1965 Indo-pak war planned by USA ?

Discussion in 'Politics & Society' started by satyam, Jul 31, 2010.

  1. satyam

    satyam New Member

    May 19, 2010
    Likes Received:
    K Subramaniyam in one of his columns wrote that while browsing in a London used book sore he picked up a American book on crisis game theory which had the exact Pak moves in 1965 gamed with participation of Pak officers in a US military academy and was appalled at the perfidy.

    Could be the 1965 war was supposed to trigger some other events and India as usual stymied them by not responding per the game scenario.
    1965 war was accompanied by Indonesia claiming the Indian Ocean name.
    KSA and Gulf changing their money from Indian rupee to Dollar.
    Two years later OIC was created...
  3. ajtr

    ajtr Veteran Member Veteran Member

    Oct 2, 2009
    Likes Received:
    1965 decided fate of the subcontinent

    Though the 1965 Indo-Pak war was only a medium-scale, limited war that lasted less than three weeks, it resulted in the Tashkent Agreement that brought about exchange of territories occupied by both sides.

    It is largely seen as a stalemate in Pakistan and the rest of the world, but the 1965 war generated very significant consequences that decided the fate of the Indian subcontinent.The Pakistani leadership carefully planned the war. It was meant to lead to a massive uprising in Kashmir engineered by sending in Pakistani infiltrators. Further, by clandestinely raising a second armoured division of relatively sophisticated Patton tanks, Pakistan aimed at a breakthrough in Punjab [ Images ] against the weak and obsolete Indian armour and wanted to cut off Jammu and Kashmir [ Images ] from India.

    Field Marshal Ayub Khan also was planning to demonstrate -- in the wake of the Indian Army's [ Images ] debacle at Sela-Bomdila in Arunachal Pradesh in November 1962 -- that one Pakistani was equal to 10 Indians in terms of military prowess.

    His conviction was that the Hindu, when struck a timely and decisive blow, would not be able to stand up. His confidant Altaf Gauhar has recorded this in Ayub Khan's biography.

    Pakistan had China's support. When Islamabad [ Images ] appealed for support, Beijing [ Images ] did try to apply pressure on New Delhi [ Images ] by delivering a not very credible ultimatum to India.

    The Americans were well informed about the possibility of Pakistani infiltration into Kashmir and the subsequent offensive months in advance, as has been recorded by the then Central Investigative Agency operative in India, Duane Claridge, in his book A Man for All Seasons.

    The American military and political establishment had concluded that in case of a war, Pakistan would win.

    The Pentagon [ Images ] and Harvard University played a war game at the Institute of Defence Analysis, Washington, DC, in March 1965. The war game and its results were available in a book, Crisis Game by Sidney Giffin, by the spring of 1965.

    The total failure of the Kashmir uprising, the complete destruction of the Pakistani Patton Armoured division at Khem Karan in Punjab and the Pakistan Army [ Images ] running out of ammunition and being saved from total humiliation through the UN ceasefire constitute a turning point in the history of India-Pakistan relations.

    Having engineered the war and seen it result in a disaster, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto turned against his benefactor Ayub Khan and blamed him for the Tashkent Agreement. His propaganda was that Ayub Khan threw away a military victory.

    The Pakistani people were not informed about the failure of Operation Gibraltar, the attempted infiltration into Kashmir and thereafter of Operation Grand Slam, the attack on Jammu. The Indian counterattack in the Lahore [ Images ] sector was depicted as Indian aggression. The decimation of the Pakistani armoured division by a poorly armed Indian armoured brigade through superior tactics at Khem Karan was also not told to the Pakistani people.

    But all these attempts at obfuscation did not deceive a leader like Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, considered the father of Bangladesh. When the question was raised about the security of what was then East Pakistan vis-à-vis India in case of another war, Bhutto, as foreign minister, implied in his answer that Pakistan depended on Beijing to ensure the security of that part of its territory.

    That led Rahman to ask for greater autonomy from Islamabad and to formulate his six points which became the basis for the subsequent secession of Bangladesh from Pakistan.

    The 1965 war also led to an embargo of US arms supplies to Pakistan. Islamabad's use of American arms against India was against the assurances given by President Dwight Eisenhower to Jawaharlal Nehru [ Images ] that in case Pakistan used US-supplied arms against India, necessary corrective action would follow.

