There is a fair amount of balance in his posts.
One should address his post and not bait him!
There is a fair amount of balance in his posts.
One should address his post and not bait him!
I have 2 apples, u have none. I grab one and claim another. And then say if you agree with me that one apple is mine, i will not try to snatch your other apple. Great logic China No wonder your colonials master's mouth piece BBC loves you so much
India needs to start buying UK arms to avoid the reappearing of the stories of this nature。
Ok. Mental note. Be nice to Amoy.
Just to clarify, I have no issues regarding Chinese ethnic people. They are amongst the nicest most polite people I know. Heck, my nephew married a HK Chinese girl, and I get on great with her. My issues are with the CCP and their nationistic fascist bullying policies. With these people there should be no appeasment, Neville Chamberlin learned this the hard way.
OK, have it out with CCP and mention it so.
However, as they say, take on the message and not the messenger!
Chinese, as people, are as good or bad as you or me!
I, too, have Chinese relations and they are super.
But that does not stop me from not commenting on the CCP or comments that, to my mind, are too way out!
Kickok, Amoy, Ohimalaya and SWJsome number are quite on the ball! They have to support their country, but they do so with facts and not emotional claptrap. One must appreciate that!
Not that I am saying anyone is wrong or right in what one is doing.
Last edited by Ray; 21-04-12 at 03:38 PM.
FYI, i haven't said that you were a CCP worker. As i said several times before, u are a chinese in the head, wherever u are. And the fact that u tried to cover up your position and tried to bring legitimacy to your posts by repeatedly claiming yourself as American. If u are an american, u would have considered china as existential threat to the world. U may have lived in the US but u can never become an american. Irrespective of what you say, the existential bias is clearly visible in your posts. Different opinions are always welcome but always taking one side is called bias. U can be biased if u are chinese. But since u call your self an American, it's called hypocracy. And still i haven't seen a single legitimate post properly criticizing china and taking indian side on atleast one single matter in this forum. Post it and u might get off my 'bash' list
s002wjh - You sure know you have an IP? And you also know Chinese hackers are not that sophisticated not to leave traces? You're probably the only guys who have been honey-trapped, again and again.
Last edited by Oracle; 24-04-12 at 01:14 AM.
again link post of my bias? did i said china has authority over india/china boarder, SCS, taiwan? like i said goto this forum, china section there are plently stuff i said about china negativetly. if you agree to the term of my previous post, ill link those post for ya.
ILLEGALLY? Defined by who? You? No doubt.
When you decided to acknowledge that tibet is part of China, whatever you claim on the McMahon line was a dispute between China and India.
We don't think China should follow the European way. We just don't think majority of Chinese would support any policy of giving up disputed area as much as indians.
If you think that individual chinese's free will will be different of indians on this border dispute, you are an idiot.
Strategic Road-Building along the India-China border
June 7, 2012
One of the most strategic landscapes for India is the northeast of India. The region shares a 4,500 km international border with Bangladesh, Bhutan, China and Myanmar. The 1,080 km border with China across the state of Arunachal Pradesh in the northeast is disputed, a dispute that led to a war between India and China in 1962. While the 1962 war did not escalate beyond a border war, the cause of the war, a disputed border, has not been resolved as yet. Besides a disputed border, China also claims 90,000 square kms of territory in the northeast; which includes the entire state of Arunachal Pradesh. To China, the state of Arunachal Pradesh is significant for two strategic reasons. First, Arunachal Pradesh borders Tibet. Tibet is one of the most uncomfortable political issues for China given the continuous Tibetan and international questioning of its legitimacy there. China fears that the Tibetan-government-in exile in India could use Arunachal Pradesh as a base to provide external support to the Tibetans in Tibet to resist the Chinese occupation. Secondly, Arunachal Pradesh is home to the second most important monastery of Tibetan Buddhism after Lhasa: the Tawang Monastery. The strong Tibetan Buddhist culture along the border districts of Arunachal Pradesh like Tawang and Upper Siang could provide the vital link to Tibetans inside Tibet looking for outside support. The presence of the Dalai Lama in India and his visits to the Tawang monastery for religious purposes further creates anxieties for China in this regard.
