1965 Indo-Pak war: Facts and Fiction

Discussion in 'Military History' started by Daredevil, Dec 19, 2009.

  1. nandu

    nandu Senior Member Senior Member

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    '1965 Indo-Pak war was too short'

    CHANDIGARH: Marshal of the Air Force Arjan Singh, who took over as Chief of Air Staff on August 1, 1964, regrets that the 1965 Indo-Pak war was "too short."

    The 86-year-old Cranwell-trained Arjan Singh, who was the first officer of the Indian Air Force to don the tapes of Air Chief Marshal soon after the war, told TOI, "I was perhaps made the Air Chief Marshal for leading the air force through the war. However, the full capabilities of the IAF were not realised during the 1965 war. Unfortunately, the ceasefire was announced prematurely due to international pressure."

    The 1965 war broke out barely a year after Arjan Singh had taken over the IAF’s reins at the young age of 44.

    Arjan Singh, who retired in August 1969, said, "Pak Sabre jets had the capabilities to fire air-to-air missiles in 1965, but we were at a disadvantage as only a...


    ... few newly-acquired MiG-21s had that potential. We lost a large number of slow-flying Vampires. Had the war lasted longer, we could have inflicted greater damage on the Pakistanis."

    The non-use of offensive air power by India against the Chinese in 1962 also disappointed Arjan Singh, who was conferred the five-star rank in January 2002. He said the IAF fighter aircraft were decidedly superior to the Chinese and use of air power would have given Indian soldiers a psychological advantage.

    "It remains in the realm of speculation whether India could have changed the outcome of the 1962 war. But we would have certainly fared better had the IAF taken part. However, politicians did not want to widen the war by using air power,"said Arjan Singh, who held the office of Air Chief for five years, the longest for any service chief.

    Arjan Singh’s first brush with the enemy came in 1940-41 when he flew the Westland Wapiti biplanes in the North Western Frontier Province against the tribals.

    He said, "The Pathans were great warriors and even great friends. Though we bombed them during the day, their jirgas (elected leaders) invited us for feasts at night."


    http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/...as-too-short/articleshow/1187478.cms?flstry=1
     
  2. nandu

    nandu Senior Member Senior Member

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    1965 war-plan-seller a DGMO: Gohar Khan

    NEW DELHI: Former Pakistan Foreign Minister Gohar Ayub Khan, who made the sensational allegation that an India Brigadier had sold India's 1965 war plan to his country for Rs 20,000, has claimed that the official was then a director of military operations.

    Khan, son of former Pakistan Commander-in-Chief and President Ayub Khan, said the plan which was "sold" between 1951 and 1958 formed the basis of his country's military campaign in the 1965 war.

    Khan in an interview on CNBC made it clear that he had been told about the plan by his father and the man who allegedly sold it was director of India's military operations between 1951 and 1958.

    Asked by interviewer Karan Thapar whether he agreed that only a Brigadier in the Directorate of Military Operations (DGMO) would have access to the plan, he replied "correct".

    To a question whether this person headed the DGMO at that time, he said "usually you do not post two Brigadiers in one organisation."

    When Thapar asked whether he was pointing his finger at five Brigadiers who served as director between 1951-58, Khan said "that would be correct."

    However, Khan declined to divulge the name....

    .... Of the five Brigadiers who served as directors of military operations during the period, one went on to become Army chief, one Vice Chief, a third Army Commander and two Generals.

    Official records show that between 1947 and 1965, the Directorate of Military Operations was headed only by brigadier-level officers: Brigadier (now Field Marshal) Sam Manekshaw, G G Bewoor (retired as Army Chief), D C Noronha (retired as Major General), D K Palit (retired as Major General), N C Rawlley (retired as Lt General), Narinder Singh (retired as Major General).

    Rawlley and Narinder Singh headed the MO after the 1962 India-China conflict and during the build-up to 1965 operations.

    Of these former DMOs, only Manekshaw, Palit and Narinder Singh were then brigadiers and are around.