    Though the US bureaucracy and the Pentagon were prepared to look the other way if Pakistan had won the war, they found it difficult to overlook the miserable performance of Pakistani armour at Khem Karan.
    Pakistan therefore turned to China and France [ Images ] for re-equipment of its forces. After 1965, China became the foremost supplier of arms to Pakistan.

    From Bhutto's death cell testimony, it also becomes clear that Pakistan initiated its discussions with China on acquiring nuclear weapon technology around 1965. Bhutto talked of completing his 11-year-long negotiations successfully in 1976. It would not be incorrect to say that the Chinese-Pakistani strategy of containing India began in the aftermath of 1965 war.

    Pakistan drew correct lessons from the failure of Operation Gibraltar when the Kashmiris did not rise against India in consequence to large-scale infiltration of Pakistani commandos into the Kashmir valley. They bided their time and in the late 1980s trained disaffected Kashmiris, who crossed over into Pakistan Occupied Kashmir, in arms and infiltrated them back.

    That this strategy too did not wholly succeed is a different story but it did begin the prolonged proxy war against India in Kashmir.

    Pakistan also discovered it was not difficult to run rings around the conditions of American arms supplies and hide things from US inspection teams. They were able to covertly raise a second armoured division in 1965. Unfortunately for them it did not give them the victory in Punjab they expected. The second armoured division met its defeat at Khem Karan.

    Pakistan used this experience of getting around US procedures in the 1980s to divert American arms -- meant for Afghans fighting Soviet forces -- to arm the various jihadi militias and to install the Taliban [ Images ] regime in Kabul.

    On the Indian side too, the 1965 war led to significant results. The Indian Army failed to assess intelligence effectively in respect of construction of aqueducts under the Ichogil canal (that runs from India to Lahore) and on Pakistan covertly raising a second armoured division. Thus, the external and internal intelligence collection and reporting were bifurcated. A dedicated external intelligence agency – the Research and Analysis Wing -- was created.

    An ill-advised reorganisation proposal in respect of Indian armour – increasing light armour and reducing medium armour –- strongly espoused by General Joyanto Nath Chaudhuri before the war, was given up. The Indo-Soviet arms supply relationship got reinforced and the Soviet Union became the sole supplier of arms for India.

    Though it is not much written about, India intensified its support to Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and his Awami League in their demands for greater economy from Islamabad.

    The 1965 war demonstrated that the 1962 debacle was not a reflection on the Indian Army but was the result of inadequacies in a few top inexperienced generals. It also proved that Indian unity was solid while Pakistan was vulnerable to divisive forces. It brought out that American short-term Cold War calculations overrode Washington's commitment to democracy.

    It also highlighted that the US establishment had very wrong assessments about the Indian leadership, the Indian Army and India's ability to survive as a Union and grow into a major power.

    The legendary K Subrahmanyam is the doyen of India's strategic thinkers.

    K Subrahmanyam
  4. ajtr

    ajtr Veteran Member Veteran Member

    Oct 2, 2009
    Likes Received:
    Guilty Gen of ’65​

    In 1965 I was deputy secretary (budget and planning) in the Ministry of Defence. It was a Sunday evening in June, shortly after the Rann of Kutch clashes. I was returning from a visit to one of the Sainik Schools — I was the honorary secretary of the Sainik Schools society — when I met M.M. Hooja, then joint director of the Intelligence Bureau (IB), at Delhi’s Palam airport.

    I had known Hooja in my earlier post as deputy secretary (joint intelligence organisation) and member of the Joint Intelligence Committee. He offered to drop me home and, in the car, told me IB had intelligence that Pakistan had raised a second armoured division by cheating the Americans. Though the army had been told, it had refused to accept this.

    I asked him to communicate this in writing to enable me to bring it to the defence minister’s notice. The next morning I received a top-secret letter from K. Sankaran Nair, deputy-director, IB.

    The defence secretary, P.V.R. Rao, was on four months leave. The secretary-in-charge was a new man, A.D. Pandit. I handed over the letter to H.C. Sarin, secretary (defence production), who enjoyed the confidence of the defence minister, Y.B. Chavan. He gave it to the minister for discussion in his daily morning meeting.

    When the minister raised the issue, the army chief, General J.N. Chaudhuri argued, according to what Sarin told me, that IB was exaggerating and unable to produce credible evidence. Due to this casual attitude of the army chief, Pakistan was able to spring the surprise of 1st Armoured Division at Khemkaran and 6th Armoured Division at Sialkot.

