BrahMos Cruise Missile

Ok mister, you've just lost all credibility the US has been trying to stop
Brahmos development for the last 25 years? Even before the JV was created in 1998 -
And for the 100th time the ESSM is a MACH 4 missile I think MACH 4 is greater than MACH 2.8?No?
So the USN has acknowledged that it is powerless to stop the Brahmos - do you have credible evidence to back that up? =omg=
I'd like to see the memo to all fleet commanders instructing them to scuttle their ships at the mere sight of a Brahmos.

Most of these questions have been answered in this thread stop trolling and derailing this thread.

Cross-Posting

IAF to receive BrahMos Missiles by 2012

Air-launched BhahMosIt is time for the Indian Air Force to take some more lessons in Artillery with its top brass accepting the extensive use of ground-to-ground supersonic missiles for neutralising enemy defence systems just before raiding their assets as a strategic option.

The idea is to pulverise all types of perceived threat and challenges to aircraft from target area with a view to minimising hostility to Indian fighters. With this thinking gaining currency, the Indian Air Force has decided to go one more step forward by installing a battery of its own supersonic cruise missiles to gain that killer edge.

Though IAF was relying on Prithvi missiles, the system is now under the command of the Strategic Forces Command. With BrahMos entering its inventory, IAF has become the first Air Force in the world to operate supersonic ground-to-ground missiles.


http://nosint.blogspot.com/2010/05/i...s-by-2012.html

The Brahmos missile started as a TD in 1970 by the SU. They operationalized the P-700 Granit back then.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/P-700_Granit

Then we have the Sunburn missile that the Chinese and Iranians have deployed. It is capable of Mach 2.2.

http://www.globalsecurity.org/milita...sia/moskit.htm

The Brahmos has been in existence since the 80s.

In 1990, after the fall of the SU, the Russians told the US about making much more advanced versions of the Brahmos, this was under the Gorbachev administration based on the 250km P-800 Granit and the 800km range P-700. The US fought tooth and nail to stop the development and they were successful until 1998 and that included a more robust ABM system for both Europe and US. Financial pressures and political pressure from the US prevented the development of the Brahmos. That's when the Brahmos JV was born. This happened under the Clinton administration and obviously Clinton did not say No to India because he was in no position to threaten us. The entire gamut of development of the Brahmos took place in India.

It does not matter. It achieves that speed only in the last phase of its flight. The reaction time to launch against the Brahmos is not 4 or 5 minutes, it is 20-30 seconds. At 1km/second, it is detectable only in its last 20 or 30km. More importantly, you cannot stop the Brahmos, the best and easiest way of stopping the Brahmos is by shooting down the launch platform itself.

Yes they did that already. When the Brahmos was first operationalized, it was declared unanimously the Brahmos cannot be stopped for atleast 10 more years. A credible link is there somewhere in open source.

That was the very reason why the brahmos was down played in the international market. It was so the other countries do not generate interest in the missile system. And the S maneuver exercise completely killed the Anti-Brahmos lobby.

You won't have the time to scuttle your ship either.

http://www.military.com/features/0,15240,110199,00.html

DoD Finds Cruise Missile Defense 'Gaps'

A Pentagon assessment of the U.S. capability to defend the homeland against incoming enemy cruise missiles has found what it calls “capability gaps” that may not be solved until 2015.

As a result, the Air Force's directorate of operational capability requirements is leading a Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System study “to determine the best approaches for mitigating high-risk joint gaps in the [Homeland Air and Cruise Missile Defense of North America] mission area,” according to an Aug. 9 request for information posted on Federal Business Opportunities.

Officials from the Army and Navy counterpart organizations, as well as the Air Force's Air Combat Command, the North American Aerospace Defense Command and U.S. Northern Command are also taking part, according to an Air Force official.

In May, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council directed the Air Force to lead a so-called “Functional Solutions Analysis (FSA) for Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD),” to include the Homeland Air and Cruise Missile Defense of North America. The following month, the Air Force Requirements for Operational Capability Council approved the “FSA Study Plan,” which included a “call for concepts” via an RFI, the Air Force official tells Inside Missile Defense.

