1965 Indo-Pak war: Facts and Fiction

Discussion in 'Military History' started by Daredevil, Dec 19, 2009.

  1. Daredevil

    Daredevil On Vacation! Administrator

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    The Sequence of events of 1965 Indo-Pak war.

    Pre-1965 War : Operation Gibraltar

    Operation Gibraltar was the name given to the master plan by Pakistan to infiltrate Jammu and Kashmir, the northernmost state of India, and start a rebellion against Indian rule. Launched in August 1965, Pakistan Army soldiers and guerrillas, disguised as locals, entered Jammu and Kashmir from Pakistan with the intention of fomenting an insurgency among Kashmiri Muslims. However, the strategy went awry from the outset as it was not well-coordinated and the infiltrators were soon found. The debacle was followed by an Indian counterattack that resulted in the 1965 Indo-Pakistani War.

    -wiki

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  3. Daredevil

    Daredevil On Vacation! Administrator

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    Pak Radio's claim of India starting 1965 war falls flat

    Malaysia Sun
    Friday 21st September, 2007
    (ANI)


    Amritsar, Sept 21 : In a blatant twist of historical facts, Pakistan Radio has been airing in 'Punjabi Darbar' programme allegation that India 'imposed' the 1965 War on Pakistan.

    The radio broadcast made from Lahore can be easily heard in areas of Punjab along the international border, and is aimed at misleading people.

    Pakistan's launching of Operation Gibraltar, in early 1965, by infiltrating its disguised soldiers into the Indian part of Kashmir in a bid to capture the rest of the State is a well known fact, which have been also confirmed by classified documents of the US, presently made available to public.

    The operation was launched by Pakistan in August 1965, after it got some partial success in the Rann of Kutch earlier, that led them to believe that Indian army was not prepared for a blitzkrieg- a fast and furious attack in Punjab cutting off the communication to Jammu and Kashmir.

    The main aim of the Operation Gibraltar was to infiltrate the Pakistan Army soldiers and guerrillas, disguised as locals, into Kashmir with the intention of fomenting an insurgency among Kashmiri.

    However, Pakistan's strategy failed as the locals did not respond to it and the infiltrators were soon detected.

    The former editor of Defence Journal of Pakistan, A H Amin writes, "Civilians at the (Pakistan's) foreign ministry assessed that the Indians could be knocked out at the strategic level."

    "The Pakistani offensive plan -a thrust against Indian line of communication at Akhnur in case of a limited war in Kashmir and against Indian line of communication between Indian Corps holding Ravi-Sutlej Corridor at Jandiala Guru on Amritsar-Jullundhur road in case of an all out war was brilliant in conception," he adds.

    But Pakistan's every effort went awry, including its final Operation codenamed Grand Slam.

    Brigadier M L Chadha, who fought the 1965 War and was posted in Kashmir during the war, has refuted Pakistan Radio's claims.

    "Pakistan infiltrated into India through Kashmir (Operation Gibraltar) and crossed 'Ichogil' canal with armaments brought from Chinese," he said.

    The War that began in August lasted for five weeks after a UN mandated ceasefire.
     
  4. Daredevil

    Daredevil On Vacation! Administrator

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    Ayub misled nation in ’65 war: Nur Khan

    8 September 2005 ISLAMABAD — The 1965 war was based on a lie in which Ayub Khan and his generals misled the nation that India rather than Pakistan had provoked the war and that “we were the victims of Indian aggression”, Air Marshal Nur Khan, a war hero who led the country’s air force at the time, has said.

    He said a coterie of army generals including its chief Gen Musa decided to send 8,000 infiltrators from the Pakistan army into India-held Kashmir in an abortive bid to foment Kashmiri revolt with vain hope that India would not retaliate and attack Pakistan.

    Both the air force and the navy as also most of army commanders were kept in the dark and when the invasion came on September 6, 1965 with Lahore being the first Indian target, all of them, including the Lahore commander were taken by surprise.

    The ‘Operation Gibraltar’, code name for infiltration into Kashmir proved a disaster as the local population did not cooperate and even helped the Indian forces to capture or kill almost all of 8,000 Pakistan army troops sneaking into the occupied territory.

    Sharing his memoirs with Dawn on the 1965 war, which is celebrated as a victory in Pakistan on September 6 every year, Air Marshal (retired) Nur Khan said President Field Marshal Ayub Khan was petrified when only on the second day after India chose to attack Lahore on September 6, 1965, his army chief informed him he has another two days’ of ammunition left with him.
     
  5. Daredevil

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    Operation Gibraltar

    September 19, 2005 16:03 IST

    Major General Afsir Karim (retired), who served in Jammu and Kashmir at various levels of his professional career including command of an Infantry Brigade on the Line of Control and as Major General Administration in the Northern Army, explains why Pakistan's Operation Gibraltar failed.

    In 1965, after a trial of strength in the Rann of Kutch, Pakistan chose an unconventional form of warfare to invade Kashmir.This clandestine guerrilla operation was code-named Operation Gibraltar.

    The headquarters of the Gibraltar force was established at Murree in Pakistan and a force of approximately 30,000 men trained in guerrilla warfare was placed under the overall command of Major General Akhtar Malik, a high profile and professionally competent officer, who was in command of the Kashmir Division at that time.

    They were given extensive training for infiltrating through gaps in Indian defences at selected points on the Cease Fire Line (CFL, now the Line of Control) with the ultimate aim of converging at Srinagar to overthrow the J&K government and declare independence.

    Before this operation was launched Pakistan had made military training compulsory for all men in PoK aged between 15 and 25. They eventually formed the corpus for a strong Mujahid force to supplement the regular Pakistan army [ Images ] and create a facade of a local uprising once they entered the valley. Various infiltrating columns were divided into eight to ten groups of about 300 to 400 men, mostly named after famous generals of Islamic folklore. These groups were armed with Browning machine guns, mortars and explosives and were fully trained to carry on their task. Their action plan in a nutshell was:

    Attacks on Indian troops by infiltration with a view to inflict maximum casualties and tie down them down in various sectors;

    Form a 'Revolutionary Council' in Srinagar to announce the overthrow of the state government and seek recognition and help from various countries of the world, including Pakistan;

    Interdict the Jammu-Srinagar highway to isolate the Kashmir valley, and to interdict lines of communication to the vital areas of Rajauri and Poonch.

    Field Marshal Ayub Khan himself addressed all the column and sector commanders of the Gibraltar Force in the second week of July 1965. This force was eventually launched in the first week of August, in various sectors as under:

    Task force: Areas of Operation

    Salahuddin Force: Gulmarg, Srinagar and Mandi
    K Force: Uri
    Khalid Force: Tithwal
    Nusrat Force: Rajauri–Mendhar
    Ghaznavi Force: Poonch–Rajauri
    Babar Force: Nowshera–Chhamb
    Tariq Force: Kargil
    Qasim Force: Gurez

    The infiltrators were to cross the cease-fire line in small groups, at night, through remote passes and jungle routes. They were dressed in baggy Kashmiri type of clothes to enable them to merge with the local population and conceal their weapons.

    They had orders to blow up bridges to interdict Lines of Communications, attack military bases and units, destroy supply and ammunition depots.

    However, the combined loads of weapons, ammunition and rations they were ordered to carry slowed their movement across steep slopes and made their task extremely difficult.

    The Salahuddin Force along with some groups was to concentrate in Srinagar on August 8, 1965 and mingle with large crowds that traditionally assembled here every year to celebrate the festival of Pir Dastgir, a much-revered Sufi saint of the valley.

    The next day a public meeting and several demonstrations were to be arranged by the Action Committee that had been formed to demand release of Sheikh Abdullah from jail; later an armed revolt or a coup was to be staged.

    A declaration of 'Liberation' was to be issued by the 'Revolutionary Council' after seizing the Srinagar radio station and the airport. The 'Revolutionary Council' was to proclaim on Radio Srinagar that it was the sole and the legitimate authority in J&K and seek help and recognition from various countries of the world and the UN.

