The new Kennedy administration in 1961 shifted American policy toward the subcontinent. Kennedy felt that Eisenhower's policies had been mistakenly focused on containing communism rather than promoting democracy. He believed that, rather than simply defending democracy, 'America would actively promote it' in countries such as India despite its adherence to socialist ideals. Kennedy did not interpret neutralism/nonalignment as inherently hostile to American interests in the contest between the democratic and socialist blocs.[25] Therefore, he hoped to make up for the lack of American influence among the nonaligned countries by cultivating a tolerant attitude towards neutralism coupled with offers of financial commitments to the economic development plans of those nations.[26]
According to Robert McMahon, 'With tact, patience, and dollars, Kennedy thought that India and other nonaligned states could be
won for the West; at a minimum, communist influence could be arrested and increased support for US policies gained.'[27] But Kennedy would face the same criticisms of aid to India from people within his own party. Democratic Senator Stuart Symington derided aiding India 'whose military plans and programs build up the Soviet economy at the expense of our allies and ourselves, and whose chief leaders constantly threaten with military aggression some of the steadfast and loyal friends the United States has in the free world.' The senator was referring to America's firm friend, Pakistan.[28]
Like Eisenhower, Kennedy, was willing to risk American-Pakistani relations to get closer to India. This was important considering the strategic nature of the American-Pakistani relationship: it provided the US with territory within striking distance of the Sino-Soviet bloc; American listening posts were located in the country; and the Central Intelligence Agency was allowed use of airfields in Peshawar and Lahore for U-2 intelligence-gathering flights.[29] Both the United States and Britain hoped to halt the arms build-up between India and Pakistan. But 'India's importance to Kennedy administration strategists derived also from their fixation with China's presumed threat to the Asian equilibrium.'[30] The Kennedy administration's perception of China as a threat cannot be underestimated. When it was reported that Beijing would soon be capable of a nuclear detonation, the idea was raised in Washington to encourage India to produce its own nuclear detonation to blunt the impact.[31]Thus, 'Kennedy and his senior aides viewed India as a Cold War prize of such magnitude that they were willing to run substantial risk with Pakistan in order to secure India's alignment with the West.'[32]
Despite the pro-Indian tilt of the Kennedy administration, Kennedy disliked Nehru personally. He found his arrogance and sense of superiority offensive.[33] The administration was, however, ready and willing to use the Sino-Indian border conflict for its own ends. This attitude is best reflected in the words of Chester Bowles, appointed by President Truman as the American ambassador to India from 1951 to 1953 and chosen by President Kennedy to replace John Galbraith in 1963 for his second tour of
duty in New Delhi:
In October 1962 we were suddenly confronted with the opportunity that many of us had been hoping for - an overt Chinese Communist action which would bring home to the Indian Government and people some primary facts of life of Asian politics, i.e., the inevitable politicaleconomic rivalry of China and India and the danger that an expansionist China holds for India not only along the 2,200-mile Himalayan frontier but also in Southeast Asia which flanks India's eastern approaches.[34]
This passage indicates that, despite differences in approach, a common thread in American policy since the Truman years was the forlorn hope that India could be convinced that China was the greater threat to its security than Pakistan. The Sino-Indian border conflict not only provided an opportunity to bring this fact home to the Indians, but also appeared to be the right time to put Nehru's nonalignment/neutralism policy to a test.
Neither Macmillan nor Kennedy criticised Nehru for his failure to negotiate the border with China or Nehru's failed forward policy which invited Beijing's attack. Instead, the border conflict was seen through the lens of communist aggression rather than Indian intransigence. From the outset of the Chinese invasion, British and Americans officials agreed that China was pursuing short term goals in India rather than attempting to establish hegemony over the subcontinent. This explains why, in the midst of dealing with the border war between October and November of 1962, the British and American governments began to put into place policies which would result in possible advantages to the West.[35] It was not inevitable that the United States and Great Britain
should join their not inconsiderable clout to deal with the border conflict. The United States acknowledged that Britain's knowledge of South Asia was superior to their own. As one British official noted in the 1940s, 'The British would educate the Americans about the finer points of Asian gamesmanship:
London would supply the brains, Washington the money and the muscle needed to hold South Asia.'[36] American interest in South Asia ebbed and waned depending on other world conditions, but Britain's attention was more constant. Britain had never written off India as anti-West: India was a valued member of the British Commonwealth and Britain continued to be India's largest trading partner and main arms supplier until 1962.[37]
Britain's decline as a world power and its loss of economic clout is underscored by the fact that, by 1959, American private investment surpassed that of Britain.[38] By the 1960s, Britain was not in a position to intervene in the subcontinent in a meaningful way without the United States as its partner. American interest in the region was peaked as a result of the Korean War which signified the spread of the Cold War from Europe to Asia. From this time on, when events caused Washington to focus on the region, the Americans were willing to pursue their own policy with or without the approval of the British. This is evidenced by the signing of bilateral military agreements with Pakistan. Generally, however, the Americans preferred to have the British on board.
For most of 1962 the United States The United States and Britain had long provided humanitarian aid to India but this had not been without strings. The United States first addressed the issue of food aid in response to a famine in India in 1951. At that time, there was a crude attempt to tie this aid to a promise by India to sell to the Americans critical strategic materials such as manganese, monazite, and beryl. Indians were offended that rich, well-fed Americans would haggle in this manner. But
the American Congress was psychologically and philosophically predisposed to question the correctness of aiding socialist India. Ultimately, wheat was sold to India for blocked rupees rather than in a grant. Actually, the Indians preferred to pay for the food, but the episode was followed by similar mistakes and harmed Indo-American relations.[42] Military aid was certain to be even more difficult to negotiate since India had refused military aid because of its policy of nonalignment and Nehru's sensitivities to what may be interpreted as economic imperialism. Nehru and his Defence Minister, Krishna Menon, insisted upon purchasing military hardware from sources of their own choosing. But India's foreign exchange reserves were not sufficient to make this policy practicable once the border war began. Because of the delicacy of the situation, however, Macmillan hesitated to make a public offer of aid to India lest the Indian Prime Minister infer that the British were trying to exploit the situation for Cold War purposes.[43]
Similarly, the Americans waited for Nehru to make a definite request for US military assistance so as not to 'be in the position of running after Nehru to offer aid.'[44] It was important for the Americans and British, therefore, to wait until India made the first request for military aid in order to avoid the appearance of exploiting India's plight. Nehru was initially reluctant to seek aid from the United States so as to protect itself from charges that it was abandoning nonalignment.[45] When Nehru formally requested
aid on 29 November 1962, the Americans were pleased but surprised by the scale of the Indian aid request. It included a dozen squadrons of all-weather fighters, two squadrons of B-47 bombers manned by American crews to attack positions in China, and, finally, American help in constructing a radar shield for India's cities.[46] Before the US could respond, however, the Chinese ended the conflict while retaining control of Indian territory.
Despite the abrupt ending of the conflict, Washington and London were not deterred from their previous decision to use Nehru's aid request to exact a price from India.[47] Within days of Nehru's request British and American officials met in Washington to discuss their objectives. In regard to India's policy of non-alignment, they wanted 'less a public change of policy than a change in emotional attitude.'[48] Their goal was not to destroy Indian non-alignment completely.