“We are soliciting ideas for materiel approaches from industry to address the high priority capability gaps identified in a Functional Needs Analysis (FNA) accomplished by the joint services and combatant commands,” the RFI reads. “As a part of this study, we also solicit inputs for Non-Materiel approaches that may be known by you to solve or mitigate these capability gaps.”

The Army, along with the other services and combatant commands, led the FNA, which took place from March 2005 through September 2005, according to the Air Force official.

Materiel solutions involve weapons, platforms, communications systems, etc., while non-materiel approaches could involve “recommended changes or improvements to doctrine, organization, training, leadership and education, personnel and facilities governed by joint instructions,” the service official said.

Pentagon and Missile Defense Agency officials increasingly are concerned with the threat of terrorists using a cargo ship to fire cruise and ballistic missiles just off U.S. shores but outside its territorial waters.

“I am concerned about that,” MDA Director Lt. Gen. Trey Obering said at a breakfast with reporters in July 2005. Lockheed Martin is proposing an architecture of Patriot missile batteries and Aegis systems to protect the United States against Scuds fired offshore, he explained.

“We have also taken steps to upgrade certain [continental U.S.]-based radars to provide a coverage against an asymmetric threat,” Obering added. “We are looking at other alternatives that will provide coverage and would provide some protection.”

In August 2004, MDA provided a target to the Israeli Arrow program during an intercept test off the coast of California where a Scud target missile was launched from an ocean-going platform.

“It was not hard,” Obering said last year. “It was very easy to do. It was not technically challenging to do.”

When asked how that compares to a cruise missile, Obering said: “The thing about cruise missiles is we have a capability to shoot them down today. As long as we can detect them. We don't have the capability over wide areas to do that with ballistic missiles.”

According to the RFI released last week, the “Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) FNA identified capability gaps in both proficiency and sufficiency out to the year 2015.” The proposed Air Force JCIDS study will address nine of those gaps.

In addressing those gaps, potential respondents are asked to consider three scenarios:

· “A 9/11 type terrorist hijacking of an airliner within the continental United States.

· “A general aviation aircraft loaded with weapons of mass destruction which launches from a Canadian airport and is headed for the continental United States.

· “A rogue maritime platform fires a cruise missile off the coast of Maryland targeting a major metropolitan area.”

The first capability gap the joint study identified is that North American Aerospace Defense Command mission analysts tend to not get the right information from different sources to obtain a “common operating picture” tailored to their individual needs, according to the RFI.

“What materiel/non-materiel approaches are you aware of that could provide an air defense analyst with 1) automatically fused information 2) specific sources or data formats in a multilevel security network-centric environment, and how they are handled?” the RFI asks.

The second capability gap has to do with insufficient surveillance coverage of NORAD's area of operations, along with endurance shortcomings in operating in all weather conditions “by the current or planned Wide Area Air Surveillance Family of Systems (FoS),” according to the request.

“What materiel/non-materiel approaches are you aware of for wide-area air surveillance and what is their mobility/flexibility with respect to deployment?” the RFI asks, also requesting the listing of “any capability, even if the capability is not yet fully operational, identifying known coverage modes, associated strengths and challenges. Are we maximizing the capability of those systems?”

The third capability gap involves an inability to detect small, low-speed, low-altitude targets. The military also “cannot adequately protect joint maneuver/maneuvering forces from reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition (RSTA) and the full array of potential aerial threats, including rockets, artillery and mortar (RAM) projectiles,” the request for information states.

“What materiel/non-materiel approaches are you aware of that could partially or fully mitigate any or all of these limitations?” the RFI asks. “For approaches identified in Gap 2, provide details on the predicted and measured performance of the sensors against small, high-speed and small, low and slow targets as well as the percent of that resource needed to maintain track.”

The fourth capability gap involves the “current or planned Wide Area Air Surveillance” family of systems' inability to automatically fuze the information they obtain into a common operating picture in a way that NORAD analysts can use effectively, according to the RFI. “For example, when air defense analysts encounter a suspect air or cruise missile target, they desire a single presentation of sensor information within the NORAD common operating picture.”

