1971 Indo-Pak War: US involvement

Discussion in 'Military History' started by LETHALFORCE, Oct 10, 2009.

  1. Tolaha

    Tolaha Senior Member Senior Member

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    That's exactly the tragedy! Millions were being butchered by a US backed regime. India and the commie SU were trying to prevent that from happening. The genocide wasn't worth much for the US then in the scheme of things. Yet, they did everything to prevent the hands that tried stopping it.
     
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  2. Virendra

    Virendra Moderator Moderator

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    You didn't mention how the war became a little thing that got managed in 15 days?
     
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  3. sesha_maruthi27

    sesha_maruthi27 Senior Member Senior Member

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    We INDIANS defeated the sabre jets by using Gnats of world war 2. Now here is an american guy coming and telling that pakistan defeated INDIA in AIR. What a joke. The 1971 war was won by the help of the INDIAN AIRFORCE. I think the american guy must check out the information about the 1971 war.
     
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  4. Bangalorean

    Bangalorean Stars and Ambassadors Stars and Ambassadors

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    That is a real tragedy - it is disappointing that the US turned away from one of the worst genocides in the 20th century. Additionally, this war resulted in the largest military surrender post WW-2, 90000 POWs. This record remained unbroken till the 1991 Gulf war.
     
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  5. Tolaha

    Tolaha Senior Member Senior Member

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    Yep! Our 'Operation Freedom' took 14 days to complete. How much did yours take to complete, 'average american'? :heh:
     
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  6. arkem8

    arkem8 Regular Member

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    Why should pics of scores of burnt out Patton tanks, crashed/ wrecked Sabre fighters or surrendering soldiers brandishing white flags and throwing down their Garand rifles be shown on American newspapers or T.V ??:rofl:
     
  7. sesha_maruthi27

    sesha_maruthi27 Senior Member Senior Member

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    Hey uncle sam is trying to take over them for more than a decade in Afghanistan, he has not been able set a firm foot still. We did it in just 10 days. In simple words we achieved in just 10,what the americans are trying to achieve for the last 10 years...............
    Hahahahahaah................:D
     
  8. Hari Sud

    Hari Sud Regular Member

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    Virendra

    I think you misunderstood. The so called Anderson Papers of 1971 Indo Pak war were classified papers which Anderson - the columnist found stuffed in his mail box during the two weeks of war in December 1971. He promptly published them either in The New York Times or Washington Post. He took Kissinger to task for ignoring genocide in East Pakistan.

    Virendra, if you have them, could you please post the link.
     
  9. average american

    average american Senior Member Senior Member

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    Best I can tell in the 1971 Air War Indian claims that both Indian and Pakistan shot down 19 planes each,,,,Indias claims are that they lost 56 and Pakistan 63
    1971 India-Pakistan War: The Air War - Case West independent observers estimate the air to air losses of India were three times that of Pakistan.
     
  10. LETHALFORCE

    LETHALFORCE Moderator Moderator

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    The air war was insignificant compared to the ground war. East Pakistan (bangladesh) total air force
    was destroyed in 3 days by Indian air force. 90,000 pakistanis were take as POW's one of the largest
    numbers for a war between 2 nations(non-world war).
     
    Last edited: Sep 16, 2012
  11. sesha_maruthi27

    sesha_maruthi27 Senior Member Senior Member

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    to be exact 93,000 pow's were taken and were released after the foolish shimla agreement........
     
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  12. Bheeshma

    Bheeshma Regular Member

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    LoL Yeager was a jackass. He got his personal cessna blown up by Adm Prakash and was very upset about it.:rofl:. The Pakis got their asses handed back in ground, air and water by Indian armed forces. The air war was a total disaster for them The sabres were outclassed by Mig-21 and the much vaunted F-104's also got their asses handed back by the Mig-21's. Yes IAFdid loose planes (mostly SU-7 and Hunters) because they actually flew missions to support the army. They did not hide and cower in fear like PAF. The PAF was ineffective in even the basic job of supporting its army by attaching IA formations leave alone air superiority.

