Indian Role in Afghanistan.

There is a difference between China and India in the eyes of muslims. Right now anti-us sentiment runs strong among them, and China is seen as outside the US camp whereas India is seen as very much in it. Also you need to differentiate the goverment and the people, yes some muslim countries (btw not too many, justb Eqypt and Turkey if I remember correctly and Turkey's prime minister just had a hot-headed run-in with Simon Perez) have diplomatic relationship with Israel, out of convenience, but generally speaking anti-semitic sentiment across the Islamic world has never run higher. Even though I'm from east asia which for the time being is not threatened by the islamic extremism, I have come to my realization that world wide the muslims are on a mission to conqur the world, and India is top in their agenda.

There is some deep problem with this narrative. India allows every religion to be practiced freely. You just need to see how much freedom China gives its Muslims. They have a raging Muslim insurgency which they are controlling with iron fist.

China-US relationship is again very strong. Most of these issues are make believe. They may think of India as a softer target compared to China, anything else is BS.

You are wrong about just "Eqypt and Turkey" as well, there are several more.

These Jihadis have had their arse handed to them. Right now they are no more than a nuisance. They are not going to capture a single street corner, leave alone a nuclear armed country.

Those N. bombs are not made for show, they are made to be used when needed!

Nukes are useless against spread of extremism. Ironically its the goverments and armies in the muslim world that are keeping islam extremism in check. And for India, and too lesser extent also China or any country with sizable muslim population, the danger mainly comes from within, external factors like al-qaida or foreign insugency fighters and ideologues could only play the role of catalysts. India, if I remember correctly, has over 150 million muslims spread throughout the country, and you can probably not tell muslims just by look, for me that's whese the danger starts. If only 1% of those 150 million people actively take part in jihad, you are screwed. Muslim extremism is spreading like wild fire, almost everywhere in the world including US and UK, there is no reason to believe that India with such huge muslim population is immune to it. China has problem with extremists too, but muslims are mainly confined in the remote west, and even there they are not majority. And most importantly at all, we look different so its not possible for the extremists to sneak upon us.

I disagree with the threat assessment provided by you. Muslim extremists have not shown the ability to take over even small countries with minuscule forces let alone a country the size of India!

Indian Muslims have proven themselves as totally patriot for decades. There is no reason to get alarmist over that as well.

Anyway we are going off topic and I would suggest that you open a new thread if you want to discuss this particular line.

The success of afghanistan lies in pakistan.decimate pakistan one will automatically slove afghanistan.USSR,USA did same mistakes so they slogged it out in afghanistan.BTW Todays russia and china have their own gameplan in afghanistan .they said no to usa doesnt mean they are not in the game coz they are are afraid of afghan quagmire.they are right there playing their own games and parts.like in 1980 usa was the hidden hand in afghanistan.or like 19 vietnam war china/ussr were the hidden players.there are many players in afghanistan including saudi arab and iran along with central asian republic.secondly if india has relations with usa israel why does it matter to jehadis even if india doesnt have relation with both jehadi even then will attack india.coz we for them are another kafirs in their ideology to be attacked.BTW we indian care about a lot it i do this what others will think.

You never know which side a camel will sit.

Indian envoys in Afghanistan face kidnap threat

TNN, Mar 13, 2010

NEW DELHI: After unarmed Indian citizens, Indian diplomats in Afghanistan are now under threat from Pakistan-supported terrorists.

According to government sources, India has received "credible" intelligence inputs on a terrorist plot to abduct Indian diplomats.

Coming against the backdrop of a determined effort by ISI to terrorise India into withdrawing from Afghanistan, India has taken the threat seriously, rushing 40 ITBP personnel to ramp up security of its diplomatic corps in Afghanistan.

The diplomats, an eyesore for Pakistan since their effort to rebuild Afghanistan's infrastructure has enhanced India's appeal in the country Islamabad considers its backyard, have been asked to be vigilant.

While Indian officials have been under constant threat in Afghanistan, the recent spate of intelligence inputs comes in the wake of the February 25 attack on Indians in Kabul.

The fear is also because of the track record of Pakistan-backed terror groups. Several years ago, they had massacred members of Iran's mission in Afghanistan.

