1971 Indo-Pak War and foreign involvement

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JayATL:

What exactly are you trying to argue about here?

The USA under that asshat Nixon, was totally in bed with the Pakis, and would have bombed India, had India not rushed to the USSR. It was the prospect of starting WW3 that made the US and that asshat Nixon bite their tongue and walk back.

Had India remained "truly non-aligned", the USA would have bombed India, and the Paki genocide of Bengalis would have continued unabated.

That is the truth, no two ways about it. Stop defending the indefensible.
 

W.G.Ewald

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When we mention US, we are not pointing fingers at the people of US. It was mainly Nixon. I appreciate the stand taken by the US Congress which was ignored by Nixon, because he thought he was smarter than the rest, just like you.
Nixon was not smarter, Kissinger was smarter. And he still is :-D
 

Payeng

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and then this one time in band camp, we heard :rofl:

That what it sounds like.Like stories made up in comic books , revisionist history.

" US wanted the PRC but the PRC was friend with the Pakistanis and the Ruskies threatened nukes. But some how the ruskies never threatened Nukes when they were being killed in Afghanistan ( who cares for actual russian lives)- BUT HEY! they certainly would have nuked everyone for India :D

Funny stuff that works in yall's head. It is still baffling how you actually believe that US came with one fleet to take on everyone. after all the claim is made that they came to stop India with few ships . Brilliant!
Actually no one used the N- term literally but everyone knows the consequence of cold war turning WWIII and so the fear and talk all about.
for further clearing your doubts, read this....
Sino-Soviet split - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
and try to make a reasoning connecting it with cold war politics.
This should clear some of you doubts.

One more point, how many nuclear warhead PRC might have had during that time to counter USSR? where as even USSR's SAMs were fitted with nuclear warheads to counter Ballistic missile threats, in an event of USSR vs PRC scenario PRC stands no chance winning the war, but the worry of USSR was during such an event the US might take the advantage of the situation but fall of India would greatly effect Soviet influence in Asian, SA region and that would be an advantage for the west, so at no cost USSR want to loose India. Soviet fleet dispatch towards Indian Ocean was clearly instructed to Defend Indian objectives as per later release by the (retired) crew. You might find a youtube video of it in the internet.
 
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'No secret deal with India during 1971 war' - Hindustan Times

'No secret deal with India during 1971 war'

Veteran diplomat Henry Kissinger, the architect of the US' historic opening to China, has denied that that the US struck a secret pact with India to prevent an attack on West Pakistan in 1971.

Known in India for unflattering comments on former prime minister Indira Gandhi, he sought to


correct the picture, saying he always thought she was "an extremely strong and far-sighted woman".

"India and the former Soviet Union had made a near-alliance around this time. It was in the national interest of the US to preserve West Pakistan," said Kissinger, a Nobel Peace laureate, while delivering the keynote address at the India Today Conclave on Friday night.
He was reacting to the perception in strategic community that after the 1971 war, which led to the split of Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh, the US asked India not to strike against West Pakistan.

With the Indian Army moving into East Pakistan Dec 4, 1971, Nixon resorted to gunboat diplomacy and sent the Seventh Fleet led by the nuclear powered aircraft carrier USS Enterprise into the Bay of Bengal.

"Each side did what it had to do. Each acted on its own national interest which clashed for a brief moment," he said.

Kissinger surprised many in India by revising his much-quoted opinion of Indira Gandhi which became public after White House tapes of the Nixon presidency were declassified in 2005.

"I was under pressure and made those comments in the heat of the moment. People took those remarks out of context," Kissinger said, adding that he had the "highest regard" for Indira Gandhi.

She was an extremely strong woman who acted in India's national interest and a far-sighted woman as a far as foreign policy is concerned, said the 89-year-old Kissinger.

The declassified tapes reveal Nixon calling then Indian prime minister Indira Gandhi an "old witch" and Kissinger agreeing with that assessment and reiterating that expression in their conversation.

Speaking on the Making of an Asian Century, Kissinger, the architect of President Nixon's historic visit to China in 1972 and the author of the bestselling "On China", advocated "a balance of power" in the Asian continent.

It would not be in India's national interests to allow a dominant power or a transnational power that would intrude into its sphere of influence, from Singapore to East Africa, he suggested.

When asked whether China would treat India as an equal, he said China would treat India respectfully, but suggested that India, China and the US would have to work together to balance China's internal forces that had the potential to destabilize it.

He said he believed in the long-term compatibility of the India-US interests and described India as "a key country" in the evolving global geopolitical landscape.
 
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1971 India Pakistan War: Role of Russia, China, America and Britain | The World Reporter: News Opinion and Analysis

1971 India Pakistan War: Role of Russia, China, America and Britain

It was in the year 1971 when the two South Asian rivals declared war on each other, causing a great loss to the lives, property and territory in case of Pakistan.

"As the topic sounds controversial, before we begin we would like to tell that every information in this article is sourced. The article was written after a detail analysis of various sources. All the relevant and immediate sources are listed at the end of the Article."

Background


Before 1971, Bangladesh used to be a part of Pakistan as East Pakistan. According to Najam Sethi, a well respected and honoured journalist from Pakistan, East Pakistan always complained that they received less development funds and less attention from the West Pakistan (Punjabi) dominating government. Bengalis in East Pakistan also resisted the adoption of Urdu as the state language. The revenue from export, whether it was from the Cotton of West Pakistan or Jute of East Pakistan, was handled mainly by West Pakistan. Lastly, in an election conducted just some months before the war, the victory was gained by the East Pakistani leader and still he was not given the power, thus fueling the movement in East Pakistan.

Pakistani army started its operation in East Pakistan to contain the movement and anger among the Bengalis. It is reported that the army was involved in mass killing of public and mass rape of women. India was aware of this and was only waiting for a trigger to start the war. India started receiving huge number of refugees which became unmanageable, pushing it to intervene in the situation.

In May, Indira Gandhi wrote to Nixon about the 'carnage in East Bengal' and the flood of refugees, burdening India. After L K Jha (then the Indian ambassador to US) had warned Kissinger that India might have to send back some of the refugees as guerrillas, Nixon commented, 'By God, we will cut off economic aid [to India].'

A few days later, when the US president said 'the goddamn Indians' were preparing for another war, Kissinger retorted 'they are the most aggressive goddamn people around.'

US and China Connection, A Little Known Fact

(All Excerpts and Sources from 929 page long Volume XI of the Foreign Relations of the United States)

US sympathized with Pakistan, because of various reasons. Among them two reasons were that: firstly, Pakistan belonged to American led military Pact, CENTO and SEATO; secondly, US believed any victory of India will be considered as the expansion of Soviet influence in the parts gained by India with the victory, as it was believed to be a pro Soviet nation, even though they were non aligned.

