Pakistan misleading people on Indus Water Treaty

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The point very simply is that Pakistan has neglected the necessary upkeep of its water-management facilities, and is now covering up the failures of its infrastructure on India. If Pakistan had attended to the source of its prosperity, namely the assets shown in the diagrams above on this thread - instead of building nukes and proliferating, sponsoring jihad in India and in Afghanistan, military adventures like Kargil and making Swiss banks rich - they would not be suffering from such systemic failures.


When Pakistan decided to snatch J&K, it felt three reasons for doing so: one, J&K was a Muslim state, especially on the boundary between the two nations and so it felt it could grab it through subterfuge; two, the Pakistani garrisons were uncomfortably close to enemy India as Pakistan lacked depth and therefore J&K appeared to be a good buffer; and three, and most importantly, most of its water sources came from or through J&K.

The water issue was bound to happen sooner or later. It first happened in 1948. But, water was plenty in those days and India did not have much of storage or means to divert waters (except for a few headworks in the East Punjab). The supply was much more than the demand in Pakistan. Even then, the IWT was bitterly opposed in Pakistan for allowing India to tap even the 33 MAF that was awarded to her. That trait of 'entitlement', the sense of 'inheritance' and the feeling that it can demand assets and resources 'vastly disproportionate' to its size and requirement have continued ever since. It was the same feeling that compelled Mohammed Ali Jinnah to demand disproportionately more reserved seats in the Parliament and Assembly as well as the number of ministers and allocation of important ministries to his Muslim League in the Nehru cabinet of 1946.

With the signing of IWT under international intervention, there was relative lull especially as India faithfully implemented the Treaty and did not attempt to build any waterworks across these rivers. On those rare occassions that it attempted to do so, Pakistan either successfully stopped the works or altered the design to its advantage and, more importantly, to the disadvantage of India. It was (and has been) more interested in harming India than even benefitting. An unwilling and generous India, belabouring under false notions of correcting an errant brother, was not forcing the issue all these years. With demands for power and water increasing, both within India and Pakistan, the latter is trying to pre-empt further Indian works such as more hydroelectric projects and 'IWT-allowed' storage works.

This has multiple benefits for Pakistan. It can conveniently hide its pathetic water management and low crop yields by blaming India. It can invest in the hands of the jihadis another 'legitimate reason' to attack India. It can increase the levels of paranoia among its masses regarding India so that the flame of hatred can be kept burning. More than that, it can harm India by delaying tactics, so that legitimate Indian power generation projects can be either delayed or even thwarted. It can also scare away investors or companies willing to partake these projects. Besides, it also fits into the overall Pakistani policy of harassing, discomfitting, unsettling and humiliating India.

Overall, the development of the 'water issue' could not have been unexpected.

 

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The point here is to expose the games played by Pakistan on water front. The fact that their official system actively discusses their problems and in public spread misinformation for their ulterior motives.Following document which has some interesting bits of information.

Part II: WATER
Chapter 6: The Secret

In 1990, a bright and ambitious Pakistani brigadier at the Royal College of Defence Studies in London was asked to prepare a dissertation as part of his one-year training programme. In September of that year, he presented his dissertation with the rather lengthy title: The Arms Race in the Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent, Conflicts with the Pressing Requirements of Socio-economic Development. What are its Causes and Implications? Is there a Remedy? The paper provided a new analytical framework to define the security paradigm in South Asia. Despite its rather lengthy and cumbersome title, the paper was clear in its diagnosis of the South Asian security situation. The brigadier argued that the basic problem in the region was the divide between the Hindu and Muslim mindset. Since it was a psychological problem, nothing much could be done about it. He reasoned that there were two other core problems and since they were of practical nature it should be possible to resolve them. One of them was the issue of Jammu & Kashmir, which was known to the international community. The other was about the distribution of the Indus Rivers between India and Pakistan.

According to the brigadier, the two issues were interdependent if one were resolved the other would not exist.
In fact, he contended that it was essential to craft a lasting arrangement, ensuring fair distribution of river waters from the
Pakistani perspective, if there were to be any solution to the Jammu & Kashmir conflict. The argument differed from the public stance taken by the Pakistani government in the last fifty years. Successive Pakistani governments still insist that Jammu & Kashmir is the unfinished business of partition.

As a Muslim majority state, it should belong to Pakistan. India has argued that it belongs to India on the basis of instrument of accession signed by Maharaja Hari Singh, then ruler of the state, and the wish expressed by Shaikh Abdullah, leader of the people's movement. The public debate has always focussed on issues of terrorism, human rights and the legality of accession. It has never linked the conflict to the rivers of Jammu & Kashmir.

The brigadier was suggesting that the rivers hold the key to the solution. His theory implied that the Kashmiri people's aspirations were secondary. The brigadier returned to Pakistan to briskly climb the ladder of the army ranks. In 1998, he replaced General Jehangir Karamat as Chief of Army Staff.

Soon after General Pervez Musharraf's elevation, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharief opened a track-two channel with the Government of India. The main thrust of the Pakistani proposal, mooted in early 1999, was that rivers should be used as the basis for resolving conflicts between India and Pakistan, including the issue of Jammu & Kashmir. It advocated using Chenab River as the border. The special envoy of Pakistani Prime Minister, made this proposal to his Indian interlocutor on March 29, 1999 in New Delhi. His visit to New Delhi was a secret known only to the Prime Minister of Pakistan.

By a curious coincidence, on the same day when the envoy was in New Delhi, General Musharraf summoned Prime Minister Nawaz Sharief for a discussion at General Head Quarters. The General concluded that the only solution acceptable to Pakistan, to settle its conflicts with India, was the Chenab Formula. The envoy returned to Islamabad on April 1, 1999, oblivious of the meeting that had taken place between the army chief and the Prime Minister.

On the following day, the envoy was taken to the General Head Quarters for consultations with General Musharraf. This meeting was meant to last for 30 minutes. It went on for 3 hours, from 8 pm to 11 pm. Besides General Musharraf and the envoy, only the head of ISI was present in the room. The meeting concluded that the Chenab Formula should be the basis of discussion with India to resolve the Kashmir conflict.

In October 1999, General Pervez Musharraf staged a coup against the elected government. He declared himself the Chief Executive. Western donors, especially the US, suspended cash flows to Pakistan.

In November 1999, on a cool afternoon in New York, a Pakistani head of an international political organisation, with very strong network in the Pakistani army and political parties, met a senior ICPI functionary. The meeting took place at the Manhattan office of the political organisation, a few blocks away from the UN office. The eminent Pakistani cited that finding a permanent solution to the India-Pakistan conflict would depend on ensuring Pakistan's water security beyond the Indus Waters Treaty of 1960. Perhaps, Chenab River could be the border. Perhaps, some other formula could be worked out but the fundamental determinant should be water. There was no mention of self determination of the Kashmiri people.

The following week, the ICPI functionary was invited by a top Pakistani lobbyist, known for his strong network in the General Head Quarters in Rawalpindi, to dinner in a suburb of Washington DC. Once the formalities of the welcome drinks were over and before the dinner was served, the Pakistani lobbyist said that he had an idea for resolving the India-Pakistan conflict for good. A detailed proposal would need to be worked out by experts but its basis must be face-saving for both the countries, while the substance must ensure water security for Pakistan from the rivers of Kashmir.

In December 2001, when terrorists attacked the Indian Parliament, India blamed Pakistan and withdrew her High Commissioner, in protest. On the very next day, a high profile seminar was organised in Lahore on how to respond to the possibility of India using water as a weapon against Pakistan. New Delhi had not even alluded to water. It had snapped rail, road and air links but there was no reference to water. In Rawalpindi, Lahore and Karachi, there was little regret about the breaking down of rail, road and air links the greatest apprehension was water.

At a seminar in Karachi in the last week of December 2001, attended by ICPI, the only occasion when tensions rose, was when someone alleged that the Indian government had plans to use the water weapon. A participant warned that any conflict over water would lead to Pakistan using nuclear weapons on a first strike basis against India.

A month and half later, on February 8, 2002, the editorial of Jang, a moderate Urdu daily, said that Pakistan's water scarcity could threaten relations between provinces and lead to a nuclear war against India. Since then, a lively debate has ensued in the Pakistani press, which continues till date with the President, Prime Minister, senior army officers and leaders of various Kashmiri groups offering their views underlining the centrality of water in India-Pakistan relations.For instance, in June 2002, Syed Salahuddin, chairman of the United Jihad Council, entered the debate. UJC is an umbrella organisation responsible for coordinating the activities known as liberation movements in Pakistan of all jihadi groups.

This organisation has been placed on the US State Department's list of groups involved in terrorism. Syed Salahuddin is also the leader of Hizbul Mujahideen a member of UJC that has claimed responsibility for many acts of violence in Jammu & Kashmir. Salahuddin was quoted in Ausaf on June 18, 2002: "Kashmir is the source from where all of Pakistan's water resources originate. If Pakistan loses its battle against India, it will become a desert." Since then in most public meetings that Salahuddin has addressed, he has emphasised that Kashmiri freedom fighters were actually fighting for Pakistan to enable it to gain control over Kashmir's rivers.

A few months later, Sardar Mohammad Anwar Khan, President of Kashmir under Pakistani control, known as Azad Kashmir in Pakistan and Pakistan Occupied Kashmir in India, joined the debate. He was quoted in most Urdu newspapers of October 21, 2002, saying: "Pakistanis who believe that they can survive without Kashmir are wrong. The Pakistani economy is dependent on agriculture and hence on water, and therefore on Kashmir."

Two weeks later, he explained in a public forum: "Kashmiris are fighting for the security, strength and prosperity of Pakistan. Building dams in Kashmir can irrigate Punjab and Sindh. Kashmir is important as Pakistan's water resources originate in Kashmir. Even peace between Punjab and Sindh depends on water, and therefore on Kashmir."

Sardar Sikandar Hayat, Prime Minister of Kashmir under Pakistani control, said in a seminar on March 6, 2003: "Without the rivers of Kashmir, Pakistan will become a desert. The freedom fighters of Kashmir are in reality fighting for Pakistan's water security and have prevented India from constructing a dam on the Wular barrage."

Finally, on March 27, 2003, a senior officer of the Pakistan army, Lt General Zarar Azim, the then Corps Commander of Lahore, was quoted in Khabrain, a newspaper known for its proximity to ISI, saying: "Kashmir is our lifeline and its importance increases in view of our water security."

Immediately after the announcement of peace initiatives by India and Pakistan in mid-2003, Sardar Sikander Hayatbegan advocating the Chenab Formula for resolving the Kashmir dispute. He argued that an autonomous Kashmir was not acceptable as it would be difficult to safeguard the freedom acquired. However, this suggestion evoked very strong criticism from all political and jihadi leaders of Pakistan as it meant bifurcation of Kashmir. Most leaders wanted him to quit as Prime Minister for having advocated such a formula. The jihadi leaders were clear they wanted a united Kashmir.

Little known is the fact that as per the Kashmir (Pakistan) charter, a person who does not uphold the vision of accession
to Pakistan cannot stand for elections or even aspire for a job in the government. While applying for a post in the government of Kashmir (Pakistan), the applicant has to sign an affidavit affirming their belief in the ideology of "Kashmir banega Pakistan" (Kashmir will become Pakistan). Sikander Hayat ostensibly has some powerful backing, for despite his differences with the President of Kashmir (Pakistan), he seems unrelenting. He definitely has some powerful backing in a country where the General Head Quarters has the monopoly of power.

In the summer of 2003, Maulana Fazlur Rehman, the head of Jamiat-e-Ulema Islami (JUI (F)), visited India. On his return, he suggested in his press briefings that he had proposed a resolution to the Kashmir conflict on geographical basis. This was interpreted as subtle advocation of the Chenab Formula. It is important to note that Maulana Fazlur Rehman was then reportedly engaged in quiet negotiations with General Musharraf on power sharing and a role for himself in Islamabad.

In November 2003, Prime Minister Mir Zafarullah Khan Jamali announced a ceasefire in preparation for the SAARC summit to be held in Islamabad in January 2004. Suddenly, since this announcement, the debate in Pakistan on the linkages between water and the Kashmir conflict almost disappeared. As frozen relations between India and Pakistan thawed, General Musharraf announced on December 18, 2003 that he was prepared to give up Pakistan's traditional insistence on the UN resolutions to address the Kashmir conflict. This provoked strong reactions from the leader of Jamaat-e-Islami AJK wing, Abdul Rashid Turabi, who stated: "If LoC is accepted as a permanent border, then the provinces of Punjab, Sindh and NWFP would be deprived of water resources which is irrigating their land and flowing from the other side of Kashmir."

On the eve of the SAARC summit in Islamabad beginning on January 3, 2004, General Musharraf was quoted saying that he was aware of a dozen options to resolve the Kashmir conflict. While he did not indicate preference for any particular formula, the media quoted so-called sources close to the General as advocating the Chenab Formula. It is difficult to state whether the media was indulging in speculation or whether it was indeed, given some serious indications.

The peace process initiated at Islamabad in January 2004 proved to be most sustainable. It continued despite the change of government in India when Dr. Manmohan Singh of the Congress Party replaced Atal Bihari Vajpayee of the Bhartiya Janata Party as the Prime Minister, in May 2004. This period saw new heights in people-to-people contacts such as a warm reception for the Indian cricket team, numerous political leaders visiting Pakistan, unprecedented sojourns of Pakistani journalists and pilgrims to Kashmir in India.

Amidst this new bonhomie between the two countries, General Pervez Musharraf announced on several different occasions in September-October 2004 that he had a new formula to resolve the Kashmir conflict. It was akin to the old Dixon plan rejected by India fifty years ago! The most striking element in the Musharraf/Dixon plan is to treat Jammu- Kashmir-Ladakh in the Indian side as a set of five, instead of three, regions. This would entail dividing Jammu into sub regions roughly along the Chenab River. The President of Pakistan did not refer to the river waters in his formula but the implications of the division of Jammu were obvious.

General Musharraf's proposal in the autumn of 2004 was the first time that a Pakistani leader came close to mentioning rivers in public, and even then he did not cross the line of convention. Otherwise, the reference to the role of rivers in India-Pakistan relations has been confined to secret talks and internal debate in Pakistan. Even academic seminars involving scholars from the two countries rarely debate on the issue.

A clause in the Indus Waters Treaty of 1960, signed between Pakistan and India, explicitly prohibits linkage between the water issue and the general position of both parties on the Kashmir issue. Also, it is much more convenient to support the Kashmiris for their cause than openly admit the truth that Kashmiri youth are being sacrificed to safeguard Pakistan's lifeline.

There may be a possibility that Kargil war was an effort by Pakistan to open the question of IWT without Pakistan ever committing to any position. This could be the result of frustration of Pakistan as India is not violating IWT. Now Pakistan is taking peace for water route by hanging Damocles sword of jehad. Pakistan would be further squeezed if India fully utilizes its share of waters under IWT without violating it. And if war happens on any ostensible reason, India is unlikely to be the aggressor. Mostly Pakistan would be shown as aggressor denying legitimacy of their action and bringing pressure on them for not going Nuclear.

As long as India takes the high moral ground on the question of IWT and refuses to concede the jehadi blackmail tactics of Pakistan , the political space to maneuver would be denied to them.

Another point is that India would need more water for its fertile North and North-West region as it continues to bring areas under cultivation. This situation would arise by 2020. Since food supply would not match the requirement due to population pressure. Hence at some time India has to revisit the treaty to correct the disproportionate allocations under IWT which is in the ratio of 20:80:: Indiaakistan. But any revisit to treaty would be at a time and condition of our own choosing, not because Pakistan needs it. Being upper ripparian state would have some advantage accrued to us.

In fact India can start playing J&K card by talking about needs of more water for J&K to be drawn from three rivers allocated to Pakistan.People of J&K must be shown Pakistan for what it is.This may make Pakistan more desperate and itching for you know what-the nuke button?. And hopefully , India would be better prepared to respond at that time.