An Indian diplomat in Afghanistan would be a huge prize for the Taliban and their Pakistani handlers, sources said.

Apart from everything else, it would create the kind of diplomatic crisis between India and Pakistan that would serve as a pretext for Pakistan to take its attention off the Taliban and the US campaign.

India sees the threat as coming principally from Pakistan's terror groups like the Haqqani network and the Lashkar-e-Taiba which are being used against India.

The Haqqanis are Pakistan's favourite Taliban group. Pakistan's army, seeing a growing advantage for itself in Afghanistan, is now more determined than ever to get India out of that country. After two attempts to attack the Indian embassy in Kabul, the Taliban have been training their sights on Indian consulates in Kandahar and Jalalabad.

Since the Indian embassy in Kabul is deemed to be reasonably secure, the additional personnel will be deployed in nearby areas with guesthouses and other residential quarters being used by Indian officials and their family members.

A senior official said, "A team of security/intelligence officials will soon go to Afghanistan to make detailed assessment of security arrangements at Indian establishments in Kabul, Kandahar and other cities. More forces will be sent, if needed, in due course."

At present, 163 ITBP personnel are deployed at the Indian embassy in Kabul and its consulates in Jalalabad, Kandahar, Herat and Mazar-e-Sharif.

Lisa Curtis' point in Taliban Reconciliation: Obama Administration Must Be Clear And Firm is clear, but so far US indications are that they do not intend to follow that advice. It might be a bit of this and a bit of that, but not quite! pakistan has offered the tired, effette American leadership of a sort of victory without too much more of costs - and the leadership, tired and bumbling it is, seems to find the prospect tantalising!

(pakistan OTOH, makes the usual mistake of punching above its weight - it might put up unacceptably high prices that might eventually be its undoing - but then this thread is about Afghanistan!) India's options seem limited. Having taken a clear stance against placing military on the ground (for whatever reasons- good or bad), the role will be similar to that Japan - aid giver, hard worker but always reviled and derided behind the back, and with zero influence! However we may feel, a bit of retreat is inevitable. We can keep up the dialog with the players and seek to influence through them. But right now, on that count pakistan's cards are stronger. Any request from them will be have to be conceded by practically all the players.

The objectives of US / UK / NATO and that of Iran / Afghanistan (as in current leadership) do not coincide. pakistan seeks to join the side that will pay more. China and Central Asian states seem to be hedging by playing both sides. Russian also hedging their bet with pakistan as indicative of Putin's speech in delhi as he advices new delhi to recognise pakistan's effort in curbing terror as seen in this article: Old allies, new friendship . India is definitely isolated. In the long run though, we can recover. Good work done and the links established will eventually pay off. But short term retreat appears inevitable. Medium term chaos too appears quite likely. India currently has a leadership that has no stomach for these kinds of things - this is the problem with placing non political academics (Manmohan Singh,PM) and failed local politicians (SM KRISHNA, the external affairs minister) in power. A successful politician would have fought many such fights in his/ her career, and will have his/her adrenalin pump at the situation. But I cannot see economists or local caste leaders doing that (hell, even Gurus like K. Subrahmanyam sing a new song!).

Indians nervous after Kabul attacks

Indians nervous after Kabul attacks

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8575745.stm


An Afghan policeman carries his machine gun at scene of attacks 26 Feb 2010
The attacks targeted an area popular with foreigners

By Sambuddha Mitra Mustafi
BBC News, Kabul



These days, the once thriving outpatient clinic at Afghanistan's leading hospital in the capital, Kabul, is shut - and the doctors are away.

A dozen Indian doctors and paramedics who run the clinic at the Indira Gandhi Institute of Child Health have also left, leaving the patients in the lurch.

They were shaken after a suicide attack in the city last month killed one of their own - a young doctor from India's north-eastern state of Manipur.

Seventeen people were killed in the 26 February attack on a number of guest houses in the Shar-i-Naw area. Seven of them, including the doctor, were Indians.

Cutting back

The doctors are not the only ones who have left Kabul after the latest attack, which many believe targeted Indians.

Robin Ghosh

"I get scared every time there is a blast or an attack"
Robin Ghosh, Waiter

An Indian company setting up mobile phone networks has decided to cut its Indian staff to 30 employees from 50 before the attacks.