    However, Khan declined to divulge the name. Of the five Brigadiers who served as directors of military operations during the period, one went on to become Army chief, one Vice Chief, a third Army Commander and two Generals.

    http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/...O-Gohar-Khan/articleshow/1131606.cms?flstry=1
     
  3. ajtr

    ajtr Veteran Member Veteran Member

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  4. nandu

    nandu Senior Member Senior Member

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  5. lambu

    lambu Regular Member

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  6. Daredevil

    Daredevil On Vacation! Administrator

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    Rude awakening for Pakistan

    Despite making major mistakes, the Indian armed forces displayed tactical superiority to hold the balance in the 1965 war

    As described in ‘From Gibraltar to Grand Slam’ (IE, December 10), for Pakistan’s first military ruler, Field Marshal Ayub Khan, the moment of truth arrived at 4 am on September 6, 1965. He was roused from his bed and informed that the Indian army was on the march towards the prized city of Lahore. This took him completely by surprise. After brief consultations with his top commanders and civilian advisors, the first man he met was understandably the United States ambassador, Walter P. McConaughy. According to Khan’s principal confidant and biographer, Altaf Gauhar, the envoy started by telling him: “Mr President, the Indians have got you by the throat.” Khan replied: “Any hands on Pakistan’s throat would be cut off.” He still believed that on the battlefield, Pakistan “would defeat the Hindu”.

    There is no point going into daily details of the war as it went on because most of these have been discussed threadbare. Attention should focus, therefore, on crucial landmarks and major mistakes both sides made in the heat and dust of war. Pakistan’s greatest folly was to go on lying to its own people, telling them that the Indian invaders were being “thrown out”. Come the ceasefire, and the rude reality could no longer be hidden.

    On the Indian side, it became evident on the very first day that coordination between intelligence, then the monopoly of the monolithic Intelligence Bureau (IB), and the army, was appalling. As our armoured columns advanced, they discovered that Pakistan had dug the Ichchogil Canal as a tank trap of which they had never been informed. Which of the two institutions was to blame became a major dispute then, and, to an extent, remains so even now. The IB maintained that it had conveyed the necessary information to the government and the army headquarters. It wasn’t its fault if the army leadership failed to pass it on to the formations in the field. The army denied this vehemently, and never let up on its trenchant criticism of the IB.

    The second failure of both the army and the IB was more serious, and it came to light most embarrassingly. To compel the Pakistan forces still struggling to occupy Chamb-Jaurian to return hastily to defend their motherland, the Indian army opened a second front in the Sialkot sector. An important calculation behind this action was that Pakistan, like India, had only one armoured division that was frantically trying to defend Lahore. But, totally unknown to India, Pakistan had raised a second armoured division that met the Indian attack in and around Sialkot.

    The third unfortunate feature of the Indian situation was that cooperation between the air force and the army left a lot to be desired. The IAF seemed to be concentrating on establishing air superiority rather than providing ground support to the troops.

    Meanwhile, Pakistan had managed to establish a bridgehead to the small Indian town of Khem Karan across the border. They were convinced that, thanks to the US-supplied, state-of-the-art Patton tanks, their counter-offensive would make a breakthrough all the way across the Punjab plains to Delhi. This was, as future developments were to demonstrate, pure hubris on their part. But the Pakistani arrival beyond Khem Karan, combined with the discovery of a second Pakistani armoured division, caused grave anxiety at the army headquarters.

    Presumably to err on the side of caution, the army chief, General J.N. Chaudhuri, ordered the GOC-in-C of the Western Command and overall commander of the battlefield, Lieutenant General Harbaksh Singh, to withdraw his forces to the east of the Beas river. To his credit, Harbaksh flatly refused. Had he carried out the directive, it would have been the greatest folly of the war, and perhaps an invitation to disaster. Some doubts have been expressed about this episode, but Captain (retd) Amarinder Singh, now a Punjab Congress leader and a former chief minister of the state, was in 1965 the ADC to Harbaksh Singh, and a witness to the telephonic exchange.