 

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Chapter 7: Lifeline

Pakistan's obsession with water in the secret diplomacy must be understood in the context of tremendous importance of
the quietly flowing rivers of the Indus Basin for the survival of Pakistan and parts of Northern India. For centuries, the
Indus River Basin constituted a unified geography spreading over almost 1.2 sq km in today's Tibet, India, Pakistan and
Afghanistan. In 1960, it was divided under the Indus Waters Treaty. Accordingly, the three western rivers Indus, Jhelum
and Chenab were awarded to Pakistan and the three eastern rivers Ravi, Beas and Sutlej to India. This division
provided Pakistan with 56 per cent of the catchment area and India with 31 per cent. The authors of the Treaty then hoped
that the division of the Indus Water Basin would eventually lead to the unity of people in Pakistan and India. Fifty years
later, they seem to be proved wrong. In fact, the concern over the distribution of the Indus catchment area raises a basic
question: whether short term divisive solutions can be sustained in the long run, or whether they can actually worsen the
situation.
Perhaps water would not have been a central issue had it been utilised efficiently over the last half century.

Unfortunately, that has not been the case.

Northern India
India's overall per capita water availability has declined from over 5000 cubic metres in 1950 to 1800 cubic metres in
2005. India may reach the threshold level of 1000 cubic metres per capita in 2025. However, some parts of the country
are already facing water scarcity conditions below the threshold level.
The northern states of Punjab and Haryana, which form part of the Indus River Basin along with Jammu & Kashmir and
Himachal Pradesh, are fearful of a substantial decline in water availability in the next 5-10 years. The underground water
levels have been falling at the rate of 5 per cent per year in Punjab and Haryana. The two states are in dispute over the
sharing of the Ravi and Beas waters. Punjab has 10 million acres of cultivable land and receives 12 MAF of water, while
Haryana with 8 million acres of cultivable land is entitled to 14.5 MAF of water. Punjab has therefore refused to
complete the construction of the Yamuna-Sutlej Link Canal. In 2004 the Punjab assembly passed a resolution annulling
all its water treaties with its neighbouring states. The ruling as well as the opposition parties in the state supported the
resolution. The relations between Punjab and Haryana area expected to deteriorate as overall water availability in the
northern states of India declines by 2010.

Pakistan
Pakistan's per capita availability of water has declined from 5600 cubic metres in 1947 to 1200 cubic metres in 2005, fast
approaching the threshold level of 1000 cubic metres by 2007.
The decline in water availability has particularly meant disaster for irrigation. In Pakistan, over 80 per cent of the
cropland is irrigated. The country has the world's largest contiguous irrigation network. The rivers of the Indus Basin
provide 60 per cent of the water utilised for irrigation, while groundwater accounts for the rest. The inflow of water for
irrigation has declined from 140 MAF in the 1980s to an average of 100 MAF in 2005. It is feared that it will decline
further as the flows in the three rivers are reducing at the rate of 6.6 per cent per year. While Pakistan's irrigation network
is vast, it is managed in an extremely inefficient manner. Seepage from irrigation canals has resulted in water logging in
low-lying areas, disturbing the composition of salts in the soil. It has reduced the delivery efficiency of the canal system
to hardly 40 per cent.
The Indus River System carries about 43,500 hectare metres of silt every year. About 40 per cent of the silt load
settles before reaching the Indus mouth and erodes the storage capacity of the three main dams Tarbela, Mangla and
Chashma. In particular, the Tarbela dam is losing storage capacity of 100,000 cusecs each year. At this rate, it will
be difficult to support cotton sowing and wheat maturity by 2010, even though the designed life span of this dam is
until 2030.
The ground water resources are also fast depleting. As compared to 3.34 MAF in 1959, ground water pumping is
estimated to reach 55 MAF by 2009. As a result of over-pumping, about 70 per cent of Pakistan's half-a-million tube
wells produce hard or brackish water.
If the network of canals and tubewells continue to provide gradually reducing quantities of fresh water, Pakistan will
face serious crisis in its agricultural output by 2010. Already the country faces a shortfall in foodgrain availability of
about 4 million tonnes per year. It is feared that this will treble by the end of the decade. Besides, production of cotton,
which is the most important source of foreign exchange revenue, will be severely affected. Most important, the unity of
the country will be undermined.
Crises in Pakistan's Provinces
While all of Pakistan is affected by declining supply of water, the impact on Sindh and Balochistan is the worst. Sindh,
almost completely depends on canal irrigation, as groundwater sources have become unfit for use. Salinity and
waterlogging has affected 88.8 per cent of Sindh's agricultural land.
Sindh has had to bear the maximum brunt of the large and inefficient irrigation network. The diversion of water upstream
has resulted in the decline of water downstream to Sindh. As a result, discharge of freshwater into the sea has come
down, thus causing intrusion of sea waters into the mainland. Sea intrusion has already destroyed 1.5 million acres of
farmland in the two coastal districts of Badin and Thatta. It has resulted in the demise of three commercial towns
Ghorabhari, Shah Bandar and Ketti Bandar and displacement of a quarter million people. The cumulative economic
loss is estimated to be close to 2 per cent of GDP.
With drought conditions prevailing since the last few years, between 2000 and 2005, Sindh's share in irrigation water
was cut by an average of 25-40 per cent per year. During the same period, the share of Punjab was also cut. Like Sindh,
Punjab also suffers from waterlogging and salinity, though of a lower intensity. The groundwater level in Lahore area
has been declining at the rate of 30 cm per year. However, Punjab has exclusive rights to the Mangla Dam, whereas
Sindh has to share its access to Tarbela dam with Punjab as well as the other provinces.
Punjab has 31 small dams that provide irrigation facilities to about 36,000 acres of land. Punjab has lately been
undertaking projects to develop and integrate its irrigation system for securing water availability. They have envisaged a
five-year project worth Rs.20 billion to revamp the irrigation system in the province to overcome system losses. Most
important, a scheme to divert the Chenab to join it with the Ravi and Sutlej is on the anvil. To improve the water
conditions in rainfed areas, the government intends to build three small dams in Pothohar, DG Khan and Cholistan areas.
A drinking water pipeline to Cholistan is nearing completion. Also, plans were afoot to build 60 mini dams, 100 link
canals and 200 village reservoirs in the Pothohar region. Over and above the initiatives taken by the provincial
government, the federal government is also assisting to improve water availability in the province. The upcoming
contentious Greater Thal canal project would help irrigate the southern parts of Punjab.
Punjab and Sindh are at loggerheads over deciding a formula to distribute shortages in water flows. Sindh demands the
implementation of the Water Accord of 1991, whereas Punjab insists on a formula worked out in 1994. The politicians in
Punjab and Sindh launch a war of words every year at the end of winter regarding water. This altercation reaches its peak
at the time of Kharif sowing in May-June and then subsides with the onset of rains. This is because the water flows in the
Chenab and Indus is relatively low during early Kharif sowing (April-June), while that in the Jhelum is relatively high
during the same period. With Punjab's exclusive rights on the Mangla, it is able to draw sufficient waters. Sindh is left
dry and to the mercy of the rain gods.
The conflict between Sindh and Punjab is expected to aggravate on account of the proposal to construct the Kalabagh
dam and Thal canal. Punjab supports Kalabagh dam as it is expected to provide additional storage to meet the existing
water shortages during the early Kharif season of April-June. It is also expected to produce 3400 MW of electricity, and
control high floods in the Indus. Sindh believes that Kalabagh will leave no surplus water for areas below Kotri and
render the province into a desert. Sea water intrusion will further increase. NWFP is also opposed to the dam, but seems
satisfied by the proposal to reduce its height by 10 metres.
Sindh is also opposing the construction of the Thal canal. The canal is designed to provide additional 1.9 MAF
water to Punjab from the Tarbela reservoir. The project covers four districts of Punjab Bhakker, Layyah, Khushab
and Jhang. Interestingly, this is precisely the area where there is concentration of jihadis and the private landholdings of
senior military officials. The Board of Revenue of Punjab revealed in June 2003 that 112 military officers including
General Pervez Musharraf had been allotted land at Cholistan at nominal rates. The Thal canal is required to build small
dams to irrigate Cholistan for the benefit of the military officials. Some analysts believe that the Thal canal will become
operation in any case. However, the construction of Kalabagh dam may prove to be difficult due to the fear of bloodshed
in Sindh and even Balochistan.
There is also a proposal to construct Basha and Skardu dams in the Gilgit-Baltistan region. However, Sindh and
Balochistan as well as many sections of society in the NWFP oppose any proposal for new dam projects. As a result,
Pakistan will have to move further upstream in search of storage sites. Kashmir, under Pakistan's jurisdiction has
facilities for only small dams. The development of large dams can only be possible in the Chenab catchment area in the
Indian side of Jammu & Kashmir.
Thus, in order to prevent a conflict between Punjab and Sindh, and to prevent a possible secession of Sindh and
Balochistan, Pakistan needs physical control over the Chenab catchment region in Jammu & Kashmir in India. It needs
sites to build dams, to store, divert and regulate water flows. It also needs additional fertile land. Thus, Jammu &
Kashmir is a source of Pakistan's water and food security. It is a real estate dispute for strategic resources.
To the outside world, it is projected that Pakistan is supporting a struggle for self-determination for the people of
Kashmir. To the leaders of Pakistan, Syed Salahuddin, chairman of the United Jihad Council, often assures that the
Kashmir youth are fighting a war to help Pakistan secure its lifeline.

STORAGE AND RESERVOIRS IN PAKISTAN
Table 1: Existing Storage Reservoirs in Pakistan

Dam (Year) River Live Storage (MAF)
Tarbela (1976) Indus 9.69
Mangla (1966) Jhelum 5.34
Chashma (1971) Indus 0.61
Warsak (1960) Kabul 0.04
Baran (1962) Kurram 0.09
Hub (1983) Hub 0.76
Khanpur (1984) Haro 0.09
Tanda (1965) Kohat Toi 0.06
Rawal (1962) Kurang 0.04
Simly (1972) Soan 0.02
BKD Khan (1900) Pishin 0.04
Hamal Lake - 0.08
Manchar Lake Indus 0.75
Kinjhar Lake Indus 0.32
Chotiari Lake Indus 0.78
Total Storage: 18.71 MAF

Source: Pakistan Development Forum, Presentation on Planning for Water Resources, by Dr. Shahid Amjad Chaudhry,
Deputy Chairman, Planning Commission, Government of Pakistan, May 2003

Table 2: Reservoir Sedimentation in Pakistan
Source: Pakistan Development Forum, Presentation on Planning for Water Resources, by Dr. Shahid Amjad Chaudhry, Deputy
Chairman, Planning Commission, Government of Pakistan, May 2003

Reservoir Original Storage Capacity Storage Loss by 2001 Storage Loss by 2010
Tarbela 11.616 2.834 (24%) 3.951 (34%)
Mangla 5.882 1.059 (18%) 1.510 (26%)
Chashma 0.870 0.373 (43%) 0.481 (55%)
Total 18.368 4.266 (23%) 5.942 (32%)
(MAF)
Table 3: On-going Water Storage and Canal Projects in Pakistan
Name of Project Storage (MAF) Cost (Rs. Billion) Completion Date
Mangla Dam Raising 2.90 62.5 June 2007
Gomal Zam Dam 1.14 12.8 September 2006
Mirani Dam 0.30 5.9 June 2006
Kurram Tangi Dam 1.20 9.3 June 2009
Sabakzai Dam 0.02 1.0 June 2005
Satpara Dam 0.08 2.1 March 2006
Greater Thal Canal 30.5 June 2007
Kachhi Canal 32.4 June 2007
Rainee Canal 17.9 December 2007
Total increment in next 5 years 5.64 174.5
Basha Dam 7.10 Feasibility in progress
Kalabagh Dam 6.10 Feasibility completed
Skardu Dam 15.52 Pre-Feasibility Study
Akhori Dam 3.60 Feasibility in progress
Katzarah Dam 35.00 Reconnaissance Study
Total increment in future 32.32*
Note: Total storage capacity excludes the Katzarah Dam project
Source: Website of the Parliamentary Committee on Water Resources website,
http://www.pakwater.gov.pk

 

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Chapter 8: Kashmir Vs Pakistan

Pakistan's primary interest in Kashmir to secure its water resources in order to satisfy Punjab and contain Sindh is in
confrontation with the interests of the people of Kashmir on both sides of line of control. For the last 15 years, Kashmiri
youth have been preoccupied with a conflict with India. However, a water war with Islamabad is in the offing.
Kashmir on the Pakistani side of the line of control is predominantly agriculture-based, depending on farming, livestock
and related activities. Of the total cultivated area in the region, only 10 per cent is irrigated, compared with about 80 per
cent in Pakistan. The average farm size is only 1.2 hectares, as compared with 4.7 hectares in Pakistan. The average
annual per capita income in Kashmir is half of the national average. Industry is underdeveloped, with only 930 industrial
units, mostly in the private sector. There is no railway network. Road and air transport is the only means of
transportation. Per capita electricity consumption is around 232 kWh, as compared with 325 kWh in Pakistan. With
regard to health, as of 1999, there were 1,382 hospital beds in the province, averaging 0.46 beds per thousand persons as
compared with 0.67 in Pakistan.
In Kashmir (Pakistan), 13 per cent or 172,721 hectares of land is under farming. Agriculture is an important sector of the
Kashmir economy, providing livelihood to 84 per cent of the household. About 97 per cent of the farmers have less than 5
hectares of land and the farming system is based upon cereals and livestock production. The typical farmer has, on an
average, 1.2 hectares land in which 60 per cent of land is either under forest or wasteland, with only 0.47 hectares
constituting the farm size. Average household size is 7-8 persons. There is an intense population pressure that is already
evident in many areas.
Though this region is well endowed with water resources, it is marginally irrigated. Worse, hardly any development
projects have been envisaged. Apart from lack of development, the province also suffers from manipulations. Its
resources are tapped, but the region is not duly compensated. The Mangla dam, constructed in Mirpur has revolutionised
agriculture in Punjab, but at the cost of Kashmir's deprivation. The Mangla dam, a major asset to the region, irrigates the
canals in Punjab and also generates electricity. This dam supplies 20 per cent of the hydro-electricity needs of Pakistan.
However, till early 2003, the province had not received any royalty for the electricity generated from Mangla dam.
NWFP, however, has been receiving due compensation for the electricity generated from its Tarbela dam.
In late 2002, during General Musharraf's regime, it was decided to raise the height of Mangla dam by another 30 feet to
1,264 feet. This issue had long been under dispute due to objections from Kashmir. It was feared that by raising the dam,
around 44,000 persons and 8,000 households in Kashmir would be displaced, and the district of Mirpur would be
submerged.
Following the federal government's decision, Kashmiris organised several protests. Though the water authorities
assured building a new city adjacent to Mirpur for the project-affected people, the locals are not inclined to trust the
authorities and almost all the political parties in the province opposed to the project.
To appease the government in Kashmir, Pakistan decided to pay royalty to the province for the electricity generated
from Mangla dam. It was also decided to charge domestic consumer electricity rates, as against the prevailing bulk
rates, which are considerably higher.
Whilst the debate was on between WAPDA and the Kashmir government over the issue of tariffs and royalty, the
Pakistan government proposed to bring the Mangla dam territory under the federal jurisdiction, which would have
deprived Kashmir of its constitutional rights to claim net profits from Mangla Dam power station and fishing in the
lake. However, this proposal did not materialise and finally, by end-June 2003, Kashmir and WAPDA managed to
reach a compromise over the issue based on receiving a royalty of 50 paise per unit of electricity generated, more
compensation for the people displaced and a reduction in electricity tariffs. Though the AJK government accepted
the package, the people of the province did not receive this proposal well, and agitations against the project
continued. By late 2004, the agitations slowed down temporarily, and Pakistan government was pumping in funds to
aid various development projects in the region. The lull in protests can be partially explained, as the construction
has not yet started. The Pakistani authorities fear resurfacing of protests once construction of the dam commences.
General Musharraf while inaugurating the Mangla dam extension project stated: "This raising of Mangla dam
project will first be benefiting Punjab, Sindh, NWFP, Balochistan and would then accrue benefits for Azad Kashmir."
This clearly reflects Pakistan's policy towards Kashmir an intermediate for the development of its provinces, especially
Punjab. Kashmir is needed for developing water and hydropower projects that will ensure reliable supply to the
provinces in Pakistan. But at the same time, Kashmir's own development needs are being neglected.
The Mangla dam project and the royalty earmarked encouraged the Kashmir (Pakistan) government to demand a share
in the National Finance Commission allocations and also in the Public Sector Development Programme. Kashmir
(Pakistan) has never been granted the status of being a province of Pakistan. Such demands reflect their assertion to not
remaining a mere surrogate to Pakistan's interests, but also seek their share from the national exchequer.
At a seminar held by the Urdu daily Ausaf in early March 2003, the President of Pakistani Kashmir, Sardar Mohammad
Anwar Khan, categorically demanded that the Kashmir in Pakistan be strengthened in every sense in comparison to the
Kashmir in India, so as to entice the latter to join Pakistan. Similar statements are often heard from leaders in Pakistani
Kashmir and these statements definitely mirror their sense of deprivation.
Punjab has always claimed the Mangla dam to be its exclusive compensation for the three eastern rivers ceded to India
under the Indus Waters Treaty. It is on account of provisions of the same treaty that Pakistan has a direct conflict of
interest with Kashmiris on the Indian side.

