Some notes I came across with on the subject of T-64 from Wikipedia, citing Perrett, Bryan (1987). Soviet Armour Since 1945. London: Blandford Press. ISBN 0-7137-1735-1:
Capabilities and Limitations
The T-64 did not share many drawbacks with the T-72, even if it is often confused with it:
* The automatic loader, hydraulic and not electric, is much faster (loading cycle of 6 to 13 seconds) and more reliable, and less sensitive to jolting when running off-road. It also has a "sequence" fire mode which feeds the gun with shells of the same type in less than 5 seconds. It is also able, in the modern versions, to turn backwards to keep a good speed at the end of the load.
* Driving seems much less exhausting for the crew, thanks to assisted controls and a more flexible suspension. (Perrett 1987:43)
* The ammunition is transported at the lower point of the turret shaft, minimizing the risks of destruction by self-detonation.
* Protection, excellent from the beginning and constantly updated, remains able to stop modern shells thanks to the reactive armor.
* The fire control on the B version is very modern.
* The tank leader's small turret has good sights, the AA machine gun can be operated from inside the turret; he can also control the gun sight in case of emergency.
The T-64 suffers from two usual weaknesses of Soviet tanks:
* Due to the low silhouette, the maximum gun depression angle is limited to -6°, preventing it from using fire positions on steep hill crests (firing "hull-down"), a disadvantage in defensive situations.
* The crew compartments are very small, precluding tall crew members and demanding the use of external storage for equipment. The limited interior space also makes long missions tiring.
Additionally, the adoption of the autoloader was highly controversial for several reasons:
* Early versions of the autoloader lacked safety features and were dangerous to the tank crews (especially the gunner, who sits nearby): Limbs could be easily caught in the machinery, leading to horrible injuries and deaths. A sleeve unknowingly snagged on one of the autoloader's moving parts could also drag a crewman into the apparatus upon firing. (Perrett 1987:42)
* The turret was poorly configured to allow the human crew to manually load the gun should the autoloader break. In such situations, rate of fire usually slowed to an abysmal one round per minute as the gunner fumbles with the awkward task of working around the broken machine to load the gun. (Perrett 1987:42)
* While having smaller tank crews (three vs. the usual four) is advantageous since more tanks can theoretically be fielded using the same number of soldiers, there are also serious downsides. Tanks require frequent maintenance and refueling, and much of this is physically demanding work that several people must work together to accomplish. Most of the time, these duties are also performed at the end of a long day of operations, when everyone in the tank is exhausted. Having one less crewman for these tasks increases the strain on the remaining three men and increases the frequency of botched or skipped maintenance. This problem worsens if the tank's commander is also an officer who must often perform other duties such as higher-level meetings, leaving only two men to attend to the tank. (Perrett 1987:42-43) All of this means that tanks with three-man crews are more likely to suffer from performance-degrading human exhaustion, and mechanical failures that take longer to fix and that keep the tank from reaching the battlefield. These problems are exacerbated during prolonged time periods of operations.
* The T-64 was criticized for being too mechanically complex, which resulted in a high breakdown rate. Problems were worst with the suspension system, which was of an entirely new and advanced design on the tank. Due to these problems, teams of civilian mechanics from the T-64 factories were "semi-permanent residents" of Soviet tank units early. (Perrett 1987:43-44)
