define its maritime borders.

The continued reinterpretation of history to advance contemporary political, territorial, and maritime claims, coupled with the Communist leadership's ability to turn "nationalistic eruptions" on and off like a tap during moments of tension with the United States, Japan, South Korea, India, Vietnam, and the Philippines, makes it difficult for Beijing to reassure neighbors that its "peaceful rise" is wholly peaceful. An acceptance of China's version of history is seen as tantamount to rejection of other countries' history and the notion of equality of sovereign nation-states. Since there are six claimants to various atolls, islands, rocks, and oil deposits in the South China Sea, the Spratly Islands disputes are, by definition, multilateral disputes requiring international arbitration. But Beijing's insistence on a bilateral approach to resolving the dispute is predicated mainly on the belief that Beijing might succeed because of China's superior relative power and ASEAN's fractiousness. China's claims of "indisputable sovereignty over the South China Sea" that have their origins in the late 1940s—and not in ancient history—pose a challenge to all seafaring nations.

Land or Sea ADIZ what is the difference?

Both are illegal and unilateral and not recognised by international law.

 

[no smoking]

Bravo @no smoking... Bravo CCP... Bravo PLA! Now that I have known that even Taiwan violated the Chinese ADIZ

Well, how long you have been absence from this planet?
Is that a news for you that ADIZ was never recognized by international law? So basically, Chinese and russians have been violated Japanese/korean/Taiwanese/Americans ADIZ for decades.

That is how the game plays. You set up ADIZ, I come to "violate" it. Since you have outlined the ADIZ, certainly you can send your fighters to follow me. And then I protest but you reject it. We have been playing this game over and over again. Now it is just Chinese turn.

 

[no smoking]

However, where China is a departure is that China has extended their ADIZ over territories that are under Japanese control, and also claimed by China.

Well, you may not noticed that Japanese extended their ADIZ over the territories that are under South korean control.

What even funnier is that when American setup ADIZ for taiwanese, they include a part of mainland China within it.

So, Chinese just follows them.

The other departure is that China demands that all flying objects obtained permission from China even if they are not heading for China, but traversing through the claimed ADIZ.

Again, since 2009, Japanese had intercepted Taiwanese civilian plane at least 41 times, most of them were heading for China or American. That was what Taiwanese senior civilian aviation officials told to their parliament.

民航局長：98年至今 日攔截我航機41次 - 中時電子報

So, Don't blame China.

 

[cobra commando]

Kerry Rejects China Air
Zone And Urges South
China Sea Stability


Kerry Rejects China Air Zone And Urges South China Sea Stability - Bloomberg

 

[no smoking]

Kerry Rejects China Air
Zone And Urges South
China Sea Stability


Kerry Rejects China Air Zone And Urges South China Sea Stability - Bloomberg

American expresses their rejection as if their ADIZ has ever been accepted by Chinese and Russian.