    Although the distressing episode became known widely fairly soon, Harbaksh the gentleman, refused to discuss it. In his book, War Despatches: Indo-Pakistan Conflict, 1965, published a quarter of a century later, all he said was: “There appeared to be a tendency in the higher command to succumb to [the] pressure of events and fall an easy prey to dark and gloomy apprehensions. This is a dangerous attitude.”

    In any case, Pakistan’s planners had counted without the tactical virtuosity of the Indian commanders in Khem Karan, Lt Gen Harbaksh Singh, Maj Gen Gurbaksh Singh, commander of 4 Mountain Division, and Brig Thomas Theograj who commanded the two armoured regiments hastily assigned to the defenders. In September, in Punjab’s fields, sugarcane grows to full height. Indian generals then hid their tanks in these fields to welcome the Pakistanis. The biggest tank battle since World War II thus began. They then played their masterstroke. They cut off the embankment of a conveniently located canal. Pakistan’s tanks got literally stuck in the mud. Soon enough, the nearby village of Asal Uttar became a graveyard of Patton tanks. Indian Centurions and Shermans of World War II vintage had decimated them.

    How this climax to the war played out in Pakistan is best left to Gauhar to describe. He records that Khan had called him into his office and was happily explaining to him, on a map, how the Khem Karan offensive, personally approved by him, was progressing. He then adds: “While Ayub was explaining the details of the operation, his military secretary, General Rafi, walked into the room in a state of great agitation and almost shouted that the Indians had cut the Madhupur Canal.” Khan wanted to know, writes Gauhar, how long it would take for the battlefield to be submerged. “The GHQ had no clue.” Ghulam Ishaq Khan, then heading the water and power authority, was of some help. “At this juncture Ayub discovered, to his dismay, that General Nasir, the commander of the operation, had relied on old survey maps.”

    “The Khem Karan counter-offensive,” concludes Gauhar, “ran aground on September 11, and with that collapsed Pakistan’s entire military strategy. For Pakistan, the war was over.”

    Rude awakening for Pakistan - Indian Express
     
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  7. W.G.Ewald

    W.G.Ewald Defence Professionals/ DFI member of 2 Defence Professionals

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    Could have been a disaster like Gallipoli.
     
  8. Daredevil

    Daredevil On Vacation! Administrator

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    From Gibraltar to Grand Slam

    If the massive Pakistani infiltrations into Jammu and Kashmir on August 5, 1965 were codenamed Operation Gibraltar, the September 1 armoured attack on the strategic Chamb Jaurian sector (‘Strange March to 1965 War’, IE, November 26) had a resounding codename, Grand Slam. Two important and intriguing questions about this operation, which the Indian army halted successfully, arise. The first is: How did Pakistan President Ayub Khan, who was initially reluctant to sanction even Gibraltar, later approve a much wider and highly risky military action? The answer, provided by his information secretary, confidant, biographer and alter ego, Altaf Gauhar, is simple.

    Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, his trusted foreign secretary, Aziz Ahmed, and other cohorts, persuaded him that if Pakistan were to “wrest” Kashmir from India by force, 1965 was its “last chance”. It was now or never. Their arguments did seem convincing. India, they said, was “demoralised and vulnerable” because of the “humiliating defeat at the hands of the Chinese”, Jawaharlal Nehru’s death, the “palpable weakness” of his successor, Lal Bahadur Shastri, (Khan, after a brief, informal summit with Shastri at Karachi airport in October 1964, had got the same impression), a virulent anti-Hindi agitation in south India and an acute food shortage across the country.

    At the same time, the votaries of war with India told Khan that the expansion and modernisation of

    the Indian armed forces was in full swing. Once it was completed, the balance of power would shift back in India’s favour, and Pakistan’s “last opportunity would be lost”. The clinching argument of Bhutto and company was that “fear of China would deter India” from extending the war beyond Kashmir. This took care of Khan’s prime concern. He had once confided to some advisors: “While winning Kashmir, I don’t want to lose Pakistan.”