    The Salahuddin Force infiltrated across the Pir Panjal range and split in two or three columns. One group headed for Gulmarg, while the main body went to Khag forest, which was their main base for operations in and around Srinagar.

    Though the attempt to take over the airfield and Radio Srinagar failed, arson and violence was witnessed at Baramula, Badgam, Yusmarg and suburbs of Srinagar.

    This group managed to instigate some collaborators to hold a rally in Srinagar on the occasion of the anniversary of Sheikh Abdullah's arrest, but they failed to muster enough support from the people to carry out their plans of overthrowing the state government in the name of the people.

    The Khalid Force that infiltrated Thithwal sector inflicted a number of casualties before it was destroyed or forced back across the cease-fire line. In this sector one of our units lost 2 officers including their commanding officer and 6 other ranks. An animal transport company lost a dozen men and some of its mules.

    A battalion that was to be relieved shortly lost 16 men before they destroyed the main enemy base where almost 70 mule-loads of arms and ammunition had been stored.

    The Ghaznavi Force operated between Jhangar and Poonch and according to reports Pakistan transport aircraft carried out some airdrops in this area.

    The force operating in Thana Mandi succeeded in cutting off a subsidiary of the Rajauri-Punch road on the night of August 7/8. Some elements from this force tried to interdict the Udhampur-Srinagar highway, but timely action by the army prevented any damage to the Chenab Bridge at Ramban and other smaller bridges along the highway that were their targets.

    Pakistan and Azad Kashmir Radio, however, announced the destruction of the Ramban Bridge and the Banihal Tunnel even before the Pakistani infiltrators reached anywhere near them.

    In fact, most infiltrating columns were detected and interdicted before they could carry out their intended plans. The information came from none others than Kashmiri Muslims themselves, who in general did not respond to the call of liberation and resented Pakistan's armed intrusion.

    Pakistan at this stage had little support in Kashmir and their ambitious plans to overthrow the government, being highly unrealistic, were bound to fail. No one in the world was quite sure what was going on as Pakistan kept on denying its 'involvement' through repeated broadcasts and called the fighting a local uprising.

    The point to note is that the US and the Western world preferred to shut their eyes to the obvious armed invasion and refused to name Pakistan as an aggressor. In the photograph: Indian soldiers raise the Tricolour at Haji Pir, August 28, 1965.
    [​IMG]

    By the end of August, most infiltrating groups had been driven out and now the Indian army [ Images ] took offensive action to seal various routes of infiltration; they captured Haji Pir Pass and several important features in Bugina bulge in the Thithwal sector besides driving out Pakistani forces from some important posts in the Kargil sector.

    The ingenious plan made by Pakistan to annex Kashmir by surprise failed because of several obvious infirmities; the people of Kashmir were not interested in a revolt except for some disgruntled elements who were a miniscule minority; most of the people were content to continue their normal lives and had no intention of giving support to a violent upheaval.

    Another basic flaw in the plan was that the so-called Mujahideen [ Images ] were all outsiders who got no help from the locals and in most cases their presence was reported to the authorities.

    However, the most important factor in the failure of OP Gibraltar was the swift and effective reaction of the Indian Army after the initial surprise to drive out the infiltrators and seal various routes of infiltration across the Cease-Fire Line.

    Some years later several Pakistani generals who were involved in planning or execution of the armed infiltration in 1965 wrote books that gave details of the role played by them and the Pakistan army in the invasion.

    Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, the then foreign minister of Pakistan, and Air Marshal Asghar Khan were to take credit for masterminding and initiating the ingenious operation.

    Lately the issue has been raked up by Air Marshal Nur Khan in a book in which he has castigated Ayub Khan for deceiving his own countrymen and launching a wrong operation for self aggrandisement, which posed a serious threat to Pakistan because the armed forces of Pakistan as a whole were neither aware of it nor prepared for an all out war.


    In 1947, Pakistan had sent well-armed raiders into Jammu & Kashmir but denied its hand in the invasion. They reluctantly accepted their involvement only when the presence of regular Pakistan army was detected in J&K by the UN observers who were deployed there after the Cease-Fire agreement in 1948.

    A similar attempt to deny involvement was made in 1965 and repeated in Kargil in 1999; Pakistani top brass seems to have learnt no lessons despite repeated failures of such operations.

    It seems India too failed to learn many obvious lessons from oft-repeated pattern of Pakistan operations in J&K and did not initiate steps to raise Special Forces trained to detect and destroy infiltrating columns or groups before or after crossing the Line of Control.

    One of India's leading specialists on issues related to terrorism and Low Intensity Conflicts, Major General Afsir Karim (retd) has published a number of books on the subject. He is currently the editor of Aakrosh, a journal devoted to the study of Terrorism [ Images ] and Internal Conflicts in South Asia.
     
  6. Daredevil

    Daredevil On Vacation! Administrator

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    The 1965 Indo-Pak War: Operation Grandslam by Pakistan

    Operation Grand Slam is virtually synonymous with the 1965 Indo-Pakistani War. It refers to an audacious plan drawn up by the Pakistan Army, in May 1965, to attack the vital Akhnoor Bridge in Jammu and Kashmir, which was not only the lifeline of an entire infantry division in Jammu and Kashmir but could also be used to threaten Jammu, an important logistical point for Indian forces. The operation ended in a failure for Pakistan Army as the stated military objectives were not achieved and subsequently were forced to retreat following a counter attack by the Indian Army.

    -wiki

    More info


    Why Pakistan lost Akhnur (Operation Grandslam)

    Last updated on: September 17, 2005 15:05 IST

    In the second of a four-part series, Brigadier Shaukat Qadir (retd) looks at Pakistan's Operation Grand Slam and examines why it failed.

    Don't miss our special coverage on the 1965 India-Pakistan War, 40 Years Later.

    Operation Grand Slam was one of a number of contingency plans that had been prepared to support Gibraltar.

    Since Gibraltar's failure was considered inconceivable, this plan intended to sever the road link between India [ Images ] and Indian held Kashmir [ Images ] once the valley was up in flames. Now that Gibraltar had not just failed but resulted in the loss of some key posts in Kashmir, the operation was undertaken to relieve pressure on the troops defending Kashmir.
    Many writers have attributed the plan to Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, which is inaccurate. This was a prepared contingency plan and one that appealed to Bhutto; since he was amongst the favored ministers of the time he might have influenced the choice of the contingency selected, but even if he did, it was militarily the most viable and sensible option.

    As an aside, recently Benazir Bhutto [ Images ] has been castigated by some and defended by others for revealing some details of a military plan to rediff.com Whether or not she should have, is another matter, but in defense of General Musharaf it must be stated that what he presented was a contingency plan.

    To distort it in a manner as to paint him a war monger is unfair without understanding the contingency. He offers a broad-side with sufficient frequency to pick on one that is unfair.

    Operation Grand Slam was four phased; the capture of Chamb, the crossing of river Tawi and consolidation, followed by the capture of Akhnur, and finally severing the Indian lines of communication and capturing Rajauri.

    Despite the difficulties of terrain, specially entailing a river crossing, the possibility for success lay in the bold audacity of the plan, which necessitated speed in execution, since if there was sufficient time permitted to the Indians, they would reinforce Akhnur and it would be impossible to capture.

    I have said a few words on Major General Akhtar Malik, but these are insufficient. He was a bold audacious commander who remained unruffled under pressure and inspired a confidence in his men, not just the officers but even down to the soldier, that could make them rise above themselves; the epitome of the commander for such a venture.

    When the operation was initially planned, GHQ was conscious of the fact that he was commanding an over extended division, which was under immense pressure from the enemy. Despite this, he was chosen to command this offensive. In fact, at most times he was commanding forces greater than 1 Corps, our only corps at that time.

    Once again, no record is available as to the causes and I have to again resort to speculation: in my view, apart from the fact that he was the commander most suited for undertaking such an operation, there was also the realisation that there was little he could do to influence events in Kashmir and, since Grand Slam was initially linked to the success and later to the failure of Gibraltar, unity of command may have been a consideration for the achievement of the aim, because of which he was selected to command this operation.