    That the Indian armoured brigade, under Brigadier T.K. Theogaraj, destroyed the Pakistani armoured division reflects to the credit of officers and men of the army, their guts, valour and skills. They had the full support of their corps commander, General J.S. Dhillon, and their army commander, General Harbaksh Singh.

    Even for taking a stand at Khemkaran, General Chaudhuri had to be overruled by defence minister Chavan and the prime minister, Lal Bahadur Shastri. the army chief preferred withdrawal to the Beas river. The details may be found in R.D. Pradhan’s bFrom Debacle to Revival. Pradhan was Chavan’s private secretary upto end 1964 and was brought back during the war. Subsequently, he had access to Chavan’s diaries.

    Earlier that year, General Chaudhuri had obtained cabinet orders to reduce our medium tank regiments from 11 down to four and increase the light tank regiments from four to 11. He carried this reorganisation through in spite of opposition from professional subordinates.

    The Pentagon simulated a ‘game’ in March 1965, according to which Pakistan attacked India on September 1, 1966, and captured Srinagar, with Shastri unable to counter-attack. In reality, Pakistan attacked on September 1, 1965, and Shastri hit back very hard If Pakistanis had not been in such a hurry and had struck a year later with their two divisions of armour, India would have been in real trouble. After the war, General Chaudhuri not only had to abandon his plans for armour reorganisation, but ask the government to hastily import six regiments of medium armour — three T-54 regiments from Czechoslovakia and three T-55 regiments from the USSR.

    General Chaudhuri, as was disclosed by Air Chief Marshal P.C. Lal in a later lecture, did not keep the Indian Air Force (IAF) informed of his intending operation in the Lahore sector. The IAF was caught off-guard and incurred avoidable losses of aircraft, including newly-arrived MIG-21s.

    The Indian Army was surprised by the Pakistani armour’s sudden appearance through the various aqueducts under the Ichogil canal. This intelligence about the aqueducts was available well in advance, since construction plans of the canal, including the aqueducts, were obtained from the World Bank by IB and provided to the army.

    Shekhar Gupta (‘‘1965 in 2005’’, National Interest, June 4, 2005) was not wrong in calling the war one of mutual incompetence. It so happens both Ayub Khan and General Chaudhuri were in the same batch at Sandhurst.

    TWO months before the war, in my planning branch, undersecretary I.C. Bansal did elaborate research on the US budgetary documents and calulated American military aid to Pakistan totalled slightly below $ 900 million. When this was put up to the Chiefs of Staff Committee, they (particularly the army chief) rejected the study. In their view, the aid should have been several billions of dollars.

    We costed the equipment and facilities and argued it could not be very much more. But it was to no avail. Subsequently it was proved our calculations in the planning branch were not very much off the mark.

    So on the one hand General Chaudhuri refused to accept the existence of the second Pakistani armoured division. But at the same time he had an exaggerated view of US aid to Pakistan.

    Having negotiated with the Americans on aid for six Indian mountain divisions, we were aware US policy was to provide only six weeks’ war wastage of ammunition at US rates, which were lower than our rates, to aid-receiving countries. On September 2, 1965, through a top-secret telegram, I sought information from S. Guhan, my cadremate and at that time first secretary in our Washington embassy, to check through contacts in the Pentagon what was the ammunition supply rate to Pakistan.

    Gohar Ayub Khan’s story of a stolen war plan is probably bogus. But 40 years on, the first full-fledged India-Pakistan war is still a very real presence for many Within a few days Guhan confirmed my assumption and a copy of the top-secret telegram went to General Chaudhuri also. He congratulated me for the information. Indeed, Gohar Ayub Khan has referred to Pakistan suffering from ammunition shortage within a few days of the war beginning.

    India had some 90 days war wastage reserves. After the war ended, it was found only eight to 10 per cent of the tank and artillery ammunition had been spent. We had to cancel an order to Yugoslavia for a million rounds of L-70 anti-aircraft ammunition. The order had been placed during the operations.

    If the war had been continued for another week, Pakistan would have been forced to surrender. Unfortunately General Chaudhuri advised the prime minister to accept the UN ceasefire proposal since he felt both sides were running out of ammunition. This was far from true for India.

    Let me come to some major intelligence failures, even though we were not aware of them at the time. According to an article by Altaf Gauhar — in 1965, the alter ego of President Ayub Khan — in Nation on October 3, 1999, Brigadier Ayub Awan, director of the Pakistani Intelligence Bureau, travelled to Saudi Arabia in early 1965. He contacted Sheikh Abdullah in Jeddah and told him about Operation Gibraltar. Later however, President Ayub decided against taking Sheikh Abdullah’s help.