    After the initial preemptive strike, PAF adopted a defensive stance in response to the Indian retaliation. As the war progressed, the Indian Air Force continued to battle the PAF over conflict zones,[61] but the number of sorties flown by the PAF gradually decreased day-by-day.[62] The Indian Air Force flew 4,000 sorties while its counterpart, the PAF offered little in retaliation, partly because of the paucity of non-Bengali technical personnel.[16] This lack of retaliation has also been attributed to the deliberate decision of the PAF High Command to cut its losses as it had already incurred huge losses in the conflict.[63] Though PAF did not intervene during the Indian Navy's raid on Pakistani naval port city of Karachi, it retaliated with bombing the Okha harbour destroying the fuel tanks used by the boats that attacked.[8][12][64]
     
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  13. LETHALFORCE

    LETHALFORCE Moderator Moderator

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  14. average american

    average american Senior Member Senior Member

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  15. LETHALFORCE

    LETHALFORCE Moderator Moderator

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    yes it's true, I will give you Pakistan's numbers. Pakistan lost the war 4 different times.

    [​IMG]
     
    Last edited: Sep 16, 2012
  16. LETHALFORCE

    LETHALFORCE Moderator Moderator

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    In 1965 war Patton tanks were claimed to be indestructible

    [​IMG]

    [​IMG]

    Over a 100 patton tanks gifted to Pakistan were destroyed .or captured
     
    Last edited: Sep 16, 2012
  17. trackwhack

    trackwhack Tihar Jail Banned

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    Yet you found it important enough send a CBG .... and then run away.:laugh:
     
  18. LETHALFORCE

    LETHALFORCE Moderator Moderator

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    nixontapes.org - Nixon Tapes and Transcripts

    New Evidence Confirms Pentagon Stole and Leaked Top Secret Documents from Nixon White House

    Consequence of Pentagon's Isolation from Decision-Making in Vietnam, China, Detente

    According to Secret Confession, Documents were Stolen with Help of White House Insider

    Washington, D.C. is a city that runs on leaks. Information equals power, and power equals influence. The highest levels of the American government are outraged when leaked information appears in the press, yet many authorized leaks come from the same government figures. Leaks both cripple and enable the policymaking process.

    A December 14, 1971 column by Jack Anderson, entitled "U.S. Tilts to Pakistan", drew particular outrage from the Nixon administration. The column detailed the Nixon administration's secret preference for Pakistan in the then ongoing war between Pakistan and India which ultimately created the new nation of Bangladesh. Anderson won the Pulitzer Prize in 1972 as a result of his coverage of the war. However, it was the fact that Anderson's columns were based on leaked highly sensitive classified documents stolen with the help of a White House insider that came as the real blow to President Nixon.

    Following publication of Anderson's column, top White House aides sought to determine the source of the leak. John Ehrlichman led the internal investigation, which scrutinized the flow of information between the Pentagon, the National Security Council, and the White House. Polygraphs were ordered for those suspected of stealing documents or providing them to Anderson. That process convinced Ehrlichman that the source of the leaks was the Joints Chiefs of Staff liaison office to the National Security Council. The JCS liaison position was created during the Eisenhower administration and had an office in the Executive Office Building. Its function was to act as a special high-level communications channel between the Joints Chiefs of Staff and the NSC. During the Nixon administration, it was staffed primarily by Admiral Robert O. Welander and his assistant, Yeoman Charles Radford.



    Yeoman Radford stole from Henry Kissinger's briefcase on secret trip to China

    I didn't know he screened through the thing, but I knew he did carry 'em to me and I just returned from San Clemente and I had been told every damn thing that was in there...I gave the things back to [Alexander] Haig.
    Thomas H. Moorer, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

    John Ehrlichman's investigation discovered that Anderson's column quoted directly from the typed verbatim minutes taken at two NSC Washington Special Action Group (WSAG) meetings, held December 4 and 6, 1971. According to Ehrlichman aide David R. Young, in a memorandum sent to President Nixon declassified on June 23, 2009, "the only person that has access to these sources, in addition to Admiral Welander, is his aide, Charles Radford." While this memorandum became available only in 2009, the most sensitive records from Ehrlichman's investigation remain closed indefinitely. However, nixontapes.org acquired a portion of these records, and they are presented here for the first time.

    The investigation was swift and efficient. While Anderson continued to publish subsequent columns based on stolen documents, Welander and Radford were interviewed and polygraphed on December 16 and 17. Radford, who "d[id] not fair well under the polygraph" according to his interrogator, "confesse[d] to purloining sensitive papers from the NSC without authority and pass[ed] them to his military superiors." Radford gave the papers to Admiral Welander and Admiral Rembrandt Robinson (Welander's predecessor), who passed them on to Admiral Moorer, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Apparently, Admiral Elmo Zumalt also saw the stolen papers. Radford was put on immediate suspension, but never prosecuted, and he and Welander were later transferred to another duty station. While Welander and Moorer are now deceased, Radford remains in the U.S. military with an active security clearance.