    One has also to bear in mind that this was a period when the Pakistan army [ Images ] had only two lieutenant generals, only one of them commanding a corps, Bakhtiar Rana, and the other on deputation to the Central Treaty Organisation, or CENTO, Altaf Qadir, and only a handful of major generals, unlike the present when both are overflowing every conceivable container.

    The operation was to commence at 05 am on September 1, but was delayed by a day. It started as planned: Chamb fell within the hour and soon after first light around 7 am on September 2 our troops started crossing the river Tawi.

    Operations from here onwards continued with speed and by 1 pm troops had consolidated and were ready to move into concentration areas from which an attack on Akhnur could have commenced well before last light around 3 pm. However we were not destined to get to Akhnur which remained, in the words of Dr Ahmed Faruqui, 'a town too far.'

    Akhtar Malik being the kind of person he was, was to be found where the action was. Unfortunately, since his command was of another formation, he also did not have the facility of staff officers. Consequently, he had found little time to communicate with GHQ, which had no idea of the battle situation.

    General Musa therefore, flew into Kharian in a helicopter around 11:30 am on September 2 to find out first hand. When he could not discover much more there, he decided to fly towards the border and en route he spotted some vehicles and ordered the pilot to land.

    Prior to the commencement of Grand Slam, another offensive division commanded by Major General Yahya had been asked to concentrate at Gujarat to meet any unforeseen contingency. These vehicles that General Musa spotted were those of Yahya and his staff out on a reconnaissance mission. From here Musa managed to establish contact with Akhtar Malik who was ordered to report to the C-in-C Musa. Akhtar Malik found the C-in-C by about 1 pm.

    Though the official reason for the change of command of Operation Grand Slam at this stage was that Akhtar Malik could not handle troops from Northern Areas to Kharian, that holds little credence since he was assigned the task knowing that he would be required to handle troops over this stretch.

    Ayub has been accused of changing the command so that Yahya got the glory and could be appointed the next chief, but records indicate that this decision was taken by Musa and subsequently ratified through a signal by GHQ.

    Consequently, once again I am forced to speculate on the decision taken there to change the command of the offensive and hand it over to Yahya; and I can think of none except that Musa was annoyed at not having been kept informed and had been waiting a few hours.

    Once contact had been established, he could well have received an update on the wireless, rather than waste precious time in ordering the successful commander back.

    Whatever the reason for changing horses midstream, precious time was lost. It took time for Akhtar Malik to return, time for him to brief Yahya, time for Yahya to assume command, and time for him to understand the situation on ground, before issuing orders. Enough time for Akhnur to be reinforced and never again be attainable by Pakistani troops.


    In fairness to Yahya, who has often been accused of this failure, probably any other in his place would have taken as much time and suffered the same fate. Perhaps the troops were also disheartened by the change of command, perhaps even the flamboyant Akhtar Malik would not have been able to get there.

    Perhaps if Akhnur had been captured and the Indian lines of communication severed, the Indian attack on Sialkot could never have occurred! Perhaps. But that we will never know.

    What we do know is that Akhnur was never captured and this led us into the attack on Lahore [ Images ] and later Sialkot in the wee hours of September 6 1965.

    If nothing else, Grand Slam did succeed in releasing pressure on the troops defending the LOC in Kashmir and Northern Areas.
     
  7. Daredevil

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    The Fog Of War: War in Sialkot Sector

    Last updated on: September 17, 2005 15:09 IST

    In the third part of a four part series on the 1965 India-Pakistan war, retired Pakistan Brigadier Shaukat Qadir looks at the Sialkot sector.

    Although the actual attack on Lahore preceded the attack on Sialkot by 24 hours but Sialkot needs to be understood before Lahore.
    Some element of our (Pakistani troops always man the border, and on September 3, 1965 a patrol ventured across the Line of Control [ Images ] and captured an Indian dispatch rider who was carrying the comprehensive orders of Indian 1 Armored Division for the Indian offensive.Nobody believed it: numerous examples of disinformation were cited, like the 'dead soldier' found by German troops during the Second World War who was also found carrying the complete orders for war providing the wrong location of the second front about to be opened.

    While intelligence assessments are hardly to be blamed in such a situation, whichever conclusion they arrive at, GHQ's decision not to order precautionary deployment defies understanding. It was left to formations to take 'precautionary measures.' In the case of the Sialkot division, it moved into forward concentration areas, but neither dug its defensive positions, nor laid any mines.

    In the early hours of the morning of September 6, about the time that the attack on Lahore began around 3.30 am, the bridge over Ravi at Jasser began to be shelled. Sometime later the bridge was attacked by a small raiding party.

    It is not clear how the confusion occurred, but then that is the fog of war. The company commander at the bridge ordered its demolition while most of his force was still across; they either swam back or were captured.

    Probably, to justify his actions, he grossly exaggerated the attacking forces, leading the division commander to believe that this was the location of the main attack on his sector.

    In response to this around midday the GOC sent a brigade with an additional armored regiment to stabilise the situation at Jasser. Later it was discovered that Jasser was merely a diversion, and the main attack was to follow 24 hours later. However, the forces sent to stabilise the situation at Jasser were called 'committed reserves,' a term denoting troops committed to defending an area, but available as reserves if their area did not face a threat.

    They were a few miles short of Jasser when the main attack began opposite Pasrur-Chawinda-Phillaurah, the positions they were supposed to be defending, and the brigade with the armored regiment was ordered back.

    The division was in a state of total chaos and confusion. Considering that this formation had moved into battle locations, even if these had not been prepared, it should have been more prepared than other divisions.

    The Sialkot division was commanded by Brigadier Ismail, an army service corps officer. In those days it was not unusual for a brigadier to take command of a division on three month's probation, before being approved for promotion.

    Ismail was at this stage.

    Not only was he from a non-fighting arm, but was under probation and thus insecure, and his insecurity and lack of confidence was infectious. It appeared that nobody knew what to do. Throughout his command there were spates of contradictory orders, units to be relieved pulled out without being relieved, giving the Indians a free run.

    This state of chaos was to be a feature of the entire Sialkot operation, until the command was changed, but by then the worst was over.

    The main Indian attack began early on September 7, with the infantry forming a bridge head, a defended area for forces, specially armored forces to build up, before proceeding further. India's [ Images ] 1 Armored division built into the bridge head and then commenced advance around 10:30 am.

    Fortunately for us, the Indians too could not take advantage of the total vacuum that existed through all the confusion. It appears (from their own analyses later) that the armored division could not believe that there was no defense. They were certain that they were being lured in to a trap.

    Perhaps this was due to the fact that they were aware of their battle orders being captured and could not believe that Pakistan army [ Images ] would not have acted upon this knowledge. Consequently, where they could have been running full pace, they crawled, and extremely slowly, allowing us to atone for our errors.

    Only those who have seen formations in move having to turn back can actually imagine the confusion of halting and turning back from close to Jasser. In such a move, infantry elements are likely to be leading, with the armor in between, followed by artillery and then other support elements, for the return they need to get into the same order of march.

    One can but imagine doing that on a narrow road. However, in view of the emergency, the armored unit led the return, followed by the artillery then infantry and the rest. This was to be a blessing in disguise.

    Major Muhammed Ahmed, one of the squadron commanders of the armored regiment was in the lead as they approached Pasrur, then Phillaurah in the early hours of September 8 when he spotted tanks ahead of him. Fortunately, he was in a copse, with the advancing Indian tanks offering him a broad side.

    This intrepid officer took the initiative, which most officers are supposed to, but seldom do, and opened fire. These Indian tanks were elements of the leading brigade of the Indian armored division. He hit a large number of tanks of the leading Indian unit and some of the following one.

    This was enough to convince the Indians that they had indeed been lured into a trap.

    Meantime the rest of the same armored unit moved on from a flank towards Chawinda, where some more of the Indian armored division units had halted upon news of the ambush in Phillaurah. They too opened fire to cause more casualties.