Consequently, the Air Force wants to know, “what sensor fusing capabilities (including but not limited to magnitude of data, types of sensors and data, number of sensors, latency and bandwidth of data, and visualization/output capability) are you aware of that could provide air defense analysts with automatically fused data (identify analyst interface and actions) from current and planned sources in a multisecurity-level, network-centric environment?”

The fifth capability gap identified by the joint services and combatant commands involves the current air defense sensors' inability to reliably provide adequate tracking information -- such as type, tail number, nation of origin, flight plan, etc. -- of an incoming aircraft or cruise missile.

“What capabilities or materiel/non-materiel approaches are you aware of that can provide identification data (identify levels of identification and reliability for each level) for air and cruise missile vehicles (any airborne vehicle)?” the RFI asks, while requesting that respondents “include cueing/input assumptions and provide [a] timeline.”

The sixth capability gap has to do with air defense sensors' inability to determine or predict the intent of an aircraft or cruise missile with 100 percent reliability, according to the RFI.

“What classification capabilities are you aware of to determine the intent of airborne vehicles and/or to predict the actions of an air and cruise missile vehicle and crew (psychological, cultural, or criminal profile etc.)?” the RFI asks.

The seventh capability gap involves an inability by the current and planned family of sensor systems to provide senior military officials with enough information to make an adequate “engagement decision recommendation” -- i.e. whether to engage a target using lethal or non-lethal force, continue to monitor it, etc.

“What assessment capabilities are you aware of that could be provided to a decision-maker operating in a time-critical environment and how is this transferred/portrayed to a decision-maker?” the RFI asks.

The eighth capability gap identified by the joint study involves the inadequate supply of information to NORAD analysts from other government agencies. “The Homeland Air Cruise Missile Defense system is unable to support decision-makers with the requisite accuracy of information to assess NORAD Homeland Air Cruise Missile Defense events with 100 percent reliability,” the request for information states.

“What information/mission services or planning capability can your organizations provide that shortens the time required to prepare accurate information for decision-making?” the Air Force asks. “How can assessments be made uniformly characterized across disparate sensors, and how does the capability handle future data inputs?”

The final capability gap involves not having enough weapons-delivery platforms available to cover the North American continent, according to the RFI, and even then, many of the available platforms are unable to “negate advanced cruise missiles and other irregular platforms.”

“What approaches/tools are you aware of that could assist decision makers in selecting/tasking the most efficient combination of capability to defeat an air and cruise missile threat and what is the level of analyst involvement?” the Air Force asks in the RFI.

In addressing these gaps, material or non-material approaches proposed by respondents to the RFI can look at solutions at the system -- “integrated solution for a major capability gap”; component -- “a fix for a specific shortfall described in the capability gap”; or functional -- “a contributing capability but insufficient in and of itself to either fix a major capability gap or fix a specific shortfall within a capability gap” -- levels, according to the Air Force.

Responses to the RFI are due by Sept. 29, according to the FedBizOpps notice. Analysis of those responses will run approximately four to six months, according to the Air Force official.

Developing a robust capability to intercept a cruise missile launched from a ship offshore is “very controversial around town,” with some believing a more likely scenario would be terrorists smuggling a weapon of mass destruction in a container cargo ship into a U.S. port, according to Ben Stubenberg, chief of analysis and scenarios at MDA.

However, the threat of a missile attack from commercial vessels off the coast “is something we need to worry about very much,” he said April 28 at a conference sponsored by Defense News.

Offshore bombardment “is not something new historically,” Stubenberg said. “Ever since the cannon was invented and they put those cannons and rockets and so forth on ships, this has been a problem.”

The challenge for the United States is that its long coast and dependence on shipping are among the factors that render it vulnerable to seaborne attack, he said.

U.S. Strategic Command chief Gen. James Cartwright had a similar take on the issue earlier this year.

Looking at cruise missile defense as merely defending a small footprint like an airport is too narrow a focus, the Marine Corps general told attendees of a March 20 missile defense conference sponsored by the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics.

