http://www.indianexpress.com/news/look-beyond-rawalpindi/716250/0
Two years after the pre-meditated and outrageous attack on Mumbai, India's vulnerabilities to cross-border terrorism remain acute as ever. Despite overwhelming evidence that the aggression was planned and executed from Pakistan in collaboration with its state institutions, there is little hope that Islamabad will bring the perpetrators to justice. There is even less of a prospect that Pakistan might give credible assurances that its soil will not be used to launch future attacks on India. Delhi's security managers can surely pat themselves on the back for being vigilant in preventing a major incident after 26/11. But the next attack might not be too far away. Much work remains to be done on all three dimensions of an effective counter-terror strategy — defence, deterrence and diplomacy. Defence is about preventing acts of terror through better acquisition and assessment of intelligence and effectively dealing with the attack when it does take place. India's handling of 26/11 exposed the pitiful state of India's capabilities on both these fronts. P. Chidambaram, who took charge of internal security in November 2008 itself, was quick to begin long overdue reforms. These included the passing of new anti-terror legislation, the setting up of the National Investigative Agency, establishing multi-agency centres at the national and state levels to better integrate and assess the available intelligence leads, and unveiling plans for the modernisation of the National Security Guard and improving coastal security.
While it marked a good beginning, there is no doubt that the effort to reform India's internal security structures has stalled. India's police personnel remain poorly equipped, under-manned and ill-trained to deal with the expansive challenge of terrorism. If most state governments have refused to rise to the challenge, the Central government has been hampered by bureaucratic battles for turf and political doubts in the ruling party about security sector reform. The second element of our counter-terror strategy is deterrence. Ever since Pakistan acquired nuclear weapons, India has had few options for punitive retaliatory actions against Rawalpindi's support for cross-border terror. Since it was surprised by Pakistan's Kargil aggression in the summer of 1999, the Indian military establishment has struggled to break out of this box.Delhi's talk about a "cold start" doctrine — that might let India conduct conventional military operations below the threshold of nuclear escalation — did draw a lot of concern from across the border and beyond. The Pakistan army headquarters in Rawalpindi is fully aware that India is nowhere near acquiring the conventional military capability to punish Pakistan.
To deter the Pakistan army from facilitating future cross-border terror attacks, India needs to act on a range of fronts. These include more purposeful modernisation of the armed forces to generate some military pressure against Rawalpindi and strengthening India's nuclear arsenal which continues to lag behind that of Pakistan. India must also focus on building up a serious missile defence programme that can introduce some uncertainty into Rawalpindi's strategic calculus. Finally, on the diplomatic front, India has had some success and a lot more frustration. The evidence from 26/11 has helped India convince the international community to recognise the sources of terrorism in Pakistan. It has also opened the door for more substantive counter-terror cooperation with the United States. During his visit to Delhi earlier this month, American President Barack Obama called on Pakistan to shut down the terror networks on its territory, including the Lashkar-e-Toiba. British Prime Minister David Cameron travelling in India a few months earlier was more direct in stating the truth about Rawalpindi's support for terror groups. Yet, Delhi knows the limits to international pressure on Pakistan. Despite giving nearly $20 billion in civilian and military aid to Pakistan during the last decade, the US is still having trouble getting Pakistan to act against groups that directly target American troops in Afghanistan. It was logical then for India to find ways to directly engage Pakistan to bring the Mumbai plotters to book. But all indications are that India is unlikely to get any satisfaction on terrorism from its current talks with Pakistan.
Our interlocutors across the border have no control over the terror machine, which is run by the Pakistan army. The real challenge for India, then, is in finding ways to compel Rawalpindi to change its calculus of support for cross-border terrorism. This in turn means exploring Rawalpindi's own weak points.The ISI's influence over the Pashtuns across its western frontiers is at the heart of Pakistan's success in holding the international community hostage in Afghanistan. It is also potentially the weakest element of Rawalpindi's strategy, for the Pashtuns, including the Taliban, have never recognised the legitimacy of the Durand Line that is supposed to be the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. India must step up its engagement of the Pashtuns and put the question of the Durand Line's future on the international agenda.India must also begin to focus on Pakistan's civil-military relations and step up its support for genuine democratic change. While Rawalpindi's dominance over Pakistan's polity is real, it is no reason why India should not make it a political issue. Further, Delhi must take a more disaggregated view of our neighbour. Instead of negotiating with the civilian government that is sat upon by the army, India must consider a direct engagement with the political parties in Pakistan both at the federal and provincial level. Capacity-building holds the key to India's progress in the areas of defence and deterrence against terrorism.
That will take time, persistent effort and strong political leadership in Delhi. On the diplomatic front, India will have to continuously look for bold approaches to contain the Pakistan army, the main support base for cross-border terrorism against India.