In a telegram sent to US Secretary of State Will Roger, on March 28, 1971, the staff of the US consulate in Dhaka complained, 'Our government has failed to denounce the suppression of democracy. Our government has failed to denounce atrocities. Our government has failed to take forceful measures to protect its citizens while at the same time bending over backwards to placate the West Pakistan dominated government... We, as professional public servants express our dissent with current policy and fervently hope that our true and lasting interests here can be defined and our policies redirected in order to salvage our nation's position as a moral leader of the free world.'

This brought China in the picture. US needed help from China and the messenger was Pakistan. US approached China very secretly on this issue, who was more than welcoming as itbelieved that their relations with US could improve from this onward.

During the second week of July, 1971, Kissinger arrived in Beijing, where he heard the words by then Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai: "In our opinion, if India continues on its present course in disregard of world opinion, it will continue to go on recklessly. We, however, support the stand of Pakistan. This is known to the world. If they [the Indians] are bent on provoking such a situation, then we cannot sit idly by.' On this, Kissinger responded that China should know that the US also backs Pakistan on this issue.

Indira Gandhi, the Indian prime minister in those times decided to tour most of the Western capitals to prove Indian stand and gain support and sympathy for the Bengalis of East Pakistan. On November 4th and 5th she met Nixon in Washington. Nixon straight forwardly told her that a new war in the subcontinent was out of the question.

The next day, Nixon and Kissinger assessed the situation. Kissinger told Nixon: 'The Indians are bastards anyway. They are plotting a war.'

The pressure increased in East Pakistan, which attracted Indian attention. Indians were preparing for war and were concentrated on the Eastern front. To divert the pressure, on December 3, in the dark of night, even before India could attack East Pakistan, Pakistan opened western front and air raided six Indian Airfields in Kashmir and Punjab.

The CIA reported to the US President that Indian Prime Minister believes that the Chinese will never intervene militarily in North India, and thus, any action from China would be a surprise for India and Indian military might collapse in tensed situation caused by fighting in three different fronts (East, North and West).

Hearing this, on December 9, Nixon decided to send the aircraft carrier USS Enterprise into the Bay of Bengal to threaten India. The plan was to Surround India from all four sides and force them to retreat and leave East Pakistan.

On December 10, Nixon instructed Kissinger to ask the Chinese to move some troops toward the Indian frontier. 'Threaten to move forces or move them, Henry, that's what they must do now.' China feared any action on India might attract Soviet aggression. At this, US assured China that any action taken by Soviet Union will be countered by US to protect China.

Pakistani army had somehow maintained their position and resisted Indian advancement. They believed China is preparing to open the Northern front which will slow down or completely stop the Indian advancement. In fact, the myth of Chinese activity was also communicated to Pakistan's army to boost their moral, to keep their will to fight and hope alive. Lieutenant General A A K Niazi, the Pakistani army commander in Dhaka, was informed: "NEFA front has been activated by Chinese, although the Indians, for obvious reasons, have not announced it." But Beijing never did.

In Washington, Nixon analysed the situation thus: 'If the Russians get away with facing down the Chinese and the Indians get away with licking the Pakistanis...we may be looking down the gun barrel.' Nixon was not sure about China. Did they really intend to start a military action against India?

Soviet Union / Russian Role in the Indo Pakistan 1971 War.


As India had decided to go on with the war, and Indira Gandhi had failed to gain American support and sympathy for the Bengalis who were being tortured in East Pakistan, she finally took a hard move and on August 9, signed a treaty of peace, friendship and cooperation with Soviet Union.

The State Department historian says, 'in the perspective of Washington, the crisis ratcheted up a dangerous notch, India and the Soviet Union have signed a treaty of peace, friendship and cooperation.' It was a shock to America as this was what they feared, expansion of Soviet influence in South Asia. They feared that involvement of Soviet Union could sabotage their plan.

On December 4, just one day after Pakistan raided Indian airfields in Kashmir and Punjab declaring war on India, America's proxy involvement in the war was becoming clear. Thinking that the Soviet Union might enter the war if they come to know this, which could cause a lot of destruction to Pakistan and American equipment given to Pakistan, US ambassador to the United Nations George H W Bush [later 41st president of the United States and father of George Bush] introduced a resolution in the UN Security Council, calling for a cease-fire and the withdrawal of armed forces by India and Pakistan. Believing India can win the war and Indira Gandhi being determined to protect the interest of Bengalis, Soviet Union vetoed out the resolution, thus letting India fight for the cause. Nixon and Kissinger pressurized Soviets to a very extent but luck did not support them.




Video Translated by : Ella Salomatina, The World Reporter.

On 3rd December, 1971, the World was shaken by another war between India and Pakistan. Pakistani airforce raided Indian cities and airstrips. The Indian PM, Indira Gandhi, brought the country in the state of emergency and ordered Indian army to reflect the aggression. Fierce military operations developed on the ground, in the air and in the sea.

Historic document: "Confidential. December, 10, 1971. Moscow. For the DM Marshal Andrey Grechko.

According to the information from our ambassador in Delhi, in the very first day of the conflict the Indian destroyer 'Rajput' had sunk a Pakistani submarine with deep bombing. On December, 4 and 9, the speed boats of India had destroyed and damaged 10 Pakistani battle ships and vessels by Soviet anti ship P-15 missiles. In addition 12 Pakistani oil storage were burned in flame."

Confidential - The Commander of the Military Intelligence Service Gen. Pyotr Ivashutin.

"The Soviet Intelligence has reported that the English operative connection has come nearer to territorial India, water led by an aircraft carrier "Eagle" [On December 10]. For helping friendly India, Soviet government has directed a group of ships under the command of contr-admiral V. Kruglyakov."

Vladimir Kruglyakov, the former (1970-1975) Commander of the 10th Operative Battle Group (Pacific Fleet) remembers:

"I was ordered by the Chief Commander to track the British Navy's advancement, I positioned our battleships in the Bay of Bengal and watched for the British carrier "Eagle".

But Soviet Union didn't have enough force to resist if they encountered the British Carrier. Therefore, to support the existing Soviet fleet in the Bay of Bengal, Soviet cruisers, destroyers and nuclear submarines, equipped with anti ship missiles, were sent from Vladivostok.

In reaction English Navy retreated and went South to Madagascar.

Soon the news of American carrier Enterprise and USS Tripoli's advancement towards Indian water came.

V. Kruglyakov " I had obtained the order from the commander-in-chief not to allow the advancement of the American fleet to the military bases of India"

"We encircled them and aimed the missiles at the 'Enterprise'. We had blocked their way and didn't allow them to head anywhere, neither to Karachi, nor to Chittagong or Dhaka".

