1962: Why the IAF was not used

Discussion in 'Military History' started by JBH22, Feb 15, 2011.

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  1. JBH22

    JBH22 Senior Member Senior Member

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    By Air Marshal RS Bedi

    “The Indians at all levels are in a state of shock. Not one but two pleas for help are coming to us, the second one of them still highly confidential. They want our Air Force to back them up so that they can employ theirs tactically without leaving their cities unprotected...” JK Galbraith (US Ambassador in India during the 1962 Indo-China War)”

    Prime Minister Nehru wrote two letters in quick succession to the US President John F Kennedy on the night of November 19, 1962. The war situation had become desperate and India was at the verge of collapse with the Chinese troops having reached the foothills of NEFA (North-East Frontier Agency, now called Arunachal Pradesh). Bomdila had fallen and the retreating troops from Sela had been trapped between the two passes. Fear of Chinese coming down the valley and occupying the eastern sector had percolated down the line, creating an aura of panic and helplessness. The plans were afoot to evacuate major cities in Assam. This was the grim scenario under which Nehru wrote those two letters.

    [​IMG]

    He asked for a comprehensive aid from the US that included immediate help of the US Air Force for the purpose of air defence of the eastern sector. For the Indian Air Force to be employed in offensive role against the Chinese on the war front, it was felt necessary to have the US Air Force to defend the eastern sector against the PLAAF (People’s Liberation Army Air force as Chinese air force is known), should the Chinese retaliate by attacking Indian cities, oilfields and the industrial complexes in the region. The UK Prime Minister was also kept in the picture. However, by then the Chinese declared a unilateral ceasefire and a phased withdrawal. Obviously, they must have met their limited objective as set at the outset of the war. Besides, they could ill afford to stay on with the passes getting snow bound in days to come. These letters made public recently betray Nehru’s fears and the state of helplessness, as also the deference with which he approaches the subject of help from the US President.

    In the light of these letters, it has become necessary to re-visit the controversy surrounding this vital issue of non use of combat elements of the IAF, despite the overwhelming Chinese onslaught. The Army rightly feels aggrieved that despite the grave circumstances, the Air Force did not come to its rescue. Perhaps, had Nehru not been so influenced by US Ambassador, Galbraith’s advise and the IB boss, BN Mullick who had Nehru’s ears always, the outcome could well have been somewhat different. Whilst the former had Cold War compulsions in mind in advising Nehru the way he did, the latter was led to exaggerating the Chinese threat in the absence of real intelligence.

    Lack of genuine intelligence with the government, as also the armed forces and consequent fear of Chinese retribution due to over assessment of their capabilities obviously led to this unfortunate decision. Thus, it was the fear of the unknown that created a sort of paranoia amongst the higher hierarchy in the govt which totally froze and took decisions and actions that did not bring much honour to the nation and its Prime Minister, as stands revealed now.

    The US advice that it would be unwise to involve the combat elements of the IAF played a major role in arriving at this decision. The suggestion that the eastern cities and the air bases at Tezpur and Guwahati, Calcutta industrial complex, oil installation might become targets for the Chinese bombing unnerved the government. The intelligence about the Chinese having active air bases at Rudok, Gartok and Tashigong further added to the confusion. There are no such bases even today in 2010. Thus, the government was led to deciding in favour of not using the IAF in operations other than the logistic support to the army, lest it should result in some sort of disaster. The demand for twelve all weather supersonic fighter squadrons placed by highly paranoiac Nehru on President Kennedy also seems rather naive and not based on any sound professional advice. It was not a small number that somebody would have given us on a platter. Maj Gen Palit writes in his book “War in the High Himalayas” that when he was shown the draft letter as a DMO at the AHQ, seeking these fighter squadrons, he could only welcome the help in light of desperate circumstances, whatever its source. Whether the Air HQs were similarly consulted is not clear at all.

    Also read: Why New Delhi wants to forget 1962?

    The Chinese were known to have only Mig-15, Mig-17, IL-28 bombers and a few Mig-19. Most airfields in Tibet are at high altitude and had inadequate infrastructure to take on offensive fighter operations. The IL-28 bomber was the only aircraft that could have posed some threat in the eastern sector. In fact, in 1962, the PLAAF was at its weakest. The Soviets had pulled out of China in August; 1960. Their aeronautical industry was in tatters. Their serviceability was low due to non-availability of spares and so also was perhaps their morale. According to some western estimates based upon inputs from the Chinese sources, the Chinese Air Force was nearly grounded due to total suspension of supplies and the spares by the Soviet Union. Discord with Taiwan was also keeping the Chinese engaged on the eastern board. Large contingent of army and air force were deployed there.