    Ironically, this was the very area they were supposed to have been defending. Had they been doing so, they would have been facing the enemy and, perhaps, would never have had the opportunity of taking on the Indian forces from a flank to inflict the kind of casualties that they actually did.

    Fortunately for us, the Indians had been over cautious when the opportunity was offered, an intrepid squadron commander halted their attack from a fortunate 'ambush', and the rest of the unit also caught some of the armored unit unawares.

    This was later referred to as the greatest tank battle since the Second World War. The Indian armored division never recovered; we had been saved by the courage of a 'lucky' squadron commander, who was afforded this opportunity because his regiment had been ordered away from its defensive position because of the ineptness of his division commander!

    It was at this stage that GHQ finally realised that the Indian main offensive was directed at Sialkot, not Lahore, and that the captured orders were in fact true. On the same day, September 8, Tikka Khan was asked to take command of the Sialkot division and our second armored division was also ordered in to Sialkot sector.

    While this was referred to as an armored division, it was actually no more than a brigade. However, from September 9 onwards, the Sialkot sector was a see saw of attacks by the Indians and counter attacks by the armored division with various infantry elements in support, which on the balance tilted in favor of our own forces, primarily because the Indian 1 Armored Division never recovered from its setback.

    Though the battle at Sialkot was far from over, but the worst was past and we can afford to omit other details to move on to Lahore.
     
  8. Daredevil

    Daredevil On Vacation! Administrator

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    Crossing Ichhogil Canal: How Lt-Col Hayde did it

    by Maj-Gen Kuldip Singh Bajwa (retd)

    IT was September 6, 1965. The troops of 11 Corps stormed into Pakistan in Amritsar-Khemkaran sector. The goal: to secure the east bank of the Ichhogil Canal in Lahore’s outskirts. On Sept 8, 1 Corps proceeded to Pasrur-Sialkot sector. The goal: to secure the near bank of the Ravi-Marala Link Canal. This strategy of offensive-defence was launched to relieve critical pressure of the Pakistani attack in Chhamb-Akhnur sector.

    As the decision was taken in a hurry, there was little time to prepare troops mentally and emotionally for the inevitable. Troops could not be recalled from the units. The artillery and signal parties could not match with the infantry battalions. This resulted in the failure of communication.

    The operational scenario in 15 Infantry Division in Amritsar sector was dismal. Of the seven infantry battalions that went into action, six had wavered under the first impact of the enemy fire. Only 3 JAT had resolutely advanced to the Ichhogil Canal, captured Dograi on the east, and Batapore-Attoke Awan in Lahore’s outskirts. This was a remarkable military achievement.

    The brick-lined Ichhogil Canal, 112 feet wide, 30 feet deep, with a depth of 20 feet of fast flowing water, ran parallel to the border, 8 km inside Pakistan, and only a short hop to Lahore. The home bank was lined with concrete pillboxes. On the east bank, astride the Grand Trunk Road (GT) from Amritsar to Lahore, Dograi was a sizeable town. The whole complex was a strong defence structure.

    In the early hours of Sept 6, 3 JAT bypassed the Pakistan border post at Wagah and captured Ghosal-Dial villages after a sharp fight. Though Commanding Officer 15 Dogra tasked to advance to the canal, Commander 54 Infantry Brigade accepted his plea that his battalion was in no state to undertake the mission. Subsequently, Lt-Col Desmond Hayde, Commanding Officer 3 JAT, readily agreed to take the challenge.

    Just past 9 am, 3 JAT advanced to the canal with C Squadron Scinde Horse. Near Dograi. Though the battalion came under accurate artillery fire, it moved forward to quickly attack from the northern flank. After a stiff fight, one company from 3 Baluch ran back from Dograi over the debris of the bridge, partially demolished a little earlier.

    By 11.30 am, 3 JAT was in full control of Dograi and the canal bank. However, it came under heavy machine gun, mortar and observed artillery fire from the tall buildings of the Bata Shoe factory and the Attock Awan village across the canal. Though Pakistani Sabres had destroyed most battalion support weapons, reserve ammunition and defence stores carried in the follow up transport, the enterprising Lt-Col Hayde chose to tackle the situation very aggressively. He led C and A companies across the demolished bridge to secure Batapore on the left of the GT road and Attok Awan on its right.

    Around 2 pm, two enemy tanks marched down GT Road from Lahore. Machine guns opened up. While firefight was going on, the Pakistani tanks broke contact and sidestepped behind Batapur. Having seen this, the machine gunners also pulled out.

    The C Company grabbed this opportunity and pushed forward deeper into Batapur. Soon after, three truckloads of Pakistani soldiers were seen rushing from Lahore at great speed. Subedar Pale Ram, who had reached the far edge of Batapore with a C Company platoon, demolished the first two at point blank range. The third turned back to flee. Meanwhile, the two Pakistani tanks appeared from Batapore, and tried to cross over to Attock Awan. The leading tank brewed up with a direct hit from the Scinde Horse troop of tanks. The second Pakistani tank and the third lorry were destroyed while both were trying to escape.

    3 JAT effectively dealt with the enemy reaction. The battalion had fought at Ghosal-Dial, Dograi, Ichhogil Canal, and Batapore-Attocke Awan. There was no communication with the brigade headquarters. Despite the outstanding feat of 3 JAT being known through the armour radio net, no senior commander had come forward to determine the operational situation on the ground. Except for a troop of tanks on the east bank of the canal, there was no sign of any follow up force. The demolished bridge over the canal was fast crumbling away. Lahore was intensifying.

    By mid-afternoon, Lt-Col Hayde was seriously concerned about the fate of his two companies across the canal. He had sent an officer to the brigade headquarters but no response.

    At about 3 pm, the tank troop commander, informed Lt-Col Hayde that his squadron commander had asked him to pull back to Ghosal-Dial. The gallant 3 JAT pulled back the two companies from across the canal, abandoned Dograi, and were back in Ghosal-Dial by 5.15 pm.

    In the generally depressing operational scenario on the first day of the war, the gallant 3 JAT led by Lt-Col Hayde stood out in the highest traditions of military grit and valour. Their outstanding achievement of putting two companies across the Ichhogil Canal practically in Lahore’s outskirts was not exploited. In the words of Field Marshal Maurice Comte De Saxe, French Army, “When we have incurred the risk of battle, we should know how to profit by the victory, and not merely content ourselves, according to custom, with the possession of the field.”

    Major-General Karl Von Clausewitz, the well-known military thinker of the Prussian Army, said, “Next to victory, the act of pursuit (in this case exploitation of the crossing of the Ichhogil Canal) is the most important in war.” Exploitation of success in battle, whenever it comes, is vital, as the elements that caused or assisted in it may not obtain again.

    During the operations in 1965, the stout and gallant 3 JAT was the only battalion that crossed the formidable Ichhogil Canal. This exceptional operational achievement was, however, overshadowed by their subsequent recapture of Dograi on Sept 21-22. The cry that involuntarily comes from the heart ‘Bravo 3 JAT!’ is tinged with regret at this lack of recognition of an operation outstanding in its own right.
     
  9. Daredevil

    Daredevil On Vacation! Administrator

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    THAMBI'S TRIUMPH

    © Sainik Samachar, Vol.51, No.7, 01-15 April 2004

    On 22/23 September 1965, Ichhogil Bund was captured by the 9th battalion of Madras Regiment, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel B.K. Satyan in a terrific hand-to-hand fight. The fight ended with the annihilation of approximately two Pakistani companies which attempted to re-occupy the eastern bund of Ichhogil Canal. A company was sent away for a different task only that evening. The battalion had three rifle companies at its disposal. Orders were given in no time. But there was hardly any time for the Company Commanders to pass the orders. However, they knew their Thambis. With brief orders, companies went in the following order: 'D' company was given the task to clear the bund up to KG Hut; 'C' company to clear from KG Hut to Centre Hut and 'B' company up to Broken Hut. The whole of divisional artillery and mortars opened up at 'H-20'. The tanks also lined up in front of village Barka-Kalan and started pounding on the bund and kept the enemy pinned down with their Brownings. The 'B' and 'D' companies reached their positions without much casualties. But when 'C' company got out of its position, it was caught up in the enemy's cross-fire. 50% got wounded including the Company Commander, Major Dharam Pal.