The Soviet ships had small range rockets (only upto 300 KM). Therefore, to hold the opponent under the range, commanders ran risks of going as near to the enemy as possible.

"The Chief Commander had ordered me to lift the submarines and bring them to the surface so that it can be pictured by the American spy satellites or can be seen by the American Navy!' It was done to demonstrate, that we had all the needed things in Indian Ocean, including the nuclear submarines. I had lifted them, and they recognized it. Then, we intercepted the American communication. The commander of the Carrier Battle Group was then the counter-admiral Dimon Gordon. He sent the report to the 7th American Fleet Commander: 'Sir, we are too late. There are Russian nuclear submarines here, and a big collection of battleships'.

Americans returned and couldn't do anything. Soviet Union had also threatened China that, if they ever opened a front against India on its border, they will receive a tough response from North.

The war ended with the surrender of Pakistani army as they missed American help due to quick Russians who blocked both America and China from preventing India to advance. With this, a new country named Bangladesh was formed, which was recognized by the whole world and by Pakistan next year on Shimla Agreement.


Source: 1971 India Pakistan War: Role of Russia, China, America and Britain | The World Reporter: News Opinion and Analysis 1971 India Pakistan War: Role of Russia, China, America and Britain | The World Reporter: News Opinion and Analysis
 
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1971 INDO PAK WAR---HOW RUSSIA COUNTERED US MOVES---SOME ASTONISHING FACTS! : rajee kushwaha blogs on sulekha, General blogs, rajee kushwaha blog from india


1971 INDO PAK WAR---HOW RUSSIA COUNTERED US MOVES---SOME ASTONISHING FACTS!


1971 Indo Pak War is seen as a grandiose victory of Indian army. But a lesser known fact is the Russian hand in this, when USA and UK had threatened to invade India to relieve pressure off East Pakistan ( Now Bangla Desh). 40 Years after the war, when documents by respective nations have been released---it is now emerging into public domain as to how Russia prevented USA-UK combine.

It seemed USA had moved its nuclear powered aircraft Carrier "Enterprise" into Indian Ocean with the explicit purpose of blackmailing and pressurising India so as to prevent collapse of PAKISTAN ARMY. UK's aircraft carrier "Eagle" had also joined Enterprise. And France was being pressurised to join the US forces.The British and the Americans had planned a coordinated pincer to intimidate India: while the British ships in the Arabian Sea would target India's western coast, the Americans would make a dash into the Bay of Bengal in the east where 100,000 Pakistani troops were caught between the advancing Indian troops and the sea.


To counter this two-pronged British-American threat, Russia dispatched a nuclear-armed flotilla from Vladivostok on December 13 under the overall command of Admiral Vladimir Kruglyakov, the Commander of the 10th Operative Battle Group (Pacific Fleet). Russia's entry thwarted a scenario that could have led to multiple pincer movements against India.

Besides USA, China and UK, it seems some other countries had also come forward to help Pakistan. The Pakistani military was being bolstered by aircraft from Jordan, Iran, Turkey and France. Moral and military support was amply provided by the US, China and the UK. It is now revealed that the UAE had sent in half a squadron of fighter aircraft and the Indonesians dispatched at least one naval vessel to fight alongside the Pakistani Navy.
Read this article, based on recently released Top Secret documents by various nations involved in the conflict. This article is by Rakesh Krishnan Simha, a Newzealand based, journalist of Indian origin:-

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1971 War: How Russia Sank Nixon's Gunboat Diplomacy

By Rakesh Krishnan Simha


Exactly 40 years ago, India won a famous victory over Pakistan due to its brilliant soldiers, an unwavering political leadership, and strong diplomatic support from Moscow. Less well known is Russia's power play that prevented a joint British-American attack on India.

Washington DC, December 3, 1971, 10:45am.
US President Richard Nixon is on the phone with Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, hours after Pakistan launched simultaneous attacks on six Indian airfields, a reckless act that prompted India to declare war.

Nixon: So West Pakistan giving trouble there.
Kissinger: If they lose half of their country without fighting they will be destroyed. They may also be destroyed this way but they will go down fighting.
Nixon: The Pakistan thing makes your heart sick. For them to be done so by the Indians and after we have warned the bitch (reference to Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi). Tell them that when India talks about West Pakistan attacking them it's like Russia claiming to be attacked by Finland.

Washington, December 10, 1971, 10:51am.
A week later the war is not going very well for Pakistan, as Indian armour scythes through East Pakistan and the Pakistan Air Force is blown out of the subcontinent's sky. Meanwhile, the Pakistani military in the west is demoralised and on the verge of collapse as the Indian Army and Air Force attack round the clock.

Nixon: Our desire is to save West Pakistan. That's all.
Kissinger: That's right. That is exactly right.
Nixon: All right. Keep those carriers moving now.
Kissinger: The carriers—everything is moving. Four Jordanian planes have already moved to Pakistan, 22 more are coming. We're talking to the Saudis, the Turks we've now found are willing to give five. So we're going to keep that moving until there's a settlement.
Nixon: Could you tell the Chinese it would be very helpful if they could move some forces or threaten to move some forces?
Kissinger: Absolutely.
Nixon: They've got to threaten or they've got to move, one of the two. You know what I mean?
Kissinger: Yeah.
Nixon: How about getting the French to sell some planes to the Paks?
Kissinger: Yeah. They're already doing it.
Nixon: This should have been done long ago. The Chinese have not warned the Indians.
Kissinger: Oh, yeah.
Nixon: All they've got to do is move something. Move a division. You know, move some trucks. Fly some planes. You know, some symbolic act. We're not doing a goddamn thing, Henry, you know that.
Kissinger: Yeah.
Nixon: But these Indians are cowards. Right?
Kissinger: Right. But with Russian backing. You see, the Russians have sent notes to Iran, Turkey, to a lot of countries threatening them. The Russians have played a miserable game.

If the two American leaders were calling Indians cowards, a few months earlier the Indians were a different breed altogether. This phone call is from May 1971.

Nixon: The Indians need—what they need really is a—
Kissinger: They're such bastards.
Nixon: A mass famine. But they aren't going to get that"¦But if they're not going to have a famine the last thing they need is another war. Let the goddamn Indians fight a war.
Kissinger: They are the most aggressive goddamn people around there.

The 1971 war is considered to be modern India's finest hour, in military terms. The clinical professionalism of the Indian army, navy and air force; a charismatic brass led by the legendary Sam Maneckshaw; and ceaseless international lobbying by the political leadership worked brilliantly to set up a famous victory. After two weeks of vicious land, air and sea battles, nearly 100,000 Pakistani soldiers surrendered before India's rampaging army, the largest such capitulation since General Paulus' surrender at Stalingrad in 1943. However, it could all have come unstuck without help from veto-wielding Moscow, with which New Delhi had the foresight to sign a security treaty in 1970.