    [​IMG]

    t may be mentioned here, though with the advantage of hindsight that during the period leading from the 62 war with India to its 1979 war with Vietnam, the PLAAF had shown a marked bias towards Air Defence as against Offensive Air Operations. That this was inspite of having more capable bomber like the Tu-16/H-6 at the time implies that this predilection towards Air Defence had more to do with their air force doctrine rather than the ‘short legs’ of its aircraft. Would it therefore, with the hindsight of course, be correct to say that the PLAAF in all likelihood would not have used its offensive power against Indian cities? This is a question that can perhaps never be answered

    In comparison, India had technologically advance aircraft comprising Toofanis, Mysteres, Gnats, Hunters and the Canberras. Some of these aircraft were in location in the eastern sector already, though the Air Defence set up was rather rudimentary. With inherent flexibility that the air power has, it would have not taken much time for the IAF to reinforce the sector with requisite assets.

    [​IMG]

    Unfortunately, the Air Force too was not as clear and certain as it ought to have been, due to the lack of requisite intelligence inputs. And that is the reason indeed for not having any in-depth study on Chinese capabilities in Tibet in hand prior to the start of war. Lack of intelligence on China’s capabilities and their intentions was obviously the limiting factor resulting in India not being as ready as required by the emerging scenario. The fear of Chinese retaliation seemed to have weighed so heavily that it coloured all our decisions. In light of the fact that the Henderson Brookes report is unlikely to be released for public scrutiny, the only source of information in this regard would be the few surviving senior officers of the day.

    Ambassador Galbraith went to a great length in pressurising Nehru to desist from using combat aircraft against the Chinese which would widen the scope of the war. The US would not be able to support or provide any fighter cover. Galbraith could not have acted entirely on his own volition or hunch in advising Nehru so strongly without the backing from the home front. It could well have been the US military as also the CIA that were saying so. They had their own Cold War compulsions. Besides, the US was not very sure in regard to the extent of fissures in Sino-Soviet relations. However, what is of great interest is the fact that Prime Minister Nehru trusted Ambassador Galbraith without any trepidation whatsoever.

    Writing in his journal later to be published as ‘Ambassador’s Journal’, on 19 Nov 62, the day Nehru dashed off his missives, Galbraith notes, “The Indians at all levels are in a state of shock .Not one but two pleas for help are coming to us, the second one of them still highly confidential. They want our Air Force to back them up so that they can employ theirs tactically without leaving their cities unprotected... I think it would be very unwise for them to initiate any air action.” Then he goes to footnote this event by saying, “In the ensuing days, I urged against doing so in the strongest possible fashion”. In his next entry on 21 Nov 1962, he goes on to explain the logic behind his urgings, when he says, “The cities of the Gangetic Plain are accessible from the airfields of Tibet. There is no chance that the Indians could retaliate to China and there is nothing in Tibet”. It is instructive to note that soon after this entry is an account of Galbraith’s 10 AM meeting with Prime Minister Nehru.

    One of the main factors in the calculus of the Americans would have been the fact that the Cold War was at its peak with the Cuban missile crisis unfolding at this very juncture. Any clear siding with the Indians would have provoked the Soviets in some form or the other. That’s how the US did not want to be seen getting too involved on the Indian side. Any such perception would have brought the Soviets closer to the Chinese who had not yet fully parted company. The US on account of Cold War constraints obviously did not want another region getting embroiled in any major war and hence the advice to Nehru to avoid widening the scope of Sino-Indian conflict by employing its air power. Whether the US deliberately exaggerated the Chinese air threat is indeed debatable. The Soviets too could not afford to take a pro India stand in October 1962 because of their pre-occupation with the US on account of Cuban missile face off.

    The unfortunate consequence of this canard being sowed deep into the minds of the Indian decision making elite was that it soon began acquiring a life of its own, as a section of the military came to believe that using the IAF offensively would lead to the PLAAF responding with operations to hinder the IAF’s air maintenance of the Indian Army on which it was extremely dependent. That’s how a few requests for close air support by some units engaged on the front with the Chinese were promptly turned down by the army authorities on these very grounds.

