The Tribune, Chandigarh, India - Opinions
^^^lol, now I know why chicoms and Paki's are allies, both are effing delusional lunatics.
More power to them.
The Tribune, Chandigarh, India - Opinions
^^^lol, now I know why chicoms and Paki's are allies, both are effing delusional lunatics.
More power to them.
Now G.Partha is a great Ambassador, who is a realist, practical and patriotic man, all of which MK.Bhadra is not. Commie traitor, he would sell India and his mother, if he could, I am ashamed to call him a Malayalee
Both Pakistani & Afghan Pashtuns think Durand line as Pakistan's & Afghanistan's respectively.Many fear that it could be the next Kashmir of South Asia.
Pakistan is at war with Afghanistan since 1947 because of this Duran line. But the irony is that Afghan do not understand it; have been fooled by Pakistan with slogans of Muslim brotherhood etc.
Whom to blame? Only Afghans. Eating free fund wheat of Pakistan which was then provided by USA as aid is going to cost them a nation.
and it was India's fault that it recognized the Durand line as the border and never on any maps or through statements called it disputed. Its never too late. India could have used the visit of Karzai and the signing of the strategic partnership to include a "peaceful" settlement of Durand lie issue. That would have ruffled the pakis no end.
Durand Line is not recognised by the Pasthuns or those in Waziristan,
This is what scares Pakistan no end.
Yes,just like the Pakistanis are siding with the Chinese & showing Arunachal Pradesh as a part of China,we should partner with our Afghan Friends on the issue of Durand line.
During the time of independence, in 1947-48, the Pakis were terrified that the tribal Pashtuns would rebel against their newly formed nation, and might resort to looting and bloodshed in Paki towns such as Peshawar.
That was an additional reason that Djinnah and his cohorts decided to send the Pashtun tribals into Kashmir - as a 'distraction'. They were told to loot, pillage, murder, rape and enjoy themselves to the maximum extent they could. The raping and looting tribals did exactly that. Never believe a Paki who brags about "sending brave Muslims to liberate their fellow Muslims". Read the accounts of the looting, pillage and rape that these tribals indulged in, in Kashmir. Truckloads of loot were taken back to the tribal areas, and more and more of them kept pouring in, till the regular Paki Army went in to "formalize things".
Pakistan's double-game on the Durand Line | The AfPak Channel
In the winter of 2009, standing on the mud wall of a border outpost manned by our partnered Afghan Border Police, I was chatting with Commander Aziz, a well-known local police chief commander. Aziz pointed east to the locations of Taliban training camps on a mountain just inside Pakistan, and to their usual infiltration routes around the dusty border town of Angor Adda. Suddenly, the high-pitched whoosh of rockets launching screamed across the valley from the direction of Pakistan to our left front towards our main coalition base to our rear. "Incoming!" one of my operators yelled as we dove under the nearest vehicles in a flash. I was only visiting, but they knew that typically the rocket attacks on the coalition base were accompanied by mortar fire on the Afghan border posts. As we dusted ourselves off, and my Air Force combat controller jumped on the radio to call for one of the aircraft continually circling over Afghanistan, I looked off in the distance towards the Pakistani military border post known as Post 41. The white trails of smoke from the rocket launches were coming from the base of the outpost on a small hill several kilometers in the distance. I noticed the launch site for the rockets was within spitting distance of the Pakistani post. The Border Police had established ambushes the night before on several of the typical launch sites, but the Taliban had learned to set up their sites very near Pakistani border positions, as the Afghans wouldn't come near them for fear of being attacked by the Pakistanis.