As Nixon's conversations with the wily Kissinger show, the forces arrayed against India were formidable. The Pakistani military was being bolstered by aircraft from Jordan, Iran, Turkey and France. Moral and military support was amply provided by the US, China and the UK. Though not mentioned in the conversations here, the UAE sent in half a squadron of fighter aircraft and the Indonesians dispatched at least one naval vessel to fight alongside the Pakistani Navy.

However, Russia's entry thwarted a scenario that could have led to multiple pincer movements against India.

Superpowers face-off
On December 10, even as Nixon and Kissinger were frothing at the mouth, Indian intelligence intercepted an American message, indicating that the US Seventh Fleet was steaming into the war zone. The Seventh Fleet, which was then stationed in the Gulf of Tonkin, was led by the 75,000 ton nuclear powered aircraft carrier, the USS Enterprise. The world's largest warship, it carried more than 70 fighters and bombers. The Seventh Fleet also included the guided missile cruiser USS King, guided missile destroyers USS Decatur, Parsons and Tartar Sam, and a large amphibious assault ship USS Tripoli.

Standing between the Indian cities and the American ships was the Indian Navy's Eastern Fleet led by the 20,000-ton aircraft carrier, Vikrant, with barely 20 light fighter aircraft. When asked if India's Eastern Fleet would take on the Seventh Fleet, the Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Vice Admiral N. Krishnan, said: "Just give us the orders." The Indian Air Force, having wiped out the Pakistani Air Force within the first week of the war, was reported to be on alert for any possible intervention by aircraft from the Enterprise.

Meanwhile, Soviet intelligence reported that a British naval group led by the aircraft carrier Eagle had moved closer to India's territorial waters. This was perhaps one of the most ironic events in modern history where the Western world's two leading democracies were threatening the world's largest democracy in order to protect the perpetrators of the largest genocide since the Holocaust in Nazi Germany. However, India did not panic. It quietly sent Moscow a request to activate a secret provision of the Indo-Soviet security treaty, under which Russia was bound to defend India in case of any external aggression.

The British and the Americans had planned a coordinated pincer to intimidate India: while the British ships in the Arabian Sea would target India's western coast, the Americans would make a dash into the Bay of Bengal in the east where 100,000 Pakistani troops were caught between the advancing Indian troops and the sea.

To counter this two-pronged British-American threat, Russia dispatched a nuclear-armed flotilla from Vladivostok on December 13 under the overall command of Admiral Vladimir Kruglyakov, the Commander of the 10th Operative Battle Group (Pacific Fleet). Though the Russian fleet comprised a good number of nuclear-armed ships and atomic submarines, their missiles were of limited range (less than 300 km). Hence to effectively counter the British and American fleets the Russian commanders had to undertake the risk of encircling them to bring them within their target. This they did with military precision.

In an interview to a Russian TV program after his retirement, Admiral Kruglyakov, who commanded the Pacific Fleet from 1970 to 1975, recalled that Moscow ordered the Russian ships to prevent the Americans and British from getting closer to "Indian military objects". The genial Kruglyakov added: "The Chief Commander's order was that our submarines should surface when the Americans appear. It was done to demonstrate to them that we had nuclear submarines in the Indian Ocean. So when our subs surfaced, they recognised us. In the way of the American Navy stood the Soviet cruisers, destroyers and atomic submarines equipped with anti-ship missiles. We encircled them and trained our missiles at the Enterprise. We blocked them and did not allow them to close in on Karachi, Chittagong or Dhaka."

At this point, the Russians intercepted a communication from the commander of the British carrier battle group, Admiral Dimon Gordon, to the Seventh Fleet commander: "Sir, we are too late. There are the Russian atomic submarines here, and a big collection of battleships." The British ships fled towards Madagascar while the larger US task force stopped before entering the Bay of Bengal.

The Russian manoeuvres clearly helped prevent a direct clash between India and the US-UK combine. Newly declassified documents reveal that the Indian Prime Minister went ahead with her plan to liberate Bangladesh despite inputs that the Americans had kept three battalions of Marines on standby to deter India, and that the American aircraft carrier USS Enterprise had orders to target the Indian Army, which had broken through the Pakistani Army's defences and was thundering down the highway to the gates of Lahore, West Pakistan's second largest city.According to a six-page note prepared by India's foreign ministry, "The bomber force aboard the Enterprise had the US President's authority to undertake bombing of the Indian Army's communications, if necessary."

China in the box
Despite Kissinger's goading and desperate Pakistani calls for help, the Chinese did nothing. US diplomatic documents reveal that Indira Gandhi knew the Soviets had factored in the possibility of Chinese intervention. According to a cable referring to an Indian cabinet meeting held on December 10, "If the Chinese were to become directly involved in the conflict, Indira Gandhi said, the Chinese know that the Soviet Union would act in the Sinkiang region. Soviet air support may be made available to India at that time."

Interestingly, while the cable is declassified, the source and extensive details of the Indian Prime Minister's briefing remain classified. "He is a reliable source" is all that the document says. There was very clearly a cabinet level mole the Americans were getting their information from.

Intolerable hatred
On December 14, General A.A.K. Niazi, Pakistan's military commander in East Pakistan, told the American consul-general in Dhaka that he was willing to surrender. The message was relayed to Washington, but it took the US 19 hours to relay it to New Delhi. Files suggest senior Indian diplomats suspected the delay was because Washington was possibly contemplating military action against India.

Kissinger went so far as to call the crisis "our Rhineland" a reference to Hitler's militarisation of German Rhineland at the outset of World War II. This kind of powerful imagery indicates how strongly Kissinger and Nixon came to see Indians as a threat.

An Indian University study of the conflict says: "The violation of human rights on a massive scale—described in a March 30 US cable as "selective genocide"—and the complete disregard for democracy were irrelevant to Nixon and Kissinger. In fact, the non-democratic aspects of Pakistani dictator Yahya Khan's behaviour seemed to be what impressed them the most. As evidence mounted of military atrocities in East Pakistan, Nixon and Kissinger remained unmoved. In a Senior Review Group meeting, Kissinger commented at news of significant casualties at a university that, 'The British didn't dominate 400 million Indians all those years by being gentle'."

Nixon and Kissinger phoned Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev and asked for guarantees that India would not attack West Pakistan. "Nixon was ready to link the future summit in Moscow to Soviet behaviour on this issue," writes professor Vladislav M. Zubok in A Failed Empire. "The Soviets could not see why the White House supported Pakistan, who they believed had started the war against India. Brezhnev, puzzled at first, was soon enraged. In his narrow circle, he even suggested giving India the secret of the atomic bomb. His advisers did their best to kill this idea. Several years later, Brezhnev still reacted angrily and spoke spitefully about American behaviour."