[email protected]
Two years after the pre-meditated and outrageous attack on Mumbai, India's vulnerabilities to cross-border terrorism remain acute as ever. Despite overwhelming evidence that the aggression was planned and executed from Pakistan in collaboration with its state institutions, there is little hope that Islamabad will bring the perpetrators to justice. There is even less of a prospect that Pakistan might give credible assurances that its soil will not be used to launch future attacks on India. Delhi's security managers can surely pat themselves on the back for being vigilant in preventing a major incident after 26/11. But the next attack might not be too far away. Much work remains to be done on all three dimensions of an effective counter-terror strategy — defence, deterrence and diplomacy. Defence is about preventing acts of terror through better acquisition and assessment of intelligence and effectively dealing with the attack when it does take place. India's handling of 26/11 exposed the pitiful state of India's capabilities on both these fronts. P. Chidambaram, who took charge of internal security in November 2008 itself, was quick to begin long overdue reforms. These included the passing of new anti-terror legislation, the setting up of the National Investigative Agency, establishing multi-agency centres at the national and state levels to better integrate and assess the available intelligence leads, and unveiling plans for the modernisation of the National Security Guard and improving coastal security.
While it marked a good beginning, there is no doubt that the effort to reform India's internal security structures has stalled. India's police personnel remain poorly equipped, under-manned and ill-trained to deal with the expansive challenge of terrorism. If most state governments have refused to rise to the challenge, the Central government has been hampered by bureaucratic battles for turf and political doubts in the ruling party about security sector reform. The second element of our counter-terror strategy is deterrence. Ever since Pakistan acquired nuclear weapons, India has had few options for punitive retaliatory actions against Rawalpindi's support for cross-border terror. Since it was surprised by Pakistan's Kargil aggression in the summer of 1999, the Indian military establishment has struggled to break out of this box.Delhi's talk about a "cold start" doctrine — that might let India conduct conventional military operations below the threshold of nuclear escalation — did draw a lot of concern from across the border and beyond. The Pakistan army headquarters in Rawalpindi is fully aware that India is nowhere near acquiring the conventional military capability to punish Pakistan.
To deter the Pakistan army from facilitating future cross-border terror attacks, India needs to act on a range of fronts. These include more purposeful modernisation of the armed forces to generate some military pressure against Rawalpindi and strengthening India's nuclear arsenal which continues to lag behind that of Pakistan. India must also focus on building up a serious missile defence programme that can introduce some uncertainty into Rawalpindi's strategic calculus. Finally, on the diplomatic front, India has had some success and a lot more frustration. The evidence from 26/11 has helped India convince the international community to recognise the sources of terrorism in Pakistan. It has also opened the door for more substantive counter-terror cooperation with the United States. During his visit to Delhi earlier this month, American President Barack Obama called on Pakistan to shut down the terror networks on its territory, including the Lashkar-e-Toiba. British Prime Minister David Cameron travelling in India a few months earlier was more direct in stating the truth about Rawalpindi's support for terror groups. Yet, Delhi knows the limits to international pressure on Pakistan. Despite giving nearly $20 billion in civilian and military aid to Pakistan during the last decade, the US is still having trouble getting Pakistan to act against groups that directly target American troops in Afghanistan. It was logical then for India to find ways to directly engage Pakistan to bring the Mumbai plotters to book. But all indications are that India is unlikely to get any satisfaction on terrorism from its current talks with Pakistan.
Our interlocutors across the border have no control over the terror machine, which is run by the Pakistan army. The real challenge for India, then, is in finding ways to compel Rawalpindi to change its calculus of support for cross-border terrorism. This in turn means exploring Rawalpindi's own weak points.The ISI's influence over the Pashtuns across its western frontiers is at the heart of Pakistan's success in holding the international community hostage in Afghanistan. It is also potentially the weakest element of Rawalpindi's strategy, for the Pashtuns, including the Taliban, have never recognised the legitimacy of the Durand Line that is supposed to be the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. India must step up its engagement of the Pashtuns and put the question of the Durand Line's future on the international agenda.India must also begin to focus on Pakistan's civil-military relations and step up its support for genuine democratic change. While Rawalpindi's dominance over Pakistan's polity is real, it is no reason why India should not make it a political issue. Further, Delhi must take a more disaggregated view of our neighbour. Instead of negotiating with the civilian government that is sat upon by the army, India must consider a direct engagement with the political parties in Pakistan both at the federal and provincial level. Capacity-building holds the key to India's progress in the areas of defence and deterrence against terrorism.
That will take time, persistent effort and strong political leadership in Delhi. On the diplomatic front, India will have to continuously look for bold approaches to contain the Pakistan army, the main support base for cross-border terrorism against India.
[email protected]