To bolster its territorial claim and keep Tibet under its control, China has built up its military presence in Tibet with about 300,000 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) troops coupled with six Rapid Reaction Forces (RPFs) at Chengdu with the ability to reach the India-China border in 48 hours. Several airfields have also been established in Tibet, namely Hoping, Pangta and Kong Ka. Added to this is the massive road building projects undertaken by China in both Tibet and Yunnan right up to the India-China border with an approximate budget of $ 325 billion. Of critical value to China’s troop movement into Tibet is the 2000 km Qinghai-Tibet railway.
Responding to the urgent need to build strategic roads along the India-China border, the Ministry of Home sanctioned 1,934 crore on 4 June 2012 for strategic road projects of about 804 kms in order to support the operational movement of the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) along the India-China border, both in the eastern and the western sector. This includes the territory from the Karakoram Pass in Ladakh to Jachep La in Arunachal Pradesh covering about 3,488 kms of border. The task of building these roads have been given to the Border Roads Organisation (BRO), the Central Public Works Department (CPWD), and the National Projects Construction Corporation. Significantly, the Arunachal Pradesh 2005 Human Development Report identified infrastructure development as one of the key concerns of the state. This was followed up with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s package of 24,000 crore in 2009 for building the 1,500 kms Trans-Arunachal Pradesh highway.
One of the biggest obstacles to road-building in Arunachal Pradesh has been the Indian strategic mindset which viewed the lack of roads in the state as a defence mechanism to stop Chinese troop movement into India’s heartland if China did a repeat of 1962. This mindset continued to influence New Delhi’s policy towards Arunachal Pradesh right up to mid-2000. However, a more confident India with a strong economy could ill afford to neglect the aspirations of the people of Arunachal Pradesh for better infrastructure. There has been growing demand within Arunachal Pradesh for better roads, more robust Indian defence mechanisms, and better institutional structures. The first sign of a shift in the Indian defensive thinking about strategic roads came about in May 2006 when the Cabinet Committee on Economic Affairs (CCEA) cleared the construction of strategic roads in Arunachal Pradesh. This reversed the 1962 mindset. Moreover, India was also forced to respond to the rapid Chinese road building activities in bordering countries like Myanmar, Nepal and Pakistan. China established vital road-links with Nepal via the Kodari highway, which connects Lhasa and Kathmandu. With Pakistan, China is connected through the Karakoram highway. The Chinese presence in Myanmar is enabled by an open border in Yunnan. Roads have benefited Chinese economic activity in these countries and have also enhanced China’s influence in these states that are located along India’s borders. One must note that it is within the Chinese grand strategic matrix to rapidly increase economic ties in South Asia, an effort in which it has been successful.
Besides, one of the biggest complaints of the 120,000 Indian troops stationed in the eastern sector is the lack of road infrastructure in Arunachal Pradesh. In that light, the recent announcement of the road package by the MHA is a welcome sign. It now remains to be seen as to how fast the project gets executed. For instance, in 2006-2007, out of 10 crore sanctioned for building border roads, only 1 crore was spent. In 2008-2009, the allocation of resources went up to 50 crore but only 9.1 crore was spent. The utilisation of funds has improved since 2009-2010 with the 334 crore sanctioned fully utilised that year. Despite that, the BRO, the main strategic road building organisation, indicated to this author during a field visit in 2011 to Arunachal Pradesh that it is an arduous task to build two-lane highways in such hilly and inaccessible terrain. Also, to get the necessary permissions to move the huge dozers for road-building to the interior mountainous areas by helicopter takes a long time. Moreover, the release of funds allocated for border roads takes more than two years to reach its destination, thereby affecting the morale and efficiency of the BRO. Inclement weather also creates havoc, with roads to the India-China border closing down due to landslides during the monsoon season.