Cold Warriors
Another telephone conversation between the scheming duo reveals a lot about the mindset of those at the highest echelons of American decision making:

Kissinger: And the point you made yesterday, we have to continue to squeeze the Indians even when this thing is settled.
Nixon: We've got to for rehabilitation. I mean, Jesus Christ, they've bombed—I want all the war damage; I want to help Pakistan on the war damage in Karachi and other areas, see?
Kissinger: Yeah
Nixon: I don't want the Indians to be happy. I want a public relations program developed to piss on the Indians.
Kissinger: Yeah.
Nixon: I want to piss on them for their responsibility. Get a white paper out. Put down, White paper. White paper. Understand that?
Kissinger: Oh, yeah.
Nixon: I don't mean for just your reading. But a white paper on this.
Kissinger: No, no. I know.
Nixon: I want the Indians blamed for this, you know what I mean? We can't let these goddamn, sanctimonious Indians get away with this. They've pissed on us on Vietnam for 5 years, Henry.
Kissinger: Yeah.
Nixon: Aren't the Indians killing a lot of these people?
Kissinger: Well, we don't know the facts yet. But I'm sure they're not as stupid as the West Pakistanis—they don't let the press in. The idiot Paks have the press all over their place.

The 1971 war victory is a tribute to India's amazing plurality. The entire war planning was conducted by Field Marshal Sam Maneckshaw (a Zoroastrian); the Eastern Army that liberated Bangladesh was headed by Chief of Staff of the Indian Army's Eastern Command Jacob-Farj-Rafael Jacob (a Jew); the head of ground forces in the east was General Jagjit Singh Aurora (a Sikh); the man who set alight Karachi for a week was Chief of Staff of the Indian Navy, Admiral H.M. Nanda (a Hindu); and the entire team was given ample freedom for their military operations by a Hindu Prime Minister.

About the author: Rakesh Krishnan Simha is a New Zealand-based writer and columnist for Russia Beyond the Headlines. He has previously worked with Businessworld, India Today and Hindustan Times, and was news editor with the Financial Express.
 
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US snooping worsened after 1971 Pakistan war - Economic Times

US snooping worsened after 1971 Pakistan war


NEW DELHI: Having weighed in on the Pakistani side during the 1971 war, the Americans refused to relent on their anti-India stance, aggressively snooping on Indian Navy ships and submarines, declassified government files show. The scale of these hostilities, thus far unknown, could have jeopardized the sensitive security scenario.

Aggressive surveillance sorties from America's newly-acquired Indian Ocean base of Diego Garcia kept getting more and more frequent and hostile through the seventies and the declassified files give instances of US military planes provoking Indian vessels. On November 21, 1975, defence secretary D R Kohli wrote to foreign secretary Kewal Singh: "In the recent past there have been several incidents of snooping/buzzing by US Orions (MR/ASW aircraft) over our naval ships." He listed incidents in 1974-75 that the Navy perceived serious.

The note listed specific instances when US surveillance planes flew very close, trailing Indian Navy vessels. In one incident, "an aircraft orbited at a very low altitude of 200 feet for about 10-15 minutes as the submarines surfaced on completion of sonobuoy trials (sonar system dropped/ejected from aircraft or ships during anti-submarine operations). On being closed by Alize (naval aircraft) the US planes sped away... " The defence secretary notes: "This snooping seems to be serious."

Aircraft carrier INS Vikrant reported on July 15, 1975 that it was shadowed on a "passage from Bombay to Madras" . INS Delhi reported at least three incidents of US snooping . In the first instance, a US Orion made "two runs over the ship at 150 feet" and flew off, Kohli said. Similar incidents were reported by INS Mysore, INS Magar and other ships.

The defence secretary wrote: "It is assessed that US Orion aircraft are operating from Diego Garcia" and are "subjecting our naval activities to surveillance, even up to Bombay" . In some earlier cases, US planes operating from bases in Thailand had carried out such activities, he said.

Foreign secretary Kewal Singh wrote on November 11, 1975: "If unfortunately, news of such incidents becomes public, it can lead to controversy and difficulties... " On the foreign secretary's note, foreign minister Yashwantrao Chavan wrote: "We must certainly take up the matter with the (US) embassy ... This is the first glimpse of their use of Diego Garcia."

T S Teja, joint secretary (Americas), subsequently summoned US deputy chief of mission David Schneider on December 3 and lodged a strong protest.
 
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'Russian arms could have led to Indo-Pak war'

'Russian arms could have led to Indo-Pak war'




Washington: The pro-Pakistan tilt of the US administration continued well into mid-70s, with the then secretary of state Henry Kissinger expressing concern over Russia's arms sale to New Delhi warning that this could trigger another Indian attack on Pakistan.

The continued Pakistani slant in the then US administration has come to light after the State Department de-classified diplomatic conversations between the American and Russian leadership of those years.

At a meeting in Vienna in 1975 with his Russian counterpart Andrei Gromyko, Kissinger raised doubts over the arm supplies by Moscow to New Delhi and threatened that the US would not take "lightly" another Indian attack on Pakistan.

"There is one point I raised at dinner, that is, our view of Indian intentions, especially since India is buying a lot of Soviet arms. I just hope you keep an eye on it. Because so far, we have sold nothing to Pakistan. We have lifted the embargo but sold nothing," Kissinger told Gromyko.



Gromyko responded by saying that India's behaviour gives Russia no concern.

"If there were another Indian attack, it is something we would not take lightly," Kissinger said.

"We, generally speaking, are behaving very modestly regarding arms supplies to India. Maybe the information you have is exaggerated. We have absolutely no information that would cause us any concern regarding Indian intentions.

"There would be no sense for us to ignore any danger there because we are very concerned with the situation there, if there were any. And we say this to India," Gromyko said.

According to the voluminous document running into 1181 pages, during another meeting in Washington on September 21, 1974, Kissinger is quoted as saying that the Indian nuclear tests early that year had "military implications".

He said this in a meeting with the Gromyko, and the then US President, Gerald Ford, among others.

"The line between weapons and peaceful uses is vague. The Indian explosion obviously has military implication. The Japanese have a big nuclear programme but have not done any explosion yet. If they moved this way, they would go like India and could be a big power very quickly," Kissinger said.
 

ejazr

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Just a repost of some earlier declassed documents on how US consider India a "Soviet Stooge" and hence the harsh anti-Indian policies that followed


Nixon/Kissinger Saw India as "Soviet Stooge" in 1971 South Asia Crisis

Washington, D.C., June 29, 2005 - President Nixon and his national security adviser Henry Kissinger saw India as a "Soviet stooge" during the South Asia crisis of 1971, downplayed reports of Pakistani genocide in what is now Bangladesh, and even suggested that China intervene militarily on Pakistan's side, according to startling new documentation from White House files and tapes contained in the State Department's Foreign Relations of the United States series and reposted today by the National Security Archive.

