Weasel for the Tibetan Plateau

[CCTV]

I am not disagreeing with what you are saying here. Yes, PLA can escalate with fighters and missile forces. The question is, will India sit back if that happens? The answer is no. India will also escalate.

If the theatre is the Tibetan Plateau, Chinese attack helicopters will be as saddled as any helicopter that struggles in those heights and rarefied low density air. If the Chinese plan to use light attack helicopters, then they will have to come close to the target, as they won't be able to carry heavier payload or enough of them, and long range anti-armour payloads are heavy.

Talking about air-drop, that is a possibility, if some kind of air-dominance is achieved. However, the weasel comes into picture before that. The idea is not to air-drop weasels. If air-drop is the intention, one might as well air-drop tanks and IFVs. The idea is to be able to deploy gliders with weasels in hundreds without the cargo aircraft having to go deep into enemy territory. This is very different from an air-drop, and does not require air-dominance.

Now, once hundreds of these weasels are operating and engaging targets in Tibet, the Heavy and Medium armour will roll into the Tibetan Plateau and take control of the cities one by one.

Coming back to escalation using air forces, India has a clear advantage. India airfields are at a lower altitude, and can take off with more payload than can the Chinese. The other alternative is for the Chinese aircraft to take off from far away in the east, and have them refuelled mid air, in anticipation of combat. IAF has a clear advantage over PLAAF in this regard.

Again , Indians are good at planning, even they don't have anything in hand.

 

[pmaitra]

Cross-posting:

A tracked Armoured Personnel Carrier

A tracked Armoured Personnel Carrier

 

[pmaitra]

Cross-posting:

Since there is a mention of Wiesel in article, I would love to have Wiesel type of platform in Indian army(Indian made, as it doesn't look like rocket science).

Wiesel AWC - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Air Defence

TOW

 

[pmaitra]

Cross-posting:

TATA`s weasel armored vehicle.

 

[nirranj]

Why should India want to launch the glider transport only from within India??

If the central asian Airbase gets operational, we can launch a Glider transport from Fukhror or Ainy air bases and get the men and equipment into the North western China and thereby forcing China to split its forces for a second Front. And India can transport equipment to the Central asian base(S) through Iran and Afghanistan. Which means A constant supply of materials to the front.

 

[Kunal Biswas]

The General And His Tanks !
The Role of tanks at High altitude, Stuart light tanks at Zojila Pass..

General K. S. Thimayya, 1906 - 1967,Padma bhushan

Perhaps the most spectacular chapter in the Indian Army History and life of the great General Thimayya was his role in what is considered to be the first Kargil War in 1948. Gen. Thimayya's tactical manoeuvres that helped save Kargil in 1948. His deployment of Stuart light tanks at Zojila Pass at twelve thousand feet above sea level to the utter surprise of the Opposition forces is still unprecedented.

Zojila, which means "Path of blizzards" is over one hundred kilometers east of Srinagar at an elevation of three thousand five hundred twenty nine meters and is the main pass on the road connecting Leh to Srinagar. When the Indian army landed at the Srinagar Airport in October 1947, it is reported that the opposition forces (a redoubtable force of over five hundred Pathans, Gilgit Scouts, Chitralis and renegades from the Jammu and Kashmir force) were just a few kilometres away. As a result of the Pakistani offensive, India lost Kargil and Dras and the Srinagar- Leh Road was blocked. The Enemy also seized control of Zojila and was headed to Gilgit and Leh. It is in these precarious circumstances that Maj. Gen. K. S. Thimayya (as he then was) spearheaded one of the greatest victories for the Indian Army. After a record-breaking landing at an airfield along with Air Cdre Meher Singh, the Indian contingent had to necessarily reopen the old Srinagar – Leh trade route after retaking Dras and Kargil. In an ambitious plan, at a high altitude and in bitterly cold conditions, Gen. Thimayya realized the necessity for firepower to blast the Enemy at the Zojila heights failing which the operation would be unsuccessful. Astonishingly he ordered the deployment of a squadron of Stuart MK-VI tanks of the 7 Light Cavalry compelling the engineers to cut a path into the rocky terrain in less than three weeks to build an eight kilometre long track that could take the width and weight of the tanks. Owing to the precipitous climb, the tanks had to be dismantled and physically pushed up by the Jawans"¦ to an altitude where tanks had never been used before.

Having successfully commissioned the tanks at this height, the assault began on November 1, 1948. The very appearance of the tanks utterly dampened the morale of the bewildered Pakistanis who either fled or were vanquished. Once Zojila was taken, the road to Kargil was reopened and Ladakh was safe. Ultimately, on November 24 Kargil was re-taken. Thus the unofficial 1st Indo-Pak War (and perhaps the longest and toughest of them all) ended in success owing to the bold, shrewd and relentless pursuit led by Gen. Thimayya. In the process, Gen. Thimayya emerged as the finest tactician among his contemporaries.


Gen. Thimayya

 

[Kunal Biswas]

Role Of Armour In 1962 War
Remembering Rezang La

On 27th October, Chinese attacked posts in Chang La and Jara La near village of Demchok located at southern end of Ladakh-Tibet border. The commander of Chang La post, Jamadar Ishe Thundup saved lives of all his men but was killed in the fighting. He was later awarded a gallantry award "Veer Chakra" posthumously. The soldiers defending Jara La, managed to escape in the cover of darkness. With fall of these posts, Chinese had captured villages of Demchok and Demchele on Indus river and had effectively blocked any possibility of a counter attack by an Indian column in Tibet. Now the garrison at Chushul and forward posts around it remained between China and capital of Ladakh; Leh.