    As Gauhar records, it was around this time that a sand-model presentation was made to Khan at Murree where he suddenly put his finger on Akhnoor on the map and asked, “Why don’t you go for the jugular?” The point was well taken because Pakistan’s occupation of Akhnoor would have cut the Kashmir Valley from the rest of India. Khan then embarked on the standard Pakistani self-delusion: The Hindus could not fight. “Hindu morale would not stand more than a couple of hard blows at the right time and right place. Such an opportunity should therefore be sought and exploited”.

    When Major General Akhtar Hussain Malik, GOC of the 12th Division of the Pakistan army and the author of Gibraltar, said that occupation of Akhnoor would require more manpower and money than he had been given, the president agreed to provide both, and told all concerned to go ahead with Grand Slam. That is where the second question comes in.

    From day one, Malik was commanding Operation Gibraltar, and he was also expected to command the attack on Chamb Jaurian. But at the last minute, there was a change. The command was handed to the swashbuckling Major General Yahya Khan who was later general and army chief, and, later still, president of Pakistan. Many Pakistanis are still asking why.

    In his two books, Jawan to General and My Version, the then commander-in-chief of the Pakistan army, General Mohammad Musa Khan, has stated candidly that from the beginning, he was opposed to Operation Gibraltar because he knew it wouldn’t work. No preparatory work had been done among

    the Kashmiri people, and even the “president of Azad Kashmir”, K.H. Khurshid, was not consulted. When the latter learnt belatedly what was afoot, he protested and landed in prison for his troubles. By this time, Musa detested Malik, and therefore took the earliest opportunity to remove him. He insists, however, that he would have appointed a different commander of Grand Slam anyhow.

    Musa does not say so, but Gauhar categorically does, that the crowning irony was that while Khan was sanctioning Grand Slam he “did not know that Gibraltar had already failed”. It is noteworthy that Khan’s Man Friday recorded this long after his subject’s death. In August-September 1965, he never told his president the truth. On the contrary, his own propaganda machine churned out fairy tales about the exploits of the Mujahideen in Kashmir and the bravery of Pakistani troops “marching to Srinagar”. Consequently, the Pakistani public was confident about the imminent “liberation” of Kashmir, and India’s defeat. Evidently, the Bhutto-Ahmed line had full sway because no one was taking any notice of Shastri’s public warnings that India would fight the war “at a time and place of its own choosing”.

    It must be added that Shastri had spoken out well after telling the army and air chiefs, General J.N. Chaudhuri and Air Chief Marshal Arjan Singh, to prepare to be in Lahore before any Pakistani soldier reached anywhere near Srinagar.

    At first light on September 6, reality struck Pakistan like lightning when Shastri did exactly what he had said he would. He sent the Indian army in Pakistani Punjab’s heartland in the direction of the prized city of Lahore. In Gauhar’s memorable phrase in his biography of his boss, “When India attacked Pakistan, the most surprised person was Ayub Khan.” “Ayub’s surprise,” he adds, “was shared by the commander-in-chief of the army. Ayub was now facing the moment of truth”.

    Here, diverting from the narrative a little, let me underscore a historical conundrum. Origins of too many wars remain disputed till today. The 1965 India-Pakistan war has the unique distinction that there is utter confusion about when exactly it began. For Pakistan, it did only on September 6 of that year, and the Pakistanis observe this date as “Defence of Pakistan Day” each year. For us in India, the war started on September 1, with Pakistan’s attack on Chamb-Jaurian. In all our writings, we call it a 22-day war.

    It is a different matter, however, that in all the resolutions of the UN Security Council, the demand on both countries was to “withdraw their forces to the positions they had occupied on August 5 (the day Pakistani infiltrations into Kashmir were first detected)”. And this is precisely the basis of the Shastri-Khan agreement in Tashkent on January 10, 1966.

    From Gibraltar to Grand Slam - Indian Express
     
  9. Singh

    Singh Phat Cat Administrator

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    A tidbit about Ayub Khan. I can't verify the said claim though.