Earlier this week, the Office of the Historian at the State Department hosted a major conference on U.S. policy in South Asia focusing on the 1971 India-Pakistan war triggered by the crisis over Bangladesh. (Note 1) Much of the discussion focused on, and flowed from, a new volume of documentation edited by Louis J. Smith for the FRUS series. (Note 2) Besides including the usual cables and memoranda, the editors of this volume made significant use of the White House tapes and the transcripts of Henry Kissinger's telephone conversations. "This volume deserves the attention of the widest possible readership because of its fascinating, sometimes startling, revelations on Nixon administration policy. It gives the reader an unparalleled perspective on the inner workings of White House policy throughout the crisis," said Dr. William Burr, senior analyst at the National Security Archive, who attended the conference.

Triggered by East Pakistan's (now Bangladesh) quest for independence, the 1971 crisis quickly raised human rights issues because of what White House officials characterized as a "reign of terror" (Note 3) orchestrated by Pakistani forces. While consular officials in Dacca, East Pakistan privately criticized the U.S. government's "failure to denounce atrocities," (Note 4) Nixon and Kissinger did not want "to get [the] West Pakistanis turned against us," in part because President Yahya was providing a secret communication link for their quest for rapprochement with China. (Note 5) The close China-Pakistan relationship was central to Nixon's wish to "tilt" U.S. policy toward Pakistan in part to show Beijing that Washington would support its allies. (Note 6) With Pakistani refugees fleeing into India, the crisis quickly turned into a clash between India and Pakistan. Quickly defining and dramatizing a regional national/ethnic crisis in geo-political terms, Nixon and Kissinger saw India as a Soviet client state that was determined to weaken Pakistan fatally. China, however, had a close relationship with Pakistan and Nixon wanted to "tilt" U.S. policy toward Pakistan to show Beijing that Washington would support its allies.

As the crisis turned to war, Nixon and Kissinger saw the event as a Cold War confrontation which could involve a China-Soviet conflict and U.S. confrontation with the Soviet Union. "The documents show that Nixon and Kissinger overlooked the regional, ethnic, and national dimensions of the crisis and instead saw it in terms of the Cold War and macho terms, which made the crisis even more dangerous; they risked a China-Soviet conflict so they could demonstrate what they thought was toughness and resolve," commented Dr. Burr. (Note 7)

Some of the most fascinating documents in the volume concern Nixon and Kissinger's reactions to developments just before and during the war and their discussions of policy options. Among the highlights:

  • Their reactions to Nixon's meetings with Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi on November 5, 1971. According to Kissinger, the "Indians are bastards anyway. They are starting a war there "¦ [W]hile [Gandhi] was a bitch, we got what we wanted to "¦ She will not be able to go home and say that the United States didn't give her a warm reception and therefore in despair she's got to go to war." (Note 8)
  • Their agreement that China could put pressure on India: " I think we've got to tell [the Chinese] that some movement on their part "¦ toward the Indian border could be very significant." On December 8, Nixon and Kissinger agreed to transfer planes to Pakistan and to tell the Chinese that "if you are ever going to move this is the time." Kissinger noted the danger that may arise "if our bluff is called." (Note 9)
  • The controversial CIA report that led Kissinger and Nixon to believe that India intended to dismember Pakistan and destroy its armed forces. (Note 10)
  • Later on December 8, Nixon and Kissinger decide to send an aircraft carrier and other naval forces into the Bay of Bengal in order to prevent a "Soviet stooge, supported by Soviet arms" from overrunning Pakistan. (Note 11)
  • Interpreting the regional crisis in geo-strategic terms, Kissinger justifies intervention to "prevent the West Pakistani army from being destroyed. And secondly to retain our Chinese arm. And thirdly, to prevent a complete collapse of the world's psychological balance of power, which will be produced if a combination of the Soviet Union and the Soviet armed client state can tackle [Pakistan] without anybody doing anything." While U.S. action could jeopardize the developing détente with Moscow, Kissinger suggested to Nixon that "your card [is] your willingness to jeopardize it." (Note 12)
  • Nixon's hot line message to Brezhnev on 10 December urging the Soviets " in the strongest possible terms to restrain India with which "¦ you have great influence and for whose actions you must share responsibility." (Note 13)
  • On December 10, Kissinger delicately encourages the Chinese to take action against India guaranteeing U.S. support if the Soviets retaliate: "if the People's Republic were to consider the situation on the Indian subcontinent a threat to security, and if it took measures to protect its security, the US would oppose efforts of others to interfere with the People's Republic." (Note 14)
  • On December 12, Kissinger tells Nixon that by taking a tough stand with the Soviets he was making a "typical Nixon plan. I mean it's bold"¦ But my view is that if we do nothing there's a certainty of disaster. This way there is a high possibility of one, but at least we're coming off like men." With Beijing's UN ambassador calling for an urgent meeting in New York with White House officials, Kissinger was sure that Beijing was "going to move. No question, they're going to move." If the Chinese intervene, Nixon asked "what do we do if the Soviets move against them? Start lobbing nuclear weapons." Kissinger later answered that "We don't have to lob nuclear weapons. We have to go on alert"¦ We may have to put forces in. We may have to give them bombing assistance." This will provide an "opportunity to clean up Vietnam at that point" by giving an ultimatum to Hanoi and blockading Haiphong harbor. (Note 15)
  • Nixon was not as sure as Kissinger that Beijing and Moscow would go to war and when General Alexander Haig met with the Chinese later that day, Nixon and Kissinger learned that the Chinese had not made any military decisions but would call for a cease-fire and mutual troop withdrawal and support a stand-still cease-fire if necessary.
  • Even before they realized that Beijing was not going to intervene, the Soviets had assured the White House that the Indians were not going to attack West Pakistan and that they were working with Prime Minister Gandhi on a cease-fire. Ever the courtier, Kissinger praised Nixon for his willingness to confront the Soviets: "What you did this morning Mr. President was a heroic thing." On December 16, Pakistani forces surrendered in East Pakistan and a cease-fire took effect the next day. (Note 16)


There is much more to the story and readers are encouraged to peruse this extraordinary compilation. Besides the print/electronic editions of this volume, the State Department historians have released an electronic supplement of scanned documents, the first ever in the FRUS series. (Note 17)
 
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Nixon plotted war against India in 1971

Nixon plotted war against India in 1971

Press Trust of India | May 7, 2005

Washington - Fearing that Soviets might get involved in the 1971 Indo-Pak war, then US President Richard Nixon had wanted China to make coordinated military moves in support of Pakistan, according to documents released by the State Department.