    [​IMG]

    Despite Nehru’s entreaties, the US help was not forthcoming till after the end of the war, although there are references here and there in regard to the US aircraft carrier (USS Enterprise) being present in the Indian Ocean and its movement towards the Bay of Bengal. The US in response to India’s request for help got the Commonwealth countries to come forward and support it in this effort. President Kennedy with the help of British Prime Minister Macmillan worked out a joint military aid package of the order of about $120 million or so for India. Other Commonwealth countries were too roped in to share this responsibility on the grounds that India was more familiar with British and the Commonwealth countries’ equipment and the weapon systems rather than that of the Americans’. The US help therefore, came in the form of non-combat equipment only. It thus became a support from the western powers and not necessarily from the US who was wary of the Soviets’ reaction.

    Thus, Ex Shiksha was planned between the air forces of the US, UK, Canada and Australia in order to check the air defence of Delhi and the eastern sector. Later, the help materialised in the form of aircrafts and the equipment from these countries. Besides, the US agreed to train certain number of Indian pilots in US. The US also gave badly needed winter clothing, some transport aircraft and later 500 series Star Saphire air defence radars which were later deployed all along the Himalayas from the west to the far east. Canada sent a squadron of Caribous transport aircraft. UK too provided some support in the form of submarine training to one batch of Indian naval officers. Some of this came free, some on concessional rates and some on full payment.

    Interestingly, a stage came when India was able to get the best from both the sides. Right till 1965 war, India was able to acquire major military hardware from the US as well as the Soviet Union. No wonder, India’s non-alignment policy came to be referred as ‘bi-alignment’. Questions about India’s foreign policy began to be raised all over, particularly in the western world. Even within the country, the eyebrows were raised that the architect of India’s non-alignment policy was seeking military intervention by the US forces. However, what really matters is the way one looks at it. National interest must remain paramount, ideology notwithstanding.

    Where India went wrong was in its strategic assessment of Chinese intentions that they would not resort to war. But they did and caught us totally off guard. This shattered Nehru and his much coveted non-alignment policy. Being still in “Bhai Bhai, era,” even our intelligence could not adjust to the emerging adverse relationship. To add to the woes, Nehru’s proclivity of ignoring the armed forces that unfortunately remained in World War-II mould all this while till the Chinese shook us resulted in the nation paying this heavy price. However, what needs to be debated in India is as to who sowed the seeds of imagination in the minds of the Indian polity of the time. Nehru was obviously not advised correctly or professionally. The unexpected Chinese onslaught and consequent rout of the Indian Army led Nehru and his advisors to overestimate Chinese politico-military objectives.

    http://www.indiandefencereview.com/IDR-Updates/1962-Why-the-IAF-was-not-used.html
     
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  3. pankaj nema

    pankaj nema Senior Member Senior Member

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    How weak and un prepared we were can be gauged by the following

    In a TV discussion in early 2010 when the China threat was being played up by Indian media a gentleman said that as a nation , in 1962 we were frozen with fear and there were talks of shifting the Indian capital Delhi to the South

    There was a fear that Chinese Bombers would Bomb North Indian towns and cities
    in retaliation ,so IAF was not used

    Basically we wanted the Chinese to take what they want and leave so we could then start building up our armed forces in a new and fresh manner

    There was no point in suffering additional losses both on civilian and military side

    The ground war was hopeless from the beginning .The IAF could not have turned it around

    The Chinese wanted Aksai Chin and they would have kept on fighting till they got it

    Arunachal though the Chinese desired , was not easy to hold or retain

    SO though they overran Arunachal they went back

    Our immediate worry in 1962 was that Pakistan would be motivated to attack India ASAP
    And we were proved right in 1965

    So it was better to conserve Human and material resources
     
  4. JBH22

    JBH22 Senior Member Senior Member

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    Its all behind us now 1962 nothing can't be done about that but the problem is that no lessons has been learn from that debacle additionally we have political masters who do not have an idea about national security or if they care about that at all.The only thing that is innate to all Indian politicians is that they are always mired in internal political rife so this doesn't allow them to focus on external politics.

    I would say imho something like US presidency is the answer to the chaos of Indian political class
     
  5. SHASH2K2

    SHASH2K2 New Member

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    As per many reports chinese airforce was at great disadvantage due to their airports in Tibet at higher altitude . due to higer altitide they cannot takeoff with higher weapon payloads . Army fought without any air support whatsoever . At least airforce should have been used to cut chinese supply lines . If Airforce had done even that results would have been much diffrent that what we saw. Logic of trying to preserve whatever we can is nothing but a excuse to hide their incompetence and cowardice . I dont know if Nehru or Airforce should be blamed for this act of cowardice.
     