    This version was confirmed by the then CIA operative in Madras (now Chennai), Duane Claridge, who was deputed to meet Sheikh Abdullah and told by him of the coming war. US authorities had, therefore, full knowledge about Operation Gibraltar and Pakistani plans to use American equipment against India as early as March 1965, but chose not to warn India.

    This information is available in Claridge’s book A Man for All Seasons. Claridge rose high in the CIA and became deputy director. He was convicted during the Reagan presidency in the Iran-Contra affair, but pardoned.

    Pakistan was suffering from an ammunition shortage within days of the war starting. India had 90 days of war wastage reserves. If the war had continued for another week, Pakistan would have been forced to surrender. But India agreed to a UN ceasefire Following all this, the Institute of Defence Analysis (IDA) in the Pentagon simulated a politico-strategic game with Harvard University. According to this game, ‘‘played’’ in March 1965, India lost the war with Pakistan and had to accept US mediation on Kashmir, after losing Srinagar. Though Shastri was advised in the game to counterattack, he was timid and refused.

    The verbatim proceedings of this game were published in March 1965 by Doubleday and available in US bookshops. The book was titled Crisis Game, ascribed to author Sidney Giffin.

    But our intelligence, civil and military, did not have a clue. In 1967, I picked up a second-hand copy on the pavement outside the London School of Economics. One wonders how much this book influenced President Ayub in initiating Operation Gibraltar.

    Strangely enough, in the book Pakistan attacks India on September 1, 1966. In reality it happened on September 1, 1965.

    Till today, the valour and skills of the officers and men of that armoured brigade commanded by Brigadier Theogaraj and the roles of Generals Harbaksh and Dhillon in defying General Chaudhuri have not received their due credit.

    One American academic — an assistant secretary of state in the Kennedy administration who played a prominent role in preventing India getting combat equipment — ruefully told me that on the eve of the 1965 war he was planning to write a book on ‘the war that changed the fate of the subcontinent’.

    Thanks to the valour and tactical skills of those men who confronted the Pakistani Pattons at Asal Uttar, he could never write that book.

    The author, a former civil servant, is a defence affairs analyst
  5. ajtr

    ajtr Veteran Member Veteran Member

    Oct 2, 2009
    Likes Received:

  6. ajtr

    ajtr Veteran Member Veteran Member

    Oct 2, 2009
    Likes Received:
  7. Rage

    Rage DFI TEAM Stars and Ambassadors

    Feb 23, 2009
    Likes Received:
    Now, that's what you call blowback.

    I also found an interesting article by Maj Gen Afsir Karim on a specific issue of the 1965 war: the infiltration in the western-Valley sector.


    Major General Afsir Karim (retired), who served in Jammu and Kashmir at various levels of his professional career including command of an Infantry Brigade on the Line of Control and as Major General Administration in the Northern Army, explains why Pakistan's Operation Gibraltar failed.

    In 1965, after a trial of strength in the Rann of Kutch, Pakistan chose an unconventional form of warfare to invade Kashmir.This clandestine guerrilla operation was code-named Operation Gibraltar.

    The headquarters of the Gibraltar force was established at Murree in Pakistan and a force of approximately 30,000 men trained in guerrilla warfare was placed under the overall command of Major General Akhtar Malik, a high profile and professionally competent officer, who was in command of the Kashmir Division at that time.

    They were given extensive training for infiltrating through gaps in Indian defences at selected points on the Cease Fire Line (CFL, now the Line of Control) with the ultimate aim of converging at Srinagar to overthrow the J&K government and declare independence.

    Before this operation was launched Pakistan had made military training compulsory for all men in PoK aged between 15 and 25. They eventually formed the corpus for a strong Mujahid force to supplement the regular Pakistan army and create a facade of a local uprising once they entered the valley. Various infiltrating columns were divided into eight to ten groups of about 300 to 400 men, mostly named after famous generals of Islamic folklore. These groups were armed with Browning machine guns, mortars and explosives and were fully trained to carry on their task. Their action plan in a nutshell was:

    Attacks on Indian troops by infiltration with a view to inflict maximum casualties and tie down them down in various sectors;

    Form a 'Revolutionary Council' in Srinagar to announce the overthrow of the state government and seek recognition and help from various countries of the world, including Pakistan;

    Interdict the Jammu-Srinagar highway to isolate the Kashmir valley, and to interdict lines of communication to the vital areas of Rajauri and Poonch.