    John Ehrlichman presented the findings of his investigation to President Nixon and Attorney General John N. Mitchell in the Oval Office on December 21, 1971, a week after the publication of Anderson's column (see table below for complete conversation audio and summary).



    Conversation

    Date

    Time Participants Audio
    Summary

    OVAL 639-030a 12/21/1971 6:07 - 6:59 pm P, JNM, HRH, JDE mp3 (2.6m) pdf (34k)
    OVAL 639-030b mp3 (48.1m)
    Ehrlichman explained the methodology behind his investigation. "Within an hour" of Anderson's columns, he determined which documents Anderson had quoted from, and then determined who had access to them. "There was really only one place in the whole federal government where all of those documents were available. And that was here, in the Joint Chiefs of Staff liaison office of the National Security Council. And there were only two men in that office, and one's an admiral, and one's a yeoman," (0:19, 301k) Ehrlichman reported. Nixon responded, "How in the name of God do we have a yeoman having access to documents of that type?" (0:04, 70k) Nixon then learned that Yeoman Radford had traveled with Haig and Kissinger, and was responsible for preparing memoranda of conversation on those trips.

    Ehrlichman continued. "In the course of the polygraph, he [Radford] was asked whether or not he had ever stolen any of the documents." (0:07, 114k) That turned out to be the key question in the investigation. "They [the interrogator] got a big flip on the polygraph, so then they doubled back," (0:04. 77k) Ehrlichman revealed. "The interrogator then doubled back, and said, 'now, you've got a bad reading on your polygraph'...and the guy broke down and cried. And then he said, 'I came into that question without permission of Admiral Welander. He called the admiral, and he said, 'I'm going to talk to this fellow, and I want you to tell him everything he knows. So the admiral got on the phone with the guy. So then it all came out." (0:30, 480k) "He has, under the express directions of Admiral Robinson, and under the implied approval of his successor, the Admiral [Welander], he has systematically stolen documents from Henry's briefcase, Haig's briefcase, people's desks, any place and every place in the NSC apparatus that he can lay his hands on, and has duplicated them, and turned them over to the Joint Chiefs, through his boss, and this has been going on now for about 13 months," (0:31, 500k) Ehrlichman reported.

    Then the investigation turned to whether any White House insiders had collaborated with the theft. In particular, Nixon wanted to know about Haig, since he was a high ranking military official also serving at a high level in the White House. "Is Haig aware of this?" Nixon asked. "I don't know," (0:01, 29k) Ehrlichman answered, but then continued. "I suspect he may be aware of it, on a back channel basis. Because after this came out, and it was reduced to writing by the interrogator, Young was advised by the interrogator that he was going to be in some trouble with his superiors, and that he was going to have to excise his report to leave that material out." (0:22, 350k) "This sailor is a veritable storehouse of information of all kinds. Because he reads and contains everything that comes to him. He testified that he knew about Henry's secret negotiations with the North Vietnamese, for instance. It came up in a response to a question," (0:22, 358k) Ehrlichman summarized.

    Nixon weighed the possible courses of action, including prosecution and court martial proceedings. However, Attorney General John Mitchell was the voice of caution. "We have to take it from there as to what this would lead to if you pursued it by way of prosecution, or even a public confrontation. You would have the Joints Chiefs allied on that side, directly against you. What has been done has been done. I think the important thing is to paper this thing over," (0:27, 434k) Mitchell reasoned. Nixon then turned to the possibility of prosecuting only Radford, without getting into a bigger confrontation with the Joint Chiefs. "You wouldn't do anything about him?" Nixon asked. "You can't, without breaking the story. Because when the pressure gets on him, it's going go right up through the channels," Mitchell responded. Ehrlichman agreed: "I have lost more sleep than anything on what to do with this guy. I have finally come to the conclusion that you can't touch him. And probably you can't touch him—", then Nixon interrupted, "because it would hurt the Joint Chiefs." (0:23, 368k) However, Nixon left firm instructions as to the future handling of the investigation.