  6. JBH22

    JBH22 Senior Member Senior Member

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    Could the Indian Air Force Have Tilted the Scales in the 1962 War With China?

    In October 1962 the Chinese Army moved against Indian positions in the East and Ladakh. The positions which were lightly held gave way in the face of the Chinese assault. The so called Macmohan Line in the East was breached and the posts in Ladakh fell after some resistance. The Indian Army was taken totally by surprise. This soon turned into a ignominious retreat. One of the reasons was paucity of equipment, but a more important reason was the mindset of the General Staff that had been conditioned to think of only Pakistan as the probable opponent.

    The result of the attack had a demoralizing effect on the Indian leadership and the Indian Army. This state of affairs can squarely laid at the doorstep of successive Army Chiefs right from General Cariappa to General Thapar who abandoned their duty in conditioning the Army to face China. No mountain exercise was ever conducted for the troops and the Staff College had only exercises on battles in the plains of Punjab and deserts of Rajasthan as possible scenarios of a conflict. The Indian Air Force at that time had a mix of Gnats, Hunters, Mystere's, Canberra's and MIG 21.

    The Eastern Command was in existence, but the IAF never carried out any exercises for hill attacks and operations. All the exercises were carried out for operations in the plains. This is hard to stomach now and the role of successive Air Chiefs from Air Marshal S Mukherjee down wards needs evaluation. The IAF was not conditioned for any form of operation in the hills and the heights of the Himalayas. However the IAF was combat ready for operations in the plains. Thus when the PLA moved in a logical corollary would have been to use the IAF as a ground support to blunt the Chinese offensive. This however did not happen and the Army fought it's battle without Air Support. Thus the cardinal principle of Douhet was thrown to the winds.

    It is a fact of history that the Indian Air Force did not take part in the operations. It has never been satisfactorily explained as to why the IAF was not used in close support operations. Who took the fatal decision not to deploy the IAF. Was it Nehru, the Army Chief General Thapar or the Air Chief. There is no answer to this question. Perhaps the only plausible answer is that fear of the unknown and retaliation by the PLAAF based in Tibet may have clouded the thought process. This shows a psychosis of fear that at that time pervaded the Indian Government and Armed Forces.

    The Air Chief himself perhaps was too numbed by the turn of events. In addition the fact that the IAF had never even had a practice exercise in hill operations, must have weighed heavily on the Air Chief. For this alone Air Marshal Aspi Engineer must stand in the dock as he headed the IAF at that time. Another point is the psychosis of fear that was built up about the capability of the PLAAF which was greatly exaggerated. In real terms the Peoples Army Air Force had outdated aircraft which could not operate with full payload from the airfields in Tibet because of the height factor of the airfields.

    All this is mentioned by Air Vice Marshal AK Tiwari in his article in the Indian Defense review. Much water has flowed down the river since then, but future generations must be made aware that the psychosis of fear must never govern a military decision. This is unfortunately what happened in 1962. As per AVM AK Tiwari 'In final analysis the use of combat air power would have turned the tables on Chinese and the 1962 war could well have been a debacle for China.
     
  7. pankaj nema

    pankaj nema Senior Member Senior Member

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    The Chinese are spiteful people
    The Chinese were pissed off by our stand on the border dispute
    The Chinese aim in addition to taking Aksai Chin was to humiliate India and teach India a lesson.

    Even Today they are NOT after territory They want to humiliate India

    This point of Tibetan air fields being unsuitable , were discovered much later in the post war analyses

    The IAF' s capabilities in 1962 could not have been better than PLAAF

    Had we used IAF in 1962 then ,in my view ,The Enimity with the Chinese would have exploded AND in 1965 Chinese would have definitely opened a second front

    It was better that we could minimise the enimity
     
  8. SHASH2K2

    SHASH2K2 New Member

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    I Think Like this . If we would have given a befitting reply to China in 1962 and Airforce was used properly to kick their ass . Leave aside china siding with Pakistan in 1962 1962 itself wouldnot have happened . 1962 happeneds because Pakistan thought that Indians armed are weak and Our Air-force is incompetent and afraid of taking tough decisions.

    I am talking about IAF capability to cut supply lines once they were deep into Indian territory . its a not a direct AOA fight . and about Tibetan airfield if we cannot calculate even such a simple factor then same on IAF strategists .
     
