Can Pakistan and India resolve their disputes? —Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi
The top leadership in Pakistan and India either lacks the will to charter a new course for their bilateral relations or are not convinced that the change will serve their personal and regime interests
Pakistan-India relations are extremely complex. They have talked on their contentious issues from time to time. However, there are few instances of the talks succeeding in resolving concrete problems. The focus has been on conflict management rather than conflict resolution.
Pakistan-India talks do not produce a breakthrough in their troubled relations because both sides are not oriented towards opting for a major departure from the traditional approaches to their bilateral problems. The civil and military bureaucracy and the intelligence community have developed such a state of mind and worldview that does not leave much scope for an out-of-the-box solution. The political leadership lacks the will to give a lead to the foreign policy and security establishment. Rather, they fall victim to their policy briefs based on conservatism, caution and advice to doubt the intentions of the other side.
This seems ironic because the ordinary citizens of both countries, when not under the spell of the propaganda orchestrated by the civil-military-intelligence establishment, manifest a keen desire to visit each other and maintain peaceful and cordial relations. The two governments do not encourage free movement of people and groups and exchange of literature, art, drama, culture and other creative activities at the societal level because they think this will weaken their capacity to dominate bilateral relations.
Due to strong and negative historical baggage and fixations of the foreign policy and security establishment with a tough disposition, ordinary diplomacy cannot be successful between India and Pakistan. A turnaround in their relations can be possible if policy makers and enforcers shift away from their current mindset, one that has trapped them in the traditional state-oriented, straight-jacketed approach towards each other.
The new relationship should reflect the principles of restraint, flexible diplomacy, wilful compromise and political choice.
There is a need to restrain the cultivated aura of self-righteousness, negative image of the adversary and overestimation of one's capacity to deal with the situation. They need to avoid adopting a dismissive attitude towards the adversary because this makes it difficult to resolve problems through peaceful diplomacy. If the adversary is viewed as weak, evil and nasty, there is hardly any chance of a meaningful dialogue.
These biases make it extremely difficult to engage in problem-solving diplomacy. The talks are held either just for the sake of talking or to demonstrate to the international community that both believe in dialogue and peaceful resolution of disputes.
Flexibility in diplomacy depends on the capacity of the leadership to opt for a wilful compromise and a clear-cut choice for resolving problems and promoting peace. This implies that the topmost leadership's disposition holds the key to problem solving. If they make a conscious and unambiguous choice for peace and demonstrate the capacity to pursue it, the foreign office, bureaucracy and intelligence agencies will change their traditional narratives and strategies accordingly.
The top leadership in Pakistan and India either lacks the will to charter a new course for their bilateral relations or are not convinced that the change will serve their personal and regime interests. They pursue the safe approach of relying on advice from the bureaucratic-intelligence elite because, if the leadership follows such advice, this elite mobilises support for such policy by invoking their linkages with a section of the media and societal groups.
If, on the other hand, the top political leadership decides to opt for a completely new strategy, it has to face opposition or discontentment first from the bureaucratic-intelligence elite and then it has to mobilise domestic public opinion in favour of the new approach, which is not always an easy job at a time when the top political leadership faces numerous internal problems.
India's prime minister is not expected to shift the single issue (terrorism) focus of his government's policy towards Pakistan after having faced strong domestic opposition to the initiative shown by him in the Sharm el-Sheikh talks in July 2009. His political clout is derived completely from the Congress Party's hierarchy, limiting his ability to act autonomously.
India faces another dilemma. Its officials and political elite feel perturbed by India's inability to derive tangible political dividends in the regional context from its size, population, economic and industrial development and military power. India, viewing itself as a player in the bigger political league of the global system, finds itself bogged down with Pakistan, a player of the lesser league.
India's leadership would like to deal with Pakistan the way the US dealt with the Taliban government in Afghanistan after the terrorist attacks in the US in September 2001. From time to time, India's security community explores the possibility of using the military option against Pakistan. However, good sense prevails and this option is dropped. After all, India is not the US and Pakistan is not the Taliban's Afghanistan. Global developments also help Pakistan save itself from India's displeasure, if not wrath. The US sympathises with India on the Mumbai tragedy but it will not support India engaging in military adventurism against Pakistan.
Pakistan's top civilian leadership is even more constrained from taking the initiative to break out of the traditional mould of Pakistan-India diplomacy. Its major concern is not Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT) but the overall terrorist onslaught by a variety of militant groups that threaten the Pakistani state and society.
A strident Indian statement against Pakistan or a public demand for punitive measures against the LeT may satisfy the imperatives of India's domestic politics but it enables the militant groups in Pakistan to mobilise public opinion in their favour by playing up anti-India sentiments. Further, the government of Pakistan does not want to be seen as taking action against these groups under pressure from India, especially when some of these groups like the LeT have cultivated support at the societal level due to their welfare activities.
Pakistan needs to decide about the role of groups like the LeT in its future security vision. As the militancy card has come to haunt Pakistan, should it not review its security approach altogether? It can put a check on the public statements and activities of the militants' leadership to defuse tension between India and Pakistan.
If Pakistan and India continue to pursue this current diplomacy and appear more interested in satisfying the needs of domestic politics, there is little hope for improved relations in the near future. However, they will continue to talk because they have learnt the art of talking without progress.