    Young Uniyal, a gallant fighter from Tehri Garhwal, and a school teacher before joining the Army, was the first to lead his platoon into the battle. With a bayonet fixed on his sten, he led his men right into the bund in the face of thousands of tracers from enemy MMGs. When he reached two hundred yards short of the objective, heavy MMG and LMG fire came from a pill-box north of the KG Hut and the platoon was held up. Uniyal knew that clearing of this position was very important for the success of the whole operation. He crawled forward with his men. Two gallant young volunteers of his platoon, Sepoy Narayanan and Sepoy Bhaskaran came forward to silence the enemy guns. They crawled under the cover of tall grass and within twenty minutes those guns were silenced. Uniyal and his platoon rushed forward, cleared the enemy and occupied the pill-box, and from then onwards, charged and cleared trench after trench. Sometimes, the Thambis lifted the enemy out physically and pushed them into the water. It was a hand-to-hand fight. A good number of Pakistani soldiers, leaving their arms, jumped into the canal in an attempt to cross, but hardly anyone reached the other side as they were swept away in the fast current of the canal. The rest were found dead in the trenches with shell or bayonet wounds.

    The battalion captured one officer and ten ORs (Other Ranks) in this operation. The bund was echoing with war cries of Adi Kollu (Hit, Kill) for one hour. Killing, firing and hurling of grenades across the canal went on unceasing till 3 a.m. The way battalion's stretcher- bearers evacuated and treated casualties during the battle put everybody in awe. A good piper, Reddy, was hit by an enemy MMG and he fell dead. When the ambulance jeep attached from the advance dressing station went out of action, the medical NCO, Thankappan known as Rasam in the battalion, took the wheel of the Medical Inspection Room truck and made at least ten trips, evacuating the casualties throughout that night. The battalion had killed forty eight Pakistani soldiers and presumably eighty Pakistani soldiers were washed away in the canal while attempting to cross. This figure was verified by the Pakistani Commanding Officer who came to collect the dead after the ceasefire.

    The outstanding feature of this battle was that an attack was launched by one battalion less a company against a well co-ordinated defence position occupied by approximately two Pak companies with a complex of MMGs and pill-boxes. The attack was launched within the minimum time with brief orders. In the morning of September 23rd, when the Pakistani CO met his counterpart, he did not speak a word. He came with a grim look accompanied by a company commander and a few men, collected the dead bodies and rowed across the canal. In the wee hours of September 23rd, Sepoy Narayanan and Sepoy Bhaskaran of the leading platoon were found dead in a pool of blood. Sepoy Narayanan was within a few feet of the pill-box, presumably after throwing a grenade through the slit of the pill-box which held three Pak soldiers - a machine gunner, a light machine gunner and a rifleman with unlimited quantity of ammunition. Sepoy Narayanan had six bullets across his face.

    The whole battalion was able to sweep past only because of gallant fighters and the supreme sacrifices of men. Sepoy Mallappan was sitting dead holding his MMG tight and Sepoy Ramachandran was dead with a big splinter in his stomach. The concrete pill-box and the bund, splashed with the blood of young heroes, twisted telephone poles with traces of blood and shell holes were evidence of the heroic actions of Thambis. In this heroic action, 27 Terrors made supreme sacrifice. The battalion was honoured with one Vir Chakra, two Sena Medals, twelve mentioned-in-despatches and theatre honour - Punjab.
     
  10. Daredevil

    Daredevil On Vacation! Administrator

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    Patton Nagar

    Patton Nagar was the imaginary name given to a stretch of land at the Bhikiwind village in the Khem Karan sector in 1965, where more than 60 tanks of the Pakistani Army were displayed after the Indo-Pak War which occurred in the same year. The Pakistan Army tanks were captured at the Battle of Assal Uttar - Pakistan's Waterloo - by India's 4th Infantry Division and it became a memorial to the Indian triumph of blunting the over-hyped Pakistani War Machine in the 1965 War. The tanks were displayed for some time after which they were shipped to various cantonments and army establishments for display as war trophies. Over the years, the 'trophy' tanks from Bhikiwind were joined by more captured tanks from the 1971 Indo-Pak War. The Battle of Basantar, the Defence of Longewala, the Capture of Dacca and other battles all resulted in scores of Pakistani tanks falling into Indian Army hands. The albums within this gallery, gives a brief listing of the battles, with some rare images.

    [​IMG]

    Pak Army tanks lined up at Patton Nagar at Bhikiwind, 25 miles from Amritsar in Punjab. The tanks were kept here for only a few months after the 1965 war, before being siphoned off to various army establishments and cantonments as war trophies


    To be continued......
     
  11. A chauhan

    A chauhan "अहिंसा परमो धर्मः धर्म हिंसा तथैव च: l" Senior Member

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    A word from Pak: 1965 was 'wrong'

    A word from Pak: 1965 was 'wrong' - World - The Times of India

    ISLAMABAD: Terming the 1965 war as "wrong," the then Pakistan Air Force chief Nur Khan has said that it was the result of attempts by Pakistani Army to push a large number of militants into Jammu and Kashmir.

    He accused former military ruler Ayub Khan and his Generals of telling a "big lie" to the nation that India had provoked the war.

    Air Marshal (Retd) Khan's account of the war, published in the local daily Dawn on Tuesday, coincided with Pakistan's commemoration of the 'Defence Day' on the 40th anniversary of the conflict.Khan said the war was the result of attempts by Pakistani Army to push a large number of armed militants into Jammu and Kashmir without even informing Air Force and Navy.

    He said Pakistani Army suffered heavy losses in the war. "They (the coterie of Generals around President Ayub Khan) had planned the 'Operation
    Gibraltar' for self glory than the national interest. "It was wrong war and they misled the nation with a big lie that India rather than Pakistan had provoked the war and that we were the victims of the Indian aggression."


    He said Gen Ayub was told on the second day of the war by Army Chief Musa Khan that Army had even run out of ammunition."That was the extent of preparation of army. And information had shocked Gen Ayub so much that it could have triggered his heart ailment which overtook him a couple of years later." Charging the Army with starting the "unnecessary" war, Khan said "rumours about an impending operation (by Pakistan Army) were rife but army had not shared plans with other forces."


    Khan said since the 1965 war "was based on a big lie and was presented to the nation as a great victory, the army came to believe its own fiction and used Ayub as its role model and therefore continued to fight unwanted wars -- the 1971 war, the Kargil fiasco in 1999." "In each of the subsequent wars we have committed the same mistakes that we committed in 1965," he said and demanded that a 'Truth Commission' should be constituted to determine "why we failed in all military adventures."


    In a detailed account of the war in which Pakistan Army suffered serious reverses, Khan said he understood from Gen Musa Khan that "something was afoot." He was later told about the plans by GoC Akthar Hassan Malik to send a large number of militants into Jammu and Kashmir to fight the Indian Army.


    "Don't worry, because the plan is to send in some 800,000 infiltrators... to throw out the Indian troops with the help of the local population," Malik told him giving an impression that the Indians would not be able to retaliate and therefore the Pakistan Air Force need not get into the war time mode.


    Meanwhile, President Pervez Musharraf in a message on 'Defence Day' said that "while Pakistan is economically stable and has an impregnable defence, our nation is still facing multidimensional threats" and asked people to pledge to uphold dignity, honour and sovereignty of Pakistan at all costs.

    Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz in his message urged people to make the country a tolerant, developed, enlightened and democratic Islamic welfare state, as envisaged by its founding fathers. "Our economy is on high growth trajectory, and we are utilising all our resources to make our defence impregnable. The armed forces are fully capable and sufficiently equipped to defend the motherland."
     