    Field Marshal Ayub Khan himself addressed all the column and sector commanders of the Gibraltar Force in the second week of July 1965. This force was eventually launched in the first week of August, in various sectors as under:

    Task force: Areas of Operation

    * Salahuddin Force: Gulmarg, Srinagar and Mandi
    * K Force: Uri
    * Khalid Force: Tithwal
    * Nusrat Force: Rajauri–Mendhar
    * Ghaznavi Force: Poonch–Rajauri
    * Babar Force: Nowshera–Chhamb
    * Tariq Force: Kargil [ Images ]
    * Qasim Force: Gurez

    The infiltrators were to cross the cease-fire line in small groups, at night, through remote passes and jungle routes. They were dressed in baggy Kashmiri type of clothes to enable them to merge with the local population and conceal their weapons.

    They had orders to blow up bridges to interdict Lines of Communications, attack military bases and units, destroy supply and ammunition depots.

    However, the combined loads of weapons, ammunition and rations they were ordered to carry slowed their movement across steep slopes and made their task extremely difficult.

    The Salahuddin Force along with some groups was to concentrate in Srinagar on August 8, 1965 and mingle with large crowds that traditionally assembled here every year to celebrate the festival of Pir Dastgir, a much-revered Sufi saint of the valley.

    The next day a public meeting and several demonstrations were to be arranged by the Action Committee that had been formed to demand release of Sheikh Abdullah from jail; later an armed revolt or a coup was to be staged.

    A declaration of 'Liberation' was to be issued by the 'Revolutionary Council' after seizing the Srinagar radio station and the airport. The 'Revolutionary Council' was to proclaim on Radio Srinagar that it was the sole and the legitimate authority in J&K and seek help and recognition from various countries of the world and the UN.

    The Salahuddin Force infiltrated across the Pir Panjal range and split in two or three columns. One group headed for Gulmarg, while the main body went to Khag forest, which was their main base for operations in and around Srinagar.

    Though the attempt to take over the airfield and Radio Srinagar failed, arson and violence was witnessed at Baramula, Badgam, Yusmarg and suburbs of Srinagar.

    This group managed to instigate some collaborators to hold a rally in Srinagar on the occasion of the anniversary of Sheikh Abdullah's arrest, but they failed to muster enough support from the people to carry out their plans of overthrowing the state government in the name of the people.

    The Khalid Force that infiltrated Thithwal sector inflicted a number of casualties before it was destroyed or forced back across the cease-fire line. In this sector one of our units lost 2 officers including their commanding officer and 6 other ranks. An animal transport company lost a dozen men and some of its mules.

    A battalion that was to be relieved shortly lost 16 men before they destroyed the main enemy base where almost 70 mule-loads of arms and ammunition had been stored.

    The Ghaznavi Force operated between Jhangar and Poonch and according to reports Pakistan transport aircraft carried out some airdrops in this area.

    The force operating in Thana Mandi succeeded in cutting off a subsidiary of the Rajauri-Punch road on the night of August 7/8. Some elements from this force tried to interdict the Udhampur-Srinagar highway, but timely action by the army prevented any damage to the Chenab Bridge at Ramban and other smaller bridges along the highway that were their targets.

    Pakistan and Azad Kashmir Radio, however, announced the destruction of the Ramban Bridge and the Banihal Tunnel even before the Pakistani infiltrators reached anywhere near them.

    In fact, most infiltrating columns were detected and interdicted before they could carry out their intended plans. The information came from none others than Kashmiri Muslims themselves, who in general did not respond to the call of liberation and resented Pakistan's armed intrusion.

    The point to note is that the US and the Western world preferred to shut their eyes to the obvious armed invasion and refused to name Pakistan as an aggressor.

    By the end of August, most infiltrating groups had been driven out and now the Indian army ook offensive action to seal various routes of infiltration; they captured Haji Pir Pass and several important features in Bugina bulge in the Thithwal sector besides driving out Pakistani forces from some important posts in the Kargil sector.

    The ingenious plan made by Pakistan to annex Kashmir by surprise failed because of several obvious infirmities; the people of Kashmir were not interested in a revolt except for some disgruntled elements who were a miniscule minority; most of the people were content to continue their normal lives and had no intention of giving support to a violent upheaval.

    Another basic flaw in the plan was that the so-called Mujahideen were all outsiders who got no help from the locals, in most cases reported their presence to the authorities.

