sorcerer
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"Patriotism should be coupled with practicality to ensure a progressive nations "- So sayz Moi
The various reports coming out of white house looks at Indias existing navel resources to hedge the US position in IOR. US would have agendas..so does India!!!!
A nice read like a Sheldon Novel minus the Femme Fatales in lingeries.
This article is in 4 parts.
Part 1 of 4
India in the Indian Ocean Region Re-calibrating U.S. Expectations
In Brief
"¢ The U.S.-India strategic partnership came with great hype about India's potential contribution to U.S. interests, that has led recently to a sense of disappointment in the absence of a realistic appraisal of India's international posture. A reassessment of India's strategy and objectives is therefore necessary.
"¢ India is an independent-minded actor, unwilling to compromise its strategic autonomy. Any notions of a transactional relationship with India, or enlisting India to
manage China's rise, should be abandoned.
"¢ The Indian Ocean region, an area of growing importance to both the United States and India, offers an illustration of the fact that similar interests do not necessarily lead to joint actions.
"¢ India is seeking to establish itself on the global stage as the main resident power of the Indian Ocean, willing cooperate with all external powers while aligning with none, to prevent strategies that might polarize the Indian Ocean region.
"¢ As the U.S. re-balances its global engagements, it is beginning to promote an "Indo-Pacific" framework that would integrate the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean into a single region. A focus on economic incentives over strategic considerations might be preferable to convince India to buy into this new construct.
"¢ After the rapid transformations and the excitement of the past few years, the U.S.- India bilateral relationship must now settle down: leaders should focus on strengthen-ing ties by embracing small, concrete opportunities to cooperate rather than target ahigh-profile initiative, as the relationship needs time and substance to mature.
"¢ Patience and firmness will therefore be required to nudge the strategic partnership along and enhance its productivity down the road.
An attractive candidate... down the road
The Obama administration does not appear to harbor great expectations that India will provide much support for U.S. initiatives as of yet6 – Secretary of State Hillary Clinton described overtures to India as a "strategic bet.7" Nonetheless, the U.S. is keen to enhance ties and lay the groundwork for closer cooperation in the future, by developing military exercises beyond their current levels, something India has appeared reluctant to agree to.
Beyond India's democratic nature and its demographic and economic weight, geography also contributes to make it an appealing candidate for greater cooperation. It juts out into the center of the Indian Ocean like a tongue9 from the North into the center of the region, with long coastlines facing East and West (totaling over 4,500 miles). As such, it sits at the center of the world's third-largest ocean, through which transit half of all containers and more than 70% of oil products.
As maritime trade becomes increasingly important for interconnected economies (India itself conducts nearly 40% of its trade with littoral nations along the Indian Ocean rim10, and depends on shipping lanes for a significant portion of its growing energy needs11), securing the Ocean that connects the Straits of Hormuz to the Straits of Malacca will be essential for global stability.
As U.S. shifts its focus more and more to the Asia-Pacific, it is naturally eager to see India become a "net security provider" for the region, preserving maritime transportation routes and possibly the global commons in Indian Ocean, given the two nations' shared commitment to preserving open lanes of communication for all.12 Steps taken by India over the past decade to expand its presence and enhance its influence throughout the Indian Ocean region have made such a prospect all the more alluring to U.S. policymakers, even as the rapprochement between the two countries has made it seem more plausible.
India is currently embarked on a large-scale program to upgrade its military capabilities,13 and is allocating large sums to the modernization of its Navy. This represents a noteworthy departure from the past, as the navy has traditionally suffered from neglect in the eyes of Indian policymakers focused on the land-based challenges emanating from China and Pakistan.14 Fueled by regular increases in its budget since 2001, India's drive todevelop a "blue-water" navy has focused essentially on acquiring three key attributes. The priorities identified by naval officials and policymakers (beyond the imperative of buttressing coastal defenses, especially in the wake of the 2008 Mumbai attacks) aim, ultimately, at enhancing India's maritime "presence" throughout the Indian Ocean region:
Reinforcing force projection capabilities:
o Purchase of an aircraft carrier from Russia (the Admiral Gorshkov, renamed the INS Vikramaditya) that is being entirely refitted;\
o Construction of another aircraft carrier in Indian shipyards;
o Acquisition of Deepak-class tankers with a range of 12,000 miles, expanding the perimeter Indian ships can venture out to;
o Construction of multiple Shivalik-class stealth frigates, projected to be the main vessel of the Indian Navy for the first half of the 21st century.15
- Bolstering deterrence
o Purchase of six Scorpène-class attack submarines from France (to be built in Indian shipyards).
o Construction of its very own nuclear-powered submarine, the INS Arihant. Strengthening maritime awareness:
o Acquisition of a growing number of P-8I long-range maritime reconnaissance aircraft from Boeing16 to address a major gap in surveillance capabilities, including the detection of submarines.