    Last edited: Feb 15, 2011
  9. pankaj nema

    pankaj nema Senior Member Senior Member

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    When the IA was in such bad shape how can we say that IAF was fully prepared
    And why assume that PLAAF could not have retaliated

    Did IAF have any training or practice ; doctrines or even weapons for such high altitude bombing

    A few bombs here and there would have made no difference

    Even in Kargil war it was PGMs ie laser guided bombs that were effective
     
  10. SHASH2K2

    SHASH2K2 New Member

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    How do you know that IAF was in very bad shape compared to PLAAF ? Our Airfields weer close to comtat areas and weer at lower altitude so no weight penalty for IAF where as having nearest airbase in Tibet and at such a high altitude they had sever weight penalty disadvantage . In short IAF could have done more number of sorties and for longer duration compared to PLAAf and thats a very big advantage.

    DO we always need a doctrine to protect national intrests . There are some desperate time when all these doctrine shuld go to hell and survival instinct should kick in . With chinese so deep into our territories and IAF sitting and doing nothing is part of which doctrine.

    Kargil was about hitting a precise target on a mountain peak and into some natural caves. In 1962 we wouuldnt be doing that . IAF was supposed to cut supply lines . something like destroying some critical bridges and roads . Flying low and slow makes it easier than modern planes which normally fly at high altitude to avoid other anti aircraft systems.
     
  11. p2prada

    p2prada Stars and Ambassadors Stars and Ambassadors

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    We were carelessly threatening China with "dire" consequences in 1962. Politicians were talking about showing China what happened to the Portuguese in Goa in 1961.

    The kind of power China used in 1962 was overwhelming. IAF would have done nothing except increase casualties by a bit on the Chinese side. But Chinese do not care about casualties. The war would have seen the same logical conclusion as what happened, with or without IAF.

    All in all the Indo-China war helped increase a sense of nationalism in the country and taught the Indian administration to be more geo-politically savvy and modernized the Indian Army enough to combat PA in 1965 with a decent advantage.

    The PGMs used in Kargil were for show, nothing else.
     
  12. JBH22

    JBH22 Senior Member Senior Member

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    Only 9 LGBs were used during the kargil war back to the main topic IAF in itself could not have change the tide if i'm not mistaken IA were armed with .303 rifles while Chinese were armed with AK-47.
     
  13. SHASH2K2

    SHASH2K2 New Member

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    1962 shouldnot have happened. We were unprepared, underarmed and had no self confidence and esteem.
    First mistake was troop deployment by Nehru knowing that we cannot match their firepower.
    second was asking troops to hold firepower when attack begin .
    Third was holding back IAF on pretext of saving whatever we can .
    When we had no capability to fight why the hell troops were deployed and when fight starts there should be no looking back and trying to save anything. It should be do or die . We should have learned from chinese that casualty shouldn't matter when it comes to protecting national pride . Any ways we had huge casualty and what pisses me off that we had chance to inflict some damage to chinese but we didn't because we were ruled by cowards .
     
  14. Kunal Biswas

    Kunal Biswas Member of the Year 2011 Moderator

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    1962:

    IA infantry platoon consist of 2 x carbine, 2 X LMGs, 17 X 303 Vs PLA AK-47 & SKS..
    Arty Consist of Old 75mm, And few 5inch Heavy Guns to that altitude Vs Chinese Light 122mm D30s..

    Nonsense..

    Why the Aircraft needed to left the Cities?, Does the whole IAF consist of 10 sqadrons? Further Its a common sence that AD was alwys there, All major Cites more or less Under Radar cover even those Days, How come IL-28 like bomber could have sneak in as the GOV presented ?

    IAF could have used for effective CAS cover, Those days Cambaras are very effective Bombers and can attend a altitude where MIG-15s cannot, Few as 5 Fighter-Bomber squadrons could have change the path of WAR..

    PLAAF is not a fool to use his precious Air crafts for Unnecessary Bombing on civilian population when their Soldiers were cut in Half by IAF..

    Those days IAF was much Strong than toady's IAF..



    http://reportmysignal.blogspot.com/2008_05_18_archive.html
     
    Last edited: Feb 15, 2011
    Waffen SS and Tshering22 like this.
  15. Kunal Biswas

    Kunal Biswas Member of the Year 2011 Moderator

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  16. Tshering22

    Tshering22 Sikkimese Saber Senior Member

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    I always have been debating this within myself, having read hundreds of articles that show various aspects on why that turd Nehru not allow Kaul to use air power. This was because he was a loser pacifist who did not deserve India's rule in first place. A ruler has to be militarist as well apart from being a politician, all this Nehru was not and Sardar Patel was. It is a rather pathetic part of our history where strong and able men have been sidelined in crisis times and spineless, romantic, short-sighted and corrupted rascals have come to power; just as Churchill has predicted before independence.