Just days before, we had met with the Pakistani military area commander for the string of army and Frontier Corps border posts that dotted that area of south-eastern Pakistan. We had confronted him about the almost daily shelling of our bases that was originating from Pakistan (which had wounded several of my men), regular reports of the insurgents using some of his bases for resupply, and the artillery duels his posts were regularly having with the Afghan border outposts. Over dozens of cups of tea, the Pakistani commander, who had traveled several hours from his headquarters in Wana, the main town in South Waziristan, in his perfectly pressed khaki uniform, assured us that our reporting must be faulty and that his men were only authorized to return fire in response to Afghan fire. The meeting, typical of these border sit-downs between the two neighbors, degenerated into Pakistani and Afghan nearly coming to blows, with my team leader playing referee in the middle. The Pakistanis made a number of commitments to conduct coordinated patrols, information exchanges and more regular meetings, none of which were fulfilled.
In the midst of the attack on this particular day, one of my men back at our coalition base got on the hotline we had established with the Pakistanis to ask them to engage the insurgents launching the rockets, or to at least to send out a patrol. After half an hour of calling, a Pakistani soldier finally picked up the phone and informed us that the post commander was not present, and that no one else could authorize a patrol or firing of their heavy weapons except in self-defense.
Back at the Afghan post, I could hear a series of dull thuds emanating from our main base in the distance as the rockets exploded all around it. One of my officers and I were on the radio arguing with multiple higher headquarters stations for authorization to return fire on the insurgents launching the rockets with the artillery platoon station at our main base. One headquarters, hundreds of miles away, indicated that their satellite imagery showed the rockets were launching too close to some civilian homes, and that if we returned fire there was too high a likelihood of civilian casualties. We could clearly see that the "homes" were old sheep pens. The next higher headquarters was concerned the artillery fire could hit too close to the Pakistani post. Any fire sent into Pakistan must be cleared by the regional command, even when U.S. troops are engaged in exchanges of fire with insurgents.
While the artillery units were writing their hands, another Taliban rocket salvo launched, and I authorized the Air Force fighter overhead to bomb the launch site as well as the men running from the site towards the mountains where Commander Aziz had earlier pointed out the training camps. As a ground element under fire, I could authorize the airstrike without higher approval as part of our inherent right of self-defense (a deliberate air attack however, would have been heavily scrutinized by staff planners and lawyers). The pilot also expressed concern about bombing so close to the Pakistani outpost and about targeting men running without weapons, until I assured him that as the ground force commander I took full responsibility for the consequences. With his cockpit tape recorder running, he asked me to repeat the command twice. The bombs killed at least four of the escaping insurgents and destroyed additional rockets as they sat on their launchers, ready to fire. We subsequently patrolled to the site of the launches near Pakistani Post 41. As we maneuvered, the Afghans intercepted communications in Urdu-accented Pashto, informing the Taliban of our movements and instructing them on where to set up an ambush. Since Post 41 was the only thing within range of the Afghan's frequency scanners, the instructions to the Taliban were almost certainly coming from the Pakistani military. Commander Aziz and his men were more nervous about the Pakistanis firing on us with their heavy weapons than he was about an ambush. No attack occurred that day, but months later one of my men would lose his foot due to a booby-trapped mine laid at the site. For our efforts that particular day, my officers and I were were investigated as to whether we had proper approvals to order the airstrike, and because the Pakistani military complained we wounded one of their soldiers.
I relay this incident in light of the recent diplomatic crisis between Pakistan and the United States over the strikes against two Pakistani border encampments last month, because it is indicative of similar exchanges occurring up and down the Afghan-Pakistani border on an almost daily basis. Indeed, it is important to understand that incidents such as the exchange in Mohmand are not isolated occurrences, though only the most serious make headlines. Second, as our policy community is finally coming to fully realize, Pakistani forces are not only turning a blind eye, but actively aiding and abetting the insurgency in attacks on not only the Afghans but U.S. and coalition forces as well. That said, it's equally important to realize the painstaking, almost paralyzing, lengths to which the coalition goes to attempt to coordinate with the Pakistani Army and to avoid accidental attacks on their posts.