The Nixon administration was not prepared to involve itself in a war on the Indian sub-continent. Nor did it pay much attention to Indian concerns about "the carnage in East Pakistan" and the problems of refugees in West Bengal, said a State Department press release giving the gist of the papers on the Bangladesh War of Liberation, released yesterday.

But, the signing of the India-Soviet Union Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation in August 1971, while not a mutual security treaty, was viewed in Washington as a blank check to India in its confrontation with Pakistan, it said.

The US policy included support of Pakistan in UN and pressure on Soviets to discourage India, with hints that US-Soviet detente would be in jeopardy if Moscow did not comply.

At Nixon's instruction, his assistance for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger met China's ambassador to the UN Huang Hua to suggest that Beijing make coordinated military moves in support of Pakistan. The implication conveyed by Kissinger was that if the soviets responded militarily, the US would support China in any confrontation with Soviet Union.

When the Chinese asked to meet Kissinger in New York two days later, the White House assumed the worst and concluded that China had already decided to take military action against India, the release said.

There was serious contemplation in the White House that the crisis might lead to nuclear war, but the general conclusion was that a regional conventional war in South Asia pitting India and the Soviet Union against China, the US and Pakistan was more likely.

When the meeting took place, the Nixon White House learned that China's message had nothing to do with military moves in support of Pakistan. For his part, President Nixon realised that "Russia and China aren't going to war."

In mid-December, Pakistani military forces surrendered in East Pakistan.

With US encouragement, Pakistan accepted an Indian cease-fire offer that would dramatically alter the Indian subcontinent, the release noted.

Tracing the history of the war, the volume released by the State Department described political crisis triggered by the electoral success of Bengali nationalists in East Pakistan, led by Sheik Mujibur Rahman and his Awami League and the announcement by Pakistan President Yahya Khan on March 1,

1971, that the scheduled meetings of the newly elected National Assembly would be postponed indefinitely.

The announcement was met initially by popular demonstrations by the Awami League and the dispatch of additional troops to Dhaka by Pakistan's martial-law government. On March 15, Rahman announced that he was taking over the administration of East Pakistan and 10 days later the Army arrested him and moved to suppress what it viewed as a "secessionist" movement, the release said.

The United States was loath to intervene in Pakistan's internal affairs, especially since Islamabad was Nixon's secret conduit for a diplomatic opening to China, according to the release.

The Pakistani Army's campaign against Bengali dissidents eventually led the US consulate in Dhaka to send a "dissent channel" message to Washington, which called for the United States to condemn the "indiscriminate killings."

When Indian officials such as Foreign Minister Swaran Singh and Prime Minister Indira Gandhi came to Washington, the Nixon administration counselled non-intervention, but assumed that India planned to go to war, the release said.

President Nixon had also warned Soviet officials not to encourage India and informed New Delhi that if it started a war with Pakistan, the United States would cut off aid, it said.

On November 22, when the war began, the Nixon administration cut off economic aid to India, and Nixon himself decided to "tilt" toward Pakistan.

When Nixon learned that Indian war plans were designed to liberate "Bangladesh" and to destroy Pakistan's military armoured and air strength, he ordered the US carrier enterprise and its escorts into the Bay of Bengal, the release said.
 

trackwhack

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So now its 1971, not 1974, really I dont remember and thing about a war as far as the USA was concerned in 1974. Heres 1971 in the United States
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, it does not seem to mention a possible war with India or Russia...are your sure about all that. http://search.yahoo.com/search;_ylt...oA?p=usa 1971 history&fr2=sb-top&fr=yfp-t-701
Usually if we are about to get in a war some one brings it up, usually in the news paper or on TV. I usually kept up with that kind of stuff.

So you want to hold me onto a typo? ok.

So, why did you run away in 1971?
 

average american

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I dont think the USA had any intention of getting into a war with India in 71 and I allways thought India was a stooge of the Russians.

Indo-Pak war 1971-The truth of Longewala - YouTube

General (Retd.) Chuck Yeager (USAF) , Book: Yeager, the Autobiography)

" The Pakistanis whipped their [Indians'] asses in the sky, but it was the other way around in the ground war. The air war lasted two weeks and the Pakistanis scored a three-to-one kill ratio, knocking out 102 Russian-made Indian jets and losing thirty-four airplanes of their own. I'm certain about the figures because I went out several times a day in a chopper and counted the wrecks below. I counted wrecks on Pakistani soil, documented them by serial number, identified the components such as engines, rocket pods, and new equipment on newer planes like the Soviet SU-7 fighter-bomber and the MiG-21 J, their latest supersonic fighter. The Pakistani army would cart off these items for me, and when the war ended, it took two big American Air Force cargo lifters to carry all those parts back to the States for analysis by our intelligence division
 

trackwhack

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I dont think the USA had any intention of getting into a war with India in 71 and I allways thought India was a stooge of the Russians.

Indo-Pak war 1971-The truth of Longewala - YouTube

General (Retd.) Chuck Yeager (USAF) , Book: Yeager, the Autobiography)

" The Pakistanis whipped their [Indians'] asses in the sky, but it was the other way around in the ground war. The air war lasted two weeks and the Pakistanis scored a three-to-one kill ratio, knocking out 102 Russian-made Indian jets and losing thirty-four airplanes of their own. I'm certain about the figures because I went out several times a day in a chopper and counted the wrecks below. I counted wrecks on Pakistani soil, documented them by serial number, identified the components such as engines, rocket pods, and new equipment on newer planes like the Soviet SU-7 fighter-bomber and the MiG-21 J, their latest supersonic fighter. The Pakistani army would cart off these items for me, and when the war ended, it took two big American Air Force cargo lifters to carry all those parts back to the States for analysis by our intelligence division
:rofl: somebody please do the honours ...
 
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How India brought down the US' supersonic man | Russia & India Report

How India brought down the US' supersonic man

Chuck Yeager is an American icon and will go down in history as the first man to break the sound barrier. But during the 1971 India-Pakistan War, when an Indian pilot shot his personal aircraft, the air ace lost his cool, and demanded retaliation against India. Mercifully, his antics were ignored by then US President Richard Nixon.

Yeager was shot down by an Indian pilot-just sore
 

average american

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How India brought down the US' supersonic man | Russia & India Report

How India brought down the US' supersonic man

Chuck Yeager is an American icon and will go down in history as the first man to break the sound barrier. But during the 1971 India-Pakistan War, when an Indian pilot shot his personal aircraft, the air ace lost his cool, and demanded retaliation against India. Mercifully, his antics were ignored by then US President Richard Nixon.

Yeager was shot down by an Indian pilot-just sore
if I remember right it was a unarmed cessana and was on the ground, Claim is exgaggerated like the number of planes India shot down in the air war. Of course Indias military was five times the size of Pakistan and they had the support of the entire USSR next door.
 