    Excerpt from December 21, 1971 (mp3, 1:10, 1.1m)

    Nixon: You can just say there is a federal offense of the highest order here. And, you have reported it to the president. The president says he can't discuss it. And the Attorney General is handling it. Period. I wouldn't worry.
    Mitchell: What about further interrogation of Welander on this thing?
    Nixon: What's that?
    Mitchell: Further interrogation of Welander on this thing?
    Nixon: Well—
    Ehrlichman: I don't think that's indicated.
    Haldeman: What about telling Henry that Welander has refused to cooperate on the grounds of his personal relationship with Henry and that Henry is to call Welander and dissolve that relationship which will free Welander to testify?
    Mitchell: That's it exactly.
    Nixon: Why don't you tell Henry that?
    Haldeman: I don't think Henry seems to think that Welander—
    Mitchell: Tell Henry just that much directly.
    Nixon: Now.
    Mitchell: Yeah. And then—
    Haldeman: Because they know you're investigating, so just say there's a block in the investigation.
    Nixon: I don't want Henry to know...yet. Don't you agree? You see what I mean?
    Haldeman: Yeah, I just think he might find out about Moorer.
    Ehrlichman: I am sure Haig has told Henry that much.
    Nixon: Does Haig know all this? That's my point.
    Ehrlichman: Not the polygraph.
    Instead of prosecution, Mitchell argued that the JCS liaison office be closed immediately, and that those involved in the theft be transferred. That, Mitchell said, would be a de facto admission of guilt on the part of the Pentagon. "The important thing, in my way of thinking, is to stop this Joint Chiefs of Staff operation, and the -----up of security over here. And if Moorer has to order Welander off to Kokomo or wherever it is—what to do with Robinson I don't know—then they have taken recognition of this. And they, in effect, are admitting to this operation," (0:23, 369k) Mitchell said. Nixon agreed: "Let the poor bastards stew over Christmas, and then crack 'em." (0:03, 58k)

    On the one hand, the theft of highly classified national security records from briefcases and burn bags was truly a "federal offense of the highest order." This was an unprecedented situation. However, whether or not Alexander Haig was involved changed the whole nature of the investigation. Journalist Joseph Kraft also probed Haig's complicity in the theft in his September 17, 1974 Washington Post column, "Questioning Haig's Role." Nixon agreed that Ehrlichman should conduct a second interview with Welander to obtain additional information about the theft that Welander refused to disclose during his polygraph. "I'll get Welander in tomorrow," Ehrlichman said. "Good," Nixon responded. (0:02, 44k)

    For Nixon, the possibility that a White House insider helped to facilitate the theft was damaging enough. However, accusations that someone as senior in the White House as Haig was involved meant that had Nixon decided to prosecute, it would have been a disaster for the Nixon White House. After all, 1971 was also the same year in which the Pentagon Papers were leaked by Daniel Ellsberg and subsequently published by The New York Times beginning in June. Additionally, less than a year before a presidential election, Nixon would have appeared weak and no longer in control of his top aides.

    Nixon also knew that following a hypothetical prosecution, those likely replace the prosecuted would take charge in an extremely adversarial climate, which would only further contribute to the tension between the Pentagon and the White House. Therefore, Nixon decided to do what he considered to be making the best of a bad situation: he did not pursue prosecution. Instead, he ordered the immediate closing of the JCS liaison office to the NSC. Nixon believed that those impugned by Ehrlichman's investigation would be sufficiently weakened to the point where they would have no choice but to be more cooperative with the White House in the future.

    This story could not have been told in this level of detail until June 23, 2009, upon the declassification and release of related records from the Nixon Presidential Library. However, the most sensitive records remain closed, in the Papers of David R. Young, Jr., Box 18. These include an audio recording made by John Ehrlichman of Admiral Welander's confession, records from the polygraph interrogations, and additional details of how the thefts took place, who received the stolen records, and whether there was a White House insider who facilitated the theft. In the same box, there is also a heavily annotated transcript of the recorded confession that Ehrlichman extracted from Welander.

    Nixon Presidential Library confirms existence of unreleased audio recording and transcript of Admiral Welander's confession in the Papers of David R. Young, Jr.:
    “In box 18 we have both the transcript and the recording withdrawn for "A" (release would violate a Federal statute or agency policy), "D" (release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy or libel of a living person") and "F" (release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law enforcement purposes).”

    Archivist, Nixon Presidential Library

    Fortunately, nixontapes.org has obtained a copy of the heavily annotated transcript of Admiral Welander's confession from the afternoon of December 22, which was originally taken by John Ehrlichman from the Nixon Presidential Materials Project in 1986. The complete, 31-page document can be accessed by clicking on the first page, to the left. The annotations are David R. Young, Jr.'s handwriting.