  12. shiv

    shiv Regular Member

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    the great thing is if you mention these facts in front of a pakistani chap,he will immideately go into a fit and rant saying the world is wrong and the pakistani central education boards history books are correct.
     
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  13. Pintu

    Pintu New Member

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    Top Stories | Pakistan Observer Newspaper online edition

    1965 PoWs still languishing in Indian jails: report

    Islamabad/Lahore—The presence of war prisoners of 1965 Pak-India war in various jails of India has been revealed, a private TV channel reported on Thursday.

    According to the report, some family members of Mohammad Ayub, the prisoner in Patiyala Jail went to Pakistani High Commission in India a few days back after information and met officials there and they were told that he (Mohammad Ayub) has been in Indian jail since 1965.

    According to the family members, some Pakistanis had been released by India in 2004-05, who had confirmed the presence of Mohammad Ayub there.

    However, the security officials have revealed the presence of 18 more Pakistanis besides Mohammad Ayub in Indian jails, saying, these are all the prisoners of 1965 war, which are languishing in various Indian jails.

    The 18 war prisoners, whose presence has been revealed, included Major Bagh Hussain and Major Abdul Khaliq, Captain Mohammad Aslam, Lieutenant Abdul Ghani, Second Lieutenant Zakir Rehman, Havaldars Mozaffar Abad, Mohammad Akhtar and Mohammad Arif Jan. Lance Naiks Mohammad Ismail, Abdur Rehman and Kaleem Mohammad, OCUs Alam Din, Mohammad Khaliq and Yuwar Jis Tagi, SPR Itbar Khan, GNR Abdal and soldiers Mohammad Ayub, Mohammad Afzal.—Online
     
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  14. Pintu

    Pintu New Member

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    Good commander, bad command?

    Good commander, bad command?

    Saturday, December 19, 2009
    By A R Siddiqi
    The counsel for the federation, Mr Kamal Azfar, appearing in the Supreme Court in the case of the infamous NRO, now struck down ab initio by the apex court, called the GHQ a "a bad boy" and the Army chief a "gentleman." He said, "You want me to say it more openly? The danger comes from the CIA and the GHQ." Even if unintended, the statement was highly unwarranted and patently indiscreet. It challenged the very basis, the very essence of the military command-and-control system under the Service chief in his own wisdom or in concert with his principal staff officer and the corps commanders when necessary. A bizarre and uneasy juxtaposition with far-reaching implications against the institutional oneness and cohesion of the army, in fact, the unity of command of the armed forces as a whole, considering the special status of the army chief.

    The simple question is: how can a team, be it the GHQ or a sporting outfit, be any better than its chief? How can a "gentleman" ever tolerate a league of rogues under his direct command? Whether in peace or war, an army chief can be no better than his command, and vice versa. The army chief represents, especially in war or a grave national emergency, such as the existing one, the centre of gravity for his command and the rest of the country.

    Without exactly losing the 1965 war, Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan, the supreme commander, and his protégé the army chief Gen Mohammad Musa, threw in the towel before fighting it out to the finish. The Sept 21-22, 1965, tame ceasefire, more then the known asymmetries and imbalances in an unequal war, resulted from the miserable loss of nerve on the part of the supreme commander and the army chief.

    Unless, the army chief, in this case, Gen Ashfaq Kayani, therefore, proves his ability to command and control his own headquarter, the GHQ, and his field formations, what sort of an army chief he will be? There is no such thing as a good, gentlemanly commander and a bad un-gentlemanly command. A command in either case must reflect the image of the commander.

    Didn't Lt-Gen Amir Abdullah Khan Niazi's command of the military forces in East Pakistan reflect badly to infect fatally their battlefield performance to end in humiliating surrender? Gen Agha Mohammad Yahya's disastrous performance as the head of the state and supreme commander irreparably damaged the battlefield performance of his forces in West Pakistan, his military's powerhouse.

    A command, at any level, especially at the level of the high command, can be no better than the commander. He is the one who rules the roost. There is no question whatever of the GHQ being nobler than the army chief. All wars won or lost are known after their commander-in-chief. Waterloo was Napoleon's rather than France's debacle.

    Mr Azfar's insinuation against the GHQ for "derailing" democracy contrary, against the wishes of the army chief betrays the existence of a war within the high command itself. Mr Azfar has used his personal acquaintance with Gen Kayani as the basis of his good chit to the general as a good cop without realising how much embarrassment he might have caused the general personally. Once army chiefs go about collecting character certificates from private citizens, no matter how eminent, God help them and their command.

    Wasn't Mr Azfar hawking his personal ties with the chief even unconsciously in the Supreme Court to influence or impress their lordships?

    Even if by a long shot, would it not be in order to ask Mr Azfar if his classification of the commander as a good man and his command (GHQ) as "undemocratic" was an unintended attempt to throw a spanner in the works of their orderly and disciplined relationship?

    Apart from stating that the GHQ and the army chief were at variance about the status of democracy in the country, by far the most incriminating part of Mr Azfar's statement alluded to collaboration between the American CIA and the GHQ. Should there be an even an iota of truth in this, the GHQ would be little more than a mole, a foreign agent planted in the highest echelon of the army. While the army chief, according to Mr Azfar is a "gentleman" and there is "no immediate" threat to democracy, the GHQ, together with CIA, posed a threat to democracy.

    Mr Azfar said: "My statement was in historic perspective as historically the army chiefs and foreign intervention have been destabilising democracy in the country." He went on to explain that his statement was a personal one, without reflecting the opinion of the government. A tame apology for the damage done to the unity of the military command, even only theoretically.



    The writer is a former brigadier.
     
  15. F-14

    F-14 Global Defence Moderator Senior Member

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    [​IMG]

    A declassified US State Department letter that confirms the existence of hundreds of "infiltrators" in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir. Dated during the events running up to the 1965 war.

    [​IMG]

    Telegram from the Embassy of the United States in Karachi: "Continuing propaganda re[garding] achievements of Pak forces seems to have convinced most that only Pak forbearance saved the Indians from disaster."
     
  16. ppgj

    ppgj Senior Member Senior Member

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    View From Pakistan

    The Guns Of August

    Some of the writing about the Indo-Pakistan war of September 1965 borders on mythology. Generations of Pakistanis continue to believe that India was the aggressor and that one Pakistani soldier was equal to 10 Indian soldiers.

    Ahmad Faruqui

    Some of the writing about the Indo-Pakistan war of September 1965 borders on mythology. It is no surprise that generations of Pakistanis continue to believe that India was the aggressor and that one Pakistani soldier was equal to 10 Indian soldiers.

    A few have argued that the war began in August when Pakistan injected guerrillas into the vale of Kashmir to instigate a revolt and grab it before India achieved military dominance in the region. That was Operation Gibraltar.

    When it failed to trigger a revolt and drew a sharp Indian riposte along the ceasefire line, Pakistan upped the ante and launched Operation Grand Slam on Sept 1. Infantry units of the army backed by armour overran the Indian outpost in Chamb, crossed the Tawi river and were headed towards Akhnur in order to cut off India’s line of communication with Srinagar.

    In the minority view, the Indian response on Sept 6 across the international border at Lahore was a natural counter-response, not an act of aggression.

    I asked Sajjad Haider, author of the new book, Flight of the Falcon, to name the aggressor. He retired as an air commodore in the Pakistan Air Force. A fighter pilot to the bone, he does not know how to mince words: “Ayub perpetrated the war.”

    In April, skirmishes had taken place in the Rann of Kutch region several hundred miles south of Kashmir. In that encounter, the Pakistanis prevailed over the Indians. Haider says that the humiliation suffered by the Indians brought Prime Minister Shastri to the conclusion that the next round would be of India’s choosing.

    The Indian army chief prepared for a war that would be fought in the plains of Punjab. Under ‘Operation Ablaze’, it would mount an attack against Lahore, Sialkot and Kasur. Of course, the trigger would have to be pulled by the Pakistanis.