Indus Waters Treaty
As pointed out in the previous chapter, the Indus Water Treaty of 1960 divided the Basin between India and Pakistan. As
per Article III of the Treaty, India is under obligation to let flow the waters of western rivers to Pakistan. India can only
use these waters for household and agricultural purpose. For instance, the new areas developed by withdrawals from
river flows cannot exceed 120,000 hectares. The treaty also puts a restriction of 3.6 MAF of storage capacity on the
western rivers.
A major achievement of the treaty was to end the decade-long bitter controversy since partition. It opened the way for
large development works in the basin in both countries. The post-treaty period led to an agricultural boom in both the
countries, leading to higher levels of production, acreage, yield and rapid growth.
The treaty assured Pakistan, permanent water supply for its canal system. The principal benefits were:
§ Gaining independence from India for ensuring its supplies by binding the latter to a formal international
treaty
§ The treaty helped regulate the flows of the Indus and its tributaries. About 80 per cent of the total water is
produced during the monsoon period July to September. Storage projects undertaken due to the treaty
ensured water availability during winters and enhanced canal diversions.
§ It helped to overcome shortcomings and revolutionize agriculture
The negative outcome for Pakistan was the loss of eastern rivers, and with this, land surrounding these rivers largely
irrigated by traditional methods was adversely affected. However, this loss was compensated by the construction of
storage reservoirs, canals and diversions. The other drawback was the rise in inter-provincial discord, especially in
recent years, due to reduced flows in the Indus. Sindh's stance towards Punjab is comparable to that of Pakistan towards
India.
The partition gave India very little of the already-developed areas of the canal and irrigation system. India was free to
undertake development works on the eastern rivers, thus helping in irrigating even arid areas like Rajasthan. However,
having earlier enjoyed complete rights over the waters of these rivers, the treaty was a compromise. The major benefits
that accrued from the treaty are:
§ Fully harness the eastern rivers to its benefit. It helped in diverting waters to arid areas like Rajasthan and
develop irrigation facilities
§ Could build run-of-river hydroelectric plants on the western rivers and flood control storage facilities,
though no storage facilities have been built so far.
The losses to India were:
§ Ceding western rivers to Pakistan hampered growth of Jammu & Kashmir, as water resources in the state
could not be harnessed (this part is discussed later)
§ Increased differences amongst basin states as they began contending higher allocation of water
§ The treaty does not augur well as it has no exit clause, though Article XII of the treaty provides for a
modification of the treaty.
Pakistan's awareness of its vulnerability to its upstream neighbour for economic viability had grown during the period of
formulating the treaty. Furthermore, its justification for acquiring the Kashmir valley also found credence with the
signing of the treaty.
President Ayub Khan in his broadcast to the nation on September 4, 1960 stated: "The very fact that we will have to be
content with the waters of three western rivers will underline the importance for us of having physical control on the
upper reaches of these rivers to secure their maximum utilisation for the ever growing needs of West Pakistan."
The treaty has thus far safeguarded Pakistan's water requirements. It has faithfully served both the countries as a means
of forestalling water-related disputes. And despite being the upper riparian state, India has never used it as a 'black
mailing' tool in spite of two major wars and constant skirmishes.
Post-treaty, after 45 years, Pakistan can now argue that by submitting to man-made reservoir water, which has inherent
complications, Pakistan has accepted an unjust principle of replacing perennial stream water. But it has to be borne in
mind that had it not been for the treaty, Pakistan would have been forced to remain in eternal conflict with its neighbour.
Pakistan still has a solution in hand by improving management of water resources and developing new projects, though
it involves huge capital outlay.
India, on its part, has never used the treaty as a bargaining lever to restrain Pakistan from providing support to Jihad-e-
Kashmir. Nevertheless, there is bound to be an eternal sense of insecurity in Pakistan's mind given that any call on India's
part to change the treaty can jeopardise Pakistan's water supply situation. After all, India is the geographical and political
owner of the three rivers ceded to Pakistan by the treaty. If the treaty is revoked, Pakistan stands to lose its lifeline.
In the long-term, the Indus Waters Treaty has favoured Pakistan. Assessing the present water situation, it is evident that
India has had much to lose while Pakistan has been insulated from water-related adversities. For India, abrogating the
treaty is an extreme step, which may be taken under coercive circumstances. On the other hand, given the bounty that the
treaty has bestowed on Pakistan, the country might not entertain even the proposition of renegotiating the treaty.
The Indus Waters Treaty would subsist till such time that:
§ India demands an irrevocable renegotiation of the treaty, for reasons including, inter alia, water shortage
§ The political status of Kashmir changes drastically
§ India decides to abrogate the treaty an extreme step in retaliation to cross-border terrorism.
If the treaty subsists, northern India would eventually reach a point where meeting growing water requirements would
become difficult.
International laws do not permit linking one river basin to another. India then might be compelled to tap the rivers given
away to Pakistan, especially the Chenab. Treaty-bound, India might fail in fostering socio-economic growth in northern
states like Jammu & Kashmir and Punjab.
The World Bank had envisioned that mutual trust would finally bind the two countries to the treaty. Instead, the two
countries have chosen the path of hostility and terrorists have assumed control of conflict dynamics since 1989.
The treaty has engendered a vicious cycle. Lack of trust between India and Pakistan forced the bifurcation of Indus River
Basin. As the gap between water availability and requirements widen in Pakistan, its desire to intensify jihadi operations
will grow. Agricultural development will be affected, which in turn will produce a stratum of unemployed youth willing
to service terrorist groups. This in turn would aggravate the mistrust and hostility between the two countries. This
vicious cycle of depleting resources spawning unemployment and fuelling terrorism is feared to intensify in the near
future.
Kashmir's Woes
Jammu & Kashmir in India has been the foremost loser as a result of this treaty as all the rivers surrendered to Pakistan
were the major water resources for the state. Due to restrictions imposed on tapping of water resources, in conjunction
with faltering policies of successive state governments, Jammu & Kashmir has been unable to grow to the optimum
potential of its agriculture and electricity sectors.
The limitations imposed by the Indus Waters Treaty that affect Jammu & Kashmir are:
§ The Treaty permits building storage aggregating 3.6 MAF on the three rivers of the Indus, Jhelum and
Chenab.
§ Of the 3.6 MAF water storage capacities, 1.6 MAF is for hydropower, 0.75 MAF for flood moderation and
1.25 MAF for general storage for non-consumptive uses including power generation.
§ It permits additional irrigation of just 1.21 lakh hectares from the Effective Date, 1 April 1960.
The treaty permits additional 1.21 lakh hectares, over and above the 2.6 lakh hectares already irrigated at the time of
signing the treaty. This implies that Kashmir can irrigate a total area of just 3.81 lakh hectares, or hardly out of a total
cultivable area of over 10 lakh hectares. As of 2000, Jammu & Kashmir had already irrigated 3.1 lakh hectares of
agricultural land. The present situation provides for just an additional 0.7 lakh hectares of irrigated land.
Hydro-electricity potential in the state has been estimated to be around 15,000 MW, of which only 10 per cent has been
harnessed so far. Currently, projects worth 1,600 MW are in various stages of development. Of the existing installed
capacity in the state of 1,473 MW (state and central sector), 99 per cent is from hydel plants. There is little scope for any
other forms of power generation, particularly thermal, in the state since there are not many feasible sites for such plants
and the state's difficult topographical condition makes transportation of raw material impracticable.
Moreover, all the power projects currently under construction in the state have become controversial due to the
continuous interference of Pakistan on the pretext of the treaty. The projects end up having long gestation periods and
short working lifespan.
Abrogating the Indus Waters Treaty would provide greater benefits and open up several avenues for unrestrained
development of the state of Jammu & Kashmir. It can:
§ Improve hydro-electricity sector's potential as storage facilities could be developed
§ Pave the way for industrialization of the state
§ Improve irrigation facilities which in turn would boost agricultural growth
§ Give rise to employment opportunities, which will indirectly keep a check on external interference in state
affairs
§ Help attract private investments, propelling the state's position on India's investment map.
The opportunity to tap the Jhelum and Chenab Rivers would provide windfall gains not only to Jammu & Kashmir, but
also to the neighbouring states of Punjab, Rajasthan and Haryana. The three states share the eastern rivers and are in
conflict over the sharing of waters. The addition of Chenab and Jhelum would secure water availability for these states.
The Indus Waters Treaty casts unilateral responsibility on India for compliance. It is an obligation that necessarily falls
on all upper riparians. Abrogation would not be defensible on any understanding of international water laws or
international humanitarian laws. Further, abrogation will necessarily have to be followed by an engineering feat that
would greatly strain the Indian economy.
In any case, legally speaking, it is virtually impossible for India to abrogate the treaty. Article XII (4) states that
"provisions of this treaty shall continue in force until terminated by a duly ratified treaty concluded for that purpose
between the two Governments." The treaty does not provide an exit clause for India per se.
Article 54 of Protocol I (1977) to the Geneva Convention (1949) prohibits any measures which could result in the
starvation of people. It specifically refers to water resources and irrigation works.
There is yet relatively little international law governing transboundary rivers and defining the rights and obligations of
riparian states. The International Law Commission of the United Nations is developing guidelines to help settle waterrelated
conflicts. In 1994, the commission presented a draft on the Law of Non-navigational Uses of International
Watercourses, which is regarded as a Framework Convention. Some articles of the Framework Conventions that have
been widely adopted are:
§ Article 5: transboundary rivers should be used in an equitable, reasonable and optimum manner
§ Article 6: 'equity' does not mean equal distribution. It rather depends on a wide range of factors which have
to be taken into consideration
§ Article 7: individual water course states must exercise due diligence to make sure that they do not give
significant harm to others
§ Article 8 and 9: call for cooperation and the regular exchange of information between riparian states
Abrogation is bound to incite reactions from the World Bank and the countries that were party to the treaty and have
provided funds. The countries, including Australia, Canada, Germany, New Zealand, Britain and the US, are also India's
major export destinations.
India is aware of the implications of abrogation of the treaty. Therefore, despite growing protests from the Kashmiri
people, no policy maker in New Delhi is ever likely to even contemplate this move. The act of abrogation on the part of
India could cause insecurity among the other countries that are lower riparian to India. India's relations with its
neighbours would also be affected, as India also has water treaties with Nepal and Bangladesh. SAARC would be
diluted
INDUS WATER

Table 1: Apportionment of Indus Waters in Pakistan as per Water Accord of 1991
* - Excluding the supplies to the civil canals in NWFP
Source: Indus Water Accord of 1991
Table 2: Irrigated Cropped Area permitted for India under
the Indus Waters Treaty
Source: Ministry of Water Resources, Government of India
Table 3: Catchment Areas of Indus River System in the Indian Subcontinent
Source: Pakistan Water Gateway
Province Kharif Rabi Total
Punjab 37.07 18.87 55.94
Sindh 33.94 14.82 48.76
NWFP 3.48 2.30 5.78
Civil Canals 1.80 1.20 3.00
Balochistan 2.85 1.02 3.87
Total* 77.34 37.01 114.35
Punjab 37%
Sindh 37%
NWFP 14%
Balochistan 12%
Distribution of balance river supplies
(including flood waters and future storages)
Basin ICA as on Additional Net ICA Total ICA
effective date ICA permissible achieved till
(hectares) permissible 1999-2000
(hectares) (hectares)
Indus 17,070 28,329 45,398 20,619
Jhelum 209,595 60,704 270,299 258,671
Chenab 33,342 20,235 53,577 46,790
Total 109,268 369,274 326,081
Indus Jhelum Chenab Ravi Sutlej Beas Total
Jammu & Kashmir 47,298 11,171 10,831 Nil Nil Nil 69,300
India (Excl. Jammu
& Kashmir) Nil Nil 1,735 4,408 12,138 7,719 26,000
Pakistan 158,078 10,188 13,469 Nil Nil Nil 181,735
(in MAF)
Miles2

Source: Pakistan Water Gateway

 

[ajtr]

Please see this site:
http://www.southasianfloods.icimod.org/saf/reports/index_country.php?hcountry=PK

You can find daily flow figures for the Chenab at the Marala station until April 17, 2008.
There is no data after that. Why? If there was data, it would be very easy to see if India did indeed reduce the flow in the Chenab below the level set by the IWT when filling up the Baglihar (August 2008).

 

[ajtr]

Pakistan's 'concern' about Wullar lake is to be taken with a large bucket of salt, as the following history of events proves (excerpts from the Indus Water Treaty that appeared in SRR):
The 74 Sq. Km. Wullar Lake (original size 202 Sq. Kms.) is the largest freshwater lake in India and is situated on the Jhelum and supplies 40% of J&K’s fish catch. The stretch of 22 Km between Sopore and Baramulla becomes non-navigable during the lean winter season with a water depth of only 2.5 ft. Small streams like the Harbuji, Arrah, Erin, Pohru and Bandipur flow into this lake. The Jhelum becomes shallow and sand banks appear in the river-bed obstructing navigation. It is only in spring that rainfall causes the snow to melt at higher elevations on the surrounding mountains and causes floods. [16] In order to improve navigation, India started constructing in 1985, a barrage 439 feet long and with a lock, at the mouth of the lake to raise the flow of water in winter to 4000 cusecs with a depth of 4 ft with an added storage of 0.3 MAF. Pakistan objected to this project and construction was halted in 1987. Pakistan’s objection [17,18] stems from two issues, one India needs to get concurrence of the design from Pakistan and two, it cannot store waters as per IWT on the Jhelum Main anything in excess of 0.01 MAF as “incidental storage work.

Wullar Lake dries up before solution

As India and Pakistan take their time resolving their dispute over the Wullar Barrage/Tulbul Navigation project in Indian-administered Jammu & Kashmir, the lake in question is drying up, thus introducing a third factor in the dispute that the two countries have refused to recognise so far. That third factor is the environment which threatens the SAARC states with closure to all disputes they have refused to resolve.

In the heat of bilateral blame-game, no one had pointed out that Wullar Lake feeding the Jhelum River and filling Pakistan's Mangla Dam was Asia's largest freshwater reservoir. As the two countries quarrel over whether the barrage on the lake is illegal storage or not, the lake has shrunk from 202 square kilometres to 30 square kilometres, and whatever is left over is full of sewage that human settlements dump into it. Pakistan should rethink its plan to raise the Mangla Dam for more capacity and talk to India about "joint action" against environmental degradation. *

 

[ajtr]

Even if the projects would comply with IWT, Pakistan can only be expected to raise objections for the following reasons, among others:
1.Delay the projects as much as possible depriving economic benefits to India
2.Try to paint a bad image for India (remember that the Pakistan psyche is all about images onleee)
3.Increase the cost for India
4.Whip up hysteria among its people about India
5.Divert attention from very pressing domestic issues
6.Continue to create an image that J&K is a disputed area and Pakistan is a legitimate claimant
7.Blame India conveniently for all its failures of managing water resources

 

[ajtr]

From Water Policy, number 10 (2008), article by Salman M.A. Salman :

" The Baglihar difference and its resolution process - a triumph for the Indus Waters Treaty? "


Abstract
On January 15, 2005, Pakistan approached the World Bank asking the Bank to appoint a Neutral Expert to address a "difference" which had arisen with India under the Indus Waters Treaty. The difference related to the Baglihar hydropower plant which was under construction by India. The Bank appointed a Neutral Expert four months later, following lengthy exchanges with the two parties. On February 12, 2007, about 20 months after his
appointment, the Neutral Expert issued his decision on the difference. This article reviews the main provisions of the Treaty, examines the process for the appointment and for the decision of the Neutral Expert, and analyzes the decision.