    Earlier in the day, on December 22, Young sent Ehrlichman a talking points memorandum, entitled "Meeting with Admiral Welander RE Anderson Leak of December 14 and Subsequent Investigation", to prepare him for his attempt to extract a confession from Welander. Young noted, "We want to consider the possibility of getting a handle on Radford by threatening him with a Court Martial arising out of these particular actions." In other words, Young and Ehrlichman were still thinking in terms of securing a successful prosecution, even though Nixon ended such discussion the day before in the Oval Office. Or, Ehrlichman and Young wanted Welander to think Nixon was still considering prosecution in order to obtain the most detailed confession possible. Finally, Young and Ehrlichman also wanted to find out more about Haig's role in the theft: "To what extent is General Haig aware of Radford's activities?"

    The confession transcript is one of the most sensitive documents created during the Nixon administration. It details the entire process of how the documents were stolen from Kissinger's briefcase and burn bags, including to whom they were circulated and how long the theft had been going on. In addition, without directly accusing Haig of facilitating the theft, the document certainly raises additional questions about his role. Welander states Haig "cut us in", which obviously does not vindicate Haig in any way.

    Finally, nixontapes.org also obtained an even more sensitive document, an interview with an eyewitness to the theft. This is the first time the existence of this document has been made public. This document was obtained on deep background and is too sensitive to release. All that can be shown here, to the left, is a distorted, redacted first page of a four page document. The document is an interview with an eyewitness to the theft, as it was observed within the walls of the White House.

    Between the transcript of the Welander confession, above, this interview, to the left, and the Oval Office conversation, above, the following conclusions can be drawn, according to the documents: 1) the theft had been going on for over a year, 2) apart from those directly involved (Moorer, Robinson, Welander, Radford, Zumwalt), only one other person had close knowledge of it, 3) Al Haig "cut us in", or facilitated, the theft, according to Welander, 4) Henry Kissinger was wary of acting upon knowledge of the theft because of his uneasy relationship with Al Haig, and 5) Nixon knew about the theft but chose not to prosecute because he did not want to worsen White House-Pentagon relations that were already tense.

    While the contours of this theft have been detailed by a few journalists and books, most recently Len Colodny and Tom Shachtman's The Forty Years War, with the help of these documents this story can now be told in greater detail than ever before. When, or if, the remaining relevant records from the papers of David R. Young, Jr. are declassified and released by the Nixon Presidential Library, historians will know that this theft was indeed a "federal offense of the highest order."
     
  19. LETHALFORCE

    LETHALFORCE Moderator Moderator

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    Revisiting 1971 humiliation -DAWN - Encounter; December 16, 2006

    Revisiting 1971 humiliation


    A Tale of Two Cities by Charles Dickens, begins with, “It was the best of times; it was the worst of times. ….it was the spring of hope; it was the winter of despair.” Similar remarks mutatis mutandis may apply to December 16, 1971 in the history of Pakistan, such as, “It was the happiest day; it was the saddest day. It was the day of rejoicing; it was the day of mourning. It was the day of resounding victory; it was the day of disgraceful defeat. If Dickens’ story was about London and Paris, December 16 was about Islamabad and Dhaka.

    It was the happiest day for the people of what was East Pakistan until a day before. It marked the birthday of a new nation. As the sun rose from behind the verdant ambience of the paddy fields ripe with grain and ready for aman harvest, a thunderous roar of Jai Bangla rent the air across the entire landscape — from the hills of Bandarban to the woods of the sundarbans. Grim faces and furtive looks gave place to cheerful smiles. For many Bengalis the euphoria was like what they had experienced once before, on 14 August 1947. But this time the thrill was greater because almost every soul had been involved with Bangladesh’s birth and experienced its birth pangs.

    The Bengalis were in a state of rapture. They had disproved the assumption that simply because they were not of a martial race, they were incapable of fighting. Today they were victors; having defeated an army that was reputed to be one of the best trained fighting forces. Although technically it was India’s victory but it could not happen without the vital contribution of the local population that had harassed the Pakistan troops to the point of asphyxiation with their guerrilla war.

    The afternoon of December 16, 1971 drew the curtain on the gory dreams that had begun on March 25. As Pakistan’s chief of the Eastern Command, Lt. Gen. (Tiger) Niazi ceremonially handed over his service revolver to India’s Lt. Gen. Arora at the Paltan Maidan in Dhaka and signed the instrument of surrender, Pakistan stood amputated. Its eastern part had ceased to be.