Despite all these obstacles, the roads have to be built given the criticality of defending the India-China border. One of the success stories in this regard has been the completion and inauguration of the longest bridge in Arunachal, the 720 metre Digaru Bridge linking Lohit and Dibang valley districts, on April 10 this year. Constructed by the BRO, this bridge will help both locals and the army to move faster. Strategic roads in Arunachal Pradesh will also play a critical role in defending the border against any future Chinese attack. If at all the Chinese escalate their posture, it will, at best, be a combined RRF and aerial move. Hence, India’s air defence structure must be robust and fully prepared taking into account Chinese capabilities and alternative war strategies. Given the present road conditions in Arunachal Pradesh, the physical movement of Indian troops to the border areas takes more than five to seven days. This aspect can be improved with the time taken reduced once the several announced road projects sees the light of day in the near future.
Strategic Road-Building along the India-China border
Chinese checkers on border board: Will India make the winning move?
Those under 50 were not born when the Indo-China battles took place. Only those now above 80, with access to newspapers and other sources of information and sufficient knowledge of history and geography, would have grasped the significance of the happenings during 1947-65.
Regardless of age, only soldiers, diplomats, bureaucrats, media personnel, historians and oddballs (like this writer) would have sufficient incentive to develop interest and keep track of the happenings on this subject.
A thousand, or even a million, words would not be sufficient to appreciate the anatomy of the events. All papers from 1913, i.e., before World War I, on the border issue are still not public.
As the saying goes, the Official Secrets Act protects officials, not the secrets. The Henderson-Brookes report, now nearly 50, is still unavailable, even to Parliament, on grounds of national security! Probably the biggest secret is the abject incompetence, mule-like obstinacy and desire for self-preservation, with deceit if necessary, of someone very high then.
Interested folks should lay their hands on just three books - India's China War by Neville Maxwell, India-China Boundary Problem by A G Noorani and Himalayan Blunder by Brig. J P Dalvi, the senior-most officer taken prisoner after Independence and the ill-fated commander of 7 Brigade - the formation around which the 1962 tragedy started and ended.
Some history is inevitable to appreciate the background. A good map - you can web-search 'Sino-Indian War' - will aid comprehension. After the Battle of Gujrat (just below the Chenab, south-west of Jammu, now in Pakistan) in the Second Anglo-Sikh War, the Sikh empire came to an end and the British acquired Kashmir as one of the prizes. How it passed on to Maharaja Gulab Singh is another story by itself.
To rein in the ambitious Maharaja, the British drew a line beyond which he was forbidden to venture into Tibetan territory. It may be noted that till the 10th/11th century, Ladakh was part of Tibet. This 1846 line, drawn by the British Boundary Commission (BBC), stretched from the River Spiti (now in Himachal Pradesh) to the Pangong Lake, east of Chusul.
In 1865, the Johnson-Ardagh Line closed the gap between Pangong and the Karakoram Pass and extended from near Shahidullah, along the Kuen-Lun Mountains, joining the BBC line near Lanak La. But the British Foreign Office modified this in 1873, curtailing it to the Karakoram Range.
Still later came the Macartney-Macdonald Line of 1899 that extended the 1873 line slightly into Aksai Chin beyond the Karakoram. This line is significant. It is the only line formally communicated to the Chinese - which evoked no reply. Further, the road the Chinese built in the 1950s across Aksai Chin falls well outside this line.
From the middle of the 19th century till about 1915, the British were more worried about the Russians than the Chinese. Having created a buffer zone in Afghanistan vide the Wakhan Corridor, the British, for nearly half a century, were virtually inviting the Chinese to come right up to the Karakoram line so as to create another buffer. The collapse of China in 1911 and the Russian Revolution in 1917 altered the geopolitical scenario significantly.
Taking advantage of the weakness of China, the British convened the Simla Conference in 1913 with Tibet and China, to now create a buffer between China and British India. There, one of the most underhand deals of deceit was played out.