1. Introduction: The Indus Waters Treaty
The Indus Waters Treaty, concluded between India and Pakistan in 1960, has a number of unique features. First, rather than divide the waters of the Indus river system between the two parties, the Treaty divided the six rivers comprising the Indus river system between them. India has been allocated the Eastern rivers (the Sutlej, the Beas and the Ravi), and Pakistan the Western rivers (the Indus, the Jhelum and the Chenab). The initial proposal of the World Bank to have the Indus irrigation scheme administered as one unit by the two parties, irrespective of the new borders drawn as a result of the partitioning of the sub-continent, was turned down by both parties, after a short period of discussion.Similarly, the attempts of the two parties and the Bank to divide the waters of the rivers, rather than the rivers themselves, failed to produce an acceptable formula. After repeated attempts, this approach was also abandoned. The only solution which emerged as viable was the division of the six rivers between the two parties, in addition to assisting Pakistan in the construction of storage reservoirs to make its overall share of water close to the share it had before the rivers were divided (Salman, 2003).However, despite the specific allocation of the rivers between India and Pakistan, each country has
been allowed certain uses in the rivers allocated to the other, subject to certain qualifications. Those uses are detailed in separate annexures to the Treaty. Annexure B deals with agricultural use by Pakistan from certain tributaries of the Ravi river which has been allocated to India, while Annexure C deals with agricultural use by India from the Western rivers allocated to Pakistan. Moreover, Annexure D deals with generation of hydro-electric power by India from the Western rivers, while Annexure E deals with storage of waters by India on the Western rivers. The use by India of the waters of the Western rivers which have been allocated to Pakistan was one of the major issues raised during negotiations of the Treaty in the 1950s. India felt that, as the upper riparian of the Indus river system which runs for large stretches in its territory before entering Pakistan, there would have to be some uses allowed for it. After lengthy and complex negotiations, agreement was reached on some qualified uses for agriculture,hydropower and storage, as discussed above (Salman & Uprety, 2002).
A second unique feature of the Treaty is that it is the only international water treaty co-signed by a third party. This third party is the World Bank which mediated the original dispute over the Indus basin,and assisted the two parties in reaching an agreement. The process which led to the conclusion of the Treaty took almost nine years of intensive negotiations and mediation by the Bank. The result was a lengthy and complex instrument of close to 150 pages. This instrument addresses the various pertinent issues in a general way in 12 articles in the main part of the Treaty, and in a very detailed manner in eight annexures to the Treaty. Some of the annexures have appendices attached thereto.The World Bank signed the Treaty for certain specified purposes, namely, Articles V and X, and Annexures F, G and H. Article V "Financial Provisions" deals with India's contribution to Pakistan of Pounds Sterling 62,060,000 for the replacement works which Pakistan would construct as a result of the allocation of the Eastern rivers to India, and the termination of Pakistan's water rights on those rivers. The Indian contribution was made to the World Bank in ten equal annual installments, and credited to the Indus Basin Development Fund. Article V also deals with the Bank responsibilities to manage the Indus Basin Development Fund. The Fund consisted of close to 800 million dollars, mostly grant funding from a number of donors, World Bank loans, in addition to the Indian contribution (Michel, 1967). The Fund was used to
finance the replacement works which Pakistan needed to end its reliance on the Eastern rivers, and to augment the flow of the Western rivers. Such works included, inter alia, eight link canals nearly 400 miles long for transferring water from the Western rivers to areas formerly irrigated from the Eastern rivers; two storage dams, the Tarbela on the Indus and the Mangla on the Jhelum; power stations; 2,500 tubewells; and other works to integrate the whole river and canal system within Pakistan (Ali, 1967). In 1964 it became clear that the original amounts subscribed to the Indus Development Fund would not be sufficient to cover the costs of those works. A supplemental agreement was concluded in that year which provided for the payment of additional contributions by the original participants to the Fund. The World Bank was again instrumental in getting those participants to agree to make such contributions (Baxter, 1967). Article X deals with "Emergency Provision" and sets forth certain responsibilities for the Bank in case Pakistan was unable to obtain the necessary materials and equipment from abroad prior to March 31, 1965, because of the outbreak of large scale international hostilities. Annexure H deals with "Transitional Arrangements" to be undertaken during the transition period which started in 1960, and ended in 1970, in the course of which Pakistan was to construct the replacement works, and end its reliance on the Eastern rivers. The Bank's role and responsibilities under Articles V and X, and Annexure H were fully completed some time ago. Annexures F and G deal with "Neutral Expert" and "Court of Arbitration", respectively, in connection with the settlement of differences and disputes, where the Bank has, and will continue to have, a limited procedural role (Salman, 2003). A third unique feature of the Treaty is the varying process for the settlement of issues which may arise between the two parties under the Treaty. According to Article IX of the Treaty on "Settlement of Differences and Disputes" any question concerning the interpretation or application of the Treaty is first examined by the Permanent Indus Commission (The Commission) established under the Treaty, with one commissioner from each country. If the Commission is unable to resolve such a question, then the question becomes a "difference" which shall be dealt with by a Neutral Expert to be appointed by agreement between the two parties. If the parties cannot agree on a Neutral Expert, or on a third party to appoint a Neutral Expert,then, according to the provisions of the Treaty, the Neutral Expert shall be appointed by the World Bank. The World Bank was given the authority also to appoint the Neutral Expert itself during the Transition Period.Detailed provisions on the Neutral Expert are laid down in Annexure F to the Treaty, including the
requirement that the Neutral Expert should be an eminent engineer. The role of the Court of Arbitration is referred to in Article IX and Annexure F of the Treaty, but the details are laid down in Annexure G of the Treaty. Annexure F lays down a list of 23 questions which fall under the mandate of the Neutral Expert. Questions outside this list do not fall within the authority of the Neutral Expert, and would have to be settled by a Court of Arbitration. If the Neutral Expert determines that the difference referred to him, or part of it, does not fall under his mandate as prescribed by the Treaty, then the difference, or that part, becomes a dispute and would be dealt with by a Court of Arbitration.The Commission itself could also deem a difference as a dispute which would be settled by a Court of Arbitration. Although the Treaty states that the decision of the Neutral Expert is final and binding, it also states that if any question which is not within the competence of the Neutral Expert should arise out of his decision, such a question should be settled in accordance with procedures which could involve the Court of Arbitration. The Court of Arbitration consists of seven arbitrators, two of whom would be appointed by each party. The remaining three (also called umpires) would be appointed through a complex process, detailed in Annexure G and its Appendix. That process could involve the World Bank, as well as the United Nations, the President of Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the Rector of the Imperial College of Science and
Technology in London, the Chief Justice of the United States, and the Lord Chief Justice of England.It is worth noting that the process for settlement of differences and disputes under the Treaty is not a hierarchical one. A question is referred to the Neutral Expert not as an appeal of the decision of the Commission. Rather, it is referred to the Neutral Expert because the Commission cannot resolve it. This is to be expected with complex questions, given that the Commission consists of two persons, each representing one of the two countries. Moreover, the decision of the Neutral Expert is final and binding,and as such, cannot be appealed to the Court of Arbitration. Indeed, the Treaty states that such a decision is binding not just on the parties, but also on any Court of Arbitration to be established.Closely related to the issue of settlement of differences and disputes is the concept of notification for planned projects which is widely viewed as a process for avoidance of disputes. Although negotiated in the 1950s when international water law was in its infancy, the Treaty includes progressive provisions on notification between the two parties. This is notwithstanding the fact that the Treaty has divided the rivers between the two countries. Article VII of the Treaty on "Future Co-operation" requires the party
who plans to construct engineering work which would cause interference with the waters of any of the rivers and would affect the other party materially, to notify the other party. The notifying party shall supply such data as would enable the other party to inform itself of the nature and magnitude of such work. If such work would cause interference with the waters of any of the rivers but would not affect the other party materially, the party planning such work shall, nevertheless, on request from the other party, supply such data, as may be available. Another unique feature of the Treaty is that it entered into force and effect retroactively. This is very
unusual because treaties are signed, and then ratified, and they enter into force either on the day of ratification, or on a specified date falling thereafter. In this case, the Indus Waters Treaty was signed on September 19, 1960 and the instruments of ratification were exchanged on January 12, 1961. Yet, Article XII (2) of the Treaty stipulated that entry into force of the Treaty would take effect retrospectively from the first of April 1960, more than five months before the Treaty itself was signed. The reason for this unusual arrangement related to agreements signed by India and Pakistan, starting in 1948, under which India was to supply Pakistan with water from the Central Bari Doab Canal of the Ravi river until March 31, 1960. Accordingly, it was agreed during negotiations of the Treaty that the Transition Period would start on April 1, 1960. It was therefore necessary for the Treaty to become effective as of that date.Despite its comprehensiveness, the Indus Waters Treaty is a bilateral treaty which is confined to two of the four riparian states of the Indus basin. In this respect, neither China nor Afghanistan, who are the other two riparians of the Indus river system, is a party to the Treaty. The Indus and the eastern most tributary, the Sutlej, both rise in the Tibetan plateau in China. The Kabul and the Kuram, which are the main tributaries of the Indus river, originate and flow for a while in Afghanistan before crossing into Pakistan and joining the Indus river. In total, about 13 percent of the catchment area of the Indus basin is situated in China and Afghanistan (Gulhati, 1973). No consultations with China or Afghanistan took place during negotiations of the Treaty. Afghanistan, and to a lesser extent China, are now increasingly asserting their rights to an equitable and reasonable share of the waters of the tributaries of the Indus river system originating there. The Bank played a crucial and substantive role in the negotiations and finalization of the Treaty
(Kirmani & Le Moigne, 1997). The involvement of the Bank started and continued at the highest level, with the then President of the World Bank, Mr. Eugene Black, personally and directly engaged throughout the process (Salman, 2003). The Bank followed a flexible approach which resulted in abandoning earlier proposals, after it became clear that they would not work (Biswas, 1992). More importantly, the Bank agreed to be a party to the Treaty. Indeed, it was the Bank's acceptance of a major role and of responsibilities in the implementation of the Treaty which facilitated the conclusion of the Treaty (Alam, 2002). It was also the Bank's leverage and convening power which resulted in raising the necessary funds, mostly as grants, to assist in the implementation of the Treaty. As discussed above, the major part of the role and responsibilities of the Bank was completed, and only a procedural role in the settlement of differences and disputes still remains (Salman, 2003). It is this role which has been tested by the recent difference over the Baglihar plant between the two parties, and that brought the Bank again, 45 years later, as a key player in the Indus Waters Treaty.

2. Appointment of the Neutral Expert
Pakistan approached the World Bank on January 15, 2005, stating that a "difference" has arisen with India with regard to the Baglihar hydropower plant which India is constructing on the Chenab river. Although the Chenab river has been allocated by the Treaty to Pakistan as one of the three Western rivers, India has been allowed, as mentioned earlier, certain uses of the Western rivers. Those uses include run-of-river hydropower plants, subject to certain conditions specified in great detail under Annexure D of the Treaty. Pakistan alleged that the design of the Baglihar plant was in violation of a number of those conditions. India, on the other hand, claimed that the Baglihar plant was in conformity with those conditions. Pakistan was concerned that the project would allow India to obstruct and control the flow of the Chenab river which is allocated to Pakistan.This was the first time since the Treaty was concluded in 1960 that the Bank had been called upon by one of the parties to exercise its role and responsibilities under the Treaty with regard to the settlement of a difference or a dispute. The Treaty states that the appointment of the Neutral Expert would be made jointly by the two parties within one month of the request by one party to the other, or failing that by such person or body as may be agreed upon by them. In the absence of such agreement, then the appointment shall be made by the World Bank, after consultation with each of the parties. Thus, the role of the Bank in this respect seems quite a simple administrative process. However, the Baglihar difference proved that the role was not that simple.A number of difficult issues arose as a result of that request, and had to be addressed by the Bank. The first issue related to the contention by India that the Baglihar plant was still being discussed by thePermanent Indus Commission, and as such it was still a "question" and had not yet reached a stage of a "difference" warranting the World Bank's intervention. The Bank asked Pakistan to substantiate its claim that the process had indeed reached that stage, and Pakistan sent a lengthy report to that effect.India was provided with Pakistan's documentation. In turn, India sent an extensive reply which was also shared with Pakistan who responded to it with an equally voluminous report. The exchange of documentation through the World Bank went on for three rounds. After a thorough analysis of the Treaty and those reports, the Bank concluded that it was required under the Treaty to appoint a Neutral Expert. That process took more than three months to complete. On April 25, 2005, the Bank informed the parties of this conclusion and started its consultation with them on the appointment of the Neutral Expert (World Bank Indus Waters Treaty Website, 2005 – 2007). The second issue related to what would constitute "consultation" with each of the parties when the Bank is undertaking the appointment of the Neutral Expert. As indicated earlier, the Treaty requires that the Bank appoints the Neutral Expert after consultation with each of the parties. With no precedent under the Indus Waters Treaty to guide it, the Bank had to look for guidance elsewhere, the closest being one of its sister organizations, the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). ICSID is one of the five institutions comprising the "World Bank Group". The other four are the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International Development Association (IDA),the International Finance Corporation (IFC), and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA). IBRD and IDA are together referred to as the "World Bank". ICSID was established under the "Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States" which came into force on October 14, 1966. Currently 143 countries are parties to the ICSID Convention. ICSID assists member countries in settling their investment disputes with private sector corporations or individuals of other states.The procedures which the Bank conducted in consulting with the two countries in the selection of the Neutral Expert were adopted from procedures used by ICSID to select arbitrators for the settlement of investment disputes. The ICSID procedures, are in turn, based on Article 6 (3) of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Arbitration Rules, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1976. Based on those procedures, the Bank compiled a list of highly qualified and eminent engineers from around the world, as stipulated in the Treaty. Furthermore, the Bank ensured that there was no conflict of interest on the part of any of the nominees. The names and curriculum vitae of three engineers out of this list were sent by the Bank to each of the two parties asking them to indicate, within fifteen days, who of the three engineers was not acceptable to them to serve as the Neutral Expert.The procedures included a second similar round of three names if there was no agreement on one name in the first round. If more than one name was agreed upon by the two parties, then the choice from among them would follow an alphabetical order. If the second round ended without an agreement on a name, then the Bank would appoint the Expert itself without going back to the parties. The person to be appointed by the World Bank in this round would not have been included in the lists of the first and second rounds. However,none of those alternatives were needed because the parties agreed on one name in the first round.The Bank also developed clear procedures for conducting its role. Those procedures were based on transparency and fairness. All communications from or to the parties would be in writing; every correspondence or document received from one party would be shared with the other party; and no meeting would take place with one party without the presence of the other. Thus, the simple administrative task for the Bank to appoint a Neutral Expert if the parties fail to agree on one, and fail to agree on a third party to appoint such an expert, developed into a lengthy quasi-judicial process. Fortunately, the Bank did not have to deal with a situation where India would disagree with the Bank's determination that the issue at hand had indeed reached the status of a "difference" which needed to be referred to a Neutral Expert. Similarly, it was quite fortunate that the two parties agreed in the first round of consultation on a Neutral Expert, and the Bank did not have to appoint the Expert itself in the third round, as mentioned above. As will be discussed in the next part, five months after Pakistan approached the Bank, the Neutral Expert was in place, with full responsibility over the Baglihar difference. Hence, the major and most critical part of the Bank role was successfully completed.

