Five Ways Russia Could Help China's Military Become Even Deadlier
- Thread starter Ray
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not my problem when you assume anyone has different opinons than yours are chinese. yes i read the Ukrain thread, and yes i still belief russia are in the wrong here.
anyone read couple of your thread knows you are anti-china. I suggest you goto china meet some chinese rather than make assumption regarding mind control etc etc. Is CCP an authoritarian state, yes, but people live there are far from been a mindless robot.
as for india autonomous region, here is result after 30sec google search. cant do all your homework for you ray
Autonomous administrative divisions of India - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
India's Autonomous Regions
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What makes you feel that I haven't.
These autonomous regions of India are district councils of the State in which it is located and are vested with administrative powers singular to the people out there.
The principle objective behind setting up the Autonomous District Council is to empower the Indigenous people to govern themselves and also to bring all round developments of the backward people so as to protect and preserve their culture, customs and traditions.
sorcerer
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Russia's risks in aerospace cooperation with China
Konstantin Makienko
In the two years that have passed since the previous air show in Zhuhai, no radical changes have taken place in Russian-Chinese military technical cooperation. Not a single new major contract was announced for the procurement of aircraft platforms or components. Potential joint aviation projects, such as those for the development of a heavy transport helicopter or a widebody commercial airliner, did not progress past the level of political statements and preliminary market studies. The Chinese Air Force's interest in Russia's newest Sukhoi Su-35 fighter and S-400 long-range SAM system has not yet resulted in any tangible contracts either.
On the other hand, Russia all this time continued with deliveries under major engine and helicopter contracts signed with China in 2011-2012. Thanks to these contracts, which are now nearing completion, Beijing has remained among the top five of largest importers of Russian arms and military equipment, with the two countries' current military technical cooperation estimated at some $2 billion. The figure is comparable to the highest indicators reported in the early 2000s.
Fighter acquisitions from Russia
In the 1990s and the first half of the 2000s, China and India remained the anchor markets for Russia's military aircraft industry. In quantitative terms, China was second after Delhi for the number of fighter jets purchased. The Chinese Air Force procured 36 Su-27SK fighters, 40 Su-27UBK twin-seat combat trainers, 100 Su-30MKK/MK2 multirole jets, and 105 Su-27SK kits for license production in Shenyang. In all, the service bought 281 Su-27/30 family fighters, not counting subsequent unlicensed clones. For comparison, India has purchased 290 Su-30K/Su-30MKI jets from Russia since the collapse of the USSR (18 examples of the Su-30K batch were later returned to Irkut Corporation under a trade-in scheme; 12 of these are undergoing overhaul and modernization and will be delivered to Angola). In addition, the Indian Navy in 2004 and 2010 ordered two batches of MiG-29K ship-based fighters, 16 and 29 examples respectively.
In qualitative terms, however, the Chinese orders have proved of much less value to Russia than the Indian projects. The on-going Indian Su-30MKI program, which started 18 years ago with the signing of the first contract for eight Su-30K and 32 Su-30MKI aircraft on November 30, 1996, has enabled the IAPO production association and its successor Irkut to build a long-term development strategy, something that China's sizeable but interspersed orders would not allow. This, however, is not the main point.
The key benefit of the Indian contracts was that they served as powerful innovative stimuli for the Russian aviation industry. The Su-30MKI technical specifications developed by the Indian Air Force in the mid-1990s tested the Russian aerospace sector to the limit of its technological capabilities of the time. It was the Indian requirements that resulted in the creation, improvement and production of thrust-vectoring aero engines, phased-array radars and advanced avionics suites, which are now the standard fit of Russian heavy fighters. In addition, the manufacturers Sukhoi and MiG obtained invaluable experience in the integration of foreign-made components into their combat aircraft. As a result, the Indian orders stimulated the Russian aircraft industry to create a combat aviation system which remains fairly modern and globally competitive 15 years on, and is the second most ubiquitous warplane in the Russian Air Force and Navy after the Su-34 bomber. For its part, the Indian order for the deck-based MiG-29K fighters predetermined the choice of new-generation ship-borne fighter for the Russian Navy, prompting that service to make an unprecedented aircraft type switch from the Su-33.
By contrast, the Chinese specifications developed in the late 1990s for a multirole twin-seater were extremely conservative, and the innovative level of the resultant Su-30MKK/MK2 proved to be fairly low. Even though the export market potential for the "Chinese" Su-30s outside of China turned out to be comparable with that for the Su-30MKI family, if not slightly higher, the Russian Air Force has ordered only 20 such aircraft, and then only as a stopgap for lack of more advanced types.
One other negative trait of Chinese military aviation orders is that Beijing invariably attempts to clone everything it buys. The Russian fighters were no exception. China reverse-engineered them and began producing domestic clones: the J-11B, the J-11BS, and the J-16. Incidentally, one possible explanation of China's conservatism when it comes to drafting technical specifications for arms imports is that it only goes for the technology its industry is capable of cloning in the foreseeable future.