    He used to recite the Sikh moolmantar and had it inscribed in gold letters in his residence.
     
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  10. Blackwater

    Blackwater Veteran Member Veteran Member

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    Only truth about 1965, rest is fiction


    :p:p:p:p:p
     
    Last edited by a moderator: May 10, 2015
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  11. Tronic

    Tronic Stars and Ambassadors Stars and Ambassadors

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    Yup, have heard the story behind it too. It was also Ayub Khan who gave Milkha Singh the title of "The Flying Sikh".
     
  12. Rage

    Rage DFI TEAM Stars and Ambassadors

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    Settlling the Issue

    1965 Analysed

    1965 analysed

    Columnist A H AMIN analyses the 1965 war dispassionately.


    1965 was a watershed in Indo-Pak history! The war instead of being dispassionately analysed became a ground to attack and condemn political opponents! Complete books were written out of sheer motivation based on pure and unadulterated venom! To date the trend continues at the cost of serious research and history writing! Most of these books were written by beneficiaries of the usurper Ayub or Bhutto haters! Men with a naive knowledge of military history made worse by a desire to settle personal scores! Jaundiced history of the worst kind!

    This article is an overall analysis of the 1965 war based on military facts rather than any motivation to settle political scores based on matters of ego rather than any serious objective considerations! It is hoped that after 36 years readers would be more interested in hard facts rather than pure and unadulterated polemics by men who did not know the division of battle “more than a spinster”!

    Timing of 1965 War

    This has been the subject of many controversies and myths! In 1965 India was recovering from the effects of the China War. Indian Army was engaged in a process of massive expansion with units and divisions half trained half novice! Something like the Austrian Army of 1809! Outwardly expanding and larger but lacking the military virtue and military spirit identified by Carl Von Clausewitz as the key elements in an military machines effectiveness! There was no overwhelming Indian numerical superiority unlike 1971 and many parts of the

    Indo-Pak border like the vast bulk of Shakargarh bulge were unmanned on the Indian side! Qualitatively Pakistan had a tangible superiority by virtue of possession of relatively superior tanks and artillery! The Centurion tank which was the backbone of Indian army was concentrated in the Indian Armoured division while the vast bulk of Indian infantry divisions were equipped with the obsolete Shermans! Even in quality of command there were serious drawbacks! The Indian 1 Corps had been just raised and the GOC of the Indian 1st Armoured Division was about to retire! Indian Mountain Divisions brought into the plains lacked sufficient antitank resources and were not in the ideal fighting condition. Some 38 plus Indian Infantry Battalions were absorbed by the blotting paper of Indian Army i.e a tract known as Kashmir! All these battalions were deployed north of Chenab River.

    Indian Army was in the process of expansion and the Indian Army had no strategic reserves in the Ravi-Sutlej Corridor against the Pakistani 1st Armoured Division.

    Setting aside the ethical dilemma whether war is the best instrument of policy to settle political disputes militarily 1965 was the ideal time for Pakistan to settle its political problems with India. This point was realized by some mid- ranking senior officers in the Pakistan Army which included the Pakistani DMO Gul Hassan, Major General Akhtar Hussain Malik and by some civilians like Foreign Minister Z.A Bhutto and Foreign Secretary Aziz Ahmad.

    On the other hand Musa the Pakistani C-in-C was opposed to war! This was not because Musa was a pacifist but because Musa lacked military competence and was enjoying his second four-year-term as C-in-C of the Pakistan Army! Ayub the military ruler was initially against any military adventure but revised his ideas after Pakistani military successes in Rann of Katch.