3. The Baglihar difference within the Treaty context
The Baglihar hydropower project is a run-of-river plant being constructed by India on the Chenab river in the north eastern state of Jammu and Kashmir. Planning for this project began in the late 1990s, and construction started in 2002. The dam is of concrete gravity type, with a height of 144.5 metres above the deepest foundation. The plant has a capacity of 450 MW in its first stage, with 900 MW on complete design. As mentioned earlier, the Indus Waters Treaty is a complex instrument, with an intricate process of references and cross references between its articles and paragraphs of the annexures. Although Pakistan claimed that the design of the Baglihar plant does not conform to certain requirements under Annexure D, the context of the Baglihar difference within the Treaty is far more complicated than that, mainly because of such cross-references.Paragraph (2) (a) of Article IX of the Treaty on settlement of differences and disputes states that any difference which in the opinion of either Commissioner falls within the provisions of Part 1 of Annexure F shall, at the request of either Commissioner, be dealt with by a Neutral Expert in accordance with the provisions of Part 2 of Annexure F. Part 1 of Annexure F specifies 23 questions which fall under the mandate of the Neutral Expert. Those questions include a wide array of issues covered in more details in other annexures to the Treaty. Paragraph 1 (11) of Part 1 of Annexure F deals with questions arising under the provisions of Paragraph 7, Paragraph 11, or paragraph 21 of Annexure D. Paragraph 11 of Annexure D states that "If a question arises as to whether or not the design of a Plant conforms to the criteria set out in Paragraph 8, then either Party may proceed to have the question resolved in accordance with the provisions of Articles IX (1) and (2)". Paragraph 8 of Annexure D lays down a seven part criteria with which a design of any new run-of-river plant shall conform. Part 2 of Annexure F deals with the appointment and procedures concerning the Neutral Expert.Moreover, paragraph 9 of Annexure D obliges India to communicate to Pakistan, six months before the commencement of construction of any plant referred to in paragraph 8 of Annexure D, certain information,specified in Appendix 2 to the Annexure, concerning such a plant. Paragraphs 10, 11 and 12 of Annexure D detail the procedures concerning the communication between the two parties on the said plant.Pakistan claimed that the Baglihar plant did not conform to criteria (a), (c), (e) and (f) of paragraph 8 of Annexure D to the Treaty. Criterion (a) states that the works shall not be capable of raising artificially the water level in the operating pool above the full pondage level specified in the design. Pakistan alleged that the Baglihar plant did not meet this requirement. Criterion (c) requires the maximum pondage in the operating pool not to exceed twice the pondage required for firm power. In this connection, Pakistan claimed that the Baglihar pondage exceeded twice the pondage required for firm power. Criterion (e) states that if the conditions at the sight of the plant make a gated spillway necessary, the bottom level of the gates in normal closed position shall be located at the highest level consistent with sound and economical design. Pakistan claimed, with regard to this criterion, that the Baglihar plant design was not based on correct, rational and realistic estimates of maximum flood discharge at the site. Criterion (f) requires that the intakes for the turbines shall be located at the highest level consistent with satisfactory and economical construction and operation of the plant as a run-of-river plant. Pakistan considered that the intake for the turbines was not located at the highest level as this criterion mandates.Hence, the Baglihar difference was clearly a complex engineering issue which required an eminent
engineer to address it, as the Treaty has rightly required. Indeed, the whole Treaty was the result of the detailed negotiations of engineers, with a limited role for others, including lawyers (Salman & Uprety, 2002).

4. Process for addressing the Baglihar Difference
On May 10, 2005, the World Bank informed the parties, and announced to the world, that it had appointed Mr. Raymond Lafitte, a Swiss national, a highly qualified engineer, and professor at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, as the Neutral Expert to address the Baglihar "difference" (World Bank Indus Waters Treaty Website, 2005 – 2007). This followed the lengthy process described above, and the agreement of Mr. Lafitte to serve as the Neutral Expert for that purpose.At the request of the Neutral Expert, the World Bank designated ICSID to coordinate the process,including communication with the two parties. Both parties endorsed the designation of ICSID. It is worth adding in this connection that Pakistan became a party to the ICSID Convention in 1966, while India has neither signed, nor acceded to the ICSID Convention. The Neutral Expert appointed an engineer as an assistant, and later, after approval of the two parties, engaged a legal adviser. Indeed the Treaty itself had envisaged the possibility of the Neutral Expert needing such assistance. Although the designation of ICSID and the appointment of the assistant were both endorsed by the two parties,the Neutral Expert took the prudent step of obtaining the prior approval of the parties for the appointment of the legal adviser.The Treaty authorizes the Neutral Expert to determine the procedures for addressing the difference,provided that he shall afford to each party an adequate hearing; and in making his decision, he shall be governed by the provisions of the Treaty, and by the compromis, if any, presented to him by the Commission. The procedures adopted by the Neutral Expert replicated those followed earlier by the World Bank of transparency and fairness. All communications from one party would be shared with the other party, and with both parties if it was originating from the Neutral Expert. Moreover, no meeting would take place with one party without the presence of the other. On the other hand, the Treaty also obliges each of the two governments to extend to the Neutral Expert such facilities as he may require for the discharge of his functions.Under Annexure F of the Treaty, each of the two parties was required to pay to the Bank, once the Treaty entered into force, the sum of $5,000. The Bank would hold this amount, together with any
income therefrom, in a trust to pay the remuneration of the Neutral Expert and any assistance he may need. The $10,000 paid by the two parties in 1960 reached over $100,000 in 2005 when the Neutral Expert was appointed, as a result of the investment of the original amount. This took place despite the fact that the Treaty does not oblige the Bank to invest the contribution of the two parties. The balance in the trust fund provided the initial expenses needed to start the Neutral Expert process. The Treaty authorizes the Bank to ask the parties to pay in equal shares any amount required to cover the cost of the process after depleting the amount held by the Bank in the trust fund. The Bank handed over the process to the Mr. Lafitte on June 9, 2005, following his acceptance to act as the Neutral Expert. The handover took place in the first meeting which was also attended by representatives of the two parties, and which was held at the World Bank Office in Paris. During that meeting the basic rules and procedures for the conduct of the process were laid down and agreed upon.
The work program was also discussed and agreed upon, keeping in mind the Treaty requirement that the decision by the Neutral Expert should be rendered as soon as possible. A time-table was set, and was adjusted later, which would start with India providing by July 15, 2005, the information specified in Appendix II to Annexure D, referred to above. Pakistan would provide its memorial by August, and India its counter-memorial by September 2005. Pakistan would file its reply by January 2006, and India its rejoinder by March 2006. The draft determination of the Neutral Expert would be completed by early October 2006, and the parties' written comments would be submitted by end of October 2006. In November 2006, the parties would provide additional written comments. The final determination of the Neutral Expert would be rendered by February 2007. It was also agreed that four more meetings would be held before the Neutral Expert would finalize and issue his decision. The sequence of the written procedures was adopted from ICSID practice which provides for two possible rounds of exchange of documents between the parties, and also provides for following each written procedure by an oral one. It was further agreed that all meetings would be recorded, and that the minutes of each
meeting would be prepared, approved by the two parties, and signed by the Neutral Expert and the coordinator. The first meeting which was held at the World Bank Office in Paris in June 2005, was followed by the
submission by India of the basic information on the project, the memorial by Pakistan, and the countermemorial by India. Subsequent to those submissions, the Neutral Expert, together with delegations from India and Pakistan, visited, in early October 2005, the Baglihar site, as well as the Baglihar hydraulic model. The second meeting of the Neutral Expert with the two parties took place in Geneva on October 19 – 21, 2005 at the World Meteorological Organization, and was devoted to questions which arose as a result of the Baglihar site visit. The third meeting took place in London on May 25 – 29, 2006, at the International Dispute Resolution Centre, subsequent to the filing of the rejoinder, and was devoted to presentations by the parties.Five months later, the Neutral Expert finalized his decision and presented his draft determination to the two parties during the fourth meeting which was held at the World Bank Office in Paris on October 2 – 4, 2006. The practice of presenting a draft determination to the parties is uncommon in international arbitration, but it exists in other fields of dispute settlement. A similar feature can be found in the "Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes" of the World Trade Organization (WTO). This feature is called "Interim Review Stage" and is intended to give the parties an opportunity to review and comment on the draft ruling. After the presentation of the draft decision by the Neutral Expert, the parties were given the opportunity to file written comments on the draft decision, and to further present these comments orally at the fifth meeting. The fifth and last meeting took place in Washington DC at the World Bank Headquarters on November 7 – 9, 2006, where the parties presented their comments on the final draft determination. The parties also filed additional comments on their respective presentations. Thereafter the Neutral Expert took three months to finalize his etermination
keeping in mind those comments. Accordingly, not only did the Neutral Expert give an opportunity to the parties to present their view and comment on his data and findings; he also gave himself the chance to obtain feedback on the basis and strength of his technical data, analysis and decision. On February 12, 2007, the Neutral Expert delivered to the ambassadors of India and Pakistan in Bern, Switzerland, signed copies of his final decision on the Baglihar difference (referred to as the Expert Determination by the Neutral Expert). Copies of the decision were also delivered to the World Bank, as required by the Treaty. The decision consisted of a full comprehensive report, and a separate Executive Summary. The two parties agreed that the Neutral Expert and the World Bank could disclose and disseminate the Executive Summary of the Expert Determination. However, the full report of the Determination can only be disclosed and disseminated by the parties themselves, according to their own procedures. Based on this agreement, the World Bank placed the Executive Summary on its Indus
Waters Treaty external web site on February 20, 2007 (Executive Summary, 2007). The Neutral Expert considered his decision as not being rendered against one or the other party. According to the provisions of the Treaty, the decision of the Neutral Expert is final and binding. However, as indicated earlier, paragraph 13 of Annexure F of the Treaty states that without prejudice to the finality of the Neutral Expert's decision, if any question (including a claim to financial compensation) which is not within the competence of a Neutral Expert should arise out of his decision, that question shall, if it cannot be resolved by agreement, be settled in accordance with the provisions of Article XI (3), (4) and (5) of the Treaty. Those provisions call for resolving such an issue by agreement, and failing that, by a Court of Arbitration. The Neutral Expert, his assistant and legal adviser were financed by the trust fund established under the Treaty in 1960, as discussed earlier. The Neutral Expert is mandated to decide which of the two parties should bear the cost of the process. In this case, he directed that the parties would share the cost equally. This direction underscored his conclusion that his decision was not rendered against one party or the other. The decision of the Neutral Expert with regard to the cost also meant that the parties would reimburse, in equal amounts, the trust fund held by the World Bank of the amounts disbursed by the Bank from the trust fund. As such, the trust fund would revert back to the same amount it had at the start of the process. The above shows the extensive work undertaken by the Neutral Expert, as well as the two parties, which spanned over a period of more than 20 months. The schedule set by the Neutral Expert and agreed to by the parties was followed, with some adjustments agreed to by both parties. ICSID continued to coordinate the process throughout this period, replicating its experience in handling investment disputes.
Only the travel and subsistence expenses of ICSID staff, in connection with the Baglihar difference, were charged to the trust fund.

5. Decision of the Neutral Expert
The Executive Summary of the decision of the Neutral Expert indicated that in interpreting the Treaty, the Neutral Expert had relied on the rules of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. This Convention was concluded in 1969, and entered into force in 1980. Neither India nor Pakistan is a party to this Convention. India has not signed the Convention, and Pakistan signed the Convention in 1970, but has not yet ratified it. However, it is widely agreed among experts in this field that the Convention reflects the rules of customary international law with regard to ordinary methods of treaty interpretation.The Executive Summary stated that the Treaty gives a clear indication of the rights and obligations of the parties, and that these rights and obligations should be read in the light of new technical norms and new standards, as provided for by the Treaty. It also stated that the interpretation of the Treaty was guided by the two principles of integration and effectiveness which "provide for the Treaty to find effect in its whole and to ensure that each of the object(s) and purpose(s) of the Treaty is given fullest weight and effect when interpreting the rights and obligations under the Treaty". Those purposes include attaining the most complete and satisfactory utilization of the waters of the Indus river system, and fixing and delimiting the rights and obligations of each party in relation to the other. The Summary indicates that the rights and obligations contained in Part 3 of Annexure D must be interpreted so as to allow fulfilling the purpose of the Treaty in "a spirit of goodwill and friendship" taking into account the best and latest practices in the field of construction and operation of hydroelectric plants.The decision of the Neutral Expert on the Baglihar difference dealt with the issues contested under the four criteria of paragraph 8 of Annexure D of the Treaty discussed above, under six headings. Those headings were: (i) maximum design flood, (ii) spillway, ungated or gated, (iii) spillway, level of the gates, (iv) artificial raising of the water level, (v) pondage, and (vi) level of the power intake. The first issue on the maximum design flood related to the calculation of the maximum amount of water which can arrive at the dam. In view of many uncertainties of flood analysis, the Neutral Expert retained the value proposed by India of 16,500 m3/s, as opposed to 14,900 m3/s proposed by Pakistan, for
the peak discharge of the design flood. He further stated that climate change, with the possible associated increase in floods, also encourages a prudent approach. With regard to the second issue of a gated or ungated spillway, Pakistan considered that a gated spillway was not necessary, and would allow India to control the flow of the river. The Neutral Expert determined that the conditions of the site, including hydrology, sediment yield, topography, geology and seismicity, require a gated spillway. He added that the analysis of 13,000 existing spillways in the world demonstrated that the provision of gates on large spillways is common practice. He further indicated that an ungated spillway might create a risk of flooding the upstream shores, and that an elevation of the dam crest, which would prevent such a risk, would be costly.On the issue of the level of the spillway gates, Pakistan stated that even if it can be assumed (without conceding) that a gated spillway was necessary, the orifice spillway proposed by India is not located at the highest level consistent with the provisions of the Treaty. The position of India was that the design of the chute spillway, sluice spillway and auxiliary spillway were necessary to ensure safe passing of the design flood. The Neutral Expert determined that the gated chute spillway on the left wing planned in India's design is at the highest level consistent with sound and economical design and satisfactory construction and operation of the works. He considered that the outlets composing the sluice spillway, planned by India, should be of the minimum size and located at the highest level consistent with a sound and economical design. However, the Neutral Expert determined that the outlets should preferably be
located 8 metres (m) lower to ensure protection against upstream flooding. On this issue, in particular,the Neutral Expert felt the need for the Treaty to be read in light of new technical norms and standards. He specifically stated "It appears that the Treaty is not particularly well developed with respect to its provisions on sediment transport. This is not criticism: The Treaty reflects the status of technology on reservoir sedimentation in the 1950s. The consequence is that the provisions of the Treaty which explicitly mention sediment acquire a special significance" (Executive Summary, 2007).On the fourth issue of the artificial raising of the water level, Pakistan considered that the dam crest elevation proposed by India was exaggerated and could be lower. The Neutral Expert considered that the dam crest elevation should be set at the lowest elevation. He determined that the crest elevation submitted by India at 844.5 m above sea level (asl), resulting from a freeboard above the full pondage level of 4.50 m is not at the lowest elevation, and that the freeboard should be 3.0 m above the full
pondage level, leading to a dam crest elevation of 843.0 m asl. With regard to the volume of the maximum pondage, Pakistan argued that the value of the maximum pondage proposed by India exceeded twice the pondage required for firm power. The Neutral Expert determined that the values for maximum pondage stipulated by India as well as by Pakistan were not in conformity with the criteria laid down in the Treaty, and fixed a lower value. On the sixth point relating to the level of the power intake, Pakistan considered that the power intake is not located at the highest level as required by the Treaty. The Neutral Expert agreed with this consideration and determined that the intake level should be raised by 3 m and fixed at elevation 821 m asl. Two observations are worth making with regard to the process and the decision of the Neutral Expert:Firstly, as appeared from the composition of the two delegations, Pakistan seemed to have viewed the difference as largely a legal one, involving the interpretation of the Treaty, while India seemed to have viewed it mainly as an engineering one, regarding hydropower plants (Executive Summary, 2007). Secondly, the Neutral Expert opined that the rights and obligations of the parties under the Treaty should be read in the light of new technical norms and new standards as provided for by the Treaty. This meant that the Baglihar difference was addressed bearing in mind the technical standards for hydropower plants as they have developed in the first decade of the twenty-first century, and not as perceived and thought of in 1950s when the Treaty was negotiated. The reference to modern technical standards is particularly clear in the discussion and analysis by the Neutral Expert of the issue of gated or ungated spillway summarized earlier. Climate change and its likely effects is another example of contemporary concerns not prevalent or thought about during the 1950s which was taken into account by the Neutral Expert in his decision. It should be added that, along the same lines, the International Court of Justice in the Danube dispute between Hungary and Slovakia (the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case) required that the current standards must be taken into consideration when evaluating the environmental risks of the project (International Court of Justice, 1997 p. 66). This manner of interpretation will most likely influence the future interpretation of the Treaty, as well as other international water treaties. The response from both India and Pakistan to the decision of the Neutral Expert was positive. Both countries claimed victory and highlighted the areas of the decision which they believed responded positively to their claims. The conclusion to be derived from those statements was that both parties have agreed to abide by that decision. This further underscored the successful completion of the Neutral Expert process.