To summarize, the Chinese contracts have been characterized by the absence of any positive effect on corporate development in the Russian aviation industry owing to the interspersed purchases, weak innovative impulse, conservative technical specifications, minimum-size batches, proclivity for cloning, as well as the low interest of the Russian Defense Ministry in the aircraft developed for China
Politics vs commerce
The aforementioned characteristics are indicative of the commercial and industrial risks involved in Russian-Chinese military aerospace cooperation. These risks would be fairly acceptable back in the late 1990s and the early 2000s, when there was no domestic paying demand for new fighters in Russia and the Su-30MKI program had not yet reached the production phase. Back then, the Chinese orders helped keep the Komsomolsk-on-Amur-based KnAAPO production facility afloat and were instrumental in the emergence of a new innovative centre, the Sukhoi Design Bureau, which was already beginning to work on the Su-35 and the fifth-generation fighter.
However, in the current situation the balance of risks and gains associated with a hypothetical Chinese order for the Su-35 appears to be quite different. On the one hand, such a contract would boost production volumes, theoretically (but not necessarily) lowering the unit cost. Seeing as the program was launched as Sukhoi's own initiative, without a launch customer, it is important for the investors to ensure a return on their money.
But the risks are also high. Particularly noteworthy is the extremely low number of aircraft China is planning to order, just 24 units. At the same time, Beijing is intent on ordering, as part of this hypothetical contract, an abnormally high number of 117S engines. The suspicion is that China's actual agenda calls for gaining access to the Su-35's two principal innovative technologies: the extremely powerful Irbis radar and the 117S powerplant. It should also be noted that the present scientific and technical potential of the Chinese industry is much higher now than it used to be 10 to 15 years ago, when that country cloned the Su-30 promptly and effectively. This is the central intrigue of the hypothetical Su-35 exports to China: how quickly, if at all, will the Chinese industry manage to clone the aircraft's powerplant and radar?
Nobody has any doubts that China will certainly attempt to reverse-engineer these technologies. If its engineers run into difficulties, then additional Su-35 orders are possible, as was the case with the Su-27SK/UBK in the 1990s. If they succeed, the Chinese Air Force will probably stop at the 24 original Russian aircraft, and the country's aerospace industry will build more fighters as required.
There is the danger of politics becoming the decisive factor in the decision-making process. The sharp worsening of relations with the West is prompting Russia to develop closer political ties with China, which means that political reasoning could prevail over long-term commercial goals and even considerations of military security.
====
Well!! Like the Hypothetical Contracts of China..China Russian Military alliance is Hypothetical..
@Ray, @roma, @pmaitra, @ladder, @hit&run, @Bangalorean, @cobra commando, @Free Karma, @NSG_Blackcats @sayareakd , @sgarg, @SajeevJino and all others.
Konstantin Makienko
In the two years that have passed since the previous air show in Zhuhai, no radical changes have taken place in Russian-Chinese military technical cooperation. Not a single new major contract was announced for the procurement of aircraft platforms or components. Potential joint aviation projects, such as those for the development of a heavy transport helicopter or a widebody commercial airliner, did not progress past the level of political statements and preliminary market studies. The Chinese Air Force's interest in Russia's newest Sukhoi Su-35 fighter and S-400 long-range SAM system has not yet resulted in any tangible contracts either.
On the other hand, Russia all this time continued with deliveries under major engine and helicopter contracts signed with China in 2011-2012. Thanks to these contracts, which are now nearing completion, Beijing has remained among the top five of largest importers of Russian arms and military equipment, with the two countries' current military technical cooperation estimated at some $2 billion. The figure is comparable to the highest indicators reported in the early 2000s.
Fighter acquisitions from Russia
In the 1990s and the first half of the 2000s, China and India remained the anchor markets for Russia's military aircraft industry. In quantitative terms, China was second after Delhi for the number of fighter jets purchased. The Chinese Air Force procured 36 Su-27SK fighters, 40 Su-27UBK twin-seat combat trainers, 100 Su-30MKK/MK2 multirole jets, and 105 Su-27SK kits for license production in Shenyang. In all, the service bought 281 Su-27/30 family fighters, not counting subsequent unlicensed clones. For comparison, India has purchased 290 Su-30K/Su-30MKI jets from Russia since the collapse of the USSR (18 examples of the Su-30K batch were later returned to Irkut Corporation under a trade-in scheme; 12 of these are undergoing overhaul and modernization and will be delivered to Angola). In addition, the Indian Navy in 2004 and 2010 ordered two batches of MiG-29K ship-based fighters, 16 and 29 examples respectively.