    In Clausewitzian terms 1965 was the ideal time for Pakistan to start a war. The following quotation illustrates the rationale; ‘Let us suppose a small state is involved in a contest with a very superior power, and foresees that with each year its position will become worse: should it not; if war is inevitable, make use of the time when its situation is furthest from worst? Then it must attack, not because the attack in itself ensures any advantages but it will rather increase the disparity of forces — but because this state is under the necessity of either bringing the matter completely to an issue before the worst time arrives or of gaining at least in the meantime some advantages which it may hereafter turn to account’.1

    Comparative Level of Planning-Strategic

    At the strategic level the Pakistani plan was superior. Its initial thrust launched with an infantry division-tank brigade size force against Akhnur was enough to cause a crisis of strategic level in the Indian Army. The situation with Akhnur in Pakistani hands would have been disastrous for India. All the Indian plans to launch the 1 Corps against the MRL would have been thrown to winds and Indians would have spent the entire war redressing the imbalance caused due to loss of Akhnur! On the other hand the Pakistani thrust in Khem Karan would have bottled up three Indian Infantry divisions in the Beas-Ravi corridor and three Indian divisions would have been forced to surrender. 1965 could have then been a Pakistani strategic success rather than a tactical draw as it turned out to be.

    On the other hand the Pakistani 6 Armoured Division was well poised to deal with any Indian armoured thrust launched in the Ravi-Chenab corridor.

    Pakistani failure lay in poor execution and understanding at the strategic level rather than planning

    It was in implementation rather than planning that the Pakistani GHQ and Ayub failed miserably at the strategic level. The reason was simple. Both Ayub and Musa lacked strategic insight! They lacked the resolution and strategic coup d oeil to conduct decisive warfare. Both were extremely defensive in their approach and saw war as reacting to enemy countermoves rather than making the enemy react to their moves. Thus Musa as late as 1983 naively claimed in his book “My Version” that the aim of Grand Slam was not to capture Akhnur but to merely threaten it. In other words Musa saw a move which had the potential to cause a severe strategic imbalance in the Indian High Command as a tactical move to relieve pressure on Muzaffarabad! Allah be praised!

    Even a foreigner saw the immense importance of capturing Akhnur. Thus the remarks of Marshall Chen Yi the Foreign Minister of China who was visiting Pakistan at the time of Grand Slam. Chen Yi thus “made a sharp cutting movement at the little finger; ‘knock them out at Akhnoor’.That will help the freedom fighters and also guarantee the security of East and West Pakistan. With the little finger gone, the whole hand becomes useless”!2 So thought a veteran of a many decade long civil war! This was Greek for a man who was elevated to the rank of Army Chief because of political considerations! This was Greek for a man accused of tactical timidity in Burma!

    Inability to develop a doctrine of decisive warfare

    The principal reason of failure of both the armies was “failure or inability to develop a doctrine of decisive warfare”. This was a colonial legacy. The Indian Army of pre-1947 was an internal security machine designed for defence while the main forces of the empires allies came into action on other decisive fronts. The concentration on both sides was to have tactical concepts while no doctrine integrating tactics with operational strategy and national strategy existed to give coherence to the whole business of warfare.

    Lack of Resolution in the Ayub-Musa duo to energetically conduct the war

    1965 was a failure in resolution at the highest level. Both the president and his handpicked chief lacked the resolution to provide strategic direction to a well oiled machine which had the potential to inflict a severe strategic defeat on the enemy.

    Failure of Pakistani GHQ to effectively supervise execution of plans or to create alternative organization or command arrangements to supervise the conduct of war

    The job of an army HQ is not just to formulate plans but to effectively supervise the execution of plans. Ayub in words of a British contemporary was devoid of “operational experience” “organizational understanding” and “lacked tactical flair”.3 Thus Ayub and Musa saw no need to have intermediate corps headquarters to over insure the success of the army’s main attack involving a force of an infantry division and an armoured division. This was a case of extreme naivette rather than a minor error of judgement. Probably the supreme commander was too busy with Five Year Plans and big business and had lost sight of the business of soldiering! His handpicked proxy chief wanted a peaceful tenure in which he would not be forced to exercise any strategic judgement!

    The 12 Divisional organizational failure, one of the main reasons of Grand Slam’s failure, was another glaring case of lack of organizational insight on part of Ayub and Musa. While the Indians had bifurcated their forces in Kashmir based on north and south of Pir Panjal range right from 1948 and early 1950s Pakistan’s military supremos naively thought that one divisional headquarter was sufficient to manage a front of 400 miles in a mountainous territory spanning the Himalayas, Karakorams and the Pir Panjal!