6. Conclusion
The Baglihar difference posed major challenges to India and Pakistan, to the World Bank, as well as to the Indus Waters Treaty itself. This was the first time in 45 years that the Treaty's provisions on settlement of differences and disputes were tested. Understandably, there was apprehension in all quarters about how the process might unfold. Questions about whether there would be an agreement that the Baglihar question had indeed reached the stage of a difference, and about whether there would be an agreement on one person to serve as a Neutral Expert, were in the minds of those concerned. Equally concerning was the issue of how the Neutral Expert would handle the difference, and how the parties would deal with him and react to his final decision. However, the Bank was again able to play a fair, transparent and constructive role which led to the
appointment of the Neutral Expert. In turn, the Neutral Expert was able, with the coordinating role of ICSID, and the full cooperation of the two parties, to handle the process in a transparent and fair manner,and to deliver a decision which was accepted by the two parties. ICSID rules and practice provided guidance on a number of procedural decisions taken by the Bank and the Neutral Expert. Undoubtedly, the process has set precedents in a number of aspects. Transparent and fair procedures for the appointment of the Neutral Expert, and for the conduct of the process, are now firmly in place, if the need were to arise again on another difference. Those procedures drew considerably from ICSID practice, the UNCITRAL arbitration rules, as well as the WTO disputes settlement rules. The result of this blend is a comprehensive and unique set of rules and procedures. On the substantive side, the notion that the rights and obligations of the parties under the Treaty should be read in the light of new technical norms and new standards, as provided for by the Treaty, will most likely influence any future interpretation of the Indus Waters Treaty. Similarly, interpretation of the Treaty keeping in mind the rules of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is likely to reshape many of the understandings about the Treaty. It is worth mentioning in this connection that neither of the two states is a party to the Vienna Convention, and only Pakistan is a party to the ICSID Convention. Nonetheless, both parties endorsed the designation of ICSID as a coordinator, and neither of them raised concerns to the invocation of the rules of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in connection with interpretation of the Indus Waters Treaty.The World Bank, ICSID and the Neutral Expert no doubt handled the process in a fair and transparent manner. The cooperation of the two parties and their acceptance of the decision of the Neutral Expert was the ultimate triumph of the process. All in all, the manner in which the process started in January 2005, and ended in February 2007, twenty five months later, attests to the strength and credibility of the Treaty itself, and underscores the notion of the peaceful settlement of international water disputes.

Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank David Freestone, Eloise Obadia and Fuad Bateh for helpful comments on an earlier version of this article. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the World Bank.

 

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Politics of water insecurity
ALI KHIZAR ASLAM
ARTICLE (April 21 2010): After centuries of facing sharp rebuttals, should Robert Malthus regain currency? The crux of Malthusian argument, which warned that eventually population will outstrip food resources, was refuted and thrown out of the window after the successful technological revolution of the 20th century.

Even closer to home, in Asia, where technological breakthroughs weren't as common the Malthusian notion was dismissed by Islamists, who argued that God is the best Provider of Rizk - which includes food and water - and hence, there will always be plenty of food. Yet, in the 21st century, major technological advancements are increasing at a decreasing rate, while world population is growing geometrically. In retrospect, the advent of global warming, a derivate of industrial development, was largely missed both by Robert Malthus and his critics.

Black gold, being the backbone of the modern economy, is now depleting. And with no substantial replacement of oil in the offing, the efforts to find its substitute are even scarier. At one end, efforts to produce alternate energy are reducing the pie of food inputs. At the other, less efficient engines run on oil, gas and other carbon emitting fuel that are adversely affecting the natural pattern of weather, and in turn, water.

Unless, a dramatic change in engine technology, which can eliminate carbon emissions, or a divine intervention happens in our lifetime, a global catastrophe is inevitable. And the South Asian subcontinent will be no exception.

Nearly one and a half billion inhabitants of India and Pakistan are likely to face severe floods followed by food shortages within a decade or two. The common source of water, melting from Himalayan glaciers and channelled through a single river system, seriously threatens a war on blue gold amongst the old arch rivals.

The distrust and diplomatic friction between the two countries is only adding fuel to the fire. There is a clear case for the two nuclear powers to unite to be able to marginalize the looming environmental disaster. However, in order to feed their respective strong armies and gain political mileage, the Kashmir issue, and cross border militancy amongst other tactics are being exploited for the past sixty plus years of their existence.

For instance, both Indians and Pakistanis raise hue and cry over the abuse of Indus Water Treaty. However, John Briscoe, a seasoned independent water analyst, denied that there is an inherent conflict between India and Pakistan on Indus Water Treaty.

Instead, Briscoe blames the political distrust for the hyped up issue. On one end, he appreciates the objective reporting and analysis from Pakistan, and on the other, he strongly criticises the influence of ministry of external affairs has on Indian media.

Briscoe further argued that India should be dealing Pakistan like the way Brazil helped Bolivia and Paraguay to build regional stability. But the fact that military expenditure in these countries, which cumulatively have millions of people under the poverty line, is much higher than on education and health undermines his wish.

Yes, the Indus Water treaty needs to be redrafted considering climate change and growing energy requirements. An amicable solution can be reached, if both sides exhibit strong political will. However, history suggests otherwise; and that is exactly what is happening today.

India is not ready to hold concrete talks on the water issue; rather Indian officials are bent upon in eliminating in Pakistan's alleged sponsorship of militant activities in India, whereas it is the Pakistanis; who cannot run an independent foreign policy owing to heavy reliance on foreign aid; that are at the receiving end of regional militancy.

Moreover, the strong influence of army and that of establishment on the widely perceived chain of incompetent and corrupt politicians impedes any chance of finding a way to convince India to sit on the negotiating table and resolve the shortcomings in the Indus water Treaty.

Nonetheless, Pakistan being a darling to the US - on its strategy to control Afghanistan through Pakistan army following its planned withdrawal of forces from Afghanistan by 2011 - cannot take its eyes of the western border to support strong commercial ties with India. Thus, not much international support is in the offing for Pakistan to plead its case on water resolution.

One may wonder that since the threat of water scarcity is an issue for India as well, then why is she so reluctant to come on table with its neighbour. India is sitting upstream and therefore, she can control water flow to Pakistan by building dams and reservoirs. Interestingly, the heart of Indus water system also emanates from Indian-held Kashmir. Thus, the control of water was given to India at the time of partition, following which it took a little more than a decade to redesign a water distribution mechanism under the Indus Water Treaty.

But now it's time to revisit the treaty for the better interest of both the parties. But Indians, being in the driving seat, are attempting to manipulate it and simultaneously lobbying to further weaken internally afflicted Pakistan. Though, the violation of hardwired Indus Water Treaty doesn't necessarily deprive the downstream farmers in Pakistan, Baglihar violation is a prime example.

The essence is the timing to release the water. But an array of Indian projects - Kishanganga, Bursar, Sawalkot and many others - are potential threats to Pakistan, if India starts playing with the timing of water discharge. If consensus estimates of climate change experts is to be believed, this cat and mouse game might come to an end when Himalayan glaciers rapidly start melting in 2015-25 and India starts diverting more water downstream from Kashmir to flood parts of Pakistani farms.

And not many years after that, by 2030-35 according to environment scientists, when glaciers start depleting, India can stop normal water supply to Pakistan, threatening to create a drought like situation. However, this doesn't mean that India will escape the catastrophe, but it can delay it for many years by exploiting its upstream influence over Pakistan.

Of course, technological advancement to grow food by using less of water can be a mitigating factor, but unless Pakistan consistent water supply is ensured, its economy and its people would face a bitter future. Some may expect a divine intervention, but think again, even Hafiz Saeed, the founder of Lashkar-e-Taiba who sought out to create an Islamic state through his Army of Good urged Pakistan officials to get going on water: "The government must take practical steps to secure Pakistani water. It is a matter of life and death for Pakistan."

 

[ajtr]

The fact is pakistan has been allocated 75% of the total indus basin water while other 25% was allocated to india.You are wrong in saying that india cant build dams.india as per IWT is allowed to build run-of -the river dam with limited pondage(storage so as to allow water to fall on turbines from height.even if india for go its western river allocated water it will be hardly !% of total western rivers water.And when sources in pakistan confirms the that the water problem in pakistan is due to mis -management not that india stealing it.the reasons recognised as:
less storage to impound water.whaterever storage dams are there from last 20-30 yrs are mired by silt hence reducing storage.moreover .Your own source in IRSA confirms that at least 40 MAF water flows to the sea due to lack of storage.2nd reason being the water loss due to seepage in old canal systems.India bogey is the easy thing to blame india for stealing just to hide ones own failure in pakistan.

source: http://pakwater.gov.pk/publications.aspx

Report on Water Conservation, Present Situation and Future Strategy Seminar

 

[ajtr]

Irrigation water withdrawal and water losses:
Over the past 20 years, groundwater use has been a major factor in increasing agricultural production. Groundwater tube wells not only supply additional water but also have provided flexibility to match surface water supplies with crop water requirements. However, because of uncontrolled and rapid private sector development of groundwater (6% annual growth), there is a danger of excessive lowering of water tables and intrusion of saline water into freshwater aquifers. Within the IBIS, total water availability at the farm gate has significantly increased in the last 15 years, and changed slightly in its composition, with a higher use of groundwater extracted by tube wells. In 1975, surface water represented 70% of the total water available, groundwater provided through private tube wells 22.5% and groundwater provided through public tube wells 7.5%. In 1990, the figures were 63%, 27% and 10% respectively. The Water Resources Section of the Planning and Development Division has estimated average water losses from canal head to outlet at 25 %, and from outlet to farm gate at 15 % .(page:9-10)

source: http://pakwater.gov.pk/publications.aspx

Whole document can be downloaded from here:

Report on Public Private Partnership Seminar

 

[ajtr]

Water Allocation among Pakistani Provinces, 1991 (in MAF)
Province Kharif Rabi Total
Punjab 37.07 18.87 55.94
Sind * 33.94 14.82 48.76
NWFP ** 3.48 2.30 5.78
Civil Canals 1.80 1.20 3.00
Balochistan 2.85 1.02 3.87

MAF - Million Acre Feet

* - Including requirements of Karachi
** - Ungauged Civil Canals above the rim stations where measurements can be made

Pakistan Water Requirements
Agricultural Water Demands (MAF)
Crops 2000 2025
Wheat 28.8 56.91
Rice 22.24 16.68
Cotton 15.71 19.35
Sugarcane 13.41 13.93
Other crops 30.59 46.74
Total + Loss 188.28 261.14

Domestic Water Demands*
Population (million) 140 260
Water (MAF) 5.2 9.7
* Industrial demand of water assumed negligible

The crops are as follows:

Around Sialkot/Gujrat Rice
Lahore/Kasur Wheat
Okara/Faisalabad/Sahiwal Sugarcane
Multan Cotton
Dera Ghazi Khan/Bahawalpur Wheat
Larkana (Sind)/Jacobabad Rice
Hyderabad/Mirpur Khas Wheat
Hub/Karachi Rice

On the basis of over fifty years' record the mean flow in Indus River System (IRS) totalled 175 MAF on the eve of Partition of the Punjab in 1947. This comprised of 93 MAF including 27 of Kabul for Indus, 23 for Jhelum, 26 for Chenab, 6 for Ravi, 13 for Beas and 14 for Sutlej annually. The three western rivers alloted to Pakistan are Indus, Jhelum & Chenab (totalling 142 MAF) and the three Eastern rivers alloted to India are Ravi, Beas & Sutlej (totalling 33 MAF)

 

[ajtr]

Smashing the myth of India has violated the Indus Water Treaty by filling Baglihar Dam in Aug 2008

India violated treaty in filling Baglihar: Jamaat

ISLAMABAD: India has violated the Indus Water Treaty by filling Baglihar Dam in less time than prescribed, Pakistan's Indus Water Commissioner Syed Jamaat Ali Shah said on Friday. Talking to PTV, Shah said India had filled the dam in 10 days instead of 60 to 70, causing water shortage in the Chenab River. He added the water shortage had badly affected Pakistan's agriculture, as farmers could not irrigate their fields in time. He said Pakistan would ask India to install a telemetry system at the Chenab and provide daily data about the dam. He said the government would promote the drip irrigation system across Pakistan to avoid wastage of water and get better crop yield. app

In the above report, the Pakistani Indus Commissioner claims that India filled up the BHEP in just 10 days instead of 60 or 70 days and this caused all the problems for Pakistan.

Let us see the holes in what he says.

1.Pakistan has been claiming since August that India had reduced the flow in Chenab to 20000 cusecs. The storage capacity of BHEP is very small as it is a run-of-the-river project. Where else could India have stored all the waters ?
2.If India filled up in just 10 days, why did the water flow go down in August & Sep ?
3.In this report appearing in DT dated 20th Oct, this same guy said "India filled Baglihar Dam in September, creating water shortage in Pakistan."
4.In this DT report two days later, this same Commissioner is "seeking compensation from India for the loss of water flow in the Chenab River between August 19 and September 5, when the dam on the river was being filled."


Indus Water Commission to assess water reduction claim

Reports from Pakistan suggest that water level was down to 22,000 cusecs due to the filling of the dam. Pakistan Indus Water Commissioner Jamaat Ali Shah, who talked to his Indian counterpart G Aringanathan, said that while India reserved the right to fill the dam, Pakistan should receive 55,000 cusecs of water at its head in Marala. Engineers at Baglihar stressed that under the provisions of the Indus Water Treaty, India has the right to fill the reservoir between June 26 and August 31. "There is no bar on the content of water, they said. "The water from India is stored in Marala Dam in Pakistan and not released directly for irrigation. How is it possible that the dam will dry up in flood season?" said the senior official.

IWT prescribes exchange of data on a daily (or even less frequent) interval only.

Article VI

EXCHANGE OF DATA

(1) The following data with respect to the flow in, and utilisation of the waters of, the Rivers shall be exchanged regularly between the Parties:
(a) Daily (or as observed or estimated less frequently) gauge and discharge data relating to flow of the Rivers at all observation sites.
(b) Daily extractions for or releases from reservoirs.
(c) Daily withdrawals at the heads of all canals operated by government or by a government agency (hereinafter in this Article called canals), including link canals.
(d) Daily escapages from all canals, including link canals.
(e) Daily deliveries from link canals.

These data shall be transmitted monthly by each Party to the other as soon as the data for a calendar month have been collected and tabulated, but not later than three months after the end of the months to which they relate : Provided that such of the data specified above as are considered by either Party to be necessary for operational purposes shall be supplied daily or at less frequent intervals, as may be requested,: Should one Party request the supply of any of these data by telegram, telephone, wireless, it shall reimburse the other Party for the cost of transmission.