"We will cut back on Indian employees and employ more locals," says Murali Shankar, who heads the Afghan operations of the firm. The firm already employs 50 Afghan employees.

The latest attack in Kabul has shaken the 3,500-odd Indians working in Afghanistan. They are mostly working on government-funded infrastructure and humanitarian projects.

India is one of Afghanistan's largest donors - it has pledged $1.3bn in development assistance.

Analysts say that India's arch-rival Pakistan is uneasy with its neighbour's expanding influence and reach.

Reports in India have blamed Pakistan-based groups of being behind two attacks on the Indian embassy in Kabul over the past two years and the 26 February attacks. Pakistan has denied such reports.

Indian workers confess that they are shaken by the attacks, especially the most recent ones.

"I get very scared every time there is a blast or an attack. I heard that the blast in February targeted Indians. Now I don't go out at all, nor do I speak to many locals," says Robin Ghosh, who works as a waiter in a Kabul curry house.

Mr Ghosh says he came to Kabul to work because the pay is much better - he earns $250 a month here, more than double what he earns at home.

Afghan concerns

He may be staying on to help keep the curry house running, but the departure of Indian doctors - authorities say it is a temporary measure - has hit Kabul's hospital hard.

The doctors treated some 250 patients every day at the out-patient department, many of them suffering from terminal diseases.

"Angry patients ask us why the Indian doctors have left," says Dr Noorulhaq Yousafzai, chief of the hospital.

"Their treatment and medicines were free of cost as they were funded by the Indian government - the same medicines are either unavailable or very expensive here," he says.

Embassy officials hope the doctors will return in a month's time.

"We are just waiting for an adequate number of volunteers," an official said.



The deserted outpatient department of Kabul hospital

They also dismiss a rash of media reports suggesting that India is scaling down its presence in Afghanistan.

Security has been tightened in places where Indians live and work, officials say.


India has already built a 218km (135-mile) road linking the south-western border town of Zaranj with the town of Delaram and completed work on a 200km (124-mile) electricity line from Uzbekistan to Kabul.

Indians are also building the new Afghan parliament in Kabul and the Salma dam in Herat province.

"There are no plans on reducing or downsizing our staff strength or our assistance programmes," an embassy official said.


Some names in the article have been changed to protect identities

IMO, I do not want indian troops in afghanistan on a combat role, yes a small contigent can be there with an operational command coordinating with the us and afghan authorities to protect indian assets, the number can be increased. We should avoid being pulled into the the fight against taliban. We should be thinking of sending in our troops for combat only if taliban link to terrorist attacks in india are established..!!!!

Af-Pak and India’s Strategic Innocence

If the grand design of the Manmohan Singh government is to forge peace with Pakistan as a liberating step in our sub-continental rivalry, India should surely be more understanding of Pakistani sensitivities in Afghanistan and its larger paranoia. Can a nation which has been done in once in the past, of course largely by its own blunders but also with some strategic help from India (the creation of Bangladesh), afford on its Western borders a government which is seen to be kowtowing to India? Much of this haranguing about strategic depth is nothing but a desperate desire in Pakistan for a friendly dispensation on its West, so that it is free from the fear of being destabilized from the rear. India’s good friend Hamid Karzai himself has alluded to the reality of the triangular matrix by describing Afghanistan and Pakistan as “conjoint twins” with India being a mere “friend.” In the dance for influence and power, therefore, why not gracefully allow the “twin” a larger role? Unless of course there are overwhelming compulsions of national interest, in which case we must recognize the prevalent hardball, take necessary risks and act with far greater persuasion and resolve so as to apply soft and hard power in an appropriate mix to get a foothold in the emerging power dynamic. The problem with India’s posture is that we seem to be shying away from the existing realities and simply hoping that economic engagement alone will secure our interests. It takes some strategic innocence to aspire for influence in a country as dangerous, conspiratorial and bloody as Afghanistan, without being willing to muddy our boots. And it is plainly ridiculous to expect Mr. Jayant Prasad and a lone military attach� to match the power and guile of Jallaluddin Haqqani and Shuja Pasha. If we seek greater influence in Afghanistan, we need to recognize the salience of military drivers therein and leverage our capacities accordingly. And if we are unwilling or unable to do so, simply and gracefully stay out. The reason we seem to be falling in between two stools is because we seek influence while being unwilling to take attendant risks (reiterating our resolve to stay engaged times without number, without spelling out as to how precisely we shall secure our interests).