    For Islamabad, the capital of the residual Pakistan, it was the saddest day; a day of lamentation and unbounded grief — grief not only at the loss of half the country but also at the humiliation of surrender. Dhaka was thrilled; Islamabad was traumatised. “Ninety-three thousand of the best fighters were made prisoners.” It was preposterous! In 1965 Pakistan had fought for 17 days to a stalemate. At the end there was the Tashkent summit. Here the ‘war’ declared on December 3 ended in just 13 days, with Pakistani troops never having an opportunity to display the battlefield valour they were proud of.

    On this day, while Bengalis were moving about freely for the first time in nine months. Pakistani officers, who had been administering East Pakistan, lay holed up in the Hotel Intercontinental, which had been declared a sanctuary by the ICRC. Others, who had sided with Pakistani troops, were wearing the same hunted expression as Bengalis did for fear of the Pakistani army.

    Though a number of books have been written by both sides on the event, yet there has hardly been an attempt to study the causes of the disaster objectively and without bias. Such a study would be more useful for Pakistan and its policymakers especially in view of the fact that no lesson seems to have been learnt. As late Khurshid Hasan Mir, in an article on this day, once observed, “We lost half the country but we did not lose our bravado.” It would be profitable even yet to ask the question, sincerely, “What went wrong?” and find out the answer. Not to reclaim Bengalis into the fold once again, but to keep those who are still in the embrace, from tearing themselves away.

    For instance, in 1947, the people of the Sylhet district of Assam had “opted” for Pakistan. Unlike the Bengalis, who became Pakistanis by “luck,” they were Pakistanis “by choice,” and were proud of it. Yet, in 1971, even these people joined the fight for “liberation” from Pakistan’s control. Why?

    Actually, Bengalis, even educated ones, were basically simple and unsophisticated. It was their passion for Pakistan that made them observe the Direction Action Day on August 16, 1946, while nowhere else did the Muslims respond to Quaid-i-Azam’s call. That was what lit the spark which ignited the Noakhali riots and Bihar massacre and, clinched the case for Pakistan.

    The blood they gave in the Great Calcutta Killing was the first sacrifice of the Bengali Muslims for Pakistan. The second was when they elected Liaquat Ali Khan from their own quota in the Constituent Assembly. He was not even from West Bengal. He was from Karnal in East Punjab. As a Punjabi, he should, in all fairness, have been elected from Pakistani Punjab. But while the Punjabis gave him a wide berth, it was the Bengalis who embraced him. In fact the East Pakistanis committed political hara-kiri by accepting parity in 1956. That was their supreme sacrifice for the united of Pakistan. Can loyalty go farther?

    They were equally ardent about Islam. Yet both their loyalty and their devotion to Islam became suspect for the ruling elite of Pakistan. Non-Bengali Muslims never cared to interact with the Bengalis, far less attempting to read their mind and understand their culture. British officers, during the Raj, used to learn the local language in order to communicate with the people they administered. But the Urdu-speaking West Pakistanis in East Pakistan’s administrative service saw no need for learning Bengali.

    So they did not know, for example, that Titu Mir laid down his life in an armed resistance against the Hindu zamindar, just because he had tried to levy a tax on his Muslim ryots for Durga Puja. They also did not know the popular adage that “What Bengal thinks today, India would think tomorrow,” — a truth that was amply demonstrated by the founding of the All-India Muslim League in Bengal. And finally, Muslim Bengalis had never picked crumbs from the royal tables of Mughal monarchs. Nor had they ever experienced serfdom of the kind prevalent in West Pakistan.

    It was the cruelest irony when even the Quaid-i-Azam assumed that Hindus could influence the Bengali Muslims and drive a wedge between them and the West Pakistanis, to make the fateful and totally uncalled for declaration at his Curzon Hall speech in 1948 that “Urdu, and Urdu alone, shall be the national language of Pakistan.” Unwittingly he had sown the wind that ultimately developed into a whirlwind which swept half the country away.

    What happened was a case of poetic justice. It was an action replay of the Muslim League’s struggle for Pakistan. The West Pakistanis did to the East Pakistanis what the Congress had done to the Muslims in India, only worse because, there it was the hegemony of the majority over the minority. Here, it was the minority exercising control over the majority.

    Twenty plus years was enough time for studying the economic and political drift and make corrections. But this was never done. In one word, as Hindu hegemony and injustice had led to Pakistan; so West Pakistani hegemony and injustice led to Bangladesh. The tragedy has a lesson for Pakistan’s rulers and political leaders if they would only heed.
     
  20. LETHALFORCE

    LETHALFORCE Moderator Moderator

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