(2) If, in addition to the data specified in Paragraph (1) of this Article, either Party requests the supply of any data relating to the hydrology of the Rivers, or to canal or reservoir operation connected with the Rivers, or to any provision of this Treaty, such data shall be supplied by the other Party to the extent that these are available.

this is what Article (15)(iii) of Annexure D of IWT which deals with the 'Western Rivers' states:

(iii) where a Plant is located on a Tributary of The Jhelum on which Pakistan has any Agricultural use or hydroelectric use, the water released below the Plant may be delivered, if necessary, into another Tributary but only to the extent existing Agricultural Use or hydroelectric use by Pakistan on the former Tributary would not be adversely affected.


Further, Article 7 of "ANNEXURE E-STORAGE OF WATERS BY INDIA ON TIIE WESTERN RIVERS" allows a General Storage Capacity of 0.5 MAF, a Power Storage Capacity of 0.25 MAF (Million Acre Feet) and a Flood Storage Capacity of 0.75 MAF. These exclude Dead Storage and Pondage for Hydroelectric plants.

India is entitled to build run-of-the-river hydroelectric projects on the Western rivers
The Indian calculation of pondage etc is accurate (notwithstanding the fact the pakistan find it difficult to comprehend)
The gated spillway and their numbers and the low-levels where they are placed are as per the requirements of these Himalayan rivers
The IWT lends itself to interpretation according to the evolving engineering technologies and these must be exploited
Unlike in the past, India will boldly go forward with the river projects learning from the bad experience of Salal and the new found confidence after Baglihar


The main aspect to be considered for run-of-the-river system within the ambit of IWT is that the "impounded" waters must be let within the system within 7 days (with a 10% variation permitted). A storage system, OTOH, will obviate the need to let waters back within 7 days. The Storage need not necessarily be very large like say in Bhakra dam.

The IWT allows India the following provisions on the tributaries of Jhelum for non-consumptive use:
0.50 MAF for General Storage
0.25 MAF for Power Storage and another
0.75 MAF for flood storage

This allows India to "store" 0.75 MAF ( or ~ 1 Billion Cubic Metres of operating pool, that excludes any Dead Storage. Compare this with 35 Million Cu. M for Baglihar) on Jhelum's tributary.

The success of the 280 MW Uri-II project , downstream of Uri-I depends on waters of the Kishanganga diverted through Wullar into Jhelum main.

 

[ajtr]

2008 PhD Thesis by MUHAMMAD ARIF RAZA ,M.Sc (Hons) AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS from Pakistan

AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS IN IRRIGATION SECTOR IN PUNJAB PAKISTAN

Section 1.6.5

Most of the water infrastructure is in poor condition. Pakistan is extremely dependent on its water infrastructure, and it has invested in it massively. Due to a combination of factors such as age, time neglecting attitude of the department towards repair and maintenance of existing infrastructure, much of the infrastructure is crumbling. This is true even for some of the major barrages, which serve millions of hectares and where failure would be catastrophic. There is no modern Asset Management Plan for any of the major infrastructure (World Bank 2005).

 

[ajtr]

Pakistan's water woes

There is unquestionable need to give more attention to water conservation and preventing water loss within the existing irrigation system, besides trying to increase water supplies

The increasing imbalance between the availability and demand of water is becoming a very serious problem. The UN keeps warning that during the next 25 years, many violent water conflicts could emerge within and between countries around the world. But the situation is no less alarming even today. Nearly twenty percent of the current world population — over one billion people — lacks access to safe drinking water.

Given the evident importance of water in the lives of individuals and nations led the UN to designate March 22 as World Water Day, so that it should be celebrated across the world as a day of action to help address this global public crisis. Although numerous countries are faced with a similar threat of water shortages, let us look at the challenges facing our own country and try to see what can be done to overcome them.

It is surprising to note that just a few decades ago Pakistan was considered to have an abundance of fresh water. Yet a recent World Bank report has listed Pakistan among 17 countries that are facing an acute water shortage. Government sources also confirm that the per capita availability of water has gradually dwindled from over 5,000 cubic metres in 1951 to 1,100 cubic metres. Such estimates based on averages are misleading, however, since they do not distinguish between those who have excess access to water and others without access to even the average amount.

Thus, looking at other data to understand the severity of the problem is necessary. A revealing alternative statistic maintains that less then sixty percent of the current population of the country has no access to safe drinking water.

One obvious reason for this decreasing water availability is that the nation's population was under 34 million in 1951, but it has exceeded the 160 million mark, and is further expected to grow to around 220 million by 2025. Water scarcity will obviously be compounded in the future when more and more water will be required to meet increased agricultural, domestic and industrial demand.

The World Bank has pointed out that Pakistan is currently close to using up all its surface and ground water. It backs this claim by pointing to the fact that Pakistan only stores 30 days of river water. India, on the other hand, stores four times as much. The decreasing reservoirs capacity is predicted to lessen the capita availability to about 550 cubic metres by 2025.

Despite this serious problem, however, the ongoing diversion of freshwater for industrial and agricultural production and the degradation of freshwater sources due to the discharge of industrial wastes, chemical inputs like pesticides, and even household sewage, continues causing further degradation of surface water quality.

Not focusing much on a more integrated approach to water management which aims to undertake a less disrupting and more holistic view towards utilisation of natural flows including their conservation, the World Bank is instead encouraging Pakistan to build new reservoirs to meet electricity demand and to fulfil its industrial and agricultural demands. The World Bank argues that these new water reservoirs can aggressively push Pakistan's economy forward, and it has put forth optimistic projections in support of this claim, such as the estimation that every new dam built by the country will add four to five percent to Pakistan's GDP.

New reservoirs are also considered vital to save the industrial sector from the consequences of a water shortage. There are over half a million small and big industrial units in the country and the estimated usage of water by all industries is 3.5 million acre feet at present but this demand is also going to continue increasing in line with ambitious production targets. Yet simultaneous measures to ensure the contamination of existing water supplies by these industries are still not being given the attention they need.

A similar trend is evident with regards to energy generation. Pakistan's electricity demand is increasing by seven percent annually, due to which the need for new water reservoirs is considered urgent. It has been calculated that Pakistan has 50,000 MW of hydropower potential, but it is merely harnessing 14 percent against its total current requirement of 20,000 MW. Conversely, the example of China and India is cited which apparently produce 30 percent of their required power through water, while even more developed countries are harnessing 70 to 80 percent of their hydro-potential for energy generation.

Pakistan, instead of generating hydropower, is producing expensive thermal power. While the discovery of coal reserves in Thar may alter the economic cost of thermal energy, the fact remains that burning fossil fuels are a very polluting source of energy production.

Given the state of the environment, it is no longer feasible for even developing countries to merely brush aside the sustainability costs of energy production. Yet brushing aside legitimate fears of increased flooding and seawater intrusion, Pakistan recently unveiled plans to build a series of dams. The stated intentions in this regard include completing the Mangla Dam raising project by September 2008, and the construction of Mirani Dam, Gomal Zam Dam, Subakzai Dam and Satpara Dam by 2009.

Whether the new government would continue with plans to construct these mega water reservoirs, and thereafter the controversial Kalabagh Dam, remains to be seen. However, there is unquestionable need to give more attention to water conservation and preventing water loss within the existing irrigation system, besides trying to increase water supplies. Yet no new and encouraging policy announcements have been put forth to this effect to date.

It is also important to realise that water scarcity is exacerbating inter-household burdens, and interregional and international conflicts. For example, water scarcity leads women in poorer households to spend more time and effort to fetch water. These households also have to bear medical costs incurred due to increased sickness brought about by waterborne diseases. These issues also must be borne in mind and adequate steps taken to address them, instead of singularly thinking of increasing water availability for boosting industrial and agricultural output.

 

[ajtr]

The author of the article below, Munir Ataullah has been a long time critic of Pakistani policies. He has consistently advocated friendlier ties with us.He is invoking John Briscoe's article," War or peace on the Indus? (however flawed it may be) to gather support for his usual thesis of friendship with India. Indirectly, he says that the IWT has survived so far only because of India, that India has not violated the terms of the Treaty, that it has not exploited much of its rights bestowed on her by the Treaty.


Life and death issue of water —Munir Attaullah

hearted and generous towards us on many issues that are of vital concern to us. We cannot expect this as long as a state of confrontation persists. And confrontation is something India can comfortably live with while we cannot without paying an inordinately high price

My concern for the past few weeks
has been to explain why peace with India is not a luxury but a necessity for us. Must I tediously so harp on a theme the overwhelming majority of us agree with 'in principle'?

I feel I must, for a number of reasons that themselves bear repetition. Yes, most of us want peace, and vaguely understand, in a general way, the dividends that may follow in its wake. But few of us are given to undertaking the detailed and rigorous cost/benefit analysis of peace and confrontation that might crystallise our views out of suspension from an otherwise turbid solution. Doing my little bit (why have none of our economic scholars written a book on this subject?) may just tip the scales — or so I hope — in favour of a rational, rather than our usual emotional, response to this mighty conundrum we face.

Then there is the mental bunker of the 'it takes two to tango' mindset, where, in lazy fashion, we are all too ready to take shelter at the first hint of a little local difficulty. How often have you heard it said, "It is not us but unjustified Indian intransigence that is the real obstacle to the 'honourable' (Ah! there is a loaded word if there ever was one) peace we seek?"

Now I do not deny there is much substance in that lament. But why should that surprise us? After all, everyone desires a settlement on his own terms. And just as our 'terms' are unacceptable to India, it should not surprise us that their 'terms' are unacceptable to us. Why do we forget that the acts of countries (us included) are usually based on self-interest rather than 'justice'?

But what concerns me most is our complete reluctance to follow this argument through to arrive at some commonsense conclusions from the consequent impasse. In particular, we refuse to accept the proven reality that we lack — and cannot hope to have — the means to force a far more powerful neighbour to amend its possibly errant and unjust ways. Instead, we continue to pride ourselves as a protagonist of at least equal stature, when clearly we are not, and continue to stubbornly bash our head against a brick wall.

Yes, there is some damage to the wall in the process but, in the main, it is us we who are grievously hurt. India can comfortably resist, and afford, confrontation. We cannot, except at an unbearably high cost.

It certainly takes two to tango. But are we sure we know the steps of that particular sophisticated dance? Is it realistic to invite a potential partner to tango when all you know is how to rock? We need to recognise the onus is firmly on us to — somehow — break the deadlock.

If ever there was a perfect illustration of all what I have said above, it is the life and death issue for us of water. How many of us, vaguely aware though we may be of its importance, have thought through this matter carefully? How many of us have actually read the Indus Water Treaty and considered its implications?

If readers cannot be bothered reading up the treaty (courtesy the internet), they should — at the very least — read and digest John Briscoe's absolutely wonderful article on the subject, published in a national daily on April 3. Here is a man who knows what he is talking about, being an expert on the subject. And he makes my case better than I could ever hope to do. It should be a compulsory reading for all our politicians and those media personalities keen to talk about our water problem. (Incidentally, his article is also interesting for his comments on the relative independence of the media in India and Pakistan.)

But what I can do here is to stress again some inescapable realities that we would do well not to ignore. The first is that the upper riparian states the world over naturally hold all the cards (think of the habitual complaints of Sindh against Punjab regarding its share of water). Possession, as they say, is nine-tenths of the law. Thus, the goodwill of the upper riparian towards the lower riparian is of immense real value.

To drive home this reality, consider the second point. India can easily, staying well within the technical ambit of the Indus Water Treaty, inflict a great deal of damage upon us should it choose to do so (and what does this say about that much trumpeted theory that our threat perceptions should be 'based on capability rather than intentions'?). The recent shortage in Chenab waters, as a consequence of India filling the Baglihar Dam, is a painful example of what I mean here.

And here is the third point. We cannot do without the treaty. We cannot just repudiate and scrap it. And it takes two to even amend it. Are we, therefore, again going to ask the international community to pressure India and address our every concern under the treaty? That would be a futile hope, quite apart from being an impractical one.

The only real choice we have is to create an environment where India will go out of its way to respect the spirit of a treaty rather than always insist on applying the strict letter of the law. For, the treaty, though perfectly reasonable from our point of view when signed decades ago, has, in today's then unforeseen circumstances, significant practical lacunae that have the potential to do us great harm should India insist on extracting its full pound of flesh.

To sum up: we need India to be large-hearted and generous towards us on many issues that are of vital concern to us. We cannot expect this as long as a state of confrontation persists. And confrontation is something India can comfortably live with while we cannot without paying an inordinately high price. Of course it remains a possibility that what we seek from peace may still not be forthcoming should India choose to act in niggardly fashion. But do we have any other option except to take that risk?

Man does not live by bread alone, I know; and, yes, there are more things in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in my philosophy. Nevertheless, in my naïve and simple-minded way, I continue to hope that rational commonsense will eventually prevail, and that those who aspire to lead us will understand that the welfare of the people is the supreme political virtue.

Why all this heartburn over Baglihar? In truth the Hunza lake now holds twice as much water as Baglihar will when completely filled. The real heartburn is that India might actually benefit from what Pakistan always thought was entitled to them. Pakistan is trying, among many other things, to pre-empt India from exercising its full rights vested in it by the Treaty. India have to learn one thing in dealing with this wily Pakistan that it should never, never be generous; because, not only will that be interpreted as weakness that would then lead to more bizarre demands, but also it would be used as a precedent to stall us from executing anything that would be beneficial to us. It is time for us to re-start the Tulbul Navigation Lock project full steam ahead, for example.India halted this project in 1987. Not only this project improves transportation, but it ensures a better flow in Jhelum during the lean winter months. This would be helpful for the Pakistanis as well because India is not consuming any water in this project and Mangla would have better storage in the winter. The Wullar lake will be recharged and possibly expand to its original size, if not entirely. Pakistan had 'agreed ' to the project in c. 1991 but later withdrew citing Kishenganga,


Landslide Lake in Northwest Pakistan

On January 4, 2010, a landslide occurred in the Hunza Valley of northern Pakistan. The initial disaster buried the village of Attabad, destroying 26 homes and killing 20 people. As the weeks passed, the problems compounded because the landslide did more than destroy a village. It also blocked the Hunza River, creating a 7-mile- (11-kilometer-) long lake that inundated several villages and submerged 3 miles (5 kilometers) of the Karakoram Highway. The highway is frequently blocked by rockfalls, most of which can be cleared in days, but work was still in progress at Attabad in mid-March 2010.

On March 16, 2010, the Advanced Land Imager (ALI) on NASA's Earth Observing-1 (EO-1) satellite captured this true-color image of the lake created by the landslide of January 4. (Note that north is on the right.) Dark rock covers the river in the upper left corner of the image, and the turquoise V-shaped lake stretches out behind the slide. Near the temporary lake, the Karakoram Highway is a faint meandering line of pale brown. A bridge across the Hunza River has been submerged by the rising waters. The bridge connects the settlements of Shaskat (or Shiskit) and Gulmit on the region's only route to and from China.

Besides displacing some 1,500 people as it flooded their homes, the lake cut off everyone between Attabad and the submerged bridge—an estimated 3,000 people—from the outside world, according to news reports. Chinese engineers had begun working with members of Pakistan's army to carve a spillway through the landslide by late January, but the size of the landslide made for slow progress.

Geologist David Petley reported that, as of January 25, the lake's level was rising roughly 1.1 meters (3.6 feet) per day, and as of February 10, water was rising roughly 60 centimeters (24 inches) per day. By March 11, water was seeping through the rocky dam, likely from the newly created lake. The seepage raised fears that the water might breach the dam and flood villages downstream.

The water level upstream of the landslide at Hunza, and the rate of rise of the lake
Latest update: 22nd April 2010 using data correct to 20th April 2010

Water level and spillway level (the gap between them is the freeboard)

Rate of rise of the water level

Picture of dam w/ Spillway.

The other end.

If the lake rises another 100 feet the end of the lake will go past this barrier and increase another 7-8 kilometers thats approximate volume will be around ~ 5 TMC of water.Imagine this had happened on the Indus. No water for a year or several years.There is evidence for 900 feet deep lakes formed in the recent past on the Indus.

 

[Singh]

Rebuttal #1 of Briscoe's article.