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if I remember right it was a unarmed cessana and was on the ground, Claim is exgaggerated like the number of planes India shot down in the air war. Of course Indias military was five times the size of Pakistan and they had the support of the entire USSR next door.
Then why did Pakistan start the war?? The genocide that took place was ok with USA?
Why wouldn't India turn to Russia when Nixon is encouraging China to attack India.

 
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Superpowers' role in 1971

Superpowers' role in 1971

Kissinger solicited Chinese cooperation to achieve the limited aim of discouraging India to launch a counter-attack on West Pakistan. China outwardly maintained its support for the unity of Pakistan it was disillusioned with Pakistan's ability to seek a political solution
Nothing is more shattering and traumatic for a state than to experience a part of its territory seceding because of internal rebellion or external intervention or both. That is, however, exactly what happened to Pakistan when its eastern wing, known initially as East Bengal and then as East Pakistan, broke away on December 16, 1971. Bengali Muslims had constituted the most reliable support base for the Pakistan movement, but they were disillusioned soon after Pakistan came into being because economic, political and military power remained in the hands of a power elite based in West Pakistan. Over the years, separatist tendencies had been growing in East Pakistan. The trigger to the secessionism movement was provided by the 1970 general election results. The East Pakistan based Awami League won an absolute majority of 161 seats in the National Assembly comprising 300 directly elected members on a radical regionalist 6-point programme that virtually rendered Pakistan a confederation or a loose federation. This was unacceptable to the Pakistan military and the main winner in West Pakistan, the Pakistan People's Party led by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. The Awami League also assumed uncompromising positions. Consequently, negotations between General Yahya Khan, Awami League leader, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, and ZA Bhutto ended in a deadlock (Hamoodur Rahman Commission Report, no publication date given).

On March 25, 1971 the Pakistan military embarked upon a massive crackdown operation in East Pakistan. Hundreds of thousands of Bengali Pakistanis fled to the Indian West Bengal and set up a resistance movement, the Mukti Bahini. The Indian authorities closely monitored the Mukti Bahini and the government in exile that the rebels set up. Thousands of Mukti Bahini cadres entered East Pakistan to fight the Pakistan Army that was seen as an occupation force. Both sides committed crimes against humanity but there can be no doubt that the Pakistan Army's excesses were far greater. The Pakistan military in particular targeted the Hindu minority of East Pakistan. Anywhere between 300,000 to 3 million people were killed. Thousands of Bengali women were raped.

The Indian Army had been planning for months an offensive in East Pakistan, which was to take place after the monsoon rains were over. US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger visited South Asia in the summer of 1971. He told the Indian leaders that the United States considered India the paramount power in South Asia and hoped that India and Pakistan would resolve their conflicts peacefully. He expressed understanding for Indian concerns about the millions of Bengali refugees that had fled East Pakistan and sought sanctuary in India. Meanwhile India had been preparing for a diplomatic offensive to ensure that if its army intervened in India there would not be any Chinese retaliation against it. Consequently on 9 August 1971, an Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation was signed. The treaty was for 20 years. Having secured a counterweight against possible Chinese intervention Indira Gandhi intensified diplomatic activities to muster support for India's position on East Pakistan. Alleged human rights violations by the Pakistan Army in East Pakistan became one of the main arguments to justify military intervention. Mrs Gandhi embarked on 25 October on a worldwide tour to explain to world leaders that the situation in East Pakistan was very bad and Pakistan was doing nothing to find a political resolution of the civil war. In November ZA Bhutto was sent to China to solicit help in case of war. He did not receive much encouragement (Khan 2006: 346-7). Foreign Secretary Sultan Muhammad Khan was despatched to some western capitals to present the Pakistani point of view that the conflict in East Pakistan was an internal problem and India had no right to train and arm Bengali rebels to carry out terrorist activities inside East Pakistan. Further, that an Indian intervention would result in an all-out war (Ibid: 349-54).

In any event,a full-fledged Indian attack from all directions by the Indian Army on East Pakistan was launched on the night of 20-12 November. In response on 3 December Pakistan attacked India from West Pakistan. That did not deter the Indians who moved rapidly into East Pakistan and headed towards Dhaka. Despite resistance being put up by Pakistani troops in some placed the Indian Army quickly reached Dhaka. The Pakistan Army surrendered on 16 December. The whole ceremony was shown on Indian and international television channels. Some 93,000 Pakistani troops became prisoners-of-war. Pakistan was roundly defeated and its eastern wing seceded to become Bangladesh.

Yahya Khan was bitter about the fact that the Americans and the Chinese did not come to his rescue. This was not entirely reasonable. Kissinger solicited Chinese cooperation to achieve the limited aim of discouraging India to launch a counter-attack on West Pakistan (Aijazuddin 2007: 367-86). The US also took an initiative on 4 December 1971 to start proceedings in the Security Council for a resolution calling upon both India and Pakistan to ceasefire. Once again it sought Chinese help which was given. Although China outwardly maintained its support for the unity of Pakistan it was disillusioned with Pakistan's ability to seek a political solution to the conflict in East Pakistan. In other words, a breakup of Pakistan seemed to have been accepted by all the major powers. The trauma of defeat and the breakup of Pakistan greatly undermined the prestige of the Pakistan military whose public relations office had been spreading fictitious stories of spectacular victories over the Indians – identical to the propaganda offensive during the 1965 war.

In any event, following the surrender at Dhaka on 16 December it took the Pakistan Military High Command another two days to agree to the unilateral ceasefire offered by Indira Gandhi in the Western theatre by Yahya, apparently on the advice of President Nixon (Siddiqi 2009: 212). On 20 December 1971 General Yahya resigned and ZA Bhutto a civilian took over as Chief Martial Law Administration, president and the supreme commander!

References

Aijazuddin, Faqir Syed, 2002, The White House and Pakistan: Secret Declassified Documents 1969-1974, Karachi: Oxford University Press.

Khan, Sultan Muhammad, 1997, Memories and Reflections of a Pakistani Diplomat, Karachi: Paramount Publishing Enterprise.

Siddiqi, A. R., East Pakistan, The Endgame: An Onlooker's Journal 1969-1971, Karachi: Oxford University Press.

The Report of the Hamoodur Rehman Commission of Inquiry into the 1971 War: As Declassified by the Government of Pakistan, (no publication date given), Lahore: Vanguard.


The writer is a Professor Emeritus of Political Science, Stockholm University. He is also Honorary Senior Fellow of the Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore. He can be reached at [email protected]
 

trackwhack

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Forget all the reasons for the war. Average American, why are you shying away from answering my initial question? Why did the US back off after trying to intimidate with the ACBG? Did they think India would bow to their intimidation? Did Kissinger shit himself when he realized that Indira meant business?
 

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