AN 12 transport aircraft that brought in AMX-13 tanks at Chushul in 1962

Considering the seriousness of the situation, commander of Indian forces in Ladakh, Brigadier Raina decided to airlift 25 pound Howitzers and AMX-13 light tanks to augment defense of Chushul. Within next 2/3 days, the guns and tanks reached Chushul. For Indian air force, this was a big challenge as Chushul only had a make shift airstrip with surface made from perforated steel planks or PSP. Air force's 44 squadron transported six numbers of AMX-13 light tanks in their AN 12 transport air craft. The tanks were carried in two parts, the hull and gun in one flight and the chassis in second. With arrival of these, one biggest deficiency in defense of Chushul was no doubt overcome. In addition some additional troupes also joined the garrison in Chushul. The army considered the possibility that the main supply route to Chushul through Tsaka La pass was likely to be overrun by Chinese and accordingly kept an alternate route to Chushul ready for use.

Armour. Two troops of AMX-13 light tanks were air lifted by AN-12 aircraft to Chushul by 26 October 1962. The half squadron was commanded by Captain AK Dewan, VrC. The tasks of armour located at the base of Gurung Hill were as follows:-


(a) To deny Spanggur gap approach to the enemy, particularly to armour which may try to venture out towards Chushul.
(b) To act as a mobile reserve with a company ex 13 Kumaon located in area Track Junction with a view to safe guard flanks and any sizeable enemy infiltration which may take place during battle particularly along road Tsaka La – Chushul.

Chinese began their assault on Chushul on 18th November 1962. Chinese artillery bagan very heavy bombardment of Indian outposts in Spangur gap, Rezang La pass, supply route through Tsaka La pass. Gurung Hill, Magar Hill and the airstrip itself. This bombardment proved quite ineffective. Chinese guns then advanced ahead of Chinese posts in Spangur gap and started bombardment. This brought them in sight of the field guns on Magar hill. When Indian guns opened up, few Chinese guns were destroyed in Spangur gap and the bombardment was silenced. After this Chinese artillery retreated and never again tried to bombard the Chushul aitstrip. This attack perhaps made Chinese realize that they must destroy all the Indian outposts around Chushul before making any attempt for Chushul.

Indian soldiers were waiting at Rezang La post when human waves of thousands of Chinese soldiers attacked from both sides. Major Shaitan Singh and his men fought this battle to the last man and the last bullet killing more than 1000 Chinese soldiers.

The Chinese, now shifted their attention to Rezang La pass outpost. This outpost was a major Indian defense position located in the mountain on the southwest shoreline of Pangur lake. As long as Rezang la was held by Indians, no attempt was possible by China to capture the main supply route to Chushul through Tsaka la pass. Indian soldiers of the 1st company of 13th Kumaon Rifles led by Major Shaitan Singh were well dug in here with a clear view of all the area upto Pangur lake. It was well neigh impossible for Chinese to move towards Chushul as long as Rezang La was in Indian hands. The only problem for the Indians at Rezang La position was that a hill feature was coming in the way of getting any covering fire from the Indian artillery for their support. It was clear that major Shaitan Singh's men would have to fight it out on their own. Their orders were clear. Fight to the last man and the last bullet. Such was the importance of Rezang La.

Source :
Remembering Rezang La; Part III | Sand Prints
http://www.usiofindia.org/Article/?pub=Journal&pubno=560&ano=482

 

[Kunal Biswas]

Role of Armour is no doubt is essential in mountain warfare, Both in defense ( 1962 ) and Offense ( 1948 ) as proven in Indian Military History..

 

[Kunal Biswas]

Wiesel AWC with TATA Offered >>

Infantry fighting version

Anti tank version

120mm motar version

Short range air-defense Version

Recon Version

Command and Control Version

Ambulance Version

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Above all they can be transported via MI-17, Dozens in MI-26 and many in IL-76 and C-17 ..

They can also carried via meter and short gauge railways, Simple Stallion trucks..

 

[pmaitra]

The Kremlin's Tiny Drone Tank Bristles With Weapons
The Russian Uran-9 ground combat drone pack some serious punch.

By Kyle Mizokami
Jan 13, 2016

Russia has a new remotely operated ground combat vehicle, the Uran-9, built for reconnaissance and fire support. Despite looking like a baby tank, Uran-9 is fully capable of taking on enemy vehicles much larger than itself.

Developed by Russian defense contractor Rosoboronexport, Uran-9 is a tracked armored vehicle controlled remotely by an operator. The turret is equipped with a 2A72 30-millimeter cannon with a rate of fire of 350 to 400 rounds per minute and can shoot high explosive incendiary and armor-piercing ammunition. A 7.62-millimeter machine gun is mounted parallel to the cannon.


Studding the outside of the turret are four 9M120 Ataka anti-tank missiles, each capable of hitting a tank at 2.5 miles with a 90 percent hit probability. The tandem shaped charge warhead is designed to defeat so-called "reactive armor" tiles by using a smaller charge to detonate the reactive armor, allowing the main charge hit the enemy's main armor. Each Uran also mounts four Igla-S surface to air missiles, giving it the ability to shoot down low-flying aircraft to distances of up to 1.86 miles.

Uran-9 is to enter service with the Russian Ground Forces and will be exported abroad. Here's Rosoboronexport's marketing video for the little killer.