India’s engagement in Afghanistan has been based on a set of soft choices - economic, infrastructural, developmental and humanitarian assistance (an estimated 4000 Indians are involved in the reconstruction effort with an investment of 1.3 billion dollars) with security guarantees coming from the Karzai government and its infantile tools. We eschewed a more deterministic military role for ourselves, even though short of direct military committal we could have done much more to shape the security dynamic in Afghanistan. We could have opted for greater involvement - through some direct military diplomacy and a broad based training commitment for instance (a stake in the planned training of 300,000 ANA/ANP personnel by 2013 is of course a gargantuan challenge but also a huge opportunity), so that we had friends, linkages and far greater leverage in the emerging security framework, but we chose not to. There were many who had cautioned against the adoption of this effete strategic outlook, whereby, even as we kept on enlarging our civilian engagement we did not do enough to shore up attendant security concerns, but we hung on to our bravado. There were others who advocated keeping channels open with some elements in the Taliban leadership but their calls went unheeded, defying not only common sense but also mathematical logic. The Taliban, it bears reiteration, represents the Pashtuns - the single largest ethnic identity in Afghanistan numbering about 40 million - how can you simply refuse to do business with such a numerically significant entity? Today, many liberal Pashtuns complain that India did not back them strongly enough. Of course, the choices were never and are still not easy, with each of the major players being a bundle of contradictions - Karzai is reportedly doing a deal with Pakistan because he feels that India did not put its weight behind him with sufficient resolve, the Taliban is grateful that India did not intervene militarily but openly claims responsibility for the recent attack in Kabul alleging RAW presence, and our natural ally (the United States) does not want us in because of fear of inviting Pakistani wrath. But the Pakistanis and the Americans were faced with similarly difficult choices - yet they did assert themselves and muscled their way in. In contrast, India was simply not assertive enough, a perception now publicly reinforced by the likes of Moridian Dawood, Advisor to the Afghan Foreign Minister, who has said, “India seems apologetic about its presence. It’s a regional player and must behave like one, instead of insisting on a benign presence with a penchant for staying in the background.” By design, or more accurately by conscious drift, therefore, we conceded the strategic initiative to Pakistan. We took the burden of a good democracy to Afghanistan, but as is our wont forgot to under gird it with force (not merely its combat dimension, but its numerous softer nuances). Pakistan, on the other hand, chose to pay with blood and leveraged its role in targeting the Afghan Taliban in hideouts on its side of the border with skill. From accused (terror epicentre) it turned approver and is now using arrests of key Taliban leaders (Mullah Baradar) to further muscle its way into the emerging power structure in Afghanistan. It has also deftly nuanced its counter terror response - decisive contest with the Pakistani Taliban (Tehreek-e-Taliban, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Sipah-e-Sahaba) and selective engagement with the Afghan Taliban, while continuing to aid and abet the LeT and Jaish as foreign policy tools along its Eastern borders.

With regard to the broader situation, there are of course huge difficulties, but there is also the faint glimmer of hope. The United States has done a great deal and will continue to remain engaged over the next 12 to 18 months in seeking military ascendancy over the Taliban. The fear that America will cut costs and run does sound a little unreal - having invested so much in blood and treasure it will stay for a while, and an early exit will come about only if America begins to cede the military initiative. If it continues with its military ascendancy as seems to be the case now, Obama will be empowered to prolong the American stay (public support for the American involvement in Afghanistan is already growing). The exit time table is more in the nature of a warning to others to get their act together, since the Americans cannot be expected to stay forever. Efforts are on under the stewardship of Maj. Gen. Richard Barrons to lure away the second tier leadership of the Taliban and peel away the hard core fighters by offering them jobs and cash (250 dollars a month as against 300 dollars on offer by the Taliban). In a few years from now, Afghanistan could begin to resemble today’s Iraq - restive, violent, not greatly democratized but not entirely anarchic either. Operation Mushtarak aimed at capturing the drug stronghold - Marjah, and despite the recent Taliban fightback in Musa Qala this may turn out to be the Fallujah moment in Afghanistan (not as bloody but possibly as decisive). If the trend continues in Kandahar (Operation Omaid is due to begin in June) and then in Eastern Afghanistan where the all powerful Jalaluddin Haqqani is ensconced in the provinces of Khost, Pakyta, Pakhtiar and Gardez, the halo of invincibility shrouding the Taliban may begin to disappear.