In addition, India has sought to exploit the considerable advantages of its geographic features to further increase its ability to extend out into the Indian Ocean region, by constructing or upgrading a series of bases and facilities.
- In 2001, India inaugurated a new facility in the Andaman and Nicobar islands. The strategic location of this archipelago, at the crossroads between the Bay of Bengal and Southeast Asia, is a major reason why this site was elevated in 2005 to an inter-services base housing Air Force and Army personnel in addition to naval forces. On the other side, to the West, Indian leaders chose the archipelago of Lak- shadweep, close to the Arabian Sea, to host a naval base, primarily for coastal surveillance.17
- To reaffirm India's thrust toward the Southwest Indian Ocean region, the Indian Navy established a third regional command, the Southern Naval Command, headquartered in Kochi near the southern- most tip of the country.
- Finally, India has begun building an important naval base next to Karwar, on its Western coast, not far from Mumbai. The INS Kadamba, or Project Seabird, as it is known, represents an extremely large undertaking to be carried out in several phases; the first phase gave the Indian Navy its first exclusive port (it has to share all others with merchant vessels, and cede to them priority access to Indian ports). The second phase, begun in 2011, will expand the base into the largest naval facility in Asia.
As the Indian navy's budget has grown, so too has its use as an instrument of foreign policy. Indeed, numerous instances of naval diplomacy have occurred over the past 10-15 years, with Indian vessels paying port calls, participating in joint maneuvers or patrolling a partner's territorial waters.
In doing so, special attention has been paid to the Southwestern island- nations, designated an "area of vital interest" in 2006 by then-Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Arun Prakash.19 India enjoys strong historical ties with this region. Mauritius, for instance, has a significant population of Indian heritage: India's determination to consolidate its influence has led it to undertake regular missions patrolling Mauritius' waters on its behalf. The establishment in 2007 of a listening post in Madagascar20 – the first one to be located outside of Indian national territory21 –marked an escalation by endowing India with a permanent presence in the area.
New Delhi has been mindful, at the same time, to develop privileged naval ties in other parts of the Indian Ocean as well: to the East, a bilateral defense agreement was signed with Singapore in 2003; to the West, negotiations have resulted in the signature, since 2005, of several defense agreements with the sultanate of Oman, situated along the Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf.
Such agreements give India a presence, whether directly or indirectly, on the rims of what the Indian Navy defines as its primary area of operations, from the Persian Gulf to the Straits of Malacca.
The various reports coming out of white house looks at Indias existing navel resources to hedge the US position in IOR. US would have agendas..so does India!!!!
A nice read like a Sheldon Novel minus the Femme Fatales in lingeries.
This article is in 4 parts.
Part 1 of 4
India in the Indian Ocean Region Re-calibrating U.S. Expectations
In Brief
"¢ The U.S.-India strategic partnership came with great hype about India's potential contribution to U.S. interests, that has led recently to a sense of disappointment in the absence of a realistic appraisal of India's international posture. A reassessment of India's strategy and objectives is therefore necessary.
"¢ India is an independent-minded actor, unwilling to compromise its strategic autonomy. Any notions of a transactional relationship with India, or enlisting India to
manage China's rise, should be abandoned.
"¢ The Indian Ocean region, an area of growing importance to both the United States and India, offers an illustration of the fact that similar interests do not necessarily lead to joint actions.
"¢ India is seeking to establish itself on the global stage as the main resident power of the Indian Ocean, willing cooperate with all external powers while aligning with none, to prevent strategies that might polarize the Indian Ocean region.
"¢ As the U.S. re-balances its global engagements, it is beginning to promote an "Indo-Pacific" framework that would integrate the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean into a single region. A focus on economic incentives over strategic considerations might be preferable to convince India to buy into this new construct.
"¢ After the rapid transformations and the excitement of the past few years, the U.S.- India bilateral relationship must now settle down: leaders should focus on strengthen-ing ties by embracing small, concrete opportunities to cooperate rather than target ahigh-profile initiative, as the relationship needs time and substance to mature.
"¢ Patience and firmness will therefore be required to nudge the strategic partnership along and enhance its productivity down the road.
An attractive candidate... down the road
The Obama administration does not appear to harbor great expectations that India will provide much support for U.S. initiatives as of yet6 – Secretary of State Hillary Clinton described overtures to India as a "strategic bet.7" Nonetheless, the U.S. is keen to enhance ties and lay the groundwork for closer cooperation in the future, by developing military exercises beyond their current levels, something India has appeared reluctant to agree to.
Beyond India's democratic nature and its demographic and economic weight, geography also contributes to make it an appealing candidate for greater cooperation. It juts out into the center of the Indian Ocean like a tongue9 from the North into the center of the region, with long coastlines facing East and West (totaling over 4,500 miles). As such, it sits at the center of the world's third-largest ocean, through which transit half of all containers and more than 70% of oil products.