“To me, one of the key attributes that we have to start to pick up in cruise missile defense is to move from point defense to area defense,” Cartwright said. “If you don't move this to area defense, the solution is unaffordable -- you cannot do a point defense for every place in the United States and you certainly can't do a point defense for every place that our forces go or that our allies are.”

Cartwright advocated thinking about cruise missile defense in the same way that ballistic missile defense is considered and analyzed.

“That has not really been where our focus has led us over the past few years,” he said. “We've got to change that; we've got to focus in on the area capability. Most of our weapon systems on the weapons end of this equation have substantially greater range than the sensors that we're using to employ this. You've got to move from the sensor grid to an area grid.”

While he acknowledged the technological challenge such an undertaking represents, “we've already started down that path in command and control and sensors for ballistic missiles,” Cartwright said in March. “To throw that out and build an entirely separate architecture for cruise missiles makes no sense to me and it's probably unaffordable. You've got to figure out what the synergies are, take advantage of them, and then move to an area-type construct versus a point-type construct.”

p2prada you haven't presented a shred of evidence to back up your claims. So far all I've heard are statement of capability and no credible evidence of capability.
And LethalForce, please try and correctly interpret what you read the above article "DoD finds cruise missile defense GAPS" is talking about undefended urban centers against asymmetric threat.
We are discussing Brahmos against well defended navy vessels and not shopping malls.

There is only one way to find it out. That is when the High Command of Indian Navy gets high on a drug from another planet and proposes an attack on Diego Garcia.

All Missiles can be defeated and all countermeasures too can be defeated. That is one thing I know. On Paper Bhramos claims that It can defeat all the modern CIWS and ACM systems. The CIWS and ACM producers claim they can defeat Bhramos but it is still to be seen in reality.

Finally a beacon of light at least ACM producers have extensively tested their equipment against missiles that mimic the Brahmos? Has the Brahmos ever been successfully tested against ship defense?
If the Brahmos is everything it is claimed to be why has there been no international sale - so far?

Well no international sale part can be partly explained by the high cost of the Missile. Not everything is available as a lot of tests were carried out by the Russians onboard one of their ships. And we need both of us to agree upon the sale to a particular country.

The countries who can afford are either in the American camp or Russian camp. Well Israel, Iran expressed interest...and I dont think we can sell this weapon system to any of them as we have strategic ties with everyone and there is face off between them.

With a price tag of $2 million a missile...it is hard to get a customer.

Russians are not pushing any sales because it would cut into their anti-ship cruise missile market. There are more than 10 countries lined up to buy but no official sales have been confirmed.

http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4500659

http://weapons.technology.youngester...to-export.html

http://www.8ak.in/8ak_india_defence_...ence-show.html

http://missilemonitor.blogspot.com/2...n-brahmos.html

http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/...updated-01536/

There is no such thing as evidence of capability unless a war is provoked. In that way the F-22 is just talk too.

This is interesting. should't it be the army's job to use ground to ground weapons to neutralise enemy installations?? is it exposure of distrust between between the armed forces? IAF and IA have agreed to disagree on few issues earlier as well. Its good that IAF is trying to build up independent capability but normally it should have been army's job.

NEW DELHI (BNS): Distinguished scientist Dr. A Sivathanu Pillai, CEO and Managing Director of BrahMos Aerospace, has been conferred with the Technology Leadership Award 2009 for his outstanding leadership in design, development, production and marketing of BRAHMOS supersonic cruise missile.

Dr. Pillai, also, as Chairman of BrahMos Aerospace Thiruvananthapuram Ltd (BATL), erstwhile KELTEC, has contributed immensely in efficiently managing and pulling KELTEC out of financial constraints and turning it into a profit earning industry within a span of two years.

Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh presented Dr. Pillai with the prestigious award on the National Technology Day in New Delhi on Wednesday. The Prime Minister in his speech referring to BrahMos highlighted that new capabilities have recently been acquired for the BRAHMOS supersonic cruise missile.

As reported earlier, BrahMos Aerospace has recently received orders worth several crores from the Indian Army and the Indian Air Force.