We do seem to have got it wrong - staying engaged as reiterated by the National Security Adviser and even by the Prime Minister, is of course a symbol of our altruistic resolve, but whether it reflects strategic acuity or even level headed pragmatism is another matter. Afghanistan was a test case for our foreign policy resolve - an arena where while leveraging other tools of foreign policy, use of instruments of force and military diplomacy/intelligence should have been predominant. But that would have meant a paradigm shift in our foreign policy construct, leading to a greater role for the military. It was easier therefore to deflect by jumping to the usual conclusions about use of force not being an option - the various reasons being trotted out do seem to be frivolous. The end state in Afghanistan will soon reflect the pusillanimous reality, because in life as in diplomacy you reap as you sow. While we may continue to gain goodwill, we will soon be faced with the prospect of waning influence in the evolving power structure and little security for our civilian presence. Closer home, we may be faced with a qualitatively upgraded terror threat - the ISI/LeT could use surrendered Taliban cadres to bring the menace of deadly suicide bombers to our door step (revelations in the ongoing Headley saga which document his linkages with elements of the Al Qaeda in North Waziristan point to the rather ominous possibilities of collusion). Even at this late stage there is a need to seriously review our options. We lack the necessary military presence and leverage with the security establishment in Afghanistan to secure our interests. Hamid Karzai is simply not in a position to guarantee our security. It may be more prudent to roll back our civilian engagement, unless we wish to lose more civilian lives. Merely pumping in more and more CRPF personnel in defensive rings will be of little help in a country where we have no penetration in the central facets of the security dynamic and no worthwhile military presence, such defensive rings can be easily breached - especially by seasoned rogues from the ISI.

We also need to ponder over our broader approach - instead of going down the familiar road of preachiness/talking down to Pakistan (repeatedly describing it as a state whose creation was fundamentally flawed, a failed/failing state, etc.) and indulging in endless diplomatic gobbledygook without accompanying resolve, we need to change tone and tenor and become less patronising while quietly undergirding our own response with far greater acuity and resolve. It may also be useful if we were to revisit the utility and wisdom of some of our own polemical rhetoric. We need to acknowledge that Pakistan may be a troubled state in many ways but it is neither failed, nor failing. Given its peculiar dynamic it is indeed a smart survivor with an uncanny knack of leveraging its benefactors (the Americans and the Chinese) with particular finesse. We must also avoid the easy temptation of churlishly finding fault for many of our own failings in the persona of the Pakistan Army - the number of people in Delhi’s seminar circuit who needlessly spit venom on the Pakistan military as the mother of all evils is indeed incredible. “Kashmir is merely an obsession with the Pakistan Army, the ordinary Pakistani does not care,” is the frequent assertion. Really? Last week, prominent Pakistani media personality Hamid Mir (who is no friend of the Pakistan military establishment), when asked by CNN-IBN as to what was the central obstacle in India-Pakistan relations, simply stated “Kashmir.” We need to acknowledge this reality. Sample some of the responses to the recently concluded Strategic Dialogue in Washington. As soon as news came that Kayani and Shuja Pasha would attend, we saw a spate of Pakistan military bashing once again. Strategic Dialogues are a great deal about matters military - so if Generals Kayani and Shuja Pasha represented the Pakistani delegation, Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman JCS, represented the Americans. That is the global practice. If our own horribly antiquated practices don’t reflect the same, we need to make amends and not curse the Pakistan military. Anyway, while there is little we can do about the US-Pakistan or Sino-Pakistan engagements, there is a great deal we can do ourselves - strengthening our counter terror response domestically, making sure we have viable military response options in the event of another Mumbai (well thought through, swift and decisive), restoring our greatly eroded conventional military edge, enhancing the credibility of our nuclear deterrent, initiating long pending organizational and structural defence reforms in the absence of which we shall continue to field an impaired military capability. This will be far more useful than the endless parroting of strategic nonsense like “force is no option”. Strategic Restraint lies in holding back despite the capacities and not in indulging in a lengthy exchange of dossiers since you neither have the capacities nor the resolve. While the former will inspire respect and may even deter, the latter is more likely to provoke fresh bouts of adventurism (especially when your thresholds are being monitored by smart cookies like Kayani and Shuja Pasha who sense weakness in our predilection to hum and haw).