As maritime trade becomes increasingly important for interconnected economies (India itself conducts nearly 40% of its trade with littoral nations along the Indian Ocean rim10, and depends on shipping lanes for a significant portion of its growing energy needs11), securing the Ocean that connects the Straits of Hormuz to the Straits of Malacca will be essential for global stability.
As U.S. shifts its focus more and more to the Asia-Pacific, it is naturally eager to see India become a "net security provider" for the region, preserving maritime transportation routes and possibly the global commons in Indian Ocean, given the two nations' shared commitment to preserving open lanes of communication for all.12 Steps taken by India over the past decade to expand its presence and enhance its influence throughout the Indian Ocean region have made such a prospect all the more alluring to U.S. policymakers, even as the rapprochement between the two countries has made it seem more plausible.
India is currently embarked on a large-scale program to upgrade its military capabilities,13 and is allocating large sums to the modernization of its Navy. This represents a noteworthy departure from the past, as the navy has traditionally suffered from neglect in the eyes of Indian policymakers focused on the land-based challenges emanating from China and Pakistan.14 Fueled by regular increases in its budget since 2001, India's drive todevelop a "blue-water" navy has focused essentially on acquiring three key attributes. The priorities identified by naval officials and policymakers (beyond the imperative of buttressing coastal defenses, especially in the wake of the 2008 Mumbai attacks) aim, ultimately, at enhancing India's maritime "presence" throughout the Indian Ocean region:
Reinforcing force projection capabilities:
o Purchase of an aircraft carrier from Russia (the Admiral Gorshkov, renamed the INS Vikramaditya) that is being entirely refitted;\
o Construction of another aircraft carrier in Indian shipyards;
o Acquisition of Deepak-class tankers with a range of 12,000 miles, expanding the perimeter Indian ships can venture out to;
o Construction of multiple Shivalik-class stealth frigates, projected to be the main vessel of the Indian Navy for the first half of the 21st century.15
- Bolstering deterrence
o Purchase of six Scorpène-class attack submarines from France (to be built in Indian shipyards).
o Construction of its very own nuclear-powered submarine, the INS Arihant. Strengthening maritime awareness:
o Acquisition of a growing number of P-8I long-range maritime reconnaissance aircraft from Boeing16 to address a major gap in surveillance capabilities, including the detection of submarines.
In addition, India has sought to exploit the considerable advantages of its geographic features to further increase its ability to extend out into the Indian Ocean region, by constructing or upgrading a series of bases and facilities.
- In 2001, India inaugurated a new facility in the Andaman and Nicobar islands. The strategic location of this archipelago, at the crossroads between the Bay of Bengal and Southeast Asia, is a major reason why this site was elevated in 2005 to an inter-services base housing Air Force and Army personnel in addition to naval forces. On the other side, to the West, Indian leaders chose the archipelago of Lak- shadweep, close to the Arabian Sea, to host a naval base, primarily for coastal surveillance.17
- To reaffirm India's thrust toward the Southwest Indian Ocean region, the Indian Navy established a third regional command, the Southern Naval Command, headquartered in Kochi near the southern- most tip of the country.
- Finally, India has begun building an important naval base next to Karwar, on its Western coast, not far from Mumbai. The INS Kadamba, or Project Seabird, as it is known, represents an extremely large undertaking to be carried out in several phases; the first phase gave the Indian Navy its first exclusive port (it has to share all others with merchant vessels, and cede to them priority access to Indian ports). The second phase, begun in 2011, will expand the base into the largest naval facility in Asia.
As the Indian navy's budget has grown, so too has its use as an instrument of foreign policy. Indeed, numerous instances of naval diplomacy have occurred over the past 10-15 years, with Indian vessels paying port calls, participating in joint maneuvers or patrolling a partner's territorial waters.
In doing so, special attention has been paid to the Southwestern island- nations, designated an "area of vital interest" in 2006 by then-Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Arun Prakash.19 India enjoys strong historical ties with this region. Mauritius, for instance, has a significant population of Indian heritage: India's determination to consolidate its influence has led it to undertake regular missions patrolling Mauritius' waters on its behalf. The establishment in 2007 of a listening post in Madagascar20 – the first one to be located outside of Indian national territory21 –marked an escalation by endowing India with a permanent presence in the area.
New Delhi has been mindful, at the same time, to develop privileged naval ties in other parts of the Indian Ocean as well: to the East, a bilateral defense agreement was signed with Singapore in 2003; to the West, negotiations have resulted in the signature, since 2005, of several defense agreements with the sultanate of Oman, situated along the Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf.
Such agreements give India a presence, whether directly or indirectly, on the rims of what the Indian Navy defines as its primary area of operations, from the Persian Gulf to the Straits of Malacca.