A concept of Outer and Inner Tibet (similar to the Russian-Chinese treaty regarding Mongolia) was initiated. The inner line was the famous, or infamous, McMahon Line, the outer line running along the foothills of Assam, the pre-1914 boundary.
The Simla Conference, as Neville Maxwell puts it, was one where there were two participants in a tripartite conference openly signing a secret declaration, one text of a draft convention initialled by three parties, another initialled by two, and a map initialled by all three!
But the net result was that the conference produced nothing that was accepted by China. The McMahon Line was virtually forgotten till 1935, and here came another sleight of hand. International treaties, pacts, agreements, etc, are published in Atchison's Register much like the Lloyd's register for shipping. Having missed announcing the 1913 Tibetan Convention in the 1929 edition, the British in 1937 published what was passed off as the 1929 edition.
All copies of the original 1929 edition were to be suppressed and were recalled and destroyed. One survived - in the Harvard University library. This falsification of evidence was to enable the British to state that the Simla Convention was always valid from 1914. Only, this claim was first made in 1960 - by Independent India!
This was the position in 1947. All lines drawn by the British but none of them agreed to by China. We became independent but it appears that there are different modes of becoming independent. A G Noorani details the manner in which Independence was granted and the various nuances of the methodologies.
The leaders of Pakistan and India adopted the Canadian/Australian model and accepted "transfer of power from British hands and devolution of treaties concluded by the British. They were stopped from contesting that position."
In contrast, Ireland's Dail Eireann (their Lok Sabha) maintains that Ireland's power comes directly from God to the people of Ireland and, hence, any treaty/pact signed by the British was null and void. Even the Burma Independence Act was different: there, the British relinquished power and there was no transfer.
The nuances of these words may make sense only to someone steeped in international law, but was the Indian National Congress aware of the consequences? If so, has it kept this hidden from its people so far? We had bound ourselves to treaties as far back as 1792, concluded by the East India Company! Noorani adds that while the 1914 Indo-Tibetan treaty on the Mcmahon Line concerned British India, the Aksai Chin province was never a part of British India, although a part of the British Empire. This distinction is significant. Was this fact known and, if so, was this also hidden?
The stage was set for the denouement.
Rustic Indian proverb: jiski lathi, uski bhains. If both have lathis, then the one whose is bigger or uses it more effectively will win. That's 1962 in short, but we have jumped time. After Independence, Tibet demanded return of the territories taken by the British! These included large parts of Ladakh, Assam and the districts of Darjeeling and Sikkim.
In 1949, China announced that its army would match into Tibet for a more centralised administration, accomplishing the exercise despite India's protestations. No other country opened its mouth. South Asian power politics had shifted with the exit of the British and, in retrospect, perhaps we should have accepted Dominion Status while our netas learned statecraft and geopolitical strategy using a military backing.
Strangely, when India moved into the Tawang tract in 1951, there was no protest from China. It appeared that China had tacitly accepted the McMahon Line.
In 1954, Jawaharlal Nehru decided to redraw maps showing firm boundary lines where earlier colour wash reflected an unsettled boundary. Aksai Chin became entirely Indian territory. Nehru further declared that the border was firm and not open to discussion.
Unilaterally drawing a map to your convenience is easy. Occupying and enforcing your administration on the ground is another. While deciding to advance and establish posts in the disputed area, an event that shook India was taking shape.
In 1956, the Chinese started building a road from Yarkand to Gartok, 1,200-km long with about 180 km in Aksai Chin claimed by India! The joke is that the Chinese completed a road right across 'our territory' without us knowing about it till 1957 - from press reports in China congratulating the building of the road!
Nehru kept this hidden from Parliament till 1959, till a patrol sent to establish the configuration of the road just disappeared. With India lodging a protest, the dispute was out in the open.