    Indian and Pakistani armour failures compared

    At the strategic level both India and Pakistan got an opportunity to knock out the other side. Pakistan got it twice, first at Akhnur and then at Khem Karan. India got it once at Gadgor on 8th September. Both the sides failed. On the Pakistani side the failure had more to do with lack of strategic insight at Akhnur, ordering a change of horses in the middle of a crucial operation. Then at Khem Karan the Pakistani failure was at divisional level i.e failure to pump in all five armoured regiments on the 8th or 9th September thus achieving a decisive breakthrough.The situation was made worse by absence of Corps Headquarter. The Indian failure at Gadgor had more to do with failure at brigade and divisional level in actual execution despite the fact that the Indians had the mains “available” as well as “physically available” to achieve a breakthrough. The failure was Brigadier K.K Singh Commander Indian 1st Armoured Division who saw a threat to his flanks which in reality was a tank squadron of 62 Cavalry which had lost its way and blundered into the Indian artillery echelons opposite Rangre. The Indians had the means to achieve a breakthrough but failed primarily because lack of coup d'oeil and resolution at brigade level. This was a command and execution failure. In Khem Karan on the other hand Pakistan had the resources but failed to bring them into the battle area because of poor staff work and planning at divisional level. Thus on the decisive 8th September Pakistan did not have the means to achieve a breakthrough and this had more to do with poor initial planning and staff work at div and brigade level rather than at the command or execution level. Thus the Pakistani failure was a staff and planning failure in which all from brigade till GHQ were included while the Indian failure was a command failure in which the prime culprits were the armoured brigade and divisional commander.

    On the Pakistani side the success at Gadgor had more to do with outstanding leadership at squadron and unit level rather than any operational brilliance at brigade or divisional level. In the Indian success at Khem Karan, however, an important role was played by Indian higher headquarters at divisional corps and army command level.

    Triumph of Defence and Failure of Offence as a Form of War

    1965 was a failure of offence and triumph of defence. Except in Grand Slam where initial overwhelming superiority enabled Pakistan to achieve a breakthrough, on both sides defence triumphed as a way of war. Both the armies were more used to defence because of British colonial military experience and comparative relative lack of difference in weaponry also ensured that defence triumphed over attack. Thus the attackers failed at Gadgor, Chawinda, Assal, Uttar and Valtoha regardless of religion of the defender! Both the armies lacked the dynamism to conduct attack a far more complicated form of war and totally outside the pre-1947 experience of fighting divisional and brigade level defensive battles till overwhelming superiority enabled the Britisher to resume the offensive as at Alalamein and that too with non-Indian formations like the purely British armoured divisions or in Burma where the British-Indians had overwhelming superiority against the Japanese in tanks and air.

    Ignored Aspects of the war

    There are certain points which are conveniently forgotten or not understood at all. Although the paratroopers failed in Pathankot area their dropping delayed the move forward of 14 Indian Infantry Division to support Indian 1st Armoured Division operations opposite Chawinda. The latter fact was acknowledged by a man no less eminent than the Indian GOC Western Command Harbaksh Singh.4

    Conclusion

    While Indian GOC Western Command Harbaksh Singh admitted that the Pakistani attack opposite Khem Karan could have been decisive we in Pakistan have twisted 1965 war into a case of blaming the civilians for intriguing against the army and leading it into an aimless military adventure. Even today India’s top military thinker Ravi Rikhye admits that Khem Karan had the potential to be India’s Fourth Battle of Panipat.

    Pakistan failed because its military leaders lacked the strategic insight which was necessary to transform its tangible qualitative superiority in equipment and manpower at the tactical level into a victory! 1965 was an undoubted strategic failure on part of Pakistani higher command. Pakistan paid the price six years later. Success would have meant unity. Defeat led to civil war and secession. The fault lay in lack of strategic insight at the military level.
     