In qualitative terms, however, the Chinese orders have proved of much less value to Russia than the Indian projects. The on-going Indian Su-30MKI program, which started 18 years ago with the signing of the first contract for eight Su-30K and 32 Su-30MKI aircraft on November 30, 1996, has enabled the IAPO production association and its successor Irkut to build a long-term development strategy, something that China's sizeable but interspersed orders would not allow. This, however, is not the main point.
The key benefit of the Indian contracts was that they served as powerful innovative stimuli for the Russian aviation industry. The Su-30MKI technical specifications developed by the Indian Air Force in the mid-1990s tested the Russian aerospace sector to the limit of its technological capabilities of the time. It was the Indian requirements that resulted in the creation, improvement and production of thrust-vectoring aero engines, phased-array radars and advanced avionics suites, which are now the standard fit of Russian heavy fighters. In addition, the manufacturers Sukhoi and MiG obtained invaluable experience in the integration of foreign-made components into their combat aircraft. As a result, the Indian orders stimulated the Russian aircraft industry to create a combat aviation system which remains fairly modern and globally competitive 15 years on, and is the second most ubiquitous warplane in the Russian Air Force and Navy after the Su-34 bomber. For its part, the Indian order for the deck-based MiG-29K fighters predetermined the choice of new-generation ship-borne fighter for the Russian Navy, prompting that service to make an unprecedented aircraft type switch from the Su-33.
By contrast, the Chinese specifications developed in the late 1990s for a multirole twin-seater were extremely conservative, and the innovative level of the resultant Su-30MKK/MK2 proved to be fairly low. Even though the export market potential for the "Chinese" Su-30s outside of China turned out to be comparable with that for the Su-30MKI family, if not slightly higher, the Russian Air Force has ordered only 20 such aircraft, and then only as a stopgap for lack of more advanced types.
One other negative trait of Chinese military aviation orders is that Beijing invariably attempts to clone everything it buys. The Russian fighters were no exception. China reverse-engineered them and began producing domestic clones: the J-11B, the J-11BS, and the J-16. Incidentally, one possible explanation of China's conservatism when it comes to drafting technical specifications for arms imports is that it only goes for the technology its industry is capable of cloning in the foreseeable future.
To summarize, the Chinese contracts have been characterized by the absence of any positive effect on corporate development in the Russian aviation industry owing to the interspersed purchases, weak innovative impulse, conservative technical specifications, minimum-size batches, proclivity for cloning, as well as the low interest of the Russian Defense Ministry in the aircraft developed for China
Politics vs commerce
The aforementioned characteristics are indicative of the commercial and industrial risks involved in Russian-Chinese military aerospace cooperation. These risks would be fairly acceptable back in the late 1990s and the early 2000s, when there was no domestic paying demand for new fighters in Russia and the Su-30MKI program had not yet reached the production phase. Back then, the Chinese orders helped keep the Komsomolsk-on-Amur-based KnAAPO production facility afloat and were instrumental in the emergence of a new innovative centre, the Sukhoi Design Bureau, which was already beginning to work on the Su-35 and the fifth-generation fighter.
However, in the current situation the balance of risks and gains associated with a hypothetical Chinese order for the Su-35 appears to be quite different. On the one hand, such a contract would boost production volumes, theoretically (but not necessarily) lowering the unit cost. Seeing as the program was launched as Sukhoi's own initiative, without a launch customer, it is important for the investors to ensure a return on their money.
But the risks are also high. Particularly noteworthy is the extremely low number of aircraft China is planning to order, just 24 units. At the same time, Beijing is intent on ordering, as part of this hypothetical contract, an abnormally high number of 117S engines. The suspicion is that China's actual agenda calls for gaining access to the Su-35's two principal innovative technologies: the extremely powerful Irbis radar and the 117S powerplant. It should also be noted that the present scientific and technical potential of the Chinese industry is much higher now than it used to be 10 to 15 years ago, when that country cloned the Su-30 promptly and effectively. This is the central intrigue of the hypothetical Su-35 exports to China: how quickly, if at all, will the Chinese industry manage to clone the aircraft's powerplant and radar?
Nobody has any doubts that China will certainly attempt to reverse-engineer these technologies. If its engineers run into difficulties, then additional Su-35 orders are possible, as was the case with the Su-27SK/UBK in the 1990s. If they succeed, the Chinese Air Force will probably stop at the 24 original Russian aircraft, and the country's aerospace industry will build more fighters as required.
There is the danger of politics becoming the decisive factor in the decision-making process. The sharp worsening of relations with the West is prompting Russia to develop closer political ties with China, which means that political reasoning could prevail over long-term commercial goals and even considerations of military security.
====
Well!! Like the Hypothetical Contracts of China..China Russian Military alliance is Hypothetical..
@Ray, @roma, @pmaitra, @ladder, @hit&run, @Bangalorean, @cobra commando, @Free Karma, @NSG_Blackcats @sayareakd , @sgarg, @SajeevJino and all others.
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