China responded with the bitter truth: the entire Sino-Indian boundary has never been formally delimited. Much correspondence flowed, each with new nuances/stances/interpretations being revealed. In the interim came the flight of the Dalai Lama from Tibet in 1959. Things began to happen very fast.
Long before letters, protests, etc, flowed, Nehru maintained to Parliament and people that there was no dispute - hence, no negotiation. He virtually painted himself into a corner. Political compulsions, media and an enraged Opposition made track-changes difficult.
But the fault for deciding on a collision course was set by Nehru by his inexplicable intransigent approach. He and the country paid a heavy price for this. While claiming Aksai Chin, Nehru defended the government's ignorance of the road by stating that it was remote, no one lived there, nothing grew there, etc. He was told: nothing grows on your head either.
From 1959 to 1962 began a race that could only end in a collision - which it did. Adopting an aggressive forward policy with inadequate resources both in men and material, the Indian army was ordered to move and patrol areas, including Chinese-claimed areas but shown as Indian territory only on our maps.
With the gun loaded, safety catch off, only the trigger had to be pulled. It came in the form of an Indian post set up at Khinzamane, in extreme north-west NEFA, north of the McMahon Line. Subsequent claims to the Thagla Ridge and the setting up of another post called Dhola on the banks of the Namka Chu, all north of the McMahon Line, was enough to rile the Chinese.
They launched their attack. 7 Brigade just evaporated, Brig. Dalvi taken prisoner. How the war was conducted is best described by him: the PM wanted the Chinese pushed out and pushed the defence minister, who pushed the army chief, who pushed the Army Commander, who pushed the Corps Commander, who pushed the Division Commander, who pushed the Brigade Commander, who pushed the nearest battalion into the river!
But let us not be harsh on the soldier. Unacclimatised, dressed in cotton with canvas shoes, with no artillery support, he was gasping at 17,000 ft. His fate was compounded by contradictory stop-go orders, often vague, coming right from Delhi from a political class that had an amateurish boy scout vision in conducting military operations. The Chinese tore through Tawang, Se La and Bomdi La, and were just miles away from Tezpur.
The 'forward policy' enunciated and implemented over three years was in shambles in less than three weeks. On November 21, 1962, the Chinese announced a unilateral ceasefire and a withdrawal to the November 7, 1959, positions. Tacitly, the Chinese were inviting India back to negotiations. It was the first time in history that a military power did not exploit victory and demand anything more. The situation today is almost the same as November 21, 1962.
We unilaterally drew borders that even the British, a more powerful nation, took care not to. Having drawn them, we transgressed them with bravado not matched with military and political capability, paying a heavy price not only in lives but also in morale and national shame for an adventure that could have been avoided and settled on the table.
Even if negotiations failed and we did not unilaterally take aggressive steps, the matter could even today have been as it was in 1959. To effect a border settlement would mean to admit the tacit error of Nehru and exorcising the belief that we were innocent victims in 1962 and that the Chinese cannot be trusted.
We need to educate our people that it was our fault, be transparent, not withhold facts and build up a consensus. Those who swear of "not letting go even an inch of territory" should be given guns and sent to the border.
The country is being held hostage to the ego and the Himalayan blunders of one man, long dead, and probably the worst first CEO of any major country. Only one major gain: Mao-Tse Tung, whose dictum, "never start a war that you cannot win", which Nehru learnt the hard way, was primarily responsible for galvanising the Indian army.
[quoe] A G Noorani details the manner in which Independence was granted and the various nuances of the methodologies. [/quote]
Noorani was always anti Indian.
I have met him.
The govt. should make Henderson-Brookes report public.Its already 50 yrs.Govt. is hiding behind the official secrets act so thats it leaders image will remain stain free and party dont have to take up any blame.In absence of any report from govt to counter propaganda, noorani and maxwell's report look more credible to anyone.if not so then govt.should better put its own counters to their propaganda like they always do for kashmir.If is cant even do that then govt should return all those areas that are occupied by india and claimed by china.
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