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  13. bennedose

    bennedose Senior Member Senior Member

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    What is amazing about this article is that he speaks of "Freedom Fighters" and "Operation Grand Slam" but does not even mention what started the war - Pakistan's "Operation Gibraltar' - the inflitration of SSG men dressed in mufti to sabotage and capture Srinagar's Radio station to make a broadcast which would then provoke a Pakistani attack.

    Here is a 36 page booklet about the war published in 1965/early 1966. I have kept it with me for 48 years. This is a pdf of scanned pages - 8.5 mb. For free distribution to anyone who wants to download it.
    https://docs.google.com/file/d/0B3JNY4IY8u2bTmVxVjJZamlFUUE/edit?usp=sharing
     
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  14. pahari

    pahari New Member

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    did we lost in chawinda the wiki article say india lost almost 1600 sq miles,i know some pakistani edited the whole page with lies ,can someone plz edit the article they block me on copyright issue.
     
  15. Hari Sud

    Hari Sud Regular Member

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    Do not rely on A h Amin. He was wounded as a cavalry officer during the war. His discussion of 1965 war is slanted in favor of Pakistan. But he still wish Indians to read it, hence one or two nice words about Indian Army are also included in his write ups.
     
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  16. Sambha ka Boss

    Sambha ka Boss Regular Member

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    Any good documentary about 1965 India-Pakistan war. Although some of the documentaries uploaded on youtube are chest-thumping about the fake victory of Pakistan. :frusty:
     
  17. Redhawk

    Redhawk Regular Member

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    There is a tendency in every country to blame the civilian political leadership for military failure. But this was taken to a whole new level with Pakistan in the wake of the 1965 Indo-Pak War.

    The classical, and most virulent, example was the German Dolchstoßlegende after the First World War.

    Dolchstoßlegende: Stab-in-the-back-myth
     
    Last edited: Jan 19, 2015
  18. bennedose

    bennedose Senior Member Senior Member

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    1965 war memorial - my tribute

    the 1965 war is one about which there is the most misinformation. Pakistan was America's blue eyed boy back then and it was powerful with weapons that were far ahead of what India had. They had Sabres - the famed MiG killer of the Korean war and the supersonic F-104s. Both were Sidewinder armed. They had Pattons with night vision capability and they had good radar cover which India did not have. We had no supersonic fighters or AAMs then

    Pakis were traipsing all over the Rann of Kutch as early as April 1965 - a time when the Indian and Pakistani Air Chiefs spoke to each other on the phone and decided not to use their Air Forces. This was just as well because we had no air bases within range. Paki Sabres (as described in the video) had done practice missions over many important Indian air bases and were never discovered. By August 15th 1965 they has sent in thousands of infiltrators (Operation Gibralar) into Kashmir to sabotage, create panic and "provoke rebellion". They were to capture Srinagar's radio station and make a broadcast after which the Pakistan army was supposed to overrun and capture Kashmir.

    Given these odds - Pakistan thought they could walk over Kashmir. As Paki plan after plan failed India was put under intense military pressure near Jammu (Chhamb) when Pakis attacked (OpGrand Slam - sept 1 1965) and India then took pressure off that area by opening other fronts - particularly near Lahore on December 6th. This event is now declared by Pakis as "India declaring war by attacking Pakistan" As Christine Fair says - the fact that Pakistanis "survived Indian aggression" is called the great victory of 1965 in Pakistan. It was very nearly a rout actually for Pakistan although we Indians were ourselves not happy with our performance and whined and whined while Pakis boasted and boasted and boasted and got chamchas like Fricker to write lies about the PAF

    Please watch
     
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  19. Yumdoot

    Yumdoot Regular Member

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    This Aman Ki Asha business has had a long term business profitability. Times Group was peddling it even around 1965. Kamal hai bhai.

    [​IMG]
     
  20. Zebra

    Zebra Senior Member Senior Member

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    Guns and Glory: Remembering the 1965 war.....
    Published on Dec 21, 2013, by Headlines Today







     

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