Unfortunately, while this country has an extremely astute and sagacious political leadership, our National Security Management Structures (those that proffer options and advice) are held hostage to the Indian Foreign Service which may be extremely adept at leveraging diplomacy but has little understanding of instruments of force and their nuanced utilities. So when the odd opportunity does arise to graft the two in the interest of Indian statecraft they choke. Afghanistan is an instructive case in point. The absence of cross cultural inputs and a viable military dynamic in our foreign policy construct is the most serious handicap in our statecraft. A good way to begin might lie in designating somebody with a sound strategic mind and an understanding of the military dynamic as the Special Envoy to Afghanistan - it could be a Lt. General from the Army or somebody like C. Raja Mohan. Such an arrangement will be a welcome departure from the present practice of an extended swaddle (the Ambassador, Special Envoy and key appointments in the National Security Council are exclusively IFS) presenting the political leadership with the usual rigmarole - the same suspects producing the same stereotyped views. But will our combative turf warriors ever be able to place national interest before their own? Or, will our political class summon the nerve to abandon outdated tenets of civilian control and seek direct, unfettered, professional military advice on matters of foreign policy while simultaneously infusing our National Security Structures with cross cultural talent? Desultory consultation (often only when the crisis erupts) must make way for intimate, prior, continuous and informed dialogue with the military and the strategic community. The resultant feed will help to develop and nurture capacities, that allow us, when confronted with challenges like Afghanistan, to apply comprehensive national power to more purposeful effect.

http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/Af-P...rshukla_020410

India's eager courtship of Afghanistan comes at a steep price

CHELEBAAK, AFGHANISTAN -- Along a rugged stretch of road in the shadow of the snow-covered Hindu Kush mountains, villagers in mud-brick huts praised the newest addition to their vista: a series of massive steel towers that reach into the clouds.

The towers, part of a $1.3 billion aid package from India, carry electricity to a crippled region that has long gone without. They also represent an intense competition between India and arch-rival Pakistan for influence in whatever kind of Afghanistan emerges from the U.S.-led war.

To blunt India's eager courtship of Afghanistan, Pakistan is pouring $300 million of its own money and resources into a nation it also views as key to the stability of volatile South Asia, as well as a potentially lucrative business partner.

The economic stakes are especially enormous for India, the far richer nation, as it seeks energy to fuel its rise as a global economic power. Afghanistan is a bridge to Central Asia's vast gas and oil reserves, which are coveted by India and Pakistan, both of which have nuclear weapons but barely enough electricity.

India's efforts have come at a cost: It has suffered four attacks on its interests in Afghanistan in the past two years, which have killed at least 101 people and wounded 239. Attacks on two Kabul guesthouses in February killed seven Indians, including a visiting musician and the chief engineer of the Chelebaak electricity project.

For U.S. officials, India's increasing presence in Afghanistan is causing new security and diplomatic problems in a country where more than 1,000 American troops have died in more than eight years of war. Washington also fears upsetting the delicate balance in its relations with Islamabad.

"Let's be honest with one another: There are real suspicions in both India and Pakistan about what the other is doing in Afghanistan," Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates told reporters after a recent trip to New Delhi.

Washington is feeling pressure from Pakistan to limit India's role in Afghanistan. Each nation fears, to a degree that outsiders often find irrational, that an Afghanistan allied with the other would be threat to its security. Pakistan considers Afghanistan, another majority-Muslim nation, a natural ally and is deeply suspicious of India's efforts there.