    Both Brij Mohan and Kaul were pressing Nehru to allow IAF to handle PLAAF. But Nehru was such a stupid wretch that he pissed in his dhoti on the prospects of PLAAF entering Indian territory and bombing cities. Why would they do that when their army would be pummeled by IAF forces which were much much stronger than PLAAF that time.

    THat was the first time Chinese Sun Tzu policy of deception of "1000s of migs" won. And to this date, we continue to be fooled.

    Till now we haven't learnt to understand the meaning of "NEVER AGAIN" unlike Israel who not only understands it but makes sure that it follows as well regardless of what bigoted "world community" calls.

    This is the trait of a strong, far sighted and dedicated national policy.
     
  17. p2prada

    p2prada Stars and Ambassadors Stars and Ambassadors

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    Air power is overestimated in the IA vs PLA scenario.

    The Canberras could only carry 4 tons of bombs at a time. They could do nothing to tide over the war in any way.

    The only way to beat PLA in 1962 or in 2011 is to attack their posts and stick bayonets into their soldiers. The only way to tide over the war is to take out PLA's Command Posts. Canberras, Su-30s, FGFA will do nothing to achieve the army's victory.

    In 2011, IAF and PLAAF will only fight each other. They will not help out IA or PLA. Neither will they provide CAS to either Armies.

    In 1962, IAF could have helped decrease casualties on our side while increasing theirs, but that's about it. The PLA would still have taken and held all that they conquered even with IAF's involvement. If we really needed to change the tide of the war, we should have given the Army better equipment. IAF can only make a slight difference in the war with Heavy Bombers like B-52 or Tu-160 which can drop 30 to 40 tons of bombs at a time.

    What Nehru did was to pressure the international community to end the war without further escalating it by involving IAF.

    The Americans ran hundreds of sorties every day over Vietnam, Iraq and Kosovo. They included B-52s and B-2s too. Nothing happened. The bombed armies functioned as effectively as always. Even in WW2 the American and British Bombers bombed German cities in a massive way, but it did not reduce the hold of the third reich even remotely. Only the Soviet tanks did what hundreds of heavy bombers could not. If Heavy Bombers were ineffective on plains then what do you think IAF can do over the Himalayas.

    Air forces only kill each other or kill civilians. Nothing more. In the entire history of warfare, the only successful air attack that ever took place was Pearl Harbour in 1941. It worked only because the defenders were asleep.
     
  18. Kunal Biswas

    Kunal Biswas Member of the Year 2011 Moderator

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    Ever been to Ladak or NE..

    Study the Terrain...

    What is your Age ?



    Not only.


    0_O It states 'Shocking'


    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_warfare_of_World_War_II#American
    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gulf_War_air_campaign
    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kosovo_War#The_NATO_bombing_campaign
    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Safed_Sagar
    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_Air_Forces#World_War_II

    Read them, And read them well..

    Ask anything related to Indo-Sino air and Ground Assets..


    Anything outside from the main topic P.M me..
     
    Last edited: Feb 15, 2011
  19. p2prada

    p2prada Stars and Ambassadors Stars and Ambassadors

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    Typical.

    WW2: After all the pounding in 1944, The Third Reich in Berlin was still intact.

    Gulf war: After all the pounding Iraq received the Iraqi Army was still intact.

    Kosovo: After all the pounding the Serbian Army was perfectly intact.

    Kargil: After all the pounding, the militants and NLI were evicted by the Army.

    Ask any analyst. Any serviceman in the officer class with years of service behind him. Ask any General. Ask any Air Marshal. He will tell you one and only one thing about air warfare.

    It is not a match winner.
     
  20. JBH22

    JBH22 Senior Member Senior Member

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    But you can't disagree that combined operations is the way forward the army on its own cannot do everything. IAF has gain valuable experience during operation Safed Sagar something that most airforces cannot dream to do.
     
  21. SHASH2K2

    SHASH2K2 New Member

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    If Airforce is not a match winner then there is no point in having so many planes and spending so much for new ones. Better to buy many air defence units and man portable anti aircraft systems.
    Till now I thought Its the airforce is match winner and game changer. Maybe longewala was just a fluke .

    Agree that Airforce alone cannot destroy enemy but it can definitely make a difference . in hilly terrain destroying a simple road or bridge means delay of several days to repair it or find an alternate route to bypass them . Also chinese troup advance would not have been so rapid had Airforce been used .
     
    Last edited: Feb 15, 2011
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