    On May 12, says Haider, an Indian Canberra bomber flew over the Pakistan border on a reconnaissance mission. To quote him: “The PAF scrambled interceptors which got within shooting range of the intruder. Air Marshal Asghar Khan’s permission was sought to bring down the intruder. He sought clearance from the president on the newly installed direct line but Ayub denied permission fearing Indian reprisal.” Laments Haider, “If this was not an indication of Indian intentions, what else could have been?”

    Oblivious to what had just taken place in the skies above Punjab, and failing to anticipate how India was gunning to equalise the score, Ayub gave the green light to Operation Gibraltar on the advice of his foreign minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (later president and prime minister). Bhutto had sought out the opinion about Indian intentions from Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi during a meeting at the Karachi airport and concluded from the latter’s body language that India would not respond.

    So Ayub gave the green light to send 8,000 infiltrators into Indian-held Kashmir. These, says Haider, were mostly youth from Azad Kashmir who had less than four weeks of training in guerrilla warfare. The entire plan was predicated on a passive Indian response, evoking Gen Von Moltke’s dictum: “No war plan survives the first 24 hours of contact with the enemy.”

    It is also worth recalling what the kaiser said to the German troops that were heading off to fight the French in August 1914: “You will be home before the leaves have fallen off the trees.” The three-month war turned into the Great War which lasted for four years.

    Operation Grand Slam abruptly ground to a halt. An Indian general cited by Haider says in his memoirs: “Akhnur was a ripe plum ready to be plucked, but providence came to our rescue.” The Pakistani GHQ decided to switch divisional commanders in the midst of the operation. The new commander, Maj-Gen Yahya (subsequently army chief and president), claimed later he was not tasked with taking Akhnur.

    I asked Haider whether the Pakistani military was prepared for an all-out war with India, a much bigger country with a much bigger military. He said it was the army’s war, since the other services had been kept in the dark. The army was clearly not prepared for an all-out war since a quarter of the soldiers were on leave. They were only recalled as the Indian army crossed the border en route to Lahore, a horrific sight which Haider recalls seeing from the air as he and five of his falcons arrived on the outskirts of Lahore.

    Maj-Gen Sarfraz was the general officer commanding of the No.10 Division which had primary responsibility for the defence of Lahore. Along with other divisional commanders in the region, he had been ordered by GHQ to remove all defensive landmines from the border. None had been taken into confidence about the Kashmir operation. The pleas of these generals to prepare against an Indian invasion were rejected by GHQ with a terse warning: “Do not provoke the Indians.”

    Haider notes that the gateway to Lahore was defended by the 3rd Baloch contingent of 100 men under the intrepid Major Shafqat Baluch. He says, “They fought to the last man till we (No.19 Squadron) arrived to devastate the invading division. There could have been no doubt even in the mind of a hawaldar that an Indian attack would come. But the ostriches at the pulpit had their heads dug in sand up to their necks.”

    In the 1965 war, the Pakistani Army repeated the mistakes of the 1947-48 Kashmir war, but on a grander scale. No official history of the 1965 war was ever written even though President Ayub wanted one. Gen Yahya, his new army chief, just sat on the request until Ayub was hounded out of office by centrifugal forces triggered by the war.

    Pakistan’s grand strategy was flawed. None of its strategic objectives were achieved. And were it not for the tactical brilliance of many mid-level commanders, the country would have been torn apart by the Indians. Ironically, in Ayub’s autobiography, one would be hard pressed to find any references to the war of 1965. One is reminded of De Gaulle’s history of the French army which makes no reference to the events that took place in Waterloo in 1815.

    War, as Clemenceau put it, is too serious a business to be left to the generals.

    Ahmad Faruqui has authored Rethinking the National Security of Pakistan.

    www.outlookindia.com | The Guns Of August
     
  17. nitesh

    nitesh Mob Control Manager Stars and Ambassadors

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    quite arrogant but one line struck :D

    Disastrous mistakes

    .......................
    Ayub undertook his misadventure against Kashmir in 1965. Thanks only to the intervention of the West, we were saved from losing Kashmir and Lahore.
    .............


    It seems that reality is slowly sinking in to there thick head
     
  18. Dark_Prince

    Dark_Prince Regular Member

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    Pakistan over the years have become a country of people fed with Lies, Propaganda and Conspiracy Theories. The education which they receive in schools/madrasas totally represents the mind set of a defeated Army General who will tell his troops that we lost the war, not because we were weak, But the other guys were strong and conspired, above all its their Fault that we LOST! Pakistan and Pakistanis are taught some False Glory about their history which starts from Advent of Islam ends at Mughal era, the selective History issue is known to the Pakistanis as well and is a matter of debate in pakistan. Pakistan makes its already naive and gullible Awam believe that they are the protectors of muslim world, which surely is not the case, as we all know how US Drones are bombing pakistan day in day out, similarly with complete dependence on US funds to run its already defunct Economy; only a naive person can think pakistan as an iota of power after faring miserably in all wars. Glorification of False victories is something they love to force into their already emotional Awam, which over a period of time has lost all objectivity and any scope of being debated with!

    Now In a war scenario, how do u define a Victory:

    1) The enemy surrenders (pakistan proudly did that in 1971)

    2) You thwart enemy offensive/infiltration with teeth (already achieved in Kargil and 1965)

    3) The Country/Army which captures the maximum land (that was the case almost all wars including in 1947)


    Now the comparative analysis of 1965 below, clearly shows India conquered more fertile and prosperous land of pakistan, while pakistan sneaked into Thar and Kutch.



    India Pakistan
    Casualties : 3,000 Indian soldiers 3,800 Pakistani soldiers
    Combat flying effort: 4,073+ combat sorties 2,279 combat sorties

    Aircraft lost: 35 IAF (official), 73 PAF.Other sources based on the Official Indian Armed Forces History put actual IAF losses at 30 including 19 accidents (non combat sortie rate is not known) and PAF's combat losses alone at 43. 19 PAF, 104 IAF 20 PAF, Pakistan claims India rejected neutral arbitration. (Singh, Pushpindar (1991). Fiza ya, Psyche of the Pakistan Air Force. Himalayan Books. ISBN 81-7002-038-7. )

    Aerial victories: 17 + 3 (post war) 30 Claimed by Pakistanis

    Tanks destroyed: 128 Indian tanks, 152 Pakistani tanks captured , 150 Pakistani tanks destroyed. Officially 471 Pakistani tanks destroyed and 38 captured 165 Pakistan tanks

    Land area won: 1,500 mi2 (3,885 km2) of Pakistani territory 250 mi² (648 km²) of Indian territory, Some neutral claims India held 710 mi²(1,1840 km²) of Pakistani territory and Pakistan held 210 mi²(545 km²) of Indian territory

    Conclusion: India had captured more land, which it had to return to Pakistan after the war. This proves the fact that India won and pakistani propaganda machinery Failed miserably (again) with its defeatist notion of 1 pakistani equivalent to 10 Indians; even defeat after defeat.

    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indo-Pakistani_War_of_1965#cite_note-bharatrakshak-41


    After Battle of Asal Uttar, pakistani tanks:
    [​IMG]
     
    Last edited: Feb 4, 2010
  19. nitesh

    nitesh Mob Control Manager Stars and Ambassadors

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    This must be really hurting:

    http://www.thenews.com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=223539
    ..............
    Regarding the 1965 war, the descriptions by the then British HC, many other local and foreign knowledgeable people, and most recently by Lt-Gen Mehmood Ahmad (The Illusion of Victory, 1965 War) gave the impression which I mentioned. I do hope I am wrong and Mr Hussein is correct, as there is a universal conception that we have not won a single war.
    ...........
     
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  20. nitesh

    nitesh Mob Control Manager Stars and Ambassadors

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  21. Dark_Prince

    Dark_Prince Regular Member

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    1965 War: A Different Legacy


    Today, over a hundred and fifty million Pakistanis celebrate the 42nd Defense of Pakistan Day. It was 6th of September 1965 when Pakistan’s armed forces faced off against India’s in the first full-scale war between the two countries. Much to the credit of the brave men (and women) in uniform that day–and for next 2-3 weeks following that–the enemy attack on the City of Lahore was repulsed and the General J. N. Chaudhary’s dream of having his drink at Lahore Gymkhana on the evening of September the 6th was squashed.