BRAHMOS, the world’s only supersonic cruise missile, has been inducted in the Indian Army and Navy after several successful trials. The air-launched version of the missile which will be inducted in the Indian Air Force is under development stage at present.

Source

IAF Plans For Su-30MKIs With BrahMos In 2012

Initial trials for the air-launch version of the BrahMos supersonic missile will be carried out in the first half of 2011, and flight trials will take place in India in 2012, the missile maker says.

The development of the air-launch version is expected to be completed in 2012, and its maker hopes to begin production and induction the same year. This version is for the Indian Air Force (IAF) and will be fitted with special launchers onto Su-30 MKI aircraft.

BrahMos CEO and Managing Director A. Sivathanu Pillai told AVIATION WEEK that a special fire control system (FCS) and missile fabrication are being developed.

“The prototype of the launcher has been already manufactured at BrahMos Aerospace Thiruvananthapuram Ltd (BATL). Work related to platform modification is to be taken up by Sukhoi Design Bureau. Two aircraft will be prepared for carrying out the trials,” Sivathanu Pillai said. Sivathanu Pillai received the “Technology Leadership Award 2009” on May 26 from Indian Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh for his outstanding leadership in design, development, production and marketing of the BrahMos missile.

The air-launch version of the missile will be slightly different from other versions because the platform itself, the Su-30MKI, will travel at supersonic speed, making it unnecessary for the missile to be taken to that speed. “Hence, the booster with reduced weight and modified nose cap will be sufficient for the missile to be taken to Mach 2 speed. Additional fins would be provided to stabilize the missile during the launch,” Sivathanu Pillai said.

Sources told AVIATION WEEK that the initial air-launch version missiles are being manufactured by the Strela Production Association (PO Strela). “The air-launch version will be lesser in weight and a new ignition engine will fire it from high altitudes,” a source said.

Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd’s (HAL) Nasik Division will be readying two Su-30 MKIs for the BrahMos air-launch version. “The platform will undergo some modifications so that the missile can be positioned under its belly and then integrated to FCS. As per the current plan, close to 40 Su-30MKIs would be fitted with these missiles. The work to strengthen the wings are also underway now,” a source said.

The BATL-built airborne launcher (5-6 meters long, 400 mm. wide and 370 mm. high) is made from high-strength aluminum. It is awaiting one more final test at the BrahMos Integration Complex in Hyderabad.

http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/gener...os%20In%202012

"BrahMos" supersonic missile hits target at range of 290 km

New software for BrahMos navigation developed in Madurai
MADURAI: Software required for the future advanced versions of BrahMos missile has been developed in Madurai and it will be used after validation by the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO).

A group of researchers here were involved in the project that was funded by the BrahMos Aerospace and the software that is now ready will be very useful for the missile to see its target/ in navigation of the missile by correlating the target with satellite images.

A. Sivathanu Pillai, Chief Controller (Research and Development), DRDO, Ministry of Defence, said here on Thursday that the software project was given to the Thiagarajar College of Engineering in Madurai where a special team had worked for three years before coming out with enhancing the “software capability” for the BrahMos missile.

To be validated

“The report on this new software will come to us. Validation will be done within a year and it will be used in future/advanced versions of the missile,” he said.

Dr. Sivathanu Pillai made a detailed presentation on the advances in technologies in aerospace and defence at the inauguration of two-day “International Conference on Computers, Communication and Intelligence” organised by the Velammal College of Engineering and Technology.

He informed that two other institutions in the country were also simultaneously working on the BrahMos software project “and everything will be analysed during a brainstorming session to discuss the features of the software developed by them.”

Dr. Pillai, who is also the Chief Executive Officer and Managing Director, BrahMos Aerospace, New Delhi, had explained about the capabilities of BrahMos missile developed by India and its phased induction in to the army, navy and air force.

“Speed, precision and power will be requirements for the country's future defence needs. We are hence engaged in software development programmes that give our missiles the capability to identify target and hit them with precision,” he said.
http://www.hindu.com/2010/07/23/stor...2353490500.htm