Link to Briscoe's article, "War or peace on the Indus?", appearing in the News, Pakistan


Here is the Rebuttal.

Battle of Paani-pat​

Where is the need for such magnanimity?

Prof. Briscoe contends the following with regard to what he believes is an issue of perception (emphasis added):

Living in Delhi and working in both India and Pakistan, I was struck by a paradox. One country was a vigorous democracy, the other a military regime. But whereas an important part of the Pakistani press regularly reported India's views on the water issue in an objective way, the Indian press never did the same.

I never saw a report which gave Indian readers a factual description of the enormous vulnerability of Pakistan, of the way in which India had socked it to Pakistan when filling Baglihar. How could this be, I asked? Because, a journalist colleague in Delhi told me, "when it comes to Kashmir – and the Indus Treaty is considered an integral part of Kashmir — the ministry of external affairs instructs newspapers on what they can and cannot say, and often tells them explicitly what it is they are to say."

This apparently remains the case. In the context of the recent talks between India and Pakistan I read, in Boston, the electronic reports on the disagreement about "the water issue" in The Times of India, The Hindustan Times, The Hindu, The Indian Express and The Economic Times. Taken together, these reports make astounding reading. Not only was the message the same in each case ("no real issue, just Pakistani shenanigans"), but the arguments were the same, the numbers were the same and the phrases were the same. And in all cases the source was "analysts" and "experts" — in not one case was the reader informed that this was reporting an official position of the Government of India.

Equally depressing is my repeated experience – most recently at a major international meeting of strategic security institutions in Delhi – that even the most liberal and enlightened of Indian analysts (many of whom are friends who I greatly respect) seem constitutionally incapable of seeing the great vulnerability and legitimate concern of Pakistan (which is obvious and objective to an outsider). [The News]

Primarily, with regard to the notion that India's news media has been coerced by the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) into presenting a largely "Indian slant" on the issue, "substantiated" by Prof. Briscoe's claim that data presented by several media houses in India were the same. Certainly, the numbers were the same. But only because they were based on factual data, and not on David Copperfield type concoctions disseminated to the world by folks in Pakistan.

The Indus Waters Treaty provided for an arbitration clause in the event of dispute. Pakistan exercised that right during the Baglihar Dam controversy (and may likely do the same in opposition to the Kishen-Ganga project). The Neutral Expert upheld some minor Pakistani objections (whereby poundage capacity was reduced by about 14%, and the height of the dam was reduced by 1.5 meters) but Pakistan's claims on the height and gated control of spillway were emphatically rejected.

The very same Pakistani press, which Prof. Briscoe lauded as having reported "India's views on the water issue in an objective way," spun the results of the arbitration and led the Pakistani awam to believe that the World Bank had ruled in favor of Pakistan. Objective, indeed.

A second point revolved not around the terms of the treaty, but on its spirit, whereby it was contended that India, big brother and upper riparian, show magnanimity towards the smaller, more fragile state. Prof. Briscoe asserts that Indians did not see the "great vulnerability and legitimate concern of Pakistan." Had this been the case, India could have, within its right, tapped all 33 million acre feet (MAF) of the eastern rivers and stored 3.6 MAFs of western rivers — it has done neither, allowing Pakistan access to, at the very minimum, 3 MAF not required by the Treaty. Even the compensation that India is entitled to, per the terms of the treaty hasn't been sought from Pakistan. Magnanimous enough?

To be sure, both India and Pakistan do need to work out aspects of current dynamics not explicitly addressed by the Treaty, such as water sharing in periods of shortage. No one denies that Pakistan faces a severe crisis on the water issue. The solution to this is for Pakistan to try and optimize design and efficiency of existing dams and develop more efficient solutions for water management by partnering with those willing to offer assistance, such as the U.S., via the Signature Energy Program and initiatives provided for by the Kerry-Lugar-Berman legislation.

While Prof. Briscoe may be an expert on water management issues, Pakistan's accusations have to be considered within the ambit of its antipathy towards India that is, ultimately, its raison d'être.

Numbers and intricacies can confuse the brightest intellect — simply painting India as the hydra-headed monster stealing water from the honest Pakistani is a simpler, more direct sales pitch to the awam already reeling from the effects of decades of water mismanagement by its own rulers.

http://filtercoffee.nationalinterest.in/2010/04/16/battle-of-paani-pat/

 

[ajtr]

Avoid inflamed reporting on India-Pakistan water dispute, say experts

Even as discussions on dam-building under the India-Pakistan Indus Water Treaty ended inconclusively in Lahore late March, senior journalists from both countries met in the Pakistani capital to debate how best to move from entrenched, inflamed reporting on the dispute to constructive reporting on sharing the waters of the Indus river basin.

The meeting of senior journalists from both countries to debate reporting on the issue was seen as a historic 'first' and spearheaded by LEAD Pakistan, part of an international NGO founded by the Rockefeller Foundation and co-ordinated from London.

The Indus Water Treaty was signed in 1960 between India and Pakistan in a bid to share equitably the waters of the six rivers of the Indus Basin straddling the two countries in the northwestern region.

The partition of India at independence, forming a separate Pakistan, cut across the Indus basin, which has the Indus River and its five main tributaries, the Chenab, Jhelum and Indus as the western rivers straddling Pakistan while the Sutlej, Beas and Ravi rivers came into Indian territory.

Under the Treaty, Pakistan was assigned rights over the Chenab, Jhelum and Indus with 136 Million Acre Feet (or one million acres under a height of one foot of water) of water while India assumed control over the Sutlej, Beas and Ravi with a significantly lesser proportion of 33 MAF.

Irrigation from these waters is permissible to 1.343 million acres for India, with the treaty allowing the country to build reservoirs amounting to 3.6 MAF from the western rivers.

Due to its smaller water resources, India is allowed under Article III of the Treaty to use waters of the western river basins for domestic, agricultural, hydropower generation and non-consumptive use, such as navigation. There are no quantitative limits on hydropower development by India, as long as they are run-of-the-river projects, and India provides their data six months in advance to Pakistan, who then has three months' time to raise any objections.

A Permanent Indus Commission, with officials from both sides, has been set up to oversee and monitor the Treaty.

But both countries have seemingly intractable views on the implementation of this treaty.

Pakistan has a simmering grievance (since the '80s) now threatening to spill over into open friction that India's dams on the western rivers of Jhelum and Chenab have impeded water flows to Pakistan and environmentally impacted regions downstream.

India has built thirty three hydroelectric projects on the western rivers, at least thirteen of which are under construction currently.

Pakistan claims that it gave up more water than it gained, that the diversion of the Indus waters through these dams, required to compensate for India's having lesser waters in its share, has inflicted heavy ecological penalties and that India's retention of the right to non-consumptive use of the three western rivers presents Pakistan with the frustrating task of guarding against Indian poaching.

In early April 2010, India's High Commissioner to Pakistan, Sharat Sabharwal, speaking at the Karachi Council of Foreign Relations, denied Pakistani allegations of 'stealing' water as 'preposterous' and 'completely unwarranted'.

"Those who allege that India is acquiring the capacity to withhold Pakistan's share of water, completely ignore the fact that this would require a storage and diversion canals network on a large scale. Such a network simply does not exist and figures nowhere in our plans," said Mr. Sabharwal.

In 2004, India's construction of the 900 MW Baglihar dam on the Chenab River in Kashmir state caused intense diplomatic wrangling between the two countries, with Pakistan ultimately taking its grievance of Indian non-compliance of the treaty's clauses to the World Bank, its funder, as arbitrator.

In 2007, the appointed neutral expert Professor Raymond Lafitte of Switzerland delivered a verdict rejecting most of the Pakistani objections, but required India to reduce the dam's height by 1.5 metres.

Pakistan remains dissatisfied over the Lafitte verdict.

India also says objections by Pakistan to India's Kishanganga hydroelectric project on a tributary of the river Jhelum 'are yet to be substantiated', according to High Commissioner Mr. Sabharwal.

"We believe that the matter should be resolved at the Commission (Permanent Indus Commission) level, keeping in mind the provisions of the Treaty and the findings of the neutral expert in the Baglihar case", said Mr. Sabharwal.

Climate change and the thinning of the Himalayan glaciers has also resulted in lesser flows in the Indus basin, experts told journalists from both countries, at Islamabad, in April 2010.

"Pakistan and India need to share information on extreme events and use it jointly for adaptation methods. There is a media role here", said Dr. Ghazanfar Ali, head of glaciology and water resources of the Global Change Impact Study Centre, Islamabad.

The head of Pakistan's Task Force on Climate Change, Shafqat Kakakhel, one-time Ambassador to India and past deputy director of UNEP, told the journalists that what was needed was a 'well-informed media' that did not get 'swayed by passions'.

"We need to make full use of the dispute settlement clause in the Indus Water Treaty", said Mr. Kakakhel.

 

[Singh]

Rebuttal #2 of Briscoe's article.

Pani Poor​

We need a more robust debate on damming the Indus water tributaries in India, but we should also try to keep the international debate in perspective.

Professor John Briscoe, an expert on water issues at Harvard, published a somewhat provocative piece in The News (Pakistan) on Monday. He argued that Pakistan was woefully vulnerable to Indian manipulation of the timing of water flows of the Jhelum and Chenab; that the Indian press—unlike the Pakistani media—never noted the other country's views on the issue, and was instructed on what to say by the Ministry of External Affairs; and that India lacked the leadership of a regional power, as Brazil had been magnanimous in similar disputes with Bolivia and Paraguay.

One should not doubt Prof. Briscoe's intentions, and it is true that water disputes certainly do not get their fair share of attention in Indian public discourse. But at the same time, it remains easy to blame India, as the larger, democratic and upper riparian owning power, and overlook the other side of the story. Pakistan may be vulnerable, but that does not also make it guiltless. There were several other reasons to be concerned with Briscoe's argument.

First, as someone who wrote news reports on the Baglihar dam negotiations, I do not think Prof. Briscoe's portrayal of the media coverage in India is entirely fair. Certainly, mainstream Indian journalists do not appear to have made a good enough effort at independently ascertaining facts about the water dispute with Pakistan, which largely explains similar figures in different news reports. Briscoe links to several reports in the Indian media as proof of the major Indian newspapers speaking in one voice. But if one reads the stories, it is quite clear that the tone is different in each. The Hindu, which is perhaps the least strident in its treatment of Pakistan actually gives a fairly sympathetic account. In sum, Briscoe's argument that a democratic India spews nothing but biased propaganda is something of a stretch. The similarities in Indian media responses to the water dispute can be explained in other ways too. It is not surprising, for example, that significant international incidents are often depicted similarly in all the major U.S. newspapers. But that does not mean that they are all fed the same line. Even in democracies, there is still such a thing as a consensus.

Second, while India cannot afford to pretend that Pakistan does not have concerns about its water supply, this does not mean the opposite: that Pakistan is not using the water issue to drum up hysteria over Indian regional hegemony. In fact, there is evidence that points to this being a deliberate tactic. Water issues made it into a dossier presented to the United States that accused India of, among other things, fomenting insurgency in Baluchistan, and not accepting Pakistan's sovereignty as an independent state. The rumours have reached such a fever pitch, that India's High Commissioner had to make this speech in Karachi to put to rest some of the accusations against India. I have it on good authority that sections of the Pakistan leadership believe that water issues provide a "back door" for getting the United States involved once again in the Jammu and Kashmir dispute. This is one reason why it has long featured prominently in the statements and writings of Pakistan's leaders. This tactic appears to have failed, at least temporarily, as Hillary Clinton recently stated firmly that water disputes were a bilateral issue for India and Pakistan to resolve.

Third, despite the thrust of Briscoe's article, India has, in fact, made concessions to Pakistan on the water issue. India acquiesced to World Bank mediation on the Baglihar dam. After a neutral Swiss expert, Raymond Laffite, was appointed and conducted a study, he upheld a few Pakistani objections, but declared that the dam project did not violate the Treaty. India also offered a number of minor concessions to Pakistan prior to the World Bank verdict. India initially acquiesced to changing the design of the Kishanganga dam following Pakistani protestations after a significant delay, but discussions did not end satisfactorily (in fact, the Indian Express carried a rather unbiased report which outlined the Pakistani government's objections to the project). Again, it should not be said that India has always been correct and fair and Pakistan incorrect and unfair in the matter, just that Prof. Briscoe's picture is incomplete.

Fourth, Prof. Briscoe's assessments that India has not de-linked the water issue with the Kashmir territorial dispute and has not demonstrated regional leadership is somewhat misplaced. India has been far more open to talks and concessions on water than on territory, and it has stuck by the terms of the Indus Waters Treaty despite flaring territorial disputes. And while many of us, myself included, may disagree with the propensity of the Manmohan Singh government to 'delink' various issues on the bilateral agenda, it is clearly a credit to his statesmanship and demonstrative of his willingness to rise above historical grievances and political calculations (almost to a fault) in a bid to secure long-term goals.

Fifth, India has very similar problems with a much more vulnerable Bangladesh. India has often been unfair in this matter as well. But Indian and Bangladeshi scientists and political leaders appear to have a good enough relationship that they have found ways to overcome some of these problems, and are negotiating others in a civil manner. Water disputes, in other words, may still be disputes, but they have not soured the overall political relationship between the two countries. For someone who lived in Bangladesh, it is surprising that Prof. Briscoe does not consider why India's relationship with Pakistan has not followed this relatively benign trajectory. Political factors come into play, yet it is worth considering that India is the common denominator.

We need a more robust expert debate on the issue in India, but we should also try to keep the international debate in perspective. Pakistan is indeed vulnerable, and India should be—and arguably has been—understanding of this. At the same time, we should not delude ourselves into believing that this is not a deliberate tactic for continuing to portray India as the cause of all of Pakistan's ills.

http://polaris.nationalinterest.in/2010/04/10/pani-poor/

 

[Singh]

Pakistan turns to water​

It was little noticed at the time, but Pakistan handed over over a 'non-paper' (an off-the-record or unofficial presentation of government policy circulated informally among delegations for discussion) to India on water sharing at bilateral Foreign Secretary talks held in New Delhi on 25 February. While the global media focused on the resumption of structured Indo-Pak talks after the Mumbai attacks, the emerging water controversy was given a miss.

India has rights over the three eastern rivers (Ravi, Beas and Sutlej), while Pakistan has rights on three western rivers (Indus, Jhelum and Chenab), according to the 1960 Indus Water Treaty (IWT) between the two countries. But India enjoys the right to non-consumptive use of the western rivers.

The non-paper stresses that no construction of power projects may be undertaken on the western rivers until objections are amicably resolved by India and Pakistan. But Indian officials feel Pakistan has used provisions under the IWT to seek information for endlessly delaying the projects.

Last month Pakistan's Indus Water Commissioner Jamaat Ali Shah and his Indian counterpart Aranga Nathan held a key meeting at Lahore. After the meeting, Shah said the Indian delegation was told about Islamabad's concerns over new dams being built by New Delhi on rivers falling under IWT. Pakistan raised objections to India's Nimoo Bazgo water project, saying the project is affecting water flow in the River Indus. Countering this, Nathan said Islamabad was given 'advance information' regarding the construction of the Nimoo Bazgo Dam.

High-ranking Indian officials allege this non-paper is a ploy by the Pakistan Army to whip up bilateral tensions over water sharing, so that the army can consolidate its grip over the country at a time when provinces within Pakistan are fighting over water sharing. For instance, this opinion piece published in The News International (Pakistan's leading English-language daily) on 12 March says:

The waters of the Indus Basin are regulated within Pakistan by the Indus River System Authority (IRSA), which itself was created by the inter-provincial Water Accord of 1991. Sindh regularly accuses Punjab of not providing it with its share of water. Punjab, on the other hand, claims nothing more than its rightful share of water under the Water Accord...

IRSA's last couple of meetings have witnessed heated arguments among Sindh, Punjab and Balochistan provinces over water sharing. According to Indian officials, the Pakistan Army wants to divert attention from its own water woes and acrimony by encouraging the view that Pakistan is facing water shortage due to India.

http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2010/04/13/Pakistan-turns-to-water.aspx