In the wake of the Mohmand airstrikes, a senior Pakistani officer accused NATO forces of deliberately targeting the Pakistani outpost. In my experience commanding U.S. Army Special Forces units spread across four provinces on the Pakistani border, this is simply ludicrous. Airstrikes and artillery in the border region come under enormous scrutiny, and are often only approved at the highest levels in-theater. In fact, one of our most significant frustrations was that getting approval for strikes over the border or anywhere within a kilometer of a Pakistani border post took too long or was often not approved at all.
More likely, as some U.S. officials have described, a joint coalition patrol was fired upon by insurgents at night, if not by the Pakistanis themselves, and in a case of mistaken identity, the coalition commander called an air strike on nearby Pakistani outposts. Rather than questioning the coalition procedures, we should be questioning why the Taliban are so confident in their own safety in proximity to the Pakistani military. The answer is obvious, and I applaud the Obama administration for expressing condolences but refusing to apologize. We have spent 10 years delivering billions of dollars of "carrots" to encourage the Pakistani Army to shift its strategic calculus away from using extremism as a foreign policy tool, and this latest crisis may show that it's time for a change.
Given the widespread view in the region that the United States is not serious about a long-term commitment to Afghanistan, Pakistani support for Afghan insurgents is understandable, but not excusable. President Barack Obama has clearly set the course for a minimalist presence in Afghanistan, and it's time to move our Pakistan policy towards using bigger sticks in order to fracture the insurgency's leadership and undermine their sanctuary while we still have significant forces in Afghanistan. We must seriously put cross-border strikes by U.S. forces on Haqqani and Taliban leadership on the table and continue to shift our supplies to the Northern Distribution Network and other routes, reducing our reliance on Pakistani supply routes. To the extent that we continue providing significant security assistance to the Pakistani army it should be prioritized away from traditional Foreign Military Sales and towards the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund, which only allows the Pakistani military to purchase counterinsurgency-related equipment. There are significant risks to this approach to be sure -- risks so bleak that heretofore in the face of every incident with Pakistan, U.S. policymakers have defaulted back to trying a different set of incentives. Ten years later, our gains and sacrifices in Afghanistan are what's truly at risk. Our soldiers making the ultimate sacrifice in Afghanistan and our national interests deserve a change in the U.S.-Pakistan dynamic.
Michael Waltz formerly served as a senior advisor for counterterrorism to Vice President Richard Cheney, and still serves as a U.S. Army Special Forces officer in the reserve component. He is currently Vice President for Strategy at Metis Solutions, LLC, and a National Security Fellow at the New America Foundation.
Last edited by ejazr; 07-12-11 at 07:21 AM.
We can put the pieces and know why US attacked that Paki post. All hand in gloves as much as they deny. For us Indians there is no difference between a terrorist or a Paki army personel. Both are wajib ul qatl for us. If the US realizes the same it would do better in Astan.
The U.S. assertion that the Durand Line is the international border between Pakistan and Afghanistan has triggered a fresh war of words between the two neighbours who as it is have a blow-hot-blow-cold relationship.
Reacting to the second statement to this effect from Washington in four days, Pakistan Foreign Office spokesman Moazzam Khan maintained that the Durand Line issue is a settled and closed one for Islamabad. “We regard it as the recognised international border and it is a position accepted by the international community.’’
The issue was prised open by U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Marc Grossman during his visit to the region over the weekend. In an interview to a private television channel in Kabul, he sad Washington recognised the Durand Line as the international border between the two countries.
Soon after, Afghanistan’s Foreign Ministry issued a statement rejecting the position taken by Mr. Grossman. According to the statement, Kabul “rejects and considers irrelevant any statement by anyone about the legal status of this line’’.
Following Kabul’s assertion, the U.S. State Department reiterated Mr. Grossman statement; adding that “our policy on this has not changed’’. Afghanistan’s contention is that the Durand Line Agreement – signed by the erstwhile governments of Afghanistan and India (under the British) to demarcate their respective territories – was valid only for 100 years and the land that had been made part of the British holdings should return to the Afghans.