"We don't want to be flanked by hostile elements," said Mansoor Ahmad Khan, deputy chief of mission in the Pakistani Embassy in Kabul, referring to Pakistan's location -- sandwiched between Afghanistan to the west and India to the east.

U.S. and NATO officials said they feared militant groups linked to Pakistan would step up attacks on Indian aid workers and other India-linked targets in Afghanistan, complicating efforts to stabilize the country.

Indian officials have publicly stated that they suspect a Pakistani role in the attacks against Indians; Pakistani officials have rejected the charges. Indian and U.S. intelligence officials have linked Pakistan to the 2008 bombing of the Indian Embassy in Kabul, which killed more than 50 people, saying Pakistani intelligence had collaborated with militants. Indian officials also suspect Pakistani involvement in a suicide bombing at the embassy in October, which killed 17 people.

In the guesthouse attacks, Afghan intelligence officials publicly blamed Lashkar-i-Taiba, a Pakistan-based militant group that has been implicated in the 2008 siege in Mumbai that killed 165 people. The guesthouse bombings shocked many Indians and intensified widespread popular anger against Pakistan. Indians and Afghans were partly enraged because Bhola Ram, the Chelebaak engineer, and several other victims were Indian nationals working on aid projects.

"Bhola Ram's project was almost done when he was killed," said Giliani Lutfi, 45, an Afghan co-worker at the new electrical plant just outside Kabul. "Please tell India, we are so sorry. Ram gave our people power, and that means life to us. It wasn't the Afghan people who stole his life."

While war still rages in parts of Afghanistan, India and Pakistan are building roads, hospitals and schools, as well as undertaking irrigation and power projects -- all while claiming closer links to Kabul.

"Our longest border is with Afghanistan. We have deep cultural and economic and people-to-people ties," said Khan, the Pakistani official in Kabul. "India may be very vocal about their aid projects here, but we don't need to publicize our position. Pakistan's role speaks for itself."

Indian officials note that their country has educated many of Afghanistan's top leaders, including President Hamid Karzai, who has a master's degree from an Indian university.

And when the U.S.-led coalition invaded Afghanistan in 2001 to oust the Taliban, India provided intelligence and other military support, according to Rani Mullen, an upcoming fellow at New Delhi's Center for Policy Research.

The competition between the two nations can seem silly at times: When India donated a fleet of buses in the western city of Herat, Pakistan began donating buses decorated with painted Pakistani flags.



But the rivalry also has serious implications for the U.S.-led war. Karzai favors attempts to negotiate a settlement with the Taliban, an idea supported by Pakistan. Indian leaders fear that any Afghan settlement with the Taliban would give Pakistan more influence in Kabul, which they view with alarm.

"If you want to try to reconcile with people who are institutionally and ideologically linked with terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda, then caution is advised," Jayant Prasad, the Indian ambassador to Afghanistan, said in an interview at his residence, which is patrolled by armed guards and heavily fortified with sandbag bunkers and razor wire.

New Delhi's diplomatic offensive in Afghanistan is on display at a dusty Kabul construction site, where Indian engineers are working with Afghans to build a $90 million parliament, funded by India.

The floors and walls of the palacelike structure, a gleaming symbol of the new Afghanistan, are to be inlaid with green and rose marble from the Indian state of Rajasthan.

Such Indian-sponsored projects are sprouting from Kabul to Herat, widely considered Afghanistan's cultural heart and home to poets, painters and Sufi mystics. And they continue despite the targeted violence against Indians. In February, Nawab Khan, an Indian musician who plays a percussion instrument known as a tabla, came to Herat to play a concert sponsored by the Indian government.

"He was sitting right here after the performance," said Tara Chand, consul general of the heavily guarded Indian consulate in Herat. "He played to a full house. All the Afghans took photographs of him with their cellphones. It was a lovely night."

Khan returned to Kabul, to fly home to New Delhi. But during the guesthouse bombings that also killed Bhola Ram, the father of six was crushed to death when the roof collapsed on him.

The guesthouse deaths outraged many Afghans, and Ram's co-workers gathered to pray for him after the attack.

Outside Kabul one recent day, at the Chimtala substation where Ram worked, young Afghans proudly inspected the power plant wearing new work boots and coats donated by India.