    Tomorrow, the country celebrates the Airforce Day to pay tribute to the defenders of the country’s air space. PAF’s performance during the 1965 War was truly remarkable given the comparative state of balance between the two airforces. It managed to shoot down 110 of India’s aircrafts while itself incurring the loss of only 18 of its own. Not only did PAF establish itself as a qualitatively superior airforce in the 1965 War but also established its credentials as one of the best airforces of the world.

    While much has been written, by official and unofficial quarters, on the history of the 1965 War and a lot more continues to be written every year, there are several gross misconceptions about this event in Pakistan’s history that need to be tackled with and addressed. In Pakistan, ever since (or soon after) its creation in 1947, the writing of history has been an almost exclusive domain of the establishment whereby an official “doctrine” or “mythology” is often disseminated to ensure a homogeneity of thought and conformity of actions.

    Noted historian, K. K. Aziz, in his “Murder of History: A Critique of History Textbooks Used in Pakistan” (1998) notes that:

    “In Pakistani schools and colleges what is being taught as history is really national mythology, and the subjects of Social Studies and Pakistan Studies are nothing but vehicles of political indoctrination. Our children don’t learn history. They are ordered to read a carefully selected collection of falsehoods, fairy tales and plain lies.”

    The myth and mystery around the 1965 War is no exception. One would not be surprised that a normal–perhaps even average college educated–Pakistani believes–or is led to believe–that on Sept 6th 1965, India invaded Pakistan (specifically Lahore) and that once thrust into this battle, Pakistan came out to be victorious over its archrival. Both of these facts, on close examination, are quite far from reality. True, India did attack Lahore on September 6th 1965, but it was not the one to force a war on Pakistan in the first place. It was Pakistan’s provocation in the form of Operation Gibralter that led India towards opening the Western front in Pakistan.

    It is also true that by the end of the 3rd week of war, both countries had found themselves in a virtual military stalemate. While Pakistan’s armed forces had successfully defended Lahore–thanks, primarily to men like Raja Aziz Bhatti who, despite the failure of leadership at the top-most levels, gave up their lives but not inch of the country’s territory, but also due to the strategic position of the BRB Canal that formed a natural defense for Lahore–all of Pakistan’s offensive maneuvers had come to a naught.

    The Operation Gibralter that began in May-June of 1965 to take Indian territory in Kashmir and create an insurgency and popular uprising in the region was frustrated. This launched Operation Grand Slam that was aimed at cutting the Jammu-Rajouri road at Akhnur and to ultimately capture the latter. This operation was unnecessary delayed because of a change in top-military commander–a change widely perceived as unwarranted at that time. Despite these delays, however, as Pakistani troops gained some territory, India launched a full-scale offensive aimed at Lahore (0530 hrs on the 6th) and Sialkot (night between 7th and 8th). The rest as they say is history.

    In the ground war itself, there was a military stalemate on virtually all, northern (Kashmir), central ( Lahore), and southern, axes. At the time of the ceasefire, India held 450 square miles of Pakistan’s territory and Pakistan held 1600 square miles of Indian territory. General K. M. Arif, in his book Khaki Shadows, though, highlights that the Indian land gains were mainly in the fertile Sialkot and Kashmir sectors while Pakistani land gains were primarily in deserts opposite Sindh. While Pakistan came out with better numbers in terms of casualties (dead, injured, and missing) and equipment losses, it hardly was victorious as is often claimed by the establishment. Unless you define victory as being able to defend oneself during an offensive operation — hardly a definition indeed.

    Apart from the unfortunate myth about who actually started the war itself, another factor that has received much less attention, and for obvious reasons, is why it was started in the first place. At the time of the 1965 War, Pakistan did not really have a full-time Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. General Ayub Khan was, at best, a part-time military commander, as he was too engaged in political affairs of the country. He had chosen General Musa Khan as his full-time Chief of Army Staff but only on the basis of his loyalty to the former rather than merit, competency or professionalism. This lack of leadership and competency at the highest levels of Pakistan’s military during the 1965 became legendary and is well-documented.

    This was also something that was consequently taken advantage of by none other that Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Bhutto was, at the time of the 1965 war, at the peak of his power as Ayub’s foreign minister and a foreign policy hawk, par excellence. He single handedly molded the opinion of the foreign office and his friends at the GHQ to plan operation Gibralter. Ayub was informed about the plans but only to an extent.

    Most importantly, Bhutto and his colleagues at the GHQ were able to dupe everyone who mattered into believing that capturing Kashmir was in sight, that an insurgency would immediately create an uprising, and that India would never declare full-scale war on Pakistan. Ayub’s indifference to this whole affair can be estimated from the fact that the Supreme Commander was vacationing in Swat during the last week of August 1965 when Pakistani troops were dying in Kashmir.

    Each one of the above assumptions was grossly incorrect and both Ayub and Pakistan paid a heavy price for it. For his part, Bhutto was able to walk away from his created mess and managed to turn the tide against Ayub and actually benefit from the situation. The 1965 War was the turning point of Ayub’s career at the helm. Bhutto rode this wave of dissatisfaction with the war as well as the Tashkent Agreement to power in 1970.

    Setting the record straight on what the 1965 War was all about, who started it, and why did it get started is not only a important constitutional right of Pakistani citizens but also is critical to learning from our own mistakes. Unfortunately, that is something that Pakistan has never been good at. General K. M. Arif in Khaki Shadows writes that in the immediate aftermath of the 1965 War “Pakistan suffered a loss of a different kind…Soon after the War the GHQ ordered all the formations and units of the Pakistan Army to destroy their respective war diaries and submit completed reports to this effect by a given date. This was done?Their [the war diaries'] destruction, a self-inflicted injury and an irreparable national loss, was intellectual suicide.”

    Clearly, the political-military nexus had an interest in ensuring that nobody should find out what actually happened during the 1965 War — the former because of its incompetence and lack of leadership and the latter because of its culpability in taking Pakistan to war. While considerable second-hand material has become available since then, first hand information and accounts of the war remain a national secret whose disseminator could be charged under the Official Secrets Act. The organizational and legal paraphernalia to ensure that nobody ever learns from this tragic event in Pakistan’s history is complete and foolproof.

    What could have happened differently if Pakistanis had actually learnt from what happened before, during, and after the 1965 War?

    One, Mr. Bhutto would probably have found it difficult to ride the wave of anti-Ayub discontent as easily as he did for he was equally, if not more, culpable for what was solely blamed on Ayub Khan.

    Two, Mr. Bhutto would not have found it as easy to continue to befriend army generals and exercise the kind of influence at GHQ that he did during the 1971 debacle. Perhaps Pakistan would have been intact.

    Three, the army leadership would have received its fair share of blame for its professional incompetence, and preoccupation with civilian and political affairs at the expense of their military duty.

    Four, Perhaps Pakistan would have learnt its lessons and Kargil-II (1965 War was, in fact, Operation Kargil-I) would not have happened. Consequently, Sharif government would not have been toppled and Musharraf would have been living a retired existence for the last 5 years.

    The chain of causalities run fairly deep and dense in Pakistan’s history. Our inability and unwillingness to learn from our own mistakes merely reinforces these events and brings us closer to a new–and more challenging–disaster every time. The 1965 War should be remembered as a day of courage and sacrifice of Pakistani people–most notably our men and women in uniform–who were wronged by their civilian and military leaders, but more importantly it should be remembered as a missed opportunity to learn and improve our lot. That is the test we continue to fail each year.

    About the Author: Dr. Athar Osama is a public policy analyst and an amateur historian of Pakistan’s political and constitutional history. He also the Founder of the Understanding Pakistan Project.

    http://pakistaniat.com/2007/09/06/1965-war-a-different-legacy/
     
    Last edited: Mar 17, 2010

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