Among the Pashtoons in Pakistan also, there is a section which advocates this position; primarily because of ethnic loyalties and the general demand for a Pashtoonistan. (we should have a Pashtoonistan flag too like Sindhudesh and Baluchistan @LurkerBaba ) Pakistan rejects the 100-year time-frame of the agreement and maintains that binding bilateral agreements are passed on to successor states; making the Durand Line the official Pakistan-Afghanistan border. In fact, Pakistan is prickly about the border with Afghanistan being called the Durand Line.
Meanwhile, Pakistan disputed Afghanistan’s contention that Islamabad had not shared any evidence to substantiate its claim that Swat Taliban chief Mullah Fazlullah had hideouts in the Afghan provinces of Kunar and Nooristan. According to Mr. Khan, Pakistan had shared a dossier regarding his presence in Afghanistan with Kabul and the International Security Assistance Force based there.
According to Pakistan, Fazlullah – who is also known as Radio Mullah because of his FM station – has been attacking its border outposts from Kunar and Nooristan. And, now he is wanted for the attack on Malala Yousafzai. Though Afghanistan has repeatedly rejected Pakistan’s allegation, author Ahmed Rashid recently wrote in The New Yorker that Afghan officials had told him in private that Fazlullah was being used by them to pay back Pakistan with the same coin.
The Hindu : News / International : Pak, Afghanistan clash over Durand Line
Last edited by Apollyon; 27-10-12 at 03:47 PM.
Q&A: ‘Baloch Groups to Unite Against Pakistan’
IPS – Q&A: ‘Baloch Groups to Unite Against Pakistan’ | Inter Press Service
Baloch fighters at a location in Pakistan. Credit: Karlos Zurutuza/IPS.
Afghan nationalists have a daunting task to finish off Taliban and educate majority illiterate Afghans about the Durand line issue, so that more nationalist can be born beyond tribal loyalties and hence take on mullahs and pakis to take what is theirs!
Moreover, if given an opportunity even Taliban will take what rightfully belongs to Afghans / Pashtoons!
The Durand Line was established after an 1893 agreement between Mortimer Durand of British India and Afghan Amir Abdur Rahman Khan for fixing the limit of their respective spheres of influence. It is named after Mortimer Durand who was the Foreign Secretary of colonial British India at the time. The single-page Durand Line Agreement which contains seven short articles was signed by Durand and Abdur Rahman Khan, agreeing not to exercise interference beyond the frontier Durand Line.
Although shown on maps as the western international border of Pakistan, it is unrecognized by the Government of Afghanistan. Even the Taliban regime of Afghanistan did not recognise it as the border.
The original 1893 Durand Line Agreement was written in English, with translated copies in Dari or Pashto language. It is believed however that only the English version was actually signed by Amir Abdur Rahman Khan, a language which he could not read or understand.
Pakistan inherited the 1893 Durand Line Agreement after its partition from the British Raj in 1947 but there has never been a formal agreement or ratification between Islamabad and Kabul. Pakistan believes that under uti possidetis juris it should not require one because courts in several countries around the world and the Vienna Convention have universally upheld via uti possidetis juris that binding bilateral agreements are "passed down" to successor states Thus, a unilateral declaration by one party has no effect; boundary changes must be made bilaterally.
Some scholars have suggested that the Durand Line was never intended to be a boundary demarcating sovereignty, but rather a line of control beyond which either side agreed not to interfere unless there were an expedient need to do so. Memoranda from British officials at the time of the Durand Agreement incline towards this view. Scholars suggest that the frontier agreement was not of the form of an "executed clause" which usually caters for sovereign boundary demarcation and which cannot be unilaterally repudiated. Rather, they conjecture that it is of the form of an "executory clause" similar to those which pertain to trade agreements, which are ongoing and can be repudiated by either party at any time.
Other legal questions currently being considered are those of state practice, i.e. whether the relevant states de facto treat the frontier as an international boundary, and whether the de jure independence of the Tribal Territories at the moment of Indian Independence undermine the validity of Durand Agreement and subsequent treaties.
Therefore, it is not an international border.
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