Sitting in a sun-streamed classroom, Sayed Arif, 25, and other young engineers were learning how to run the power plant.

"We very much want the Indians here," Arif said, looking out at the power lines that India brought to his country. "That much in Afghanistan we are sure of."

India to stay in Afghanistan despite Pak objections

During an hour-long bilateral meeting held between Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and US President Obama held at Blair house in Washington on Sunday, the Indian PM has made it clear that there was no question of withdrawing from Afghanistan despite Pakistan’s objection.

The uncompromising posture on Afghanistan is based on the efforts India has made in the war-torn country, where many Indians have also been killed. In 2008, India’s Military Attach� Brig R.D. Mehta and IFS officer Venkat Rao were killed in a suicide bombing. This year six Indians, including two Indian army Majors were killed when Taliban terrorists attacked the hotel where they were staying.

India, which did not send troops to Afghanistan to support the US-led global war on terror (GWOT), is involved in large scale humanitarian relief work. As part of the relief work, India has pledged US$1.3 billion in aid to the Afghan government, making it the biggest regional contributor. It is also constructing power stations, schools, hospitals, and training the Afghan national army apart from gifting buses to setup a public transport system and providing aircrafts to Afghanistan’s national carrier.

The meeting that took place on the side-lines of the ongoing nuclear security summit was significant to both countries, since diplomatic relations were strained due to several recent issues like India not getting access to 26/11 Mumbai attacks mastermind, David Headley, who is under US custody and the US' decision to supply more weapons (F-16s, frigates etc) to Pakistan despite India's concerns.

On its part, the US response was positive on both the important issues. OneIndia reports that Obama has assured India will get access to Headley. However, no time, date or place has yet been finalised. Another important outcome of the meeting was President Obama applauding the Indian role in Afghanistan and expressing desire that India continue the good work in Kabul, as well as promising to monitor the US arms aid to Pakistan reports Hindustan Times.

As a consequence of the tough stand taken by PM Manmohan Singh, PTI reports that Obama has prevailed upon the Pakistani PM Yousuf Raza Gilani, in a bilateral meeting, to reign in the terror groups like LeT operating against India from its soil.

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Look at the mid-range too

There is much irony in the fact that Afghanistan has evolved into a huge rock in the path of relations between India and the United States. Strategically, there is little difference between the two countries. More so than almost any other country, New Delhi hopes that Washington will keep its troops in Afghanistan, defeat the Taliban and establish a democratic and sovereign government in Kabul.
They differ strongly, however, on how this should be accomplished. The cost of the Afghan war and geographical necessity have meant Pakistan has gained a larger-than-life role in Washington’s ‘Af-Pak’ policy. The US has no illusions that Pakistan speaks with a forked tongue on Afghanistan. India may complain, but ultimately it cannot provide an alternative to what Pakistan provides. Thus the irony: Pakistan is more essential to the war than India, but it is far less genuine a supporter of the US’s aims.
Unfortunately, neither India nor the US has found out a way to get around this thorny tangle of contradiction. This constitutes a failure of diplomacy on both sides. At the very least, Manmohan Singh and Barack Obama should have provided the relationship enough ballast to let their two countries sail above the Af-Pak conundrum. But nothing of the sort has happened. The conclusion of the civil nuclear agreement left a vacuum in the bilateral discourse and nothing has yet filled that space. The result is that minor irritants and excitable commentary dominate. Access to David Headley is important but hardly the stuff of grand strategy. India is as much to blame as the US. Its feetdragging on various military agreements and bungling of the civil nuclear liability bill’s passage is reawakening sceptics in Washington who have long argued India is not ready to be a global player.
Trivial pursuit has replaced chess even when the two heads of government met. What was striking about the Singh-Obama meeting in Washington was how much Pakistan-related issues dominated the proceedings. India lowered its own strategic horizon and the US did not bother to try and lift it. Things can and are likely to change. The US
Af-Pak military game is still unfolding and Pakistan may yet be surprised by its consequences. But more importantly, new and important synergies in education, technology and commerce are just starting to come to fruition between the two countries. It’s time New Delhi realises that medium-sized ideas can be as transformational as one big one.