    However, the most important factor in the failure of OP Gibraltar was the swift, decisive and timely reaction the Indian Army took after the initial surprise to drive out the infiltrators and seal various routes of infiltration across the Cease-Fire Line.

    Some years later several Pakistani generals who were involved in planning or execution of the armed infiltration in 1965 wrote books that gave details of the role played by them and the Pakistan army in the invasion.

    Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, the then foreign minister of Pakistan, and Air Marshal Asghar Khan were to take credit for masterminding and initiating the ingenious operation.

    Lately the issue has been raked up by Air Marshal Nur Khan in a book in which he has castigated Ayub Khan for deceiving his own countrymen and launching a wrong operation for self aggrandisement, which posed a serious threat to Pakistan because the armed forces of Pakistan as a whole were neither aware of it nor prepared for an all out war.

    In 1947, Pakistan had sent well-armed raiders into Jammu & Kashmir but denied its hand in the invasion. They reluctantly accepted their involvement only when the presence of regular Pakistan army was detected in J&K by UN observers who were deployed there after the Cease-Fire agreement in 1948.

    A similar attempt to deny involvement was made in 1965 and repeated in Kargil in 1999; Pakistani top brass seems to have learnt no lessons despite repeated failures of such operations.

    It seems India too failed to learn many obvious lessons from oft-repeated pattern of Pakistan operations in J&K and did not initiate steps to raise Special Forces trained to detect and destroy infiltrating columns or groups before or after crossing the Line of Control.

    One of India's leading specialists on issues related to terrorism and Low Intensity Conflicts, Major General Afsir Karim (retd) has published a number of books on the subject. He is currently the editor of Aakrosh, a journal devoted to the study of Terrorism [ Images ] and Internal Conflicts in South Asia.



    One thing that constantly strikes out is the reliance upon cowardly mercenaries or infiltrators to carry out objectives.

    One begins to wonder: whether the theory of 10 Pakistanis to every Hindu really holds.

    Another striking feature, and this is a failure on our part, is the inability of intelligence to accurately gauge the nature, size and timing of invasion. It seems to me that a vast majority of the intelligence coming from the War, was from people, who were reporting acts of militancy or violence in the districts.

    The third, and this is relatedly, points to the issue of intelligence coordination and sharing between the intelligence body and the Chiefs of Staff: there seems to have been no knowledge passed on of the planned Jammu-Kathua interdiction; and the then JIC had been removed from under the Chiefs of Staff Committee after the 1962 debacle, naturally depriving them of the one tool so essential to military planning.

    Had we had a proper assessment of the Pakistani stock of ammunition, if indeed reports that came out subsequently of its stock collapsing within two days after the war were true, we could have pressed on with the offensive and had far reaching consequences for subcontinental history. Especially, in light of the post war accounting on our side, which showed that less than 10% of ammunition of our total stocks were used!

    As for the Pakistani side, their biggest failure I think, could be attributed to their general inability to anticipate an Indian offensive in response to Operation Gibraltar, and the estimation of the public support they'd get, morale, ability and tactics of their nemeses.
    Last edited: Aug 1, 2010
  8. ajtr

    ajtr Veteran Member Veteran Member

    Oct 2, 2009
    Likes Received:
    Rage there is another article From Air Marshal Noor Khan in Dawn....let me quote some fine points from it.

    Nur Khan reminisces ’65 war​

    What he says that pak army generals like Ayub ,yahya ,musharraff creates conflict with india for their own grandstanding and even after losing they believe in their own created fictions nation as a whole.Case in point Mushy's self grandstanding in his biography,"in the line of fire".1965 war in many ways similar to the 1999 kargil war.See these generals dont learn anything from histroy coz they live in their own self created history as Noor Khan points out:happy_2:
  9. samarsingh

    samarsingh Regular Member

    Jun 18, 2010
    Likes Received:
    could very well be true, the same can be said of the decade long Iran-Iraq conflict.
    lets see
    pre 1962 pakistan was a member of CENTO, SEATO.
    US spy planes used to take off from Peshawar in the 1950's to collect information about the Soviet Union.

    so the US would have got what it wanted irrespective of the result of the war: ie a more dependent Pakistan.
    But the sour experience of 1962 had us prepared. I think it was probably good for us in that India became to appreciate about having some sort of military understanding with the Soviet Union.
    On the negative side: we lost a highly efficient and honest Prime Minister during the